ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute

The debate over China's One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative has been lively and at times heated, both in China and internationally. In many ways, this is a reflection of the vagueness of the concept, and of its exceptionality. OBOR does not prioritize trade and investment concessions, which makes it essentially different from traditional regional economic cooperation models such as FTAs, the TPP and the RCEP. Instead, it emphasizes regional infrastructure connectivity. After China proposed the initiative, countries within the New Silk Road Economic Belt, especially the five Central Asian countries, responded enthusiastically and positively, while Southeast and South Asian countries, on the other hand, expressed more concerns and reservations about the initiative. In response to these countries' concerns, China has tried to adjust its approaches to convince Southeast Asian countries that the OBOR initiative holds potential synergy with ASEAN's development strategies and can play a complementary role in the building of the ASEAN community. Beijing has also adjusted its India strategy. From previously "inviting" India to join OBOR, it is now stressing "strategy connectivity" and "policy coordination" between the two countries. Nevertheless, OBOR is viewed by some as an expression of China's grand ambitions to lead Asian economic growth, and by others as a grand strategy to build a "China-dominated Asia". While it may be mainly an economic and trade initiative, its broader consequences have a strong political and security dimension. Hence, China badly needs to cultivate political trust with neighbouring countries if it wishes to convince them that the initiative is a "public" strategy, and not a "conspiratorial" one.

The foreign policy issue in the 2014 Indonesian presidential election was the rejection by both candidates, Joko Widodo (Jokowi) and Prabowo Subianto, of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's high-profile globalism. Both promised instead a foreign policy directed to the real economic and social interests of the people. This raised concerns by Indonesia's international partners that its new foreign policy would be more nationalistic and inward looking. A year and a half into Jokowi's presidency, it is possible to make a preliminary assessment of the course of Jokowi's foreign policy in relation to the goals that Jokowi the candidate set forth for Jokowi the president. Indonesia's foreign policy under Jokowi, like his predecessor's, is that suited to a rising middle power with a claim to regional leadership. Its operating principles have been unchanged since first enunciated in 1948: "bebas dan aktif" — independent and active — shaped pragmatically to existing situations. Jokowi revived Sukarno's trisakti ("threes pillars of the state") as the organizing principles of his presidential campaign -- an Indonesia that is sovereign, economically independent, and with a strong socio-cultural identity — and these are reflected in his foreign policy. In his "Vision and Mission" manifesto for the presidential election, Jokowi listed the action agendas necessary for achieving his four foreign policy priorities. These were (a) promotion of Indonesia as an archipelagic maritime state, (b) promotion of Indonesia's middle-power regional role, (c) a new focus on the Indo-Pacific, and (d) reforming the foreign policy process. Five critical areas in particular define Jokowi's foreign policies. These are (a) building the Global Maritime Axis, (b) economic diplomacy, (c) Indonesia's role in ASEAN, (d) navigating between China and the United States, and (e) Indonesia's role in the South China Sea. The bedrock of Indonesian foreign policy since at least 2001 remains firm. The country continues to be a responsible, cooperative international partner sharing interest in economic growth and a peaceful, secure international order with like-minded states. However, heightened tension in the South China Sea is limiting the space for Indonesia's hedging strategy.

In 2014 Myanmar introduced a constituency development fund (CDF) to sponsor small public works and development projects in each of the country's 330 electoral constituencies. As a form of "pork-barrel" spending, CDF programmes have long remained controversial among international donors, anti-corruption agencies and civil society watchdogs for their potential for corruption, embezzlement, waste of public money, vote-buying and other clientelistic behaviours. The CDF has however emerged in as an extremely popular instrument for lawmakers, in offering new opportunities for meeting the basic infrastructure and development needs of local communities. The scheme has also fostered more frequent interactions among parliamentarians, local bureaucrats, and citizens. Mechanisms for vetting and monitoring the CDF projects seem also to have grown stronger each year. Rumours about petty corruption and misappropriation cases have gradually surfaced, particularly since the National League for Democracy (NLD) took control of the legislature in 2016. Yet in the first three fiscal years of its implementation, the scheme did not lead to any known major punitive action. There is also not yet enough of a record to identify credible linkages between the use of CDFs and the building of an electoral clientele by politicians — another common criticism of "pork-barrel" funding.

