Introduction

President Vladimir Putin's overriding purpose from the very first days of his presidency from 2000 was the normalization of Russian foreign policy. Russia was to be treated as neither supplicant nor threat, but as just one more ‘normal’ great power. Through a combination of luck, skill and circumstances Putin achieved this remarkably quickly and effectively. By the time of the second Iraq war of 2003 Russia was treated no differently than any other country. That is to say, the harsh realities of the post-post-Cold War world hit Russia just as hard as any other country. The shedding of exaggerated illusions about Russia's status in the world did not mean that the country could avoid making hard choices and assuming responsibility for some of the world's problems. At the same time, unresolved problems of internal political development, the country's regional role and identity questions affected relations with the West. During Putin's second term, following his re-election in March 2004, the ‘regime question’ – the condition of Russian democracy – became an ever more salient issue in Russo-Western relations.

Towards a New Realism

McFaul and Goldgeier have argued that post-communist Russian foreign policy does not follow the pattern anticipated by realist thinking.

This essay examines how Western social theory from Marx and Weber to Wallerstein and Frank has been based on a Eurocentric version of history. The latter not only denies real world history, but also neglects most of the human reality, especially in Asia, even during the early modern period. In doing so, this Eurocentric history and historiography, as well as the social theory derived from the same substantially distorts the experience of the West. Therefore, as Asia is now re-emerging as the centre of world history, it is high time to re-orient our historiography and social theor y and that of the nineteenth century as well, during which the West and Asia traded places in the world.

How Western Perceptions of the East Changed

Until about 1800, the predominant Western perception of the East was favourable. Europeans were attracted to and sought to learn from many parts of the Orient that were seen as civilizationally, culturally, politically, socially, economically and technologically more advanced than any part or all of Europe. Indeed, ‘Orient’, according to the Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English, whose first edition dates to 1911, meant the following: ‘ORIENT: The East; lustrous, sparkling, precious; radiant, rising, nascent; place or exactly determine position, settle or find bearings; bring into clearly understood relations; direct towards; determine how one stands in relation to one's surroundings.’

Discourse on Applied Sociology is the collection of essays from the scholars who are excellent in the field of applied sociology. This engaging study urges a balance between knowledge-sociology and use-sociology. The authors are aware of the impasse often deliberately created by the self-conscious language of sociological theory. The primary concern of the applied sociologist is to adapt theoretical knowledge to actual human situations, using it to formulate social policy, investigate domestic and international social problems and create a pragmatic ‘sociology of possibility’. The volumes provide workable guidelines for social scientists, policymakers, planners, administrators and social activists. The reader is also introduced to the sophisticated research methods employed in the social sciences. Emphasizing cross-cultural experiences and a global perspective, the essays study social problems using inductive and deductive approaches, measurable concepts and quantitative analysis. Modern crises precipitated by war, terrorism, anarchy and poverty are examined in practical and realistic terms.

Professor Jay Weinstein of Eastern Michigan University, USA, an excellent friend, philosopher and guide has inspired us to undertake such a great venture. We are deeply indebted to him. It has been our pleasure to work with Anthem Press – we thank them for their unfailing enthusiasm.

Introduction

When the long-projected enlargement of the European Union (EU) finally took place on 1 May 2004, the Western Newly Independent States (WNIS), as the European Commission calls the former Soviet states of Belarus, Moldova, Russia and Ukraine, became the EU's new eastern neighbourhood. Although they had no prospect of acceding to the EU in the foreseeable future, they were perceived as ‘the EU's essential partners’. Indeed, the attainment of security, stability and sustainable development within the Union was deemed to require political reform, social cohesion and economic dynamism outside it, in particular in the EU's new eastern neighbourhood. The European Commission proposed a European Neighbourhood programme to promote a set of values ‘within the fields of the rule of law, good governance, the respect for human rights, including minority rights, the promotion of good neighbourly relations, and the principles of market economy and sustainable development’.

Russians were appalled that the EU's new neighbourhood plans appeared to put Russia in the same category not only as Belarus and Moldova, but also as the states of North Africa. Russia was duly left out of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP); instead the EU and Russia decided to develop their strategic partnership through the creation of four common spaces. However, the EU-Russian strategic partnership was already experiencing considerable strain by this time. Following the December 2003 parliamentary election, the Duma was dominated by the pro-presidential United Russia party, with little or no representation of those parties, Yabloko and the Union of Right Forces, which had previously been the most enthusiastic supporters of relations with the EU and of a ‘European perspective’ more generally.

