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15726 results in ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute

Page 85 of 787

Asia's Transformation
  • From Economic Globalization to Regionalization
  • Joergen Oerstroem Moeller
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    17 December 2021
    Print publication:
    01 August 2021
  • Moeller's book The Veil of Circumstance, published in 2016, discussed the impact of technology, dehumanization and values on politics and economics. In this book, he takes the analysis one step further. The cocktail of capitalism, globalization and technology has turned toxic, causing disruptions and cracks in the global economy and societal structures. Economic globalization is being replaced by a mixture of globalization, regionalization and economic nationalism. Neither the United States nor China will in the mid-2030s possess the strength to be a global leader. Power will mainly rotate around a regional axis instead of globally. The existing political systems and institutions governing the global system see their primogeniture challenged. Social networks open the door to communication for literally everybody; while they link the world to a degree never seen before, they also divide people according to cultural norms and values. The large data companies possess enormous power that threatens both national governments and the global political and economic infrastructure.

Non-State Chinese Actors and Their Impact on Relations between China and Mainland Southeast Asia
  • Enze Han
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    17 December 2021
    Print publication:
    05 January 2020
  • International relations scholarship and the popular media tend to portray China as a great power with hegemonic designs for Southeast Asia. Moreover, studies on Chinese influence in Southeast Asia predominantly focus on the Chinese state. This paper argues that Chinese non-state actors and their daily encounters with local communities in Southeast Asia deserve equal attention as these interactions evidently produce friction at both the society-to-state and state-to-state level. The influence of Chinese non-state actors in Southeast Asia can be illustrated with three examples, namely, Chinese tourism operations in Thailand, Chinese market demand and agricultural transformations in Myanmar, and Chinese gangs within the casino economy in Cambodia. Thailand has recently become a top tourist destination for Chinese nationals. This has cultural implications as those involved in the tourism industry need to have Chinese language skills. The economic implications include increased competition and decreased accountability as Chinese tour companies have set up in Thailand using Thai locals as nominees. Bilateral relations also soured after a boat carrying Chinese tourists capsized in Thailand. As global prices of corn rose in 2011 and 2012, areas in Myanmar close to the Chinese border have increased corn cultivation to meet Chinese demands for that crop. This has led to deforestation in these areas. Chinese gangsters fleeing their government's crackdown in China have settled down to operate in the casino economy in Cambodia. Consequentially, there has been a rise in crime rate involving online scams and deteriorating public security. Despite the Chinese government encouraging the Cambodian government to enforce a ban on online gambling, the actions of non-state actors from China continue to be associated with the Chinese state as a whole and there is rising resentment towards the Chinese in Cambodia. The COVID-19 pandemic has temporarily halted cross-border trade between China and mainland Southeast Asia. This has negatively affected local farmers who are dependent on the Chinese market.

Why Did Bersatu Leave Pakatan Harapan?
  • Wan Saiful Wan Jan
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    17 December 2021
    Print publication:
    01 August 2021
  • The Pakatan Harapan (PH) coalition won Malaysia's 14th general election on 9 May 2018, the first time a regime change took place in the country. However, it lost its majority in late February 2020, when Parti Pribumi Bersatu Malaysia (BERSATU) left the coalition. The four parties in PH had very different ideologies, especially when it comes to issues of race and religion. But despite taking various steps to create a coalition agreement, the more fundamental differences were never reconciled during the coalition's time in power. PH won GE-14 with a relatively low level of support from the ethnic Malays, who perceived it to be a coalition dominated by the mainly Chinese DAP. Fearmongering about how PH and the DAP were a threat to Malay privileges further weakened PH while in government. Furthermore, BERSATU disliked the possibility that Parti Keadilan Rakyat (KEADILAN) president Anwar Ibrahim might succeed Mahathir Mohamad as prime minister. They did not trust Anwar to champion the Malay agenda if he became prime minister. BERSATU decided as early as in 2019 to explore leaving PH to form a new Malay-led government, and saw the departure as a necessary step for a better chance at winning GE15. This was a controversial decision and it created a major rift within BERSATU itself, with party chairman and then Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad refusing to accept the party's decision to leave PH. Following Mahathir's sudden resignation on 24 February 2020, BERSATU immediately announced their departure from PH. This led to a series of events that culminated in the collapse of PH and the formation a Perikatan Nasional government led by the three biggest Malay parties, UMNO, BERSATU and PAS. The whole episode shows that any coalition or political parties that wish to govern Malaysia must not ignore sentiments among the Malays, especially those in rural areas.