Summary

INTRODUCTION

Following the introduction of economic reforms in trade and investment in the mid-1980s, manufacturing gradually replaced agriculture as the mainstay of the Indonesian economy. In terms of exports, the sector even edged out oil's monopoly as the top foreign exchange earner. In other words, manufacturing emerged as the driver of development, pushing the country's GDP to grow at an average of about 8 per cent per annum. This trend abruptly ended in 1998 with the onset of the Asian Financial Crisis (AFC). The post-crisis recovery was led by the commodity boom, mainly fuelled by the economic expansion in China. The growth of manufacturing, however, remained sluggish and continues to be so — well into the first term of President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo's administration (2014–19).

Despite a number of initiatives taken by the government, reviving the manufacturing sector has proven to be a difficult task. The role of manufacturing as the primary growth-driver has not been replicated in the post-AFC era. Even though, for a while, moderate economic growth of 5.5 per cent per annum could be maintained with the help of the commodity boom which boosted aggregate demand (especially consumption), the end of the boom in 2012 brought the growth rate down to a steady state level of 5 per cent per annum. The current government's recent strategy to improve growth and employment figures is articulated in President Jokowi's campaign platform, known as Nawacita (nine priority programmes). One of its main focus areas is the manufacturing sector.

The purpose of this chapter is to assess the performance of the Indonesian manufacturing sector under the Jokowi government. To boost the sector, several policies have been launched by the Ministry of Industry. External factors like infrastructure, government regulations, the structure of effective rate of protection (ERP), and openness are discussed in this chapter, along with the dynamics of structural change and overall growth in the manufacturing sector. The analysis is based on the data from the Annual Manufacturing Surveys of the Central Bureau of Statistic (BPS).

POLICY OVERVIEW

Pre-2000 Manufacturing Policies

The rise of Indonesian manufacturing can be traced to the introduction of the Investment Law in 1967 and subsequent Law No. 6 concerning Domestic Investment in 1968. One important question that arises is whether Indonesia has (ever) seriously pursued industrial policies. The answer, however, remains unclear.

Summary

INTRODUCTION

Military conglomerates owned by or linked to state armies are a feature of economic and political systems across Southeast Asia. Often justified by military leaders on the basis of “alleviating” the burden of defence spending on government budgets, these companies can provide sources of funding entirely independent of civilian oversight. Military conglomerates thus commonly serve to entrench the power and autonomy of the armed forces from civilian control despite political transitions to more democratic modes of rule. Extensive scholarly work focused on Southeast Asia and regional contexts including the People's Republic of China and Pakistan has examined and theorized how military commercial interests — or “Khaki Capital” — shapes civilian control over the armed forces. However, the origins, evolution and contemporary implications of military capitalism in Myanmar remain little examined and under-researched.

Myanmar is one of the most highly militarized societies in Southeast Asia and, indeed, the world. If soldiers, veterans and their families alone are considered, the lives of over 3 million people are currently or could in the future be directly shaped by military institutions and conglomerates which dominate major sectors of Myanmar's economy. This report examines the origins and evolution of military capitalism in Myanmar and its contemporary implications for reform of civil–military relations, veteran welfare and the peace process. It draws on interviews with thirty-eight veterans, civil servants, business people, policymakers, researchers and others with experience of military affairs and conglomerates. These interviews were conducted between September and November 2018.

The report is structured in four sections. The first section situates military companies in the context of the political and economic legacies of colonial rule, while the second section examines the re-emergence of military conglomerates after 1988. The third assesses the politics of military companies in contemporary Myanmar, including where they sit in the larger context of shifting civil–military relations. It notes that government pensions appear to be more important in the welfare of the average veterans than the minimal benefit received from military capitalism. The fourth section outlines the role of military capitalism in attempts by the Myanmar government to end conflict since the 1990s, and then examines whether “Business for Peace” initiatives in ceasefire areas are likely to deliver welfare outcomes for average ethnic armed group soldiers, officers and conflict affected communities.

