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15726 results in ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute

Page 151 of 787

Catharsis
  • A Second Chance for Democracy in Malaysia
  • Kee Beng Ooi
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    12 February 2019
    Print publication:
    03 September 2018
  • Malaysia pulled itself back from the brink on 9 May 2018. That day the majority of its voting population decided to topple the Barisan Nasional government that had been in power for over 60 years and that had come to be seen as corrupt beyond redemption, and incompetent to boot. Lined up against the unpopular administration of Najib Razak was a coalition led by former strongman Tun Dr Mahathir Mohamad, who at the age of 92 had decided to return to Malaysian politics to stop the rot which many believed had begun during his earlier period in power, in 1981-2003. As the oldest prime minister in world history, he is now setting about creating structure that he believes will lead to a Malaysia that will achieve the Vision 2020 that he first propounded in 1991. This vision dovetails with the ideals of the highly influential Reformasi Movement which was ignited by the sacking of his deputy, Anwar Ibrahim, in 1998. This compilation of insightful analyses is Ooi Kee Beng's seventh, and discusses key events from the last five years leading up to 9 May 2018 and beyond. These seven books together cover the strange period we may come to know as the Inter-Mahathir Era, and the present volume discusses some of the challenges facing the new government, and the Malaysian population in general, now that the Barisan Nasional has imploded.

Electoral Dynamics in Sarawak
  • Contesting Developmentalism and Rights
  • Edited by Meredith Weiss, Arnold Puyok
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    12 February 2019
    Print publication:
    11 January 2017
  • Based upon observation of the 2016 Sarawak state elections at a time of political turmoil for the ruling Barisan Nasional coalition, Electoral Dynamics in Sarawak offers four ethnographic accounts of grassroots electoral politics in diverse constituencies of Sarawak. Covering Ba' Kelalan, the rural stronghold of Sarawak Parti Keadilan Rakyat (People's Justice Party) leader Baru Bian; Tupong, the urban Malay-majority stronghold of the PBB; Stakan, a mixed constituency in which postal votes proved decisive; and Repok and Meradong, rural Chinese majority constituencies caught between the Sarawak United People's Party and the Democratic Action Party, this volume exposes the diversity and complexity of Sarawak's electoral geography. Central to the analyses in this volume are not only the role of ethnicity and the urban/rural divide but also the longer term impact of the politics of developmentalism, the personality politics surrounding Chief Minister Adenan Satem and the emerging force of Sarawakian states' rights enshrined in the Sarawak for Sarawakians (S4S) social movement. Part of a comparative study of electoral dynamics across Southeast Asia, Electoral Dynamics in Sarawak seeks both to analyse the wider lessons to be learned from the 2016 Sarawak state elections as well as to deepen our knowledge and understanding of a state which is likely to play an especially important role in the political future of Malaysia.

Indonesia and China's Belt and Road Initiatives
  • Perspectives, Issues and Prospects
  • Siwage Dharma Negara, Leo Suryadinata
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    12 February 2019
    Print publication:
    18 June 2018
  • For Indonesia, which is keen to accelerate its infrastructure development, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is seen as an opportunity to tap into China's huge financial resources and technological capability. There has however been no concrete BRI project agreed to between China and Indonesia so far. While China considers all projects, including infrastructure projects and economic interactions as part of BRI, Indonesia only considers those infrastructure projects initiated during the Xi Jinping period as BRI projects. Indonesia has offered several broad areas for cooperation under the BRI framework and carefully selected project locations to minimize political risk for the Joko Widodo government. But no agreements have been signed yet as China requires detailed project proposals from Indonesia, which it has apparently not received. What appears to hamper progress are four key issues: the perception of China's economic domination, the ethnic Chinese issue, the Natuna issue, and the mainland Chinese workers issue.

Pancasila and the Challenge of Political Islam
  • Past and Present
  • Leo Suryadinata
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    12 February 2019
    Print publication:
    26 June 2018
  • Islam has become an important symbol in post-Suharto Indonesia, and political figures or parties feel they cannot afford to be seen to be against the religion or be considered unfriendly to it. Islamism emerges to challenge Pancasila (or cultural pluralism) again. Islamists already challenged Pancasila soon after Indonesian independence. But during that initial era under Sukarno, this challenge was already under control. Under Suharto, Pancasila as an ideology was effectively used to govern Indonesia, and political Islam was suppressed. However, Suharto began to co-opt Islamic political leaders during the last decade of his rule. Religious Islam grew significantly during the Suharto era and would gradually transform itself into political Islam after Suharto's fall. Nevertheless, the electoral strength of 'Islamic political parties' remained relatively low. But since then, Islam has been used as an effective tool to undermine political rivals. The pluralists who are now in power continue to promote Pancasila, and combining with moderate Islamic organizations and through laws and regulations, have tried to hinder the further development of Islamist organizations. The future of Pancasila depends on whether the Indonesian government and other pluralist forces are able to control the Islamists and provide political stability and economic development in the country.