  • Public Perceptions of the Election Commission, Election Management and Democracy in Malaysia

  • Helen Ting Mu Hung, National University of Malaysia, Andrew Jia Yi Kam, National University of Malaysia
  • Book:
    Public Perceptions of the Election Commission, Election Management and Democracy in Malaysia
    Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Print publication:
    14 November 2021, pp 1-61

  • Summary

    INTRODUCTION

    A lot have been published on the subject of democracy in Malaysia, yet there are few comprehensive survey-based academic studies on how Malaysians view the state of democracy, and, even rarer, in relation to election management and the country’s Election Commission (EC). Welsh (1996) on political attitudes among Malaysians in 1994 was one such study and based on a survey of 400 respondents, while the study by Muhammad Fathi Yusof et al. (2015) on public perception towards the EC is based on a small survey of seven questions among 1,104 respondents in 2014/15. Periodic and systematic international surveys on democracy have been conducted by the Asian Barometer of Democracy surveys, and Malaysia has been included since 2007 during its Second Wave Asian Barometer Survey (ABS). Thus far, three working papers or report with a focus on Malaysia have been produced from the ABS (Welsh, Suffian and Aeria 2007; Welsh Suffian and Aeria 2008;Welsh 2014). Otherwise, outputs from ABS have been in the form of cross-country regional studies among several Asian countries which include Malaysia (Chang, Chu and Welsh 2013, Chu, Welsh and Chang 2013, Huang, Chu and Chang 2013; Ikeda 2013; Lu 2013; Mujani and Liddle 2013; Park 2013; Wang and Tan 2013; Chu and Welsh 2015; Kang and Lee 2018). While cross-country comparative studies are useful in contextualizing political perception in Malaysia within an international context, they do not provide a detailed understanding of Malaysians’ perceptions on the EC and other state institutions, the management of elections, and the state of democracy.

    This report is an analysis of the findings from a nationwide survey conducted with 2,627 respondents between March and April 2021. The objectives are to find out how Malaysian citizens evaluate the performance of the EC in managing elections, perceive the neutrality of the EC, and also how they perceive the state of democracy and of political authorities in the country. As the EC is one of the fundamental institutions in the operationalization of democracy, i.e., in conducting popular elections, public perception of its performance and function is best understood in the general context of the latter’s evaluation of the state of democracy and perception of the legitimacy of state institutions as a whole.

  • Foreword

  • Helen Ting Mu Hung, National University of Malaysia, Andrew Jia Yi Kam, National University of Malaysia
  • Book:
    Public Perceptions of the Election Commission, Election Management and Democracy in Malaysia
    Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Print publication:
    14 November 2021, pp v-vi

  • Summary

    The economic, political, strategic and cultural dynamism in Southeast Asia has gained added relevance in recent years with the spectacular rise of giant economies in East and South Asia. This has drawn greater attention to the region and to the enhanced role it now plays in international relations and global economics.

    The sustained effort made by Southeast Asian nations since 1967 towards a peaceful and gradual integration of their economies has had indubitable success, and perhaps as a consequence of this, most of these countries are undergoing deep political and social changes domestically and are constructing innovative solutions to meet new international challenges. Big Power tensions continue to be played out in the neighbourhood despite the tradition of neutrality exercised by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

    The Trends in Southeast Asia series acts as a platform for serious analyses by selected authors who are experts in their fields. It is aimed at encouraging policymakers and scholars to contemplate the diversity and dynamism of this exciting region.

