Aspiring Southeast Asian religious teachers regard the Al-Azhar University as one of the best Islamic centres of learning in the world. Some of the current students posit that their parents encouraged them to pursue their education at the university. Some were inspired by their local teachers, who are also alumni of the university. Many young religious teachers I spoke to idolized the Al-Azhar University, and quite a number mentioned that it was their childhood dream to study there. Current Singapore Al-Azhar undergraduate, Abdul Malek, mentioned that the very first time he entered one of Al-Azhar's lecture halls, he recalled: “Oh! Syed Isa Semait used to sit here, and so did Dr Fatris Bakaram!”. Abdul Malek felt that his idols used to be students of the university, and many other Singapore Al-Azhar students will follow their trajectory and become religious scholars in Singapore. Others shared having some form of spiritual attachment to the university, claiming that “Al-Azhar is the land that gave birth to many prophets”. All these factors add up to the reasons why many Southeast Asian students, including those from Singapore madrasahs, aspire to study in Al-Azhar.

Al-Azhar has produced many ulama in the region, trained in theology, exegesis, jurisprudence, Hadith (narrations by the Prophet Muhammad) and morality from Al-Azhar. Despite graduating from the same institution, the religious outlook of Al-Azhar former students varies from one to another. There is no one “Al-Azhar school of thought” that graduates suggest. When asked what studying in the university entails, the graduates would say: Al-Azhar teaches moderate Islam or wasatiyyah. What the students hope to achieve at Al-Azhar may not necessarily be accomplished. As discussed in Chapter 3, upon returning to their country of origins, Al-Azhar graduates ventured into different fields; most came back as religious teachers, while others joined the bureaucracy, started their own businesses, and went into politics. For those who went into politics, they may even join opposing camps.

Would the political turmoil in the Middle East deter parents from sending their children to study in Al-Azhar University? Is Al-Azhar education suited for the modern world? Al-Azhar has been the centre for Islamic education in the world since its inception in the tenth century. The university has produced prominent ulama in the Malay world, and some made their mark as the countries’ Islamic intellectuals and thinkers. They have contributed in scholarship, led Islamic bureaucracy, and most importantly, became the voice of conscience to the community.

Prominent Al-Azhar graduates from Singapore include the former Mufti, Shaikh Syed Isa Semait and the current Mufti, Dr Muhammad Fatris Bakaram. Some of these Al-Azhar graduates ended up as judges in the Shariah court, but most of them serve in the local mosques and teach in local madrasahs. Al-Azhar remains the popular destination for Singapore religious studies students because of the closeness in terms of religious orientation between Singapore and Egypt, in which both communities largely follow the Shafie school of thought. Even though Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states offer Singapore students lucrative scholarships, and also close proximity to Islam's holiest sites in Mecca and Medina, Al-Azhar remains Singaporean Muslims’ top choice. The other popular destination for students would be Malaysia, but the universities in the country also modelled their curriculum after the Al-Azhar University.

Through my conversations with Al-Azhar graduates from different cohorts, I find that there is not much generational divide in terms of experience of students studying in Al-Azhar. Their style of learning continues to emphasize on memorizing, even though, increasingly, there has been more emphasis on critical thinking. Some students complain that they would learn more if they are given more assignments because that would bring them closer to reading materials, where they would have to source for books not assigned by their lecturers. This has been the practice in modern universities. Moreover, classes in the Al-Azhar University are not compulsory for the students, and they need to be motivated and disciplined in order to come to campus, even though the system has penalties for students who skip classes regularly: they will not be able to pass their exams well if they miss classes often, because they are not familiar with the issues raised in class.

This chapter presents a broad overview of the evolution of Vietnamese diplomacy from 1986 to the present. This thirty-year timeframe is divided into three parts. The first part highlights the seismic shifts in Vietnam's foreign policy after its adoption of Doi Moi in late 1986 until 1990. The second part assesses the implementation of Vietnam's foreign policy of “diversifying and multilateralizing” [đa dạng hóa, đa phương hóa] its external relations and becoming “a friend and reliable partner” [bạn bè và đối tác đáng tin cậy] to all countries during the period 1991–2005. The third part analyses Vietnam's proactive international integration, including the pursuit of strategic partnerships with the major powers and regional states, in the period 2006–16. This chapter concludes by noting that Vietnam has been able to make successful major strategic adjustments in its foreign policy to safeguard its sovereignty, national independence and territorial integrity over the past three decades.