Summary

INTRODUCTION

Joko “Jokowi” Widodo was sworn in as the new president of Indonesia in October 2014, replacing Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) who had governed Indonesia for ten years from 2004 to 2014. At the time of the transition, the picture of the Indonesian economy was not too positive. Economic growth had steadily declined since its peak in 2011 and poverty reduction had stagnated since 2012. Meanwhile, inequality, as measured by the Gini Ratio, had steadily increased and reached its highest point ever of 0.41 in 2011 and remained at this level thereafter. An underlying fundamental beneath these trends was the continuously declining commodity prices since 2011. During the previous decade, Indonesia had been riding a commodity boom — a steady increase in the prices of primary commodities.

Figure 12.1 depicts the trends of economic growth, poverty rate, and Gini Ratio during the 2002–17 period. It shows that Indonesia's economic growth rate has steadily increased from 4.5 per cent in 2002 to 6.35 per cent in 2007, but the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) brought it down to 4.58 per cent in 2009. The recovery was relatively quick, reaching 6.49 per cent in 2011. However, it has steadily declined since then, bottoming out at 4.88 per cent in 2015. It has progressively increased in the following two years, reaching 5.17 per cent in 2017.

During this period of positive economic growth, the poverty rate has generally declined, falling from 18.2 per cent in 2002 to 10.64 per cent in 2017. The exception was in 2006 when the poverty rate increased to 17.75 per cent from 15.97 per cent in the previous year due to increases in fuel and rice prices. Meanwhile, the Gini Ratio has steadily increased from 0.32 in 2004 to 0.41 in 2011, remaining at this level until 2015. It then slightly decreased to 0.393 by 2017.

The stagnating poverty reduction and high inequality level posed a double challenge in social welfare for Jokowi when he took over the presidency at the end of 2014. He immediately launched a couple of initiatives in this area, which he had flagged during his presidential campaign. First, he introduced the KIP (Kartu Indonesia Pintar, Smart Indonesia Card) and KIS (Kartu Indonesia Sehat, Indonesia Health Card), two major social assistance programmes in the areas of education and health, respectively.

Summary

“It would be wrong to see nationalism as either an unmitigated evil or a universal virtue. It can be both, a boon and a curse.”

Amartya Sen (2008)

“Protectionism breeds monopoly, crony capitalism and sloth. It does not achieve a happy and serene egalitarian society.”

Paul A. Samuelson (2005)

BACKGROUND

The world is gradually recovering from the 2008–09 Global Financial Crisis. In 2017, for example, economic growth climbed back to 3 per cent. During this transition phase, however, the role of trade has been much smaller — thanks to the maturation of global value chains, the shift to robotization and the services economy, fluctuation in commodity prices, as well as rising protectionism around the world.

At the same time, more than 3 billion people still have to struggle to live with US$2.50 or less per day. The richest 10 per cent of the global population owns more than 85 per cent of the global wealth. Even in countries where poverty has gone down, inequality is on the rise — prompting social tensions. These factors are often seen as the main cause of the re-emergence of anti-globalization sentiments and seem to have encouraged world leaders to adopt populist, inward-looking policies. Examples of consequent surprises coming from the voting booths include Duterte, Brexit, and Trump among others. Moreover, often by riding on the back of this disdain for globalization, those in power display increasingly authoritarian inclinations — such as Erdogan in Turkey, Putin in Russia, and Xi in China, to name a few.

Indonesia is no exception. In this country, dissatisfaction with globalization has manifested itself in rising protectionism, rejection of foreign interference, and expressions of distrust of democracy — sometimes with a New Order flavour. The disappointment, nevertheless, is not totally unfounded. As in the case elsewhere, globalization — and nationalism — can bring both good and bad results, “boon and curse”, as Amartya Sen put it. Trade creates winners and losers, and in the absence of (1) wellfunctioning compensation mechanisms and (2) free movement of labour across sectors, the gains may remain concentrated in the hands of a few. And corruption only worsens this situation.

Nationalism in the economic sphere takes the form of protectionism — protecting domestic industries from foreign competition. It usually reveals itself in policies aimed at self-sufficiency in a number of commodities, including those of which Indonesia is a natural net importer.