    THE EDITORS

    Series Chairman:

    Choi Shing Kwok

    Series Editor:

    Ooi Kee Beng

    Editorial Committee:

    Daljit Singh

    Francis E. Hutchinson

    Norshahril Saat

  • Public Perceptions of the Election Commission, Election Management and Democracy in Malaysia

  • Helen Ting Mu Hung, National University of Malaysia, Andrew Jia Yi Kam, National University of Malaysia
  • Book:
    Public Perceptions of the Election Commission, Election Management and Democracy in Malaysia
    Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Print publication:
    14 November 2021, pp vii-viii

  • Summary

    EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

    • • This report presents findings from a nationwide face-to-face survey of 2,627 Malaysians between March and April 2021 regarding public perceptions on the Election Commission (EC) and on election management.

    • • Malaysians by and large hold a cautious, moderate affirmation of the state of democracy in Malaysia, and of it having made notable progress over the past decade.

    • • A quarter of respondents regard the 2018 general election to be very free or/and fair, while 43 per cent think that it was free/fair though not without problems. This perception appears to have been influenced by the fact that there was a change of federal government.

    • • Public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the election management process and the EC is weakly affirmative, as revealed by a majority expressing a lack of confidence in an eventual online voting system being handled transparently.

    • • Urban residents generally have greater distrust in state institutions.

    • • Some notable contrasts in regional trends:

      • – Sarawakians have a high level of trust in state institutions.

      • – Sabahans have the lowest appreciation for the progress made in the state of democracy in the country, the lowest satisfaction with civil liberty, or the lowest trust in state institutions except for the Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission (MACC) and the EC.

      • – West Malaysians have the lowest level of trust in the MACC and EC but express the highest level of appreciation for the progress that have made in the state of democracy.

The Military in Burma/Myanmar
  • On the Longevity of Tatmadaw Rule and Influence
  • David I. Steinberg
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    29 October 2021
    Print publication:
    12 May 2021
  • The Myanmar military has dominated that complex country for most of the period since independence in 1948. The fourth coup of 1 February 2021 was the latest by the military to control those aspects of society it deemed essential to its own interests, and its perception of state interests. The military's institutional power was variously maintained by rule by decree, through political parties it founded and controlled, and through constitutional provisions it wrote that could not be amended without its approval. This fourth coup seems a product of personal demands for power between Senior General Min Aung Hlaing and Aung San Suu Kyi, and the especially humiliating defeat of the military-backed party at the hands of the National League for Democracy in the November 2020 elections. The violent and bloody suppression of widespread demonstrations continues, compromise seems unlikely, and the previous diarchic governance will not return.

    Myanmar's political and economic future is endangered and suppression will only result in future outbreaks of political frustration.

Renewable Energy
  • Malaysia's Climate Change Solution or Placebo?
  • Serina Rahman
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    29 October 2021
    Print publication:
    14 July 2020
  • Malaysia pledged to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 45 per cent by 2030 in relation to its 2005 GDP figure. The sectors listed as the main focus of this effort included: energy, industrial processes, waste, agriculture, land use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF). Several initiatives under myriad governments have been launched to reduce Malaysia's climate change impacts; among those has been the emphasis on renewable energy (RE). Malaysia's current energy mix relies heavily on coal and natural gas. Long-entrenched subsidies on these energy sources, coupled with greatly depreciating prices make it difficult for new RE producers to enter the market and increase their market share. This is in spite of positive developments in RE infrastructure and reduced RE material costs. Solar, biogas, biomass and mini-hydro have been put forward as the RE sources with the most potential, but all have issues of consistency and reliability. Because small energy generators cannot guarantee infallible energy production, they may not be the most viable options for the long term. Their size also denies them the economies of scale that would reduce their costs. Instead, these higher costs may be transferred to the consumer. Other issues include the competition for land in the development of large-scale solar farms, including the possible loss of community farmlands and hence livelihoods, if not displacement. A push for biomass and biogas as a source of energy might also lead to increased oil palm production to meet the need for consistent supplies of oil palm waste. Biogas from municipal landfills is made even more challenging given that Malaysian municipal waste is not sorted at source. One possible solution is the use of hybrid RE in rural areas, comprising a mix of micro-hydro, solar and diesel-based energy generation as a back-up. However an immediate win is to ensure energy efficiency and public education to encourage emissions reduction and climate change impacts on the individual consumer.