Vietnam Joins the International Community, 1986–90

The year 1986 was a pivotal year in the evolution of Vietnam's domestic and foreign policy. Up until 1986, Vietnam had always regarded its relations with the Soviet Union and membership in the socialist camp as the cornerstone of its foreign policy.

Two major factors influenced Vietnam's decision to jettison outmoded Marxist–Leninist conceptions embodied in the “two world theory” that international relations were shaped and determined by the antagonistic contradictions between socialism and capitalism, or, more prosaically, as a struggle between friends and enemies and “who will triumph over whom” [ai thắng ai]. The first factor was Vietnam's mounting domestic socioeconomic crisis due to the breakdown of its Soviet-styled central planning system. The second factor was external and arose from the “new political thinking” emanating from the Soviet Union under the leadership of Mikhail Gorbachev (Palmujoki 1997; Thakur and Thayer 1987).

Due to the confluence of these domestic and external factors, Vietnam turned from a foreign policy structured by ideological considerations to a foreign policy framework that placed greater emphasis on national interest and pragmatic diplomacy. Vietnamese analysts now stressed global economic forces and the impact of the revolution in science and technology as key determinants of international relations (Cam 1995; Khoan 1995). Vietnam's changed worldview emerged gradually and nested with remnants of Leninist ideology.

Unlike most other major bilateral relationships in East Asia, the Vietnam–Japan ties are generally “problem-free”. Although their official relationship was only established in 1973, Vietnam and Japan have a long history of people-to-people connections which date back to the eighth century, when a Vietnamese Buddhist monk named Phat Triet carried out his missionary works in Japan. In the sixteenth century, Japanese merchants set up “Japanese towns” in Hoi An and Pho Hien in central and northern Vietnam, where bilateral trade flourished. As the first Asian country to successfully transform itself into a major power and avoid Western colonization, Japan served as a source of inspiration and a regional hub where Vietnamese patriots would come to learn how to liberate their country from French colonization and to revive their nation. A primary example was the Dong Du Movement led by Phan Boi Chau.1 Although the movement was short-lived due to the adverse historical context at the time, Phan Boi Chau's famous quote that “Vietnamese and Japanese peoples share the same culture, same racial roots, and same continent” [đông văn, đông chung, đông châu] still rightly describe the closeness between the two peoples and societies to date. Despite Japan's military occupation of Indochina during World War II, Vietnam–Japan relations do not carry a historical baggage. Instead, the reconciliation and rapprochement between Hanoi and Tokyo since the restoration of their ties in 1992 have resulted in one of the most fruitful relationships in East Asia.

In 2009, Vietnam and Japan established their “strategic partnership” framework. Due to domestic and external constraints, this strategic partnership has until recently been confined to the economic domain. However, the changing regional geopolitical landscape due to China's rise and its increasing assertiveness in territorial and maritime disputes, the ambiguity of U.S. commitment to Asia, and the lack of effective multilateral frameworks for conflict prevention and management in the region, has made it necessary for Vietnam and Japan to strengthen their strategic partnership as a hedge against economic, security, and strategic challenges of mutual concern. Cooperation in security and strategic realms has been strengthened since 2011, and in March 2014, Hanoi and Tokyo decided to elevate their ties to the level of an “Extensive Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity in Asia”.

The Al-Azhar University has significantly impacted Islamic education around the world. The university has been referred to as Qiblatul ‘ilm (The Centre of Knowledge) because it offers a wide range of Islamic studies disciplines besides the study of the Quran and Hadith. The university offers an-nahwu was sorf (Arabic syntax and morphology), Arabic language, mantiq (logic), aqidah (belief), fiqh (jurisprudence), and tassawuf (Sufism). Many Islamic universities or Islamic departments emulate Al-Azhar's curriculum. For example, the Faculty of Shariah of the University of Damascus in Syria follows the teaching methods of the Al-Azhar University. Similarly, universities in Sudan have their Islamic curriculum modelled after the Al-Azhar University. Graduates from Al-Azhar have also been invited to teach in Malaysian universities, particularly in the Islamic departments. These academics also helped kick-start these departments during their formative years (in the 1970s) in order to improve students’ Arabic standards (Abaza 1994, p. 70). Many of the teachers lecturing at the Akademi Islam — today known as Islamic Studies Academy (Akademi Pengajian Islam, or API) — of the University of Malaya are Al-Azhar graduates. Graduates from the Al-Azhar University have headed the Faculties of Shariah (Islamic Law) and Usuluddin (theology) in Malaysian universities.