Summary

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Summary

INTRODUCTION

Scholars have had difficulty characterizing the economic orientation of the contemporary Indonesian state. Following the devastating Asian Financial Crisis (AFC) of 1997–98, the Indonesian government opened up many parts of its economy, and pursued a neoliberal economic model recommended by its lenders, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. At the same time, many sectors remained characterized by high levels of state intervention and market distortion. Despite the democratic transition and the new government's pursuit of liberal economic policies to ensure competition, transparency and accountability, old oligarchs and predatory state actors maintained much political and economic power. State capacity has also continued to vary enormously across ministries and regional governments, and problems of coordination and communication mean that different state bodies often pursue contradictory economic policy paths. As a result, since the end of the New Order, analysts have variously identified the new democracy as being “neoliberal” (Aspinall 2012), “quasi-developmental” (Sato 2017), “oligarchic” (Hadiz and Robison 2013), “nationalist” (Patunru and Rahardja 2015), or some combination thereof.

Yet, this chapter argues that over the course of the past decade, a discernible developmental model has (re)emerged. To advance this argument, the study draws upon a body of literature on the “new developmentalism” in middle-income and emerging economies. The new developmentalism is characterized by a normative commitment to an activist state, and a rejection of neoliberalism's blind faith in small government (Khan and Christiansen 2010; Trubek et al. 2013; Schneider 2015; Döring, Santos and Pocher 2017). Economic policy is underpinned by the idea that states should intervene in markets in order to stimulate economic growth, direct industrial upgrading, and ensure economic redistribution. The new developmentalism is heterodox and flexible, and state activism is supplemented by selective support for aspects of an orthodox and liberal economic strategy. It is a paradigm associated with emerging economies such as China, and often Brazil (at least during the first decade of the 2000s), where activist states seek to transform their country's comparative advantage, and graduate to a higher-income status.

Aspects of this model have deep roots in Indonesian history. But, a more self-conscious developmentalist agenda re-emerged during President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's second term in office (2009–14). The chapter suggests that under President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo, the new developmentalism has crystallized further and, arguably, become a defining feature of Indonesia's political economy.

Summary

INTRODUCTION

In January 2018, President Joko Widodo stated that his government would start to focus on improving the country's human resources (Kompas Daily, 3 January 2018). He added that improved human resources is a necessary condition to be able to take full advantage of Indonesia's demographic dividends and be globally competitive.

The president's assessment is correct. Hanushek and Woessmann (2008) find that cognitive skills have large and causal relationships with earnings, distribution of income, and economic growth. In addition, Hanushek et al. (2017) find that returns to these skills are larger in faster growing economies. Since strong economic growth is usually a sign of a dynamic and rapidly changing economy, the authors state that their finding is consistent with the hypothesis that highly skilled individuals are better at adapting to, and taking advantage of change.

The policy implication of the findings in the previous paragraph is straightforward: countries must ensure that their labour markets are highly skilled. From a policymaker's perspective, it means that increasing the educational attainment of the population is a necessity. And, overall, countries have largely succeeded in doing so (Pritchett 2001). The World Bank's Edstats show that the average educational attainment of adults globally has increased from 6.4 years in 1990 to 8.3 years merely two decades later.

The problem, however, is that learning levels remain low for many countries. Pritchett (2013) states that in India, over a quarter of fifth graders could not read a simple sentence while only slightly more than half could perform subtraction. Mullis et al. (2012) find that only 43 per cent of Indonesian eighth grade students have some understanding of whole numbers, decimals, operations, and basic graphs. In contrast, 99 per cent of Singaporean eighth grade students have this knowledge. Therefore, the amount of learning produced by Indonesian and Singaporean education systems in the eight years of schooling are vastly different. In addition, there has been very little improvement among the weak performers. For example, Suryahadi and Sambodho (2013) show that Indonesia's performance in eighth grade TIMSS mathematics has declined between 2003 and 2011. Hanushek and Woessmann (2008) conclude that merely increasing education attainment, without focusing on the amount of learning actually accrued by students, has no correlation with economic growth.

This chapter examines numeracy and literacy levels among fifteenyear- olds in Indonesia and put them in a global perspective.