The Making of Anwar Ibrahim's 'Humane Economy'
  • Khoo Boo Teik
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    29 October 2021
    Print publication:
    04 January 2021
  • Anwar Ibrahim, Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia, 1993-98, and Opposition Leader, 2008-15 and since March 2020, is associated with two lasting, seemingly contradictory images. Those were of the young Anwar as a radical Islamist for whom economics seemed not to matter, and as a pro-market reformer during the 1997 East Asian financial crisis for whom Islam no longer mattered.Yet there was economics in the young Anwar's Islam and, conversely, Islam in the mature man's economics. Between them lay certain 'moral ambivalences' that occupied Anwar during the pre-crisis period when economic growth, prosperity and ambitions were dogged by rent-seeking, corruption and institutional degradation. Anwar had expressed various thoughts on 'Islam and economics', notably when he was President of Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia (ABIM, or Malaysian Islamic Youth Movement), Minister of Finance (1991-98), and leader of the post-Reformasi opposition. His thoughts formed the core of a 'humane economy' that he envisioned and advocated upon his return to active politics from 2006 onwards.

    The vision of a 'humane economy' holds personal, ideological and political significance at a specific political juncture in Malaysian history.

Challenges in Tackling Extremism in the Indonesian Civil Service
  • A'an Suryana
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    29 October 2021
    Print publication:
    04 December 2020
  • In his second term (2019-24), President Joko Widodo remains committed in combating radicalism. Anti-radicalism measures such as the banning of radical organization Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), anti-radicalism policies at schools and universities and the deradicalization of terrorists have been expanded to include the Indonesian civil service that currently employs over 4.2 million people across the archipelago. In November 2019, a joint decree was signed by eleven government and state institutions to formalize the new anti-radicalism policy. This paper argues that some challenges arose during the process of implementing the policy including the lack of cooperation from Personnel Development Officers (PPK) in imposing disciplinary actions recommended by the task force.

    The spread of COVID-19 further impedes policy coordination and has hampered efforts to effectively implement the policy.

Indonesia's Ministry of Religious Affairs under Joko Widodo
  • Syafiq Hasyim, Norshahril Saat
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    29 October 2021
    Print publication:
    13 November 2020
  • Indonesia is the most populous Muslim country in the world, with 87.18 per cent of its 260 million population embracing the Islamic faith. However, Indonesia is neither an Islamic state nor a secular one. It adopts Pancasila as the state ideology but has a Ministry of Religious Affairs (MORA) overseeing six official religions.

    MORA has its genesis in Dutch colonial rule (1602-1942). It was strengthened during the Japanese occupation (1942-45) and then sustained by the post-independence Indonesia government (after 1945). The decision to keep MORA was to compensate those who had aspired for the enactment of the Jakarta Charter in the era of Sukarno but failed. MORA has always been the arena for contestation between the traditionalist Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and the modernist Muhammadiyah. Both organizations eye not only the minister post, or leadership positions in the bureaucracy, but also lower ranking positions.

    This article examines how MORA has been managed under President Joko Widodo (Jokowi) from 2014 till the present. It highlights similarities and differences in Jokowi's control of the influential ministry compared to his predecessors. In 2014, even though Jokowi was elected on a reform agenda, he left MORA untouched.

    After the 2019 election, Jokowi appointed Fachrul Razi, a retired general as Minister of Religious Affairs, departing from past practices of naming a religious scholar (ulama) or a religiously trained person (santri) to that position. This demonstrates a wish on the part of the President to shake up the ministry and to exert control over the institution. This decision, however, has alienated core supporters in NU who helped him get re-elected in 2019.

