The main goal of religious reformism is to make a religion relevant to its sociocultural context so that it may continue to provide meaning to the lives of its practitioners. Another goal is to strengthen religious presence in the civic and political lives of its members. It also implies a creative re-evaluation of past traditions, which can lead to fresh interpretations. But reform is not simply appropriating new ideas or practices. It is also about having the moral courage to exert the necessary intellectual endeavour to correct the aberrations or misleading thought and practices of the present.

The inhibited reformist voices in contemporary Malay/Muslim religious discourse in Singapore warrant special attention. While the Malay/Muslim community lives in a modern cosmopolitan city state, it would be naïve to assume their religious ideas are also marked by openness and liberality. As in many other societies, there is a challenge to nurturing a progressive and reformist religious discourse. Voices for reform are intermittent and at times timid, but at other times they are more confident and determined.

The persistency of religious traditionalism and revivalism means that there is very little space for reformist ideas to gain ground within the local community. Apart from some inherent weaknesses in reformist agendas, the moral sanctions and pressure from conservative traditionalists has meant that reformists have always been in a defensive mode. In many Muslim societies today, reformist ideas are received in a guarded way and are deemed as unnecessarily disruptive as they affect the harmonious “balance” of the people's religious lives and convictions. Indeed, openness to exogenous ideas is immediately equated to the erosion of Muslims’ authenticity and identity.

In Singapore we are not faced with ultra conservatives who vehemently oppose reformists groups and deem them wayward, secular or Westernized. Opponents, however, do see reform as unnecessary or even as approaching heresy, since the religious formulations and commandments of the past are considered to be complete, final and absolutely creedal. For the modern-day religious revivalists, religious reformism is seen as a modernist project that will sap the authenticity of the religion, and it is often seen as a fatal compromise to liberal/ secular (Western) ideas.

Since the 9/11 attacks there has been a proliferation of strategic studies and publications on terrorism and radicalism in the region, given their potent social, economic and political ramifications. However, critical studies on the phenomenon of the non-violent resurgence of Islam among the Malays remains wanting, despite its dominance and impact. Those studies that do exist tend to disproportionately focus on its emergence and manifestations within a generally positive evaluative perspective. This chapter focuses critically on the major fixations and agenda promoted and embedded in resurgence discourse, and analyses how they are sustained and reinforced. It argues that the phenomenon has become so dominant that it negates, marginalizes and silences competing Malay thought and perspectives that are vital to the development and well-being of the community and the larger society. Instead of identifying relevant problems and providing muchneeded solutions grounded in an enlightened concept of religion and other philosophies that could facilitate Malays’ adaptation to change, resurgence discourse impedes this process and exacerbates the challenges. While special attention is given to the case of Singapore, the issues and problems discussed here are no less relevant to but intertwined with the country's predominantly Malay/Muslim neighbours.

Religious resurgence has become so prevalent today that there has been a strong tendency amongst both Muslims and non-Muslims to misleadingly conflate manifestations of the phenomenon with the teachings and values of Islam itself. So influential has the phenomenon been that it has profusely penetrated not only religious thought and practice at the individual or community level but has also expanded to the public sphere, where proponents articulate their views and demands on a thousand points, leaving hardly any domain untouched. Its overwhelming imprints are evident in the innumerable and diverse issues that encompass identity issues; the sense of morality; perceptions of customs, traditions and social norms; the expanding range of dietary taboos and restrictions; gender relations; and intra-community issues, issues relating to relations with non-Muslims. Perceptions and discourse on popular culture involving music, dress, lifestyles, dance, film, literary forms and expressions also bear its unmistakable imprints.

In the 1960s, Peter L. Berger argued that religion would face serious challenges dealing with modernity. He believed that when confronted with the wave of modernity, religion would steadily but surely decline and be marginalized from public life. He also maintained that the more rational human beings became, the narrower and smaller would be the roles that religion would play in the public sphere.

However, Berger's projection is not in line with contemporary trends. Religion has moved in the opposite direction. There has been a vociferous resurgence of religion in the public sphere. Religious resurgence has emerged in various dimensions and manifestations in many parts of the world. Diana L. Eck observed this phenomenon in the context of the United States. In Europe, religious resurgence not only saw the rise of the Christian right but also of Islamophobia—anti-Muslim sentiments. Geertz Wilders, a former Dutch member of parliament, produced a film, Fitna, that offended many Muslims. Wilders’ movie can be read as part of the anxiety over the Islamic religious resurgence emerging in the Netherlands.