Summary

The economic, political, strategic and cultural dynamism in Southeast Asia has gained added relevance in recent years with the spectacular rise of giant economies in East and South Asia. This has drawn greater attention to the region and to the enhanced role it now plays in international relations and global economics.

The sustained effort made by Southeast Asian nations since 1967 towards a peaceful and gradual integration of their economies has had indubitable success, and perhaps as a consequence of this, most of these countries are undergoing deep political and social changes domestically and are constructing innovative solutions to meet new international challenges. Big Power tensions continue to be played out in the neighbourhood despite the tradition of neutrality exercised by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

The Trends in Southeast Asia series acts as a platform for serious analyses by selected authors who are experts in their fields. It is aimed at encouraging policymakers and scholars to contemplate the diversity and dynamism of this exciting region.

THE EDITORS

Series Chairman:

Choi Shing Kwok

Series Editor:

Ooi Kee Beng

Editorial Committee:

Su-Ann Oh

Daljit Singh

Francis E. Hutchinson

Benjamin Loh

Summary

INTRODUCTION

Indonesia, comprising over 17,000 islands, is the world's largest archipelago and is blessed with a rich diversity of resource endowments, ecology and population. It extends about 6,000 km along the equator between the Indian and Pacific oceans, linking the continents of Asia and Australia. This fourth most populous nation in the world (about 260 million in 2016) is the largest member state of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), accounting for nearly 40 per cent of its population and approximately 36 per cent of its gross national product in 2016 (CEIC Database). Considering these diverse characteristics, Indonesia certainly presents a challenging natural resource and environmental policy environment (Resosudarmo 2012; Hill 2014).

For a long time, particularly since the mid-1960s, Indonesia has been able to utilize its natural resources — gas, forest, coal and various types of ore, among others — to push for economic and human development in the country. Since the mid-1990s, the debate over whether the rate of natural resource extraction in Indonesia has been too fast and consequently over-exploitative, began to emerge as a top national issue. At the same time, the growth of economic activities, particularly in urban areas, has resulted in several alarming environmental issues, such as a high level of air pollution and a deterioration in river quality (Resosudarmo 2005; ADB 2013).

By the mid-2000s, the evidence of natural resource over-exploitation and environmental challenges in Indonesia attracted global attention. Among these issues were: the rate of Indonesia's deforestation was among the highest in the world (Resosudarmo et al. 2012b; Margono et al. 2014); several megacities in the country were experiencing alarmingly bad air quality; river water pollution was reaching levels that could seriously affect the health of the general public (Resosudarmo and Napitupulu 2004; Cochrane 2015); Indonesia being one of the top exporters of coal — despite its coal reserve being smaller than several other countries (Burke and Resosudarmo 2012; PwC 2012) and; over-fishing occurring everywhere in the nation's sea water areas (Resosudarmo, Napitupulu and Campbell 2009; Muawanah, Pomeroy and Marlessy 2012). The concern that shocked many Indonesians and people worldwide, however, was that Indonesia is one of the top three carbon dioxide (CO2) emitters in the world, just after China and the United States, due to its deforestation activities (PEACE 2007; Jotzo 2012).

Summary

INTRODUCTION

The costs of financial system failure in the form of a systemic banking crisis can be extraordinarily high, as illustrated by Indonesia's devastating financial crisis that began in 1997. It took many years for bank lending growth to resume and, by some measures, Indonesia's level of financial development has yet to return to pre-crisis levels. In comparison with this history, Indonesia's financial system has been working very well over the past decade. Government financial policy has the declared aim of promoting a financial system that facilitates economic growth, supports financial inclusion and safeguards financial stability. These goals require a balancing act that, so far, appears to have achieved a degree of success. Measures of growth and performance described in this chapter focus on the significant financial development over the past two decades and suggest a financial system that is more resilient than at any stage in the past. Notwithstanding potential costs and risks arising from increasingly interventionist financial policies and an inadequate financial safety net, the banking sector (to date) remains relatively robust in prudential terms. There is evidence of inefficiency arising from structural segmentation of the banking system, which has persisted despite foreign presence in the banking system. The financial sector as a whole has diversified as nonbank capital markets and the nonbank financial service sector have developed, albeit modestly.