Accidental and Intentional Exporters
  • Comparing Indonesian and Malaysian MSMEs
  • Siew Yean Tham, Tulus Tambunan
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    12 February 2019
    Print publication:
    06 March 2018
  • Regardless of the size of the domestic economy, there are ample reasons for firms to extend their markets beyond home shores. These include increasing sales, improving profits, diversifying risks, reaping economies of scale, matching the moves of competitors, enhancing competitiveness or accessing government incentives. Both Indonesia and Malaysia seek to enhance the competitiveness of their micro, small and medium enterprises (MSMEs) by including internationalization goals in their respective national development plans for these enterprises. Findings from fourteen case studies in the two countries indicate that exporting may be a serendipitous discovery, as few of these cases were born global in intent. Shifting to intentional exporting will require entrepreneurs to tap into government and/or private networks and thus connect with international buyers. Indonesian MSMEs are more inclined to depend more on government than private networks as they perceive the former to be more credible. Malaysian cases indicate some firms prefer private to government networks. This is attributed to the differences in the political economy of the two countries. Going forward, both countries need to consolidate their government-run programmes and reduce the fiscal burden. MSMEs should tap more into private networks to bridge the information gap that hinders their access to external markets. ASEAN can facilitate the entry of MSMEs into the ASEAN market by implementing resolutely current plans to reduce technical barriers to trade.

Living on the Edge
  • Being Malay (and Bugis) in the Riau Islands
  • Andrew M. Carruthers
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    12 February 2019
    Print publication:
    27 June 2018
  • In Indonesia's Riau Islands Province - a place envisioned as a distinctly 'Malay Province' upon its legal formation in 2002 - ethnic Malays are the proud heirs and custodians of a rich legacy associated with a once-sprawling Malay empire that stretched across present-day transnational borders from Indonesia, to Singapore, to Malaysia. Malays of Bugis descent have long played a disproportionately central role in the history (and the historiography or 'history-telling') of the region that now encompasses Indonesia's Riau Islands Province. While steadfastly 'Malay', members of this community readily acknowledge that their ethnically Bugis roots maintain an enduring historical and ideological salience in their everyday lives. However, transregional economic trends and rapid sociodemographic shift shaped by ongoing migration flows have led to feelings of 'marginalization' (peminggiran) among the islands' Malay-Bugis community. This has led them to claim that they are being gradually pushed to the literal and figurative 'edges' of social life in the Riau Islands Province. Fears that a one-time ethnic 'majority is becoming a minority' (mayoritas menjadi minoritas) have fuelled feelings of inter-ethnic resentment, and have shaped provincial government policies geared toward the 'preservation' of Malay custom. While international focus continues to centre on Indonesia's Chinese-pribumi divide as diagnostic of Indonesian inter-ethnic and religious relations on edge, a grounded assessment of ethnicity in the Riau islands offers an alternative perspective on these important issues.

Reconciling Economic and Environmental Imperatives in Batam
  • Poh Onn Lee
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    12 February 2019
    Print publication:
    06 March 2018
  • Batam's economic transformation has been accompanied by a marked degradation of its natural environment. Enforcement to protect the environment has often been inadequate on many fronts, exacerbated by population increases. Though regulations exist for the provision of public amenities like wastewater and sewerage treatment, existing facilities are run-down and ill-equipped to cope with the present demands. The capacity of reservoirs to meet the present demand for water is also strained because of the large population base, with illegal intrusion and squatters further threatening supplies. Economic and environmental imperatives can be reconciled if more emphasis and resources are put into enforcing regulations and protecting the environment.

