Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
  1. Home
  2. Publications
  3. Publishing partners
  4. ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute
  5. Content Listing

Refine listing

Refine listing

Access:
Content type:
Publication date:
Apply   From and To filters
Subject: Show more
Journals Show more
Publishers: Show more
Societies Show more
Series: Show more
Collections: Show more

Actions for selected content:

Select all | Deselect all
  • View selected items
  • Export citations
  • Download PDF (zip)
  • Save to Kindle
  • Save to Dropbox
  • Save to Google Drive

Save Search

You can save your searches here and later view and run them again in "My saved searches".

Please provide a title, maximum of 40 characters.
Cancel
×

15726 results in ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute

Page 173 of 787

  • U.S. Relations with Southeast Asia in 2018: more Continuity than Change

  • David Shambaugh
  • Book:
    U.S. Relations with Southeast Asia in 2018
    Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    25 August 2018
    Print publication:
    18 July 2018, pp 1-27

  • Summary

    INTRODUCTION

    A year and a half into the Trump presidency, Southeast Asian countries (like the rest of the world) are wrestling with understanding their region's place in his administration's priorities. If there is a consensus in the region, it is that under Trump the United States is returning to its long-standing approach of benign neglect — or what Joseph Chinyong Liow aptly terms “ambivalent engagement” in his excellent study of American relations with the region.

    While the Trump administration has certainly not prioritized Southeast Asia, neither has it intentionally downgraded the region. It simply seems to be returning to its traditional pattern of episodic diplomacy, whereby multi-month periods of no or little high-level interaction is followed by bursts of “parachute diplomacy” by U.S. officials who fly into the region, give reassuring speeches of America's continuing commitment and resolve, and then fly out. On some occasions the U.S. Government becomes proactive by inviting Southeast Asian heads of state and senior officials to the White House and Washington. But such surges of U.S. diplomacy are normally followed by many consecutive months of relative inattention — before the pattern repeats itself. One can thus understand and forgive Southeast Asian scepticism about the continuity and commitment of the United States to the region. This time around though, the residual doubts and questions about America's attention span and staying power is greater, and it is fuelled by three further factors: Trump's own unpredictability and capriciousness; China's rapidly rising role in the region; and the legacy of the Obama administration.

    The Trump Factor

    Trump has proven himself his administration's own worst enemy. An aggressive early morning tweet or denigrating comments made about a foreign leader, combined with the President's clear disdain for multilateralism, unappreciation of the importance of alliances, barely disguised racial and religious prejudices, and his simplistic mercantilist view of international commerce all have the potential to do real damage to U.S.–Southeast Asian relations. Trump's anti-immigration policies and targeting of Muslim immigrants in particular go down very badly in Brunei, Indonesia and Malaysia — and his abrupt withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) sent irreparable shock waves throughout the region.

  • 2 - Southeast Asia: From Trust Deficit to Strategic Trust

  • Marty Natalegawa
  • Book:
    Does ASEAN Matter?
    Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    08 June 2019
    Print publication:
    16 July 2018, pp 14-69

  • Summary

    Southeast Asia has been a region transformed.

    In 1967 the region was afflicted with wars and conflicts; tensions and instability; poverty and underdevelopment. Five decades since, while tensions and instability still permeate, and the battle against the scourge of poverty is yet to be completely won, the region is largely free from war and has made economic strides that are the envy of much of the world.

    Anchoring these developments has been a fundamental transformation in the nature and dynamics of relations among the countries of the region — the transformation of “trust deficit” to “strategic trust”.

    What have been some of the conditions conducive for such transformation? What has made this transformation possible? Are such conditions likely to persist over the next fifty years? Indeed, even if they do continue to exist, are such conditions still of relevance in the face of possible new types of challenges in the next fifty years? Will ASEAN's current strengths still be of relevance in the world of tomorrow? Of equal interest, has ASEAN simply been the manifestation, the embodiment and beneficiary of the positive transformation of Southeast Asia, or has ASEAN actually facilitated and made such transformation possible? Has ASEAN been a passive bystander or a determinant of the region's dynamics? Or, indeed, has it been both — ASEAN as peace dividend and facilitator for peace? In other words, while the birth of ASEAN itself was made possible due to initial and fragile dynamics towards positive change, ASEAN in turn helped to consolidate, nurture and accelerate these emerging positive dynamics. ASEAN helped turn what was probable to possible, and what was possible into reality.