From Pakatan Harapan to Perikatan Nasional
  • A Missed Opportunity for Reforms for East Malaysia?
  • Anantha Raman Govindasamy
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    29 October 2021
    Print publication:
    23 July 2021
  • The Malaysia Agreement 1963 (MA63) brought together Peninsular Malaya with the East Malaysian states of Sabah and Sarawak. This Agreement afforded certain rights and obligations to these two states, notably in areas such as religion and language, financial autonomy, immigration, judicial autonomy, and finance and tax issues. However, since the signing of this foundational treaty, East Malaysians have become discontented. Key frustrations include a gradual erosion of the stipulated privileges by the federal government, persistent underdevelopment, as well as the perceived unequal distribution of petroleum revenue earned from these states.

    When Pakatan Harapan came to power in 2018, there were expectations from Sabah and Sarawak that the new administration would be committed to the restoration of East Malaysia's special position within the Malaysian Federation. In order to address long-standing tensions, Pakatan Harapan established a Special Cabinet Committee on MA63 to look for new ways of restoring East Malaysia's prerogatives. The Special Cabinet Committee managed to resolve seventeen out of twenty-one issues pertaining to the economy, finance and the judiciary. However, the most complex issues pertaining to the sharing of oil revenue were outstanding. One key outcome was that the Committee proposed a constitutional amendment to recognize Sabah, Sarawak and Peninsular Malaysia as equal partners in the Federation. However, the proposed amendment did not garner the necessary two-thirds majority in parliament. A bloc of parliamentarians allied with the Gabungan Parti Sarawak - a coalition of Sarawak-based parties formerly aligned with ousted national coalition Barisan Nasional-abstained from voting. Since the advent of the Perikatan Nasional administration, the broader issue of East Malaysian rights has received little attention.

    It is likely that, rather than seeking to address the fundamental tensions between the Peninsula and East Malaysia, the current administration will seek to offer targeted benefits to elites from the region.

Urban Transition in Hanoi
  • Huge Challenges Ahead
  • Danielle Labbé
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    29 October 2021
    Print publication:
    15 January 2020
  • Vietnam is in the midst of one of the world's most rapid and intensive rural-to-urban transitions. In Hanoi, heritage preservation has gained significant policy attention over the last decades, but efforts continue to focus on the Old Quarter and Colonial City to the exclusion of collective socialist housing complexes and former village areas, and natural features such as canals and urban lakes. Parks and public spaces are urgently needed to offset the high residential densities and to improve the quality of life of residents. Motor vehicles continue to fuel the growth in transportation. Significant efforts were recently made to establish a mass transit system, but progress there is slow. More attention should be paid to improving the existing transportation system and to reduce dependence on fossil fuels.

    Investments in new housing estates have fuelled a speculative real estate market but failed to address adequately the needs of the vulnerable segments of the population. Regional integration is a challenge as the city expands and swallows the peri-urban areas around the city.

The Belt and Road Initiative
  • Environmental Impacts in Southeast Asia
  • Alex M. Lechner, Chee Meng Tan, Angela Tritto, Alexander Horstmann, Hoong Chen Teo, John R. Owen, Ahimsa Campos-Arceiz
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    28 October 2021
    Print publication:
    01 August 2021
  • China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is expected to be the largest infrastructure development scheme of the twenty-first century. There is escalating concern over BRI's potential environmental impacts in Southeast Asia, a global biodiversity hotspot and a focus area of BRI development. Case studies of Indonesia, Myanmar, Lao PDR and Malaysia show that the success of BRI in bringing about sustainable growth and opportunities depends on the Chinese government and financiers, as well as the agencies and governments involved when BRI investments take place. The adoption of best environmental practices is critical in ensuring that growth is sustainable and that bad environmental practices are not locked in for decades to come.