Parti Pribumi Bersatu Malaysia in Johor
  • New Party, Big Responsibility
  • Wan Saiful Wan Jan
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    12 February 2019
    Print publication:
    16 January 2018
  • Parti Pribumi Bersatu Malaysia (PPBM) was officially launched on 14 January 2017, led by prominent personalities including former Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad, former Deputy Prime Minister Muhyiddin Yassin, and former Kedah Chief Minister Mukhriz Mahathir. Upon establishment, the party immediately announced that they are aiming to win the southern state of Johor in the upcoming general election. Historically, UMNO splinter parties have never been able to threaten UMNO in this state. Since independence, Johor has always been seen as an UMNO bastion. PPBM has moved quickly to establish themselves in all parliamentary and state constituencies in Johor, however, and it has been rather successful in attracting support from those aged below 35. Their key challenge remains the rural and female voters. Identity politics is a major hurdle for PPBM. The presence of the Democratic Action Party (DAP) in the Pakatan Harapan coalition - of which PPBM is a member - is a hurdle in attracting Malay support. Among Malay voters, DAP is perceived as a threat to Malay privileges. At the same time, PPBM leaders in Johor believe that their contribution towards the coalition is not yet fully recognized by their coalition partners who insist that PPBM contests only in constituencies with a large Malay population. Areas with a high percentage of Malay voters are difficult for PPBM to win because UMNO tends to enjoy huge support in such constituencies, and PPBM leaders argue that they deserve more mixed seats to run in as well. Winning Johor, or some other state, is crucial for PPBM. Should the coalition fail to win at the federal level, PPBM will need a base to avoid disintegration.

Malaysia's General Elections 2018
  • Understanding the Rural Vote
  • Serina Rahman
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    12 February 2019
    Print publication:
    24 April 2018
  • This study was carried out in Johor and Kedah through a combination of focus groups, formal and informal interviews and long-term ethnographic participant observation. Johor was selected for this study because it is the birthplace and long-time bastion of UMNO while Kedah was of interest because of the Mahathir family legacy in the state. The study shows that the rural vote is not homogeneous; views and perceptions that could lead to electoral action differs between regions, ages and genders. Daily survival and rising costs of living are the key common issues that were raised across all regions. The importance of Malay rights and the priority of Islam are also important to the rural voter. Another common problem mentioned is that of the middleman who prevents allocated funds or financial assistance from reaching the average rural resident. Malay cultural norms, traditional obligations of loyalty and patronage politics are major factors that affect the decisions of older rural voters. Younger voters might be open to the idea of a new government, but they need to overcome community and family pressure to break away from generational practices of voting for Barisan Nasional. Some rural voters feel that they gain no benefits from having either side of the political divide in power. While these voters generally do not see the point of voting, a last-minute decision to vote may go the way of the party that provides them with immediate gains.

GE14
  • Will Urban Malays Support Pakatan Harapan?
  • Wan Saiful Wan Jan
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    12 February 2019
    Print publication:
    24 April 2018
  • In Malaysia's last general election, urban voters tended to support the opposition coalition - 72 of the 97 urban parliamentary seats were in fact won by it. However, most of these seats have a mixed demography, with a high percentage of ethnic Chinese voters. In the upcoming general election, Pakatan has a good chance of winning the federal government if Malay voters join their Chinese counterparts in supporting the opposition coalition. A subsequent so-called 'Malay tsunami' could lead to a Pakatan victory. This present study, which is based on a series of focus group discussions held in the Malaysian states of Kedah and Johor, finds that urban Malay voters are very unhappy with the economic condition of the country and are also worried about corruption. But despite their grouses, they are still uncertain about supporting the opposition coalition due to the fear of losing the race-based privileges they enjoy as ethnic Malays.

EduCity, Johor
  • A Promising Project with Multiple Challenges to Overcome
  • Chang-Da Wan, Benedict Weerasena
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    12 February 2019
    Print publication:
    14 February 2018
  • EduCity, built as an integrated learning hub, is a constituent part of Malaysia's general programme to enhance its reputation as a regional centre for higher education. Located in Iskandar Malaysia, Johor, on a 305-acre catalyst development housing seven higher education institutions, EduCity aims to become a best-in-class higher education destination and at the same time provide talent to support economic activities in Iskandar Malaysia. With over 3,500 students currently enrolled, EduCity is moving towards its goal of having 16,000 students by 2025. Its proximity to Singapore and Kuala Lumpur provides it with a large population of potential students, although attracting academic staff to work there remains a challenge. Other challenges that EduCity faces revolve around the provision of facilities and support services, coordination of courses on offer, and coordination between the entity that runs the site - EduCity Iskandar Sdn Bhd (EISB) - and the universities.