    There is little doubt, however, that the fifty years of ASEAN's existence coincided with some of the most fundamental transformations in Southeast Asia's milieu — the conversion of trust deficit to strategic trust, and the conversion of a culture of war to a culture of peace.

    Prior to 1967, Southeast Asia had been a region marked by deep tensions, distrust and, indeed, open conflict. Prior to Western colonial rule, relations among the kingdoms and entities then existent in Southeast Asia were not entirely devoid of conflict. Such conditions, the divisions inherent in Southeast Asia and the complex diversities prevalent, provided optimum settings for their exploitation that enabled Western colonial rule to take hold.

  • Appendix 3 - Statement of Asean Foreign Ministers on Asean's Six-Point Principles on the South China Sea

  • Marty Natalegawa
  • Book:
    Does ASEAN Matter?
    Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    08 June 2019
    Print publication:
    16 July 2018, pp 239-240

  • Summary

    ASEAN Foreign Ministers reiterate and reaffirm the commitment of ASEAN Member States to:

  • the full implementation of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (2002);

  • the Guidelines for the Implementation of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (2011);

  • the early conclusion of a Regional Code of Conduct in the South China Sea;

  • the full respect of the universally recognized principles of International Law, including the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS);

  • the continued exercise of self-restraint and non-use of force by all parties; and

  • the peaceful resolution of disputes, in accordance with universally recognized principles of International Law, including the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).

    • The ASEAN Foreign Ministers resolve to intensify ASEAN consultations in the advancement of the above principles, consistent with the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (1976) and the ASEAN Charter (2008).

  • 5 - ASEAN: Wither or Prosper?

  • Marty Natalegawa
  • Book:
    Does ASEAN Matter?
    Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    08 June 2019
    Print publication:
    16 July 2018, pp 228-235

  • Summary

    Has ASEAN mattered? Without hesitation, I can say, absolutely. Without ASEAN the past five decades could have been witness to an entirely different experience for the countries of Southeast Asia.

    It would not have been too far-fetched to imagine the countries of Southeast Asia continuing to be enveloped by a deep sense of distrust and animosity, providing fuel for and sustaining the latent sources of conflict between them. It would not have been improbable for the countries of Southeast Asia to continue to be sharply divided along the interests of the extra-regional major powers — remaining as pawns in the proxy rivalries of non–Southeast Asian states. Indeed, Southeast Asia could have suffered the same fate as other regions afflicted by incessant conflict; namely, of economic regression and malaise, as well as the extensive neglect of human rights, good governance and democracy.

    While ASEAN's record over the past fifty years has not been without blemish, and there have been critical moments in the region's evolution when ASEAN has been felt to be “absent” — divided even — there is little doubt that ASEAN has made a difference; it has mattered. However, to remain of consequence over the next five decades, clearly a business-as-usual approach by ASEAN will not suffice.

    In the preceding chapters I have sought to make the case for ASEAN to recognize some of its likely future challenges and opportunities and, more importantly, to ensure that it is suitably equipped to manage and address these challenges, and to seize such opportunities. In my view — given, on the one hand, ASEAN's significant past achievements and, on the other, the constantly changing national, regional and global milieu — it is critical that ASEAN consolidates and secures aspects of its cooperation that have worked, adapt and adjust where necessary, and create and innovate where new forms of challenge and opportunities beckon.

    In other words, ASEAN must find equilibrium between the need for change and continuity. In a world marked by a dizzying pace of change, an ASEAN that relies simply on its past achievements would run the risk of irrelevance. Conversely, an ASEAN overly driven to change for the sake of change — to reinvent the wheel, so to speak — may find itself not necessarily strengthened as a result.