The Free and Open Indo-Pacific Beyond 2020
  • Similarities and Differences between the Trump Administration and a Democrat White House
  • John Lee
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    28 October 2021
    Print publication:
    01 August 2021
  • American Indo-Pacific policy will be driven by its China policy, regardless of whether there is a second-term Donald Trump administration or a first-term Joe Biden administration. The Republicans will continue to frame the major challenge as 'balancing' against Chinese power and 'countering' the worst aspects of Beijing's policies. Establishment or moderate Democrats under Biden will choose the softer language of seeking a favourable 'competitive coexistence' in the military, economic, political and global governance realms, and the reassertion of American leadership and moral standing. In advancing the FOIP, the current administration argues that disruptiveness and unpredictability are necessary to reverse what they see as the 'normalization' of Chinese assertiveness, coercion and revisionism. They also point to the closeness of US cooperation with Japan, Australia and India and bourgeoning strategic relationships with Vietnam. A second-term Trump administration will continue to seek out 'fit-for-purpose' existing institutions and relationships, or prioritize new ones. Establishment Democrats believe that the 'America First' unilateralist approach is unsettling for allies and partners. In advancing a favourable 'competitive coexistence' with China, Democrats will seek to expand the tools of statecraft and achieve a better balance between military/economic/political/governance approaches.

    Prima facie, a Biden administration might position America as a more consultative guarantor of a preferred order. However, there will be greater pressure on Southeast Asians to accept more collective responsibility to advance common objectives. This means hedging in a manner more suitable to American rather than Chinese preferences. Failing that, more emphasis might be placed on greater institutionalization of the Quad and ad hoc groupings. A Bernie Sanders administration, now an unlikely prospect, would be a disaster for US standing and power in the region, and therefore for Southeast Asia.

Deepening the Understanding of Social Media's Impact in Southeast Asia
  • Ross Tapsell
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    28 October 2021
    Print publication:
    01 August 2021
  • Southeast Asia's Internet users are far more diverse than usually reported. They range from the urban youth with laptops and highspeed Wi-Fi, to the older generation semi-rural and rural users with affordable mobile phones for Facebook and WhatsApp. Southeast Asians generally trust social media platforms more than in Western societies. This trust in social media reflects a lack of trust in local mainstream media and official sources of information. What campaign information (and disinformation) is being spread and which ones are most successful are essential for understanding how voters in Southeast Asia use and trust social media. Social media platforms and Southeast Asia's 'app industry' need clearer and enforced regulation on their use of data and the extent to which they can sell data to advertisers. These advertisers include, but are not limited to, politicians and political parties. Since the future of social media usage will likely lie in closed groups, the role of big data analyses that have dominated research on social media over the past ten years, is likely to regress. Instead, ethnographic scholars who can access these groups and engage with their particular interests and identities are more likely to be useful in understanding the digital sphere in the future.

Will Pakatan Harapan's Hold on Selangor Continue?
  • Tricia Yeoh
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    28 October 2021
    Print publication:
    28 January 2021
  • When the Pakatan Harapan (PH) federal government fell in February 2020, PH also lost control over the states of Johor, Malacca, Perak and Kedah. In Sabah, PH-aligned Warisan was replaced by the PN-aligned United Alliance of Sabah. PH maintained its hold on three states-Selangor, Penang and Negeri Sembilan. Selangor's position is of unique interest, given the largest share of PH assemblypersons comprising members from the People's Justice Party (Parti Keadilan Rakyat, or PKR), the party which has faced significant elite splits in 2020. The present stability of PH's survival in Selangor can be accounted for by the sheer majority it possesses within the legislative assembly, comprising forty-one out of fifty-six state seats. Unless a significant share of assemblypersons were to defect, the change in state government would be highly unlikely. PH built a strong base in Selangor during its time in power over more than a decade, securing performative legitimacy and rooting itself strongly within the community. PH has benefited from the highly urbanized and educated demographic profile of Selangor. However, the economic fallout from the COVID-19 pandemic has likely changed the landscape, which may in turn affect how constituents will now respond to goodies offered by the federal government. Although PH in Selangor has survived the national storm, its future performance remains uncertain. This year's political realignment, public opinion towards PN and the 2018 redelineation exercise where the number of Malay-majority seats has grown may hamper PH's ability to maintain its strong margin. The political fragmentation that continues to unfold will see further party and coalitional realignment, which will invariably impact PH's strength in Selangor.

Page 85 of 787