The next section of this chapter presents basic data on the structure and performance of Indonesia's financial system. It goes on to discuss the policy framework governing the financial sector, with an emphasis on agencies and policies relating to banks, which remain the dominant players in the financial system. The third section identifies some of the policy conflicts and constraints affecting financial sector performance, with attention to the segmentation of the banking sector, the role of foreign ownership and the potential for financial sector diversification away from current levels of reliance on commercial banks. The final section concludes.

FINANCIAL SYSTEM STRUCTURE AND PERFORMANCE

Indonesia's financial system remains bank-dominated, with banks accounting for around 76 per cent of the assets of all financial institutions, as shown in Figure 5.1. Insurance companies, pension and mutual funds and all other financial intermediaries together thus account for less than a quarter of all assets held by financial institutions.

Summary

INTRODUCTION

Since 1990, rates of extreme poverty have fallen by more than half. With rapid income growth, a global middle class has arisen in emergent middle-income countries such as Indonesia. However, the majority of the global poor also reside in these middle-income countries (Sumner 2012), as sustained growth has not worked evenly to alleviate persistent poverty. In this context, social protection policies (SPPs) have emerged as the key response. Social protection encompasses all interventions from public, private, voluntary organizations and informal networks, to support communities, households and individuals in their efforts to prevent, manage and overcome a defined set of risks and vulnerabilities (Barrientos and Hulme 2008). In many respects, the turn to social protection represents a laudable move in social policy. With the state embracing the need to provide for its most vulnerable as a moral duty, we can see social protection as an effort to expand progressive social contracts to marginal groups (Hickey 2012).

In the case of Indonesia, rising inequality emerged as a critical political concern after the Gini coefficient increased from 0.33 in 2002 to 0.41 in 2016. After reducing the multibillion U.S. dollar fuel subsidy as soon as he stepped into office, President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo has overseen a rapid expansion of SPPs — publically distributing an Indonesia Health Card (KIS) that provides free healthcare services and the Prosperous Family Saving Card (KKS) in public events. Likewise, the health programme (Program Jaminan Kesehatan Nasional or JKN) is being expanded to cover 36 million families, the rice for welfare — Beras untuk Keluarga Sejahtera (Rastra) — programme will include 15.7 million families, while the Family Hope Programme (Program Keluarga Harapan, PKH) will provide cash transfer benefits to 10 million families. As depicted in Figure 13.1, the national expenditure for social protection programmes has increased more than ten times between 2005 and 2017. However, this does not represent aggregate growth in terms of GDP, as contributions have fallen from 0.9 per cent of GDP to 0.7 per cent of GDP over the same period (World Bank 2017). This is still far below the World Bank target for social spending and as a percentage of GDP is among the lowest worldwide (Samboh 2017).

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China's One Belt One Road

Understanding Jokowi's Foreign Policy

The Emergence of Pork-Barrel Politics in Parliamentary Myanmar

About the Contributors

Index

7 - Trends in the Manufacturing Sector under the Jokowi Presidency: Legacies of Past Administrations

Summary

Military Capitalism in Myanmar: Examining the Origins, Continuities and Evolution of “Khaki Capital”

Summary

12 - Cards for the Poor and Funds for Villages: Jokowi's Initiatives to Reduce Poverty and Inequality

Summary

Frontmatter

6 - Rising Economic Nationalism in Indonesia

Summary

Military Capitalism in Myanmar: Examining the Origins, Continuities and Evolution of “Khaki Capital”

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2 - A New Developmentalism in Indonesia?

Summary

Frontmatter

10 - Education in Indonesia: A White Elephant?

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Foreword

Summary

15 - Illegal Fishing War: An Environmental Policy during the Jokowi Era?

Summary

5 - How Well Is Indonesia's Financial System Working?

Summary

13 - Distributional Politics and Social Protection in Indonesia: Dilemma of Layering, Nesting and Social Fit in Jokowi's Poverty Policy

Summary

Contents

Acknowledgements

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China's One Belt One Road

Understanding Jokowi's Foreign Policy

The Emergence of Pork-Barrel Politics in Parliamentary Myanmar

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