Chinese Capitalism and Economic Integration in Southeast Asia
  • Yos Santasombat
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    12 February 2019
    Print publication:
    12 April 2018
  • China's rise exerts a powerful pull on ASEAN economies and constitutes an impetus for a resinicization of Overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia. China has become a skilled practitioner of 'commercial diplomacy', and as long as it continues to lead the way in regional integration, China's state-led capitalism will seek to integrate itself into the ASEAN Economic Community. This in effect becomes China's essential strategy of desecuritization for the region. With increasing trade and investment between China and ASEAN countries, the ethnic Chinese economic elites have managed to serve as 'connectors and bridges' between the two sides, and benefited in the process from joint ventures and business investments. The impact of new Chinese Capitalism on SMEs, however, has not been equally positive. As China rises, Southeast Asia has witnessed increased complexity and variations of 'hybrid capitalism', including alliances between state-led capitalism, transnational entrepreneurs emanating from China's 'going out' policy and ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia. Three main forms of Chinese Capitalism in Southeast Asia are neoliberal capitalism, flexible capitalism and Confucian capitalism. These intermingle into a range of local varieties under different socio-economic conditions.

  • The Indo-Pacific and Its Strategic Challenges: An Australian Perspective

  • Peter Varghese
  • Book:
    The Indo-Pacific and Its Strategic Challenges
    Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    31 January 2020
    Print publication:
    11 February 2019, pp vii-viii

  • Summary

    EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

  • • The shift in the framework of Australia's strategic thinking from the Asia-Pacific to the Indo-Pacific reflects the primary focus on the maritime environment in the coming decades and the expectation that over time India will become more embedded in the strategic dynamics of the Asia-Pacific.

  • • India is in the midst of a major geopolitical repositioning, as it pursues a hard-headed national interests-based policy and builds stronger strategic ties with a wide range of countries including the United States and its allies in the region.

  • • The region is entering a potentially dangerous phase in U.S.–China relations. China's rise needs to be managed not frustrated; balanced not contained. Constructing that balance and anchoring China in a new multi-polar strategic equilibrium in the Indo-Pacific is the big challenge of our time.

  • • More and more individual Southeast Asian countries are being pulled into China's orbit: not with enthusiasm or conviction but because they see that the economic cost of opposing China's agenda is too high. The United States is so far doing little to change this.

  • The Indo-Pacific and Its Strategic Challenges: An Australian Perspective

  • Peter Varghese
  • Book:
    The Indo-Pacific and Its Strategic Challenges
    Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    31 January 2020
    Print publication:
    11 February 2019, pp 1-13

  • Summary

    INTRODUCTION

    It is not often that a country changes the geographic definition of its primary strategic environment. But that is precisely what Australia has done in recent years by embracing the concept of the Indo-Pacific.

    Below is a personal perspective on what lies behind this change from the Asia-Pacific to the Indo-Pacific and the key strategic challenge facing the Indo-Pacific: how to reach a new strategic equilibrium in the region as U.S. primacy is challenged by a China with ambitions to become the predominant power in the region.

    The Asia-Pacific, with Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia at its strategic centre, has been the conceptual foundation of Australian strategic thinking for most of the post-World War II period. It was seen as a coherent strategic system bringing in the major powers and also reflecting a long period of trade and investment integration, best captured by the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC).

    Australia saw this economic integration as giving the Asia-Pacific added coherence. The Asia-Pacific construct provided a framework for thinking about the management of major power relationships especially the vital U.S.–China relationship. It was Australia's frame of reference for charting the strategic impact of shifting economic weight, most notably the extraordinary expansion of the Chinese economy.

    In more recent years, however, Australia has moved from Asia-Pacific to Indo-Pacific to describe the crucible of its strategic environment. And a large part of that shift is driven by how we see India.

    WHAT IS THE INDO-PACIFIC?

    The concept of the Indo-Pacific as a single strategic system is very much a work in progress. It is both an act of imagination and a recognition of an emerging structural shift in our strategic environment.

    At its heart, the Indo-Pacific reflects two propositions. First, that the maritime environment is likely to be the primary focus of strategic planning and strategic competition over the next several decades. Secondly, that India's strategic focus will over this period shift well beyond India's immediate neighbourhood and embed India in the strategic dynamics of the broader region in a way it has not in the post-war period.

    These two propositions do not, in themselves, create a coherent Indo-Pacific strategic system.

  • Foreword

  • Peter Varghese
  • Book:
    The Indo-Pacific and Its Strategic Challenges
    Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    31 January 2020
    Print publication:
    11 February 2019, pp v-vi

  • Summary

    The economic, political, strategic and cultural dynamism in Southeast Asia has gained added relevance in recent years with the spectacular rise of giant economies in East and South Asia. This has drawn greater attention to the region and to the enhanced role it now plays in international relations and global economics.