In the same vein, Tariq Ramadan depicted Muslim dynamics in Europe and projected the future of Islam in that continent. His primary concerns were what it means to be a Muslim in Europe and how do European Muslims play their part within the continent's social and political context. He also noted, amongst others, the dynamics of religious resurgence that have implications on Muslim public life.

In short, religious resurgence has become a global phenomenon, and Indonesia has also been feeling its impact. The wave of resurgence and rising religious consciousness has become more visible in recent years. Religious consciousness has come to colour the lives of Indonesians more so than in the past. It is interesting however to see the impact of this rising religious consciousness, especially in the context of political contestation and identity assertion. Generally, this chapter argues that the direction of Muslims’ religious consciousness in Indonesia will manifest and affect the political, economic, ideological and civilizational orientation of the masses.

Political Orientation

When religious resurgence in Muslim circles gets stronger, it becomes more politically appealing. Accordingly, it invites certain political agencies to attempt to utilize religion as a political tool. In this context, politics operates in the name of religion that is a condition of faith.

Judging from the behaviour of ordinary Muslims, as well as the rulings issued by the religious elite (ulama), observers have expressed concerns about the rise of Islamic conservatism in Malaysia. They also note the rise of “Arabization” among the Malay/Muslims—their preference for Arabic culture, lifestyle and ideas at the expense of Malay culture, heritage and intellectual tradition. They also worry that there are groups promoting Saudi Arabian puritan Islamic ideology—namely, Salafi- Wahhabism—which counters Malaysia's Shafii School of jurisprudence and Sufi leanings. Not totally unrelated to these broad observations, some have complained that officials in the religious bureaucracy— particularly those bending towards conservatism—have been becoming more powerful since the turn of the millennium. These officials restrict the circulation of different viewpoints in public. Islamic NGOs, academics and politicians promoting alternative views complain about the extensive reach of federal religious institution JAKIM (Department of Islamic Development Malaysia). The institution has the power to decide who has authority to speak on Islam, to define what the “correct” version of Islam is and to clamp down on progressive groups.

This chapter highlights the challenges facing groups promoting progressive Islamic discourse in Malaysia and examines how these groups have been marginalized. It also analyses the issues that the religious authorities seek to restrict from being discussed in public. The basis for these restrictions goes beyond theological differences, but includes power play as well. While most of the examples here cover issues from during the Barisan Nasional (National Front) government—the Abdullah Badawi government (2003–9) and the Najib Razak government (2009–18)—the chapter also analyses issues discussed during the Pakatan Harapan (Coalition of Hope) government. At the general election of 9 May 2018 (GE14), former prime minister Dr Mahathir Mohamad led the Pakatan Harapan coalition to topple the six-decade-old Barisan Nasional government.

Is there room for progressive voices to be aired in contemporary Malaysia? Can the Pakatan Harapan government undo the Barisan Nasional's policies and approaches to the progressives and ensure the religious bureaucracy does not overstep its role? In the following, a conceptual definition of progressivism will be provided. This will be followed by a discussion of the role of JAKIM and the muftis (official ulama) as religious authority in the country.

In the last three decades, frequent reference had been made to Islam in the plural. For example, some years ago a book appeared with the title Islams and Modernities by Aziz Al-Azmeh. Such usage confuses rather than clarifies matters. Many Muslims would be puzzled by what is meant by “Islams”. From a conceptual and empirical point of view, as well, it would be wrong to refer to Islam in the plural. Muslims understand from the Qur’an that there is only one din or religion of Islam. By this is meant that there are certain basic beliefs and practices common to all Muslims that neither change from space to space nor time to time. This is not an ideal but a reality.