  • 4 - From State-centric to People-centred ASEAN

  • Marty Natalegawa
  • Book:
    Does ASEAN Matter?
    Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    08 June 2019
    Print publication:
    16 July 2018, pp 164-227

  • Summary

    ASEAN's transformative impact can be recognized in how it changed the dynamics of the region (chapter 2) by securing strategic trust among Southeast Asian countries that was previously absent, and by altering the dynamics of its relations with the rest of the world (chapter 3), asserting the centrality previously denied it. But the previous fifty years have also been significant in witnessing the promotion of the so-called “people-centred” ASEAN. The 1967 Bangkok Declaration and the 2007 ASEAN Charter, for instance, are a study in contrasts — reflecting ASEAN's evolution hitherto unforeseen. While the Bangkok Declaration made scant reference to “peoples”, it is a constantly recurring theme in the latter. Indeed, in marked contrast to the Bangkok Declaration, the 2007 ASEAN Charter begins: “WE THE PEOPLES of the Member States of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)…”.

    Today, promoting a “people-centred” and “people-oriented” ASEAN has become as much a part of ASEAN lexicon as the so-called “ASEAN way” in describing intra-ASEAN relations and “ASEAN centrality” in depicting ASEAN's role in the wider region. A people-centred ASEAN may be viewed as a “process” and outcome. The former refers to the engagement of non-state stakeholders in determining policy priorities, policymaking and policy implementation; in other words, the development of peoples’ sense of participation in and ownership of ASEAN affairs. The latter, as an “outcome”, refers to the extent to which ASEAN has had an impact on its peoples at large. In short, is ASEAN making a difference in areas that matter to its peoples?

    People-centred ASEAN: It's Always the Economy

    Without doubt one of the clearest illustrations of ASEAN's transformative impact — its positive impact on the peoples of Southeast Asia at large — has been in the economic domain. The Southeast Asia of 1967 bears little resemblance to the one that prevails today — fifty years after ASEAN's inception.

    Some key indicators illustrate the magnitude of the transformation. ASEAN's combined estimated GDP (US$ at current prices) in 2016 stood at US$2.55 trillion (sixth largest in the world, or third in Asia, if it were a single economy), four times the level in 1999 when ASEAN 10 was achieved (US$ 576,519 billion) and in sharp contrast to the level in 1967 at US$22,542 billion. Meanwhile, its combined GDP per capita in 2016 stood at US$4,021, in contrast to figures in 1999 and 1967 of US$1,135 and US$122, respectively.

  • 3 - ASEAN and the Region: From Cold War Pawn to ASEAN Centrality

  • Marty Natalegawa
  • Book:
    Does ASEAN Matter?
    Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    08 June 2019
    Print publication:
    16 July 2018, pp 70-163

  • Summary

    The transformative impact of ASEAN to intra–Southeast Asia relations over the past fifty years has been matched by ASEAN's contribution to altering the dynamics of Southeast Asian countries’ relations with countries beyond the region. Concurrent with, a sine qua non perhaps, the changing dynamics in intra–Southeast Asia relations, relations between Southeast Asian countries and countries outside the region have also been fundamentally transformed.

    If the period prior to ASEAN was marked by a Southeast Asia sharply divided along Cold War lines — of individual Southeast Asian countries essentially succumbing to East–West rivalries — then fifty years of ASEAN saw those very same countries playing a central role in framing the region's affairs. Indeed, five decades of ASEAN have seen the setting of norms and principles on the nature of major powers’ engagement in the region; of an ASEAN being in the “driving seat” in shaping the region's political, diplomatic and economic architecture. The terms ASEAN centrality and ASEAN in the driving seat have become deeply ingrained in the region's lexicon. As a matter of fact, over different periods during the past fifty years, ASEAN-led forums and processes have often provided the only venues for certain competing non-ASEAN powers to gather. This has certainly been the case as far as China, Japan and the Republic of Korea are concerned (in the ASEAN context, the so-called “Plus Three” countries).