    The sustained effort made by Southeast Asian nations since 1967 towards a peaceful and gradual integration of their economies has had indubitable success, and perhaps as a consequence of this, most of these countries are undergoing deep political and social changes domestically and are constructing innovative solutions to meet new international challenges. Big Power tensions continue to be played out in the neighbourhood despite the tradition of neutrality exercised by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

    The Trends in Southeast Asia series acts as a platform for serious analyses by selected authors who are experts in their fields. It is aimed at encouraging policymakers and scholars to contemplate the diversity and dynamism of this exciting region.

    THE EDITORS

    Series Chairman:

    Choi Shing Kwok

    Series Editor:

    Ooi Kee Beng

    Editorial Committee:

    Su-Ann Oh

    Daljit Singh

    Francis E. Hutchinson

    Benjamin Loh

  • Exploring the Trade Potential of the DFTZ for Malaysian SMEs

  • Siew Yean Tham, Andrew Kam Jia Yi
  • Book:
    Exploring the Trade Potential of the DFTZ for Malaysian SMEs
    Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    31 January 2020
    Print publication:
    29 January 2019, pp vii-viii

  • Summary

    EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

  • • Malaysia established the Digital Free Trade Zone (DFTZ) to facilitate the development of e-commerce and the country's small and medium enterprises’ (SMEs’) exports. The data revealed thus far indicates an increasing number of SMEs coming on board the DFTZ e-commerce platforms.

  • • The publicly disclosed data focus on the value of exports achieved but do not show whether these are from new or existing exporters or whether they are re-exports. They also do not highlight Malaysia's imports through the zone.

  • • The overall trend signals that Malaysia is losing its bilateral revealed comparative advantage in exports to China, as well as an increasing use of imports for exporting to China.

  • • While the DFTZ facilitates both exports and imports, differing standards and customs processes in different export destinations, including China, will require Malaysian SMEs to know and understand the standards and customs processes governing imports in each export destination involved.

  • • Imports are also encouraged by the de minimis rule, which allows duty- and tax-free imports of up to RM800 into Malaysia. Overall, imports can help enhance the competitiveness of Malaysian SMEs, expand choices for Malaysian consumers, as well as facilitate re-exports.

  • • A clearer understanding of the role of DFTZ in facilitating trade will require more detailed data collection, and a closer investigation of the imports going through the zone, and their uses.

  • Vietnam's Industrialization Ambitions: The Case of Vingroup and the Automotive Industry

  • Hong Hiep Le
  • Book:
    Vietnam's Industrialization Ambitions
    Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    04 February 2020
    Print publication:
    29 January 2019, pp 1-19

  • Summary

    INTRODUCTION

    At its eighth national congress in 1996, the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) set the target of turning Vietnam into an industrialized economy by 2020. However, in April 2016, National Assembly Chairwoman Nguyen Thi Kim Ngan acknowledged that Vietnam would not be able to achieve that goal. Documents of the CPV's twelfth national congress in January 2016 also acknowledged this failure. Specifically, the political report of the congress replaced the target of “creating foundations to turn the country into a basically modern and industrialized country by 2020” in the eleventh congress's political report by “creating foundations to turn the country into an effectively modern and industrialized country soon”. The replacement of the deadline “by 2020” with the vague term “soon” reflects the Party's more realistic view of the economy as well as its cautious assessment of the country's industrialization prospects.

    Among the reasons for Vietnam's failure to achieve the goal was its inability to grow a strong local manufacturing base and develop key strategic industries to provide a strong momentum for the country's industrialization. The automotive industry is one of the primary examples. Despite repeated efforts, Vietnam's automotive industry has been based mainly on a handful of assembling facilities, and supporting industries have remained largely undeveloped.

    Recently, Vietnam's hopes for an indigenous automotive industry were rekindled when Vingroup, the country's largest private conglomerate, started in September 2017 the construction of a manufacturing complex in the northern city of Hai Phong and announced plans to develop a national car under the brand of Vinfast. Within a year, Vinfast managed to develop two prototypes, a sedan and a sport utility vehicle (SUV), which debutted with great fanfare at the 2018 Paris Motor Show. The company plans to put its first cars on the market in 2019.

    While it is still too early to tell whether Vinfast will be successful, the way the company is rolling out its strategy, the great potential of the Vietnamese car market, the strong support that the Vietnamese government is lending the company, and the generally positive reception the Vietnamese public has shown for its first models, have all given rise to the hope that Vietnam will eventually be able to develop its own automotive industry. The impetus shown by Vinfast, if sustained, may also become a significant landmark along Vietnam's economic development and industrialization path.

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