What does change, however, are the material, cultural and ideological expressions of Muslims. For example, the cuisine of Muslims, their music and dance forms, their art and literature continuously develop in different directions. So do the ideologies; that is, the Muslims’ orientations to the political, economic and social worlds. The ideologies of Muslims do draw upon the sources of Islam, such as the Qur’an, the Sunnah or traditions of the Prophet Muhammad, as well as the intellectual heritage of the Muslims that developed from the early days of Islam. But they also incorporate interpretations and experiences that are space-time bound and, therefore, continuously change. We can, therefore, speak of multiplicity and plurality when we speak of Islam at these levels. The term din refers to Islam as revelation, while other terms such as sabil, shari‘a, tariqah and jama‘ah refer to Islam as interpretation and lived experience. At the level of din, Islam is unitary. The diversity appears at the levels of sabil, shari‘a, tariqah and jama‘ah. These are the historical and empirical levels at which the din is realized.

While there are no multiple Islams, there are a multitude of Muslim ideologies. They are often grouped under headings such as modernism, traditionalism, neo-modernism, fundamentalism and radicalism. Some Muslim ideologies are held to be in line with Islam as a religion, and some are not. Backward and extremist ideologies and orientations have always been held on to by a minority in Muslim societies. But that is enough to cause problems. As a result, the question as to what constitutes a progressive interpretation of Islam arises.

The emergence of modern Malay literature at the turn of the twentieth century came alongside the growing nationalistic and reformist consciousness clamouring for the Malays to address and confront the challenges of development. These challenges included the economy, education, culture, and religious and intellectual thought. Generally, progressive religious and cultural ideas in Malay society are largely expressed via the literary medium, which is more pronounced than mainstream religious discourse. Reformist ideas of the time were articulated and debated through novels, short stories and essays. The role and contribution of literature in Malay society cannot be underestimated. Thus, any study on Malay society that ignores the literary tradition will miss one of the important cultural and intellectual expressions of the Malays, be it in the past or the present.

This chapter does not seek to chart the development of Malay literature. The aim is to highlight that the literary realm is a creative and critical site where progressive ideas are articulated. Therefore, an appreciation of the historical and sociological dynamics, beyond dissecting texts, an approach that is often taken up in mainstream formalistic literary studies, is necessary. The literary realm can be viewed as contending sites where progressive writers apply the literary medium to annunciate and denunciate ideas in society, inasmuch as regressive and problematic ideas have found their way into literary works too.

By progressive writers, we mean those who have articulated and advocated reformist ideas against religious traditionalism and obscurantism, while recognizing the primacy of human reason, human dignity and rights, political and social freedom, economic and social justice, intellectual and cultural creativity and the overall sense of humanity and rootedness in history and society. Not all of these attributes can be found in any single writer among those whom we classify as “progressive”. In reality these ideas had been articulated by a number of writers, with some articulating them more consistently and persistently than others. In some cases reformist writers also express conservative ideas, reflecting competing streams of ideas in society.

A number of scholars, such as Deliar Noer and Abdul Mukti Ali, have argued that the Ahmadiyah in Indonesia have had no significant influence on Islamic revivalism in the early twentieth century. Others, such as Federspiel, perceive that the Ahmadiyah have contributed to the revival of Islam in the country to a degree disproportionate to the group's small size. “[T]he Ahmadiyah groups in Indonesia remained relatively small and isolated throughout the era and probably received more attention from the modernist Muslim organizations than was warranted by their size and influence”, states Federspiel. Challenging the above views, Margaret Blood stated, “If Ahmadiyah is discussed simply as one organization among many Islamic based organizations in Indonesia in the early twentieth century we must conclude that its importance within the Muslim community of Indonesia is insignificant. This is most true of the Qadiani branch which is primarily a sectarian organization, and as such, can be best evaluated in terms of its membership.” However, Blood continues, if one evaluates the Ahmadiyah on the quality of the group's membership, then the Ahmadiyah, particularly the Lahore branch, “has of course quite a large reverberation for even those Muslims who are reluctant to associate with the sect from Pakistan”. Blood agrees with Justus M. van der Kroef, who believes that the Ahmadiyah have “contributed greatly to a modernistic religious quickening among younger western schooled Indonesians”.