    Such a transformation did not occur overnight. And, as far as Indonesia is concerned, did not occur fortuitously. Instead, it has been the culmination of a continued and deliberate process — it has been policy outcomes.

    As argued above, prior to ASEAN 10, the countries of Southeast Asia were divided as much due to their varied political systems and histories as their diverse foreign policy orientations. These ranged from countries actively aligned with the “West” or the “East” to those pursuing a stance of active “nonalignment” — indeed, essentially, of isolation. In fact it was precisely such a diverse array of foreign policy orientations that made Southeast Asia such fertile ground for East–West proxy conflict for much of the Cold War.

  • Introduction

  • Marty Natalegawa
  • Book:
    Does ASEAN Matter?
    Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    08 June 2019
    Print publication:
    16 July 2018, pp 1-5

  • Summary

    Does ASEAN Matter?

    The world that greeted the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) upon its formation in 19671 differs sharply from the one that prevails today — fifty years after ASEAN's inception. And, more likely than not, the world in the next fifty years will bear little resemblance to the one which is current.

    Indeed, for the future, as it is sometimes said, the only certainty is uncertainty itself. Change is permanent.

    This book is about the present and future relevance of ASEAN. It is about ASEAN's quest for security and prosperity in a region marked by complex dynamics of power. Namely, the interplay of relations and interests among countries — large and small — which provide the settings within which ASEAN must deliver on its much-cited leadership and centrality in the region.

    How can ASEAN build upon its past contributions to the peace, security and prosperity of Southeast Asia, to the wider East Asia, the Asia-Pacific and the Indo-Pacific regions? More fundamentally, and a sine qua non, how can ASEAN continue to ensure that peace, security and prosperity prevail in its own region: Southeast Asia? And, equally central, how can ASEAN become more relevant to the peoples of ASEAN, such that its contributions can be genuinely felt in making better the lives of its citizens?

    Will ASEAN Continue to be Relevant in Facing Future Challenges and Opportunities?

    The milieu within which ASEAN finds itself as it commemorates fifty years of its existence is certainly a radically complex one, marked by at least two overriding qualities: connectivity and change.

    More than ever, ASEAN confronts an interconnected world in which the delineation between local, national, regional and global issues is increasingly blurred. It is facing a milieu in which economic, political and social issues increasingly converge. It is navigating a world in which the indivisibility of peace, security and prosperity holds a greater truth than ever.

    Yet, recent developments suggest that the apparent reality of an interconnected world does not necessarily translate into a world with a greater sense of unity of purpose and cohesion. While the past fifty years have witnessed a tremendous proliferation of formal interstate institutions and organizations, regional and global alike, all committed to manage, facilitate and, even, promote global and regional cooperation, signs of unrest and dissatisfaction currently abound.

  • Appendix 1 - Guidelines for the Implementation of the DOC

  • Marty Natalegawa
  • Book:
    Does ASEAN Matter?
    Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    08 June 2019
    Print publication:
    16 July 2018, pp 236-236

  • Summary

    Reaffirming that the DOC is a milestone document signed between the ASEAN Member States and China, embodying their collective commitment to promoting peace, stability and mutual trust and to ensuring the peaceful resolution of disputes in the South China Sea;

    Recognizing also that the full and effective implementation of the DOC will contribute to the deepening of the ASEAN-China Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity;

    These Guidelines are to guide the implementation of possible joint cooperative activities, measures and projects as provided for in the DOC.

  • The implementation of the DOC should be carried out in a step-by-step approach in line with the provisions of the DOC.

  • The Parties to the DOC will continue to promote dialogue and consultations in accordance with the spirit of the DOC.

  • The implementation of activities or projects as provided for in the DOC should be clearly identified.

  • The participation in the activities or projects should be carried out on a voluntary basis.

  • Initial activities to be undertaken under the ambit of the DOC should be confidence-building measures.