HISTORY OF AL-AZHAR

The formation of the Al-Azhar University dated back to more than 1,000 years ago. It was formed during the Fatimid Caliphate (909– 1171), a Shia-leaning government, in 972. The Fatimid Caliphate upheld the Shiite Ismailiyya school of thought. The rulers claimed to be descendants of Prophet Muhammad's daughter, Fatimah. Interestingly, even though the rulers were Shias, Egypt was (and still is) a Sunni-majority country. When the Fatimids conquered Egypt, they did not oppress the Sunnis, and they were allowed to practise their beliefs freely (Dodge 1961, p. 10). Under the Fatimids, Jews, and Copts were also allowed to practise their faith without any oppression (Tignor 2010, p. 154). Al-Azhar was first constructed by a Fatimid general to serve as an “assembly mosque” for the masses. Al-Azhar was also a means to glorify the Caliphate, projecting its power and authority to its rival, mainly the Caliphs in Baghdad (modern-day Iraq) (Dodge 1961, pp. 1–2).

Since Vietnam launched its economic reforms under Doi Moi in 1986, foreign policy has been an essential tool for the ruling Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) to facilitate the implementation of its domestic agenda. As the CPV considers foreign policies as the extension of domestic ones, the Party has consistently sought to make use of external relations to enhance the country's national security and prosperity, and, ultimately, to strengthen the Party's rule. Understanding Vietnam's foreign policy is therefore necessary for one to fully appreciate the transformations that Vietnam has undergone since the adoption of Doi Moi.

This chapter serves as a background for readers to understand the making of Vietnam's contemporary foreign policy before examining its various aspects in subsequent chapters. The chapter first provides an overview of key drivers, objectives, principles, and actors involved in the making of Vietnam's foreign policy. It then assesses transformations in Vietnam's foreign policy under Doi Moi by examining major political and policy documents released by the CPV and how these changes have been translated into actual developments of the country's foreign relations. Finally, the chapter discusses several contemporary foreign policy challenges that Vietnam is facing before providing a summary of the book's structure.

The Making of Vietnam's Foreign Policy

Unlike democratic countries where government changes may lead to foreign policy shifts, Vietnam's foreign policy is fairly stable thanks to the continuity maintained under the country's one-party system. As “the force leading the state and society”, the CPV single-mindedly dictates Vietnam's foreign policy, and the country's foreign policy is therefore also the foreign policy of the Party. On the one hand, the stability and predictability in Vietnam's foreign policy lends it credibility, and thus the international community's confidence in its external commitments. On the other hand, the convergence of national interest with the CPV's interest in foreign policymaking renders it impossible to determine how much each weighs in the country's actual policies. In certain cases, the Party's ideological considerations and regime security concerns may interfere to dictate the country's foreign policy in ways that cannot be fully accounted for by national interests (see, for example, Co 2003; Hiep 2013a).

Bilateral ties between Hanoi and Delhi have been on the upswing in recent years with a focus on strategic cooperation and trade. While Vietnam sees India as a natural ally, India also treats Vietnam as one of its trusted and privileged partners. The strengthening of bilateral ties mainly results from changes in the two countries’ foreign policy agenda that aim to respond to shifts in the geostrategic landscape of the Indo-Pacific region.

The current chapter examines the drivers of the deepening partnership between India and Vietnam. It posits that the elevation of the India–Vietnam Strategic Partnership to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in September 2016 is a natural outcome of the increasing convergence of the two countries’ strategic interests and can contribute positively to the regional stability and prosperity.

The chapter starts with an introduction of India's foreign policy under the government of Prime Minister Narendra Modi, followed by a brief background of India–Vietnam relations. The chapter then analyses drivers of recent developments in bilateral ties and the various measures that both sides have taken to improve their relationship. Finally, the chapter concludes by assessing the implications of the deepening bilateral ties for the broader region.

India's Foreign Policy under Modi

As one of the fastest growing economies in an increasingly interdependent world, India has been pursuing an active international economic integration agenda, which has enabled the country to benefit from a wide range of economic engagements. At the same time, India's rising economic clout and diplomatic dynamism have uplifted its global status, bringing about remarkable transformations in the country's foreign policy. India now stands at a critical juncture, preparing itself to become a responsible stakeholder in the emerging global and regional economic and security architectures. The direction and key elements of Indian foreign policy are driven by both India's national interests and the political ideology of the party in power.