These differing perceptions need to be examined by looking at the history of the arrival of the Ahmadiyah in Indonesia, the circumstances at that time, and how Muslims perceived the group. This article, therefore, intends to study the role of the Ahmadiyah in Islamic revivalism in Indonesia in the first half of the twentieth century by first looking at the circumstances in the country at that time. Second, the article aims to describe the linguistic divide among Indonesian intelligentsia—i.e., between the Arab-educated and the Dutch-educated Muslims—in accessing information and knowledge from foreign countries. Lastly, it will elaborate the appeals of the Ahmadiyah to the Muslim intelligentsia and the role of this movement in Islamic revivalism.

In 1987, academic and political observer Chandra Muzaffar published a seminal work, Islamic Resurgence in Malaysia, analysing the rise of religiosity in Malaysian society and its impact on Malaysian social, economic and political life. The community's outlook was undergoing change: more urban dwellers wanted to be in touch with religious values, and this meant embracing conservative teachings. Chandra defined Islamic resurgence to mean “the endeavour to establish Islamic values, Islamic practices, Islamic institutions, Islamic laws, indeed Islam in its entirety, in the lives of Muslims everywhere. It is an attempt to re-create an Islamic ethos, an Islamic social order, at the vortex of which is the Islamic human being, guided by the Quran and Sunnah.” The causes were multifold. Malaysia was undergoing political and economic changes with Mahathir Mohamad taking over as the country's prime minister in 1981. The country was also undergoing rapid urbanization and industrialization, and those from the working class sought to strengthen their religious values so that they could have some form of spirituality to fall back on. Second, international events that seemingly oppressed the Islamic world—such as Arab wars, the Palestinian issue and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979—led to Malaysian Muslims wanting to be part of the global ummah and to stand up against imperialists. Islamist literature is used to strengthen anti-colonial sentiments. The Iranian revolution of 1979 was also significant because it inspired many Muslims to believe the leadership of the ulama (Islamic religious elites) could generate social change. The Iranian revolution sparked interest in many Islamic societies, including Malaysia, because they saw Islam as a force to unite fragmented societies against the West and oppression. This also meant the ulama could lead a revolution and provide the necessary leadership to mitigate their hardships.

In the 1980s and 1990s, Islamic institutions were built and expanded. While the Malaysian government intended to out-Islamize PAS (Islamic Party of Malaysia)—which was also undergoing reforms after infighting in the 1970s—some of these institutions supported Mahathir's procapitalistic, industrialization and development models. It was during this period that the state began to support Islamic finance, banking and the halal economy.

The discourse promoted by the Muslim resurgence glosses over past cleavages between the traditionalists and modernists. For centuries the two camps have not been able to settle differences over rituals.

Malaysia has an estimated population of 31.7 million, of which 28.4 million are citizens. While the country is seen as multi-ethnic, the dominant ethnic group is made up of Malays/Bumiputras (68.6 per cent) who are predominantly Sunni Muslims and considered the original settlers of the land. Malaysia is composed of thirteen states and operates within a constitutional monarchy under a Westminster-style parliamentary system. The Federal government controls most policies and decision-making, with religion and some limited matters left to the state level. The respective ruler—the sultan—heads all religious matters for each state, assisted by the state religious department.

Malaysia has always been viewed as one of the more stable countries in Southeast Asia, having had uninterrupted democratic elections since independence. The country is relatively secular and has experienced positive economic growth. In 1958 more than 60 per cent of Malaysians lived in poverty, a stark difference from the situation in 2016, when only 0.6 per cent lived below the poverty line. Today, Malaysia is a highly open upper-middle-income country, providing universal access to twelve years of basic education and to healthcare. In terms of gender equality, Malaysia is doing relatively well, with women accounting for the majority of students in public universities, and with nearly 32.3 per cent of decision-making positions in public service held by women.

However, despite the country's economic successes, media reports, both national and international, have constantly published news, articles and opinion pieces on how racism has become rampant in Malaysia. IMAN—a Malaysian independent research centre that looks at how society, beliefs and perceptions impact and influence a nation and the region—has reviewed statements made by leaders and commenters as reported in the conservative Malay newspaper Utusan Melayu over the Selangor state's decision in 2010 to allow the building of an Indian temple in a Malay-majority neighbourhood of Shah Alam. Conservatives have used the decision to play up racial sentiments, claiming that Islam is “under attack” and that the Selangor chief minister was trying to deny Islam its position as the official state religion. They also consider the move an attempt at making all religions equal and to disrupt racial harmony. The rising tempers culminated in a demonstration outside the Selangor State Administrative Building, where demonstrators stepped on the severed head of a cow in front of the building's gate. The actions of the protesters received wide condemnation.