  • The decision to implement concrete measures or activities of the DOC should be based on consensus among parties concerned, and lead to the eventual realization of a Code of Conduct.

  • In the implementation of the agreed projects under the DOC, the services of the Experts and Eminent Persons, if deemed necessary, will be sought to provide specific inputs on the projects concerned.

  • Progress of the implementation of the agreed activities and projects under the DOC shall be reported annually to the ASEAN-China Ministerial Meeting (PMC).

  • Appendix 2 - Declaration of the East Asia Summit on the Principles for Mutually Beneficial Relations

  • Marty Natalegawa
  • Book:
    Does ASEAN Matter?
    Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    08 June 2019
    Print publication:
    16 July 2018, pp 237-238

  • Summary

    WE, the Heads of State/Government of the Member States of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Australia, the People's Republic of China, the Republic of India, Japan, the Republic of Korea, New Zealand, the Russian Federation, and the United States of America on the occasion of the Sixth East Asia Summit.

    REITERATING our commitment to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia and other recognized principles of international law.

    RECALLING the 2005 Kuala Lumpur Declaration on the East Asia Summit and reaffirming its importance in setting the broad vision, principles, objectives and modalities of the East Asia Summit (EAS).

    RECALLING ALSO our commitment in the 2010 Ha Noi Declaration on the Commemoration of the Fifth Anniversary of the East Asia Summit to redouble efforts to move progress and cooperation in priority areas of the EAS and other wider regional economic integration efforts including studies on East Asia Free Trade Area (EAFTA) and Comprehensive Economic Partnership for East Asia (CEPEA).

    UNDERLINING our common vision of the EAS as a Leaders-led forum for dialogue on broad strategic, political and economic issues of common interest and concern with the aim of promoting peace, stability, and economic prosperity in East Asia.

    DESIROUS of consolidating and strengthening the EAS on the basis of its established principles, objectives and modalities.

    REAFFIRMING ASEAN as the driving force in the EAS, working in close partnership with the other participants of the EAS.

    REITERATING ALSO that the EAS is an integral part of the evolving regional architecture which includes other mutually-reinforcing processes such as ASEAN+1, ASEAN+3, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), and the ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting Plus (ADMM+).

    WELCOMING the participation of the Russian Federation and the United States of America at the East Asia Summit.

    RECOGNIZING that the international law of the sea contains crucial norms that contribute to the maintenance of peace and stability in the region.

    DESIROUS ALSO of creating a peaceful environment for further enhancing cooperation and strengthening the existing bonds of friendship among our countries in keeping with the principles of equality, partnership, consultation, and mutual respect thereby contributing to peace and stability, and prosperity in the region and the world at large.

  • 1 - Statecraft and Diplomacy in a World Transformed: 1967–2017

  • Marty Natalegawa
  • Book:
    Does ASEAN Matter?
    Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    08 June 2019
    Print publication:
    16 July 2018, pp 6-13

  • Summary

    Of various historical epochs, the fifty-year span between 1967 and 2017 is as much a study in contrast and change as any other fivedecade period that preceded it. The period saw the world's population more than doubling: from some 3.5 billion people in 1967 to some 7.5 billion in 2017. ASEAN's population alone, from ASEAN-5 to ASEAN-10, increased from 185 million in 1967 to 634 million in 2016. It witnessed the growth of the world's GDP from US$2.253 trillion in 1967 to US$74.152 trillion in 2015. Not least, it heralded the birth of significant numbers of new sovereign states, due primarily to the demise of colonial rule in much of Asia and Africa and, in the later years, the collapse of the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. In 1967 the United Nations had a membership of 123 states, while in 2017 the number stood at 193.

    However, such figures do not tell the entire story. In order to better comprehend the situation, an appreciation of the underlying dynamics is essential.