Discourse on Islam in Indonesia has focused on the question of a “conservative turn” or rising intolerance. The question seems to be more pertinent in the wake of the 2 December 2016 rally called Defending Islam Act (“Aksi Bela Islam”, or more popularly the 212 rally) against the then governor of Jakarta, Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (Ahok), for allegedly committing blasphemy. More recently, the appointment by President Joko Widodo (Jokowi) of the Indonesian Ulama Council (MUI) general chairman Ma’ruf Amin as his running mate for the 2019 presidential election has made this question even more pressing. Ma’ruf was the one who signed MUI's “religious stance” stating that Ahok's remarks (he was Jokowi's vice governor in 2012–14) constituted blasphemy. He was also one of the expert witnesses during the trial, contributing to the judge's decision to imprison Ahok for two years. Unlike Ahok, Jokowi is a Muslim. He was still concerned however that the 2019 election would be about which candidate is more Islamic. He seems to have been vindicated in this regard by the issues raised during the campaign. Recent events have amplified the polarization within Indonesian society, which in many cases boils down to competition between pro-Jokowi and anti- Jokowi groups.

It is ironic that Indonesia's conservative turn occurred during the post-1998 democratization phase. It has also, directly or indirectly, caused many setbacks to the process. These setbacks can be seen in two forms: the agenda of the conservatives on the one hand, and the government's reaction to them, such as the move to limit their freedom, on the other. In a sense, there is a tension between maintaining pluralism as a rival to the conservative agenda and democracy. While this chapter looks at recent events taking place in Indonesia, including the issues raised during the 2019 presidential election campaign, the issue about the tension between pluralism, conservatism and democracy is not unique to today's Indonesia, but is also an issue even for established democracies.

This chapter begins with the question of how to characterize the situation of Indonesian Islam today. Has it become more conservative or intolerant? While the perception of increased religious conservatism is valid, this article argues for a nuanced understanding of what is now happening in Indonesia.

In the past, Southeast Asia has been regarded as the bastion of “moderate Islam”. Some argue it is the “smiling face of Islam” compared to Muslim societies in the Middle East, where Islam originated 1400 years ago. Southeast Asian Muslims have always shown respect for local beliefs, traditions and cultures while remaining committed to their faith. The ulama or religious elites of the past did not consider respecting local traditions as compromising their religion. However, events in the 1970s, known as the Islamic revivalist period, led to Muslims in Southeast Asia embracing more conservative interpretations of Islam. Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore have shown an “Islamist turn”, some say. Muslim religious elites are promoting traditionalist discourses that are holding the community back from progress and modernity.

Recent episodes in the three countries feed this narrative. Chief among them was the 2016 mass rallies in Indonesia that sought to challenge Chinese-Christian governor Basuki Tjahaja Purnama, also known as Ahok. He was campaigning for re-election to the Jakarta governorship in 2017 when one of the speeches he gave was interpreted as constituting blasphemy. Ahok later lost the Jakarta election and was sentenced to jail. The mass protests were led by ultra and firebrand conservative Habib Rizieq Shihab. Indonesian president Joko Widodo was also banking on the rising conservatism to stay in power. In the April 2019 presidential election, in which he sought re-election, he chose the conservative Ma’ruf Amin as his running mate, despite the latter's controversial position towards minority Shias, Ahmadis and liberals. Jokowi won the election, which means Ma’ruf will serve as his vice-president between 2019 and 2024. In 2005, Ma’ruf endorsed the SIPILIS fatwa—anti-secularism, pluralism and liberalism—when he was head of the MUI (Ulama Council of Indonesia) fatwa committee. Ma’ruf has also concurrently been the chairman of MUI and Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) since 2015, making him the leader of the largest Muslim organization in the country. This book presents chapters on Indonesia that deal with issues pertaining to minority rights under the first Jokowi government. In the same vein, one chapter discusses the contribution of the Ahmadiyah to modernist Islamic discourse in the country, despite the group being seen as a deviant sect today. Another chapter addresses the debates surrounding the “conservative turn” in Indonesia and questions whether this is really taking place.