    Thus, the aggregate world population figure does not reveal the fact that the Indo-Pacific, that wide geographic expanse which encompasses the countries of the Asia-Pacific and the Indian Ocean, continues to constitute the bulk of the world's population, with no less than six out of ten of the most-populated countries in the world to be found among them. It also conceals the fact that the last fifty years saw the marked ageing of populations in some countries, while others, notably in significant parts of Southeast Asia, have been the beneficiaries of demographic dividends. Thus, within ASEAN, the labour force increased from some 115 million people in 1984 to approximately 327 million people in 2016.

    Further, while the period witnessed a tremendous spurt in the number of independent sovereign states, the full impact and potential of such a development has been constrained by a lack of corresponding reform in the institutions of global governance to better reflect these changing global realities.

    Thus, for example, the United Nations Security Council last underwent reform in its membership in 1961; increasing the number of the elected, non-permanent members from six to ten.

  • Developing Eastern Johor: The Pengerang Integrated Petroleum Complex

  • Serina Rahman
  • Book:
    Developing Eastern Johor
    Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    25 August 2018
    Print publication:
    10 July 2018, pp 1-42

  • Summary

    Introduction

    Johor has had the fastest growing state economy in all of Malaysia since 2011. With lofty goals of becoming the next Shenzhen, the peninsula's southernmost state now seems poised to become the country's second largest state economy within the next few years. Johor is already the country's busiest transshipment hub, benefiting from its position along some of the world's most important maritime routes. Its diversified economy has manufacturing and services as its main strengths.

    While Johor has vast land banks, development has mostly been on its western and southern coasts. Much of its industrial areas remain within the Greater Johor Bahru area. Areas to the east of the Johor River are not part of the Iskandar Development Region, and while Mersing in the upper reaches of eastern Johor is meant to benefit from the Eastern Economic Corridor, “progress” there has been minimal.

    The arrival of the Pengerang Integrated Petroleum Complex (PIPC) on the east coast is said to have been the game changer for the eastern shores of Johor. The transformation of the wider Pengerang region from five fishing villages and adjacent smallholder farmlands to the bristling metallic towers of the petrochemical refinery, innumerable white domed storage chambers and barren red landscapes waiting to be built upon is both startling and extraordinary.

    This paper looks into the details of the PIPC and examines the components that make up the complex and adjacent auxiliary projects. The sections will discuss the significance of the PIPC in light of regional oil and gas facilities and the value that it brings to Malaysia. The paper will then consider both the need and the success of the project as a catalyst for development in east Johor, as well as its impact on the local community and the environment.

    BACKGROUND TO THE PIPC

    The PIPC began in 2011 as the Refinery and Petrochemical Integrated Development (RAPID) project in response to the realization that gas resources in Peninsular Malaysia were finite, limiting the growth of the gas-based petrochemical industry. It was thus decided that it would be financially sustainable to enhance Petronas’ petrochemical portfolio through an integrated refinery and petrochemical complex enabling Malaysia to move into downstream production of premium differentiated petrochemicals. In 2012, then Prime Minister Najib Abdul Razak declared the Pengerang Integrated Complex, comprising RAPID and its associated facilities, to be a “National Project of Strategic Importance”.

  • Foreword

  • Mulya Amri, Faizal Rianto
  • Book:
    State Formation in Riau Islands Province
    Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    25 August 2018
    Print publication:
    10 July 2018, pp v-vi

  • Summary

    The economic, political, strategic and cultural dynamism in Southeast Asia has gained added relevance in recent years with the spectacular rise of giant economies in East and South Asia. This has drawn greater attention to the region and to the enhanced role it now plays in international relations and global economics.

    The sustained effort made by Southeast Asian nations since 1967 towards a peaceful and gradual integration of their economies has had indubitable success, and perhaps as a consequence of this, most of these countries are undergoing deep political and social changes domestically and are constructing innovative solutions to meet new international challenges. Big Power tensions continue to be played out in the neighbourhood despite the tradition of neutrality exercised by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

    The Trends in Southeast Asia series acts as a platform for serious analyses by selected authors who are experts in their fields. It is aimed at encouraging policymakers and scholars to contemplate the diversity and dynamism of this exciting region.

Page 173 of 787