Mutual Disappointment

One of the main objectives of the book was to examine the current state of Russia's relations with Europe from the perspective of both parties since the long-term prospects of any relationship must depend on meeting the needs of all those involved. What is particularly striking is the level of disappointment on all sides about what has actually been achieved over the past 15 years. There have certainly been a number of apparent breakthroughs in the development of a genuinely strategic partnership such as the NATO-Russia Founding Act in May 1997, the coming into force of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) in November 1997, the adoption of the European Union (EU)'s Common Strategy and Russia's Medium-Term Strategy in 1999, the establishment of the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) in 2002, the commitment to the four common spaces at St Petersburg in 2003 and the adoption of the road maps in 2005. However, the optimism and high expectations generated by such initiatives rapidly gave way to frustration at the slow progress being made in translating the ambitious goals into concrete achievements. It is clear that neither Russia nor Europe are satisfied with the current state of their partnership and both feel that the other has not lived up to their expectations.

From Russia's perspective, the West has provided only meagre aid to support its economic transition and been slow to open up its markets, either through the EU or the World Trade Organization (WTO).

Introduction: Norms, Values, and EU Foreign Policy*

For the European Union (EU), the link between norms, values and foreign policy seems to be an obvious one. For example, the new Constitutional Treaty spells out the set of values on which the Union's external action is based: democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law. In the treaty, the development of relations with third parties is made conditional upon sharing and upholding them.

In its external action the Union thus wants to be seen as an essentially normative power. This emphasis is understandable not only in the light of the EU's own history as a successful economic project based on political reconciliation between former deadly foes, but its current postmodern, or civilian power nature as well. Despite the recent and hectic work on the development of its military crisis-management capabilities, the Union still largely lacks the traditional (military) means of coercion, and is consequently forced to rely on ‘ softer’ means for influence and persuasion instead. Moreover, it needs to be stressed that this choice is not merely practical, reflecting the lack of means, but it also stems from the Union's self-conception (or identity) as a new and qualitatively different international actor that shuns away from traditional modes of ‘ power politics’ and seeks to promote a ‘ rule-based international order’ in its stead.

Russia and Europe in the Post-Cold War World

At the opening of the twenty-first century there was widespread optimism that the relationship between Russia and Europe was entering a new era of unprecedented cooperation and constructive engagement. Growing economic interdependence and the recognition of shared political, security and environmental challenges provided a powerful rationale for the development of a genuinely strategic partnership. However, by the summer of 2006 when this research project was completed it was clear that there was deep disappointment on both sides that so little had actually been achieved either in terms of practical outcomes or in developing mutual understanding and trust. As is usually the case when relationships are strained, the reasons are complex and rooted in the legacy of the past as much as in the difficulties of the present.

The sudden implosion of the Soviet-type system in central and eastern Europe (CEE) in 1989 and, ultimately, the Soviet Union two years later in 1991, initiated a traumatic period of socio-economic and political disruption and decline in Russia during the 1990s which was to culminate in the collapse of the rouble in August 1998 and the political humiliation of its impotence in the face of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-led military intervention into Kosovo in 1999. During this decade there was a fundamental transformation of the European political landscape which introduced a situation of extreme uncertainty within the international community.

The study of sociology began as a practical discipline, concerned with the alleviation of social problems through rational, logical analyses of the nature of the community. Sociology is the quintessential Enlightenment product – based on the commitment to the value of objective reason – a means for achieving social progress and harmony. What now seems naivety to many was considered to be an achievable goal – that a new world was possible and the sociologist, as the scientist of the social, was best placed to assist in the production of such a world. Naïve or not, it meant that the idea of sociological theory as different in some way from applied sociological work was inconceivable. As Marx suggested, it was not sufficient to interpret the world, the world also needed a change – a sentiment that was common to the varying perspectives of classical sociology (as well as to some recent sociology such as feminist sociology). But agreement as to how sociology could best affect positive social change has been a contested issue. It also partially explains the idea that developed in contemporary sociology that there is an abstract realm of theoretical discourse which is separated from the empirical investigation of social problems and the application of the findings. As stated above, this viewpoint would have been antithetical to early sociology.

Introduction

In 1999 Javier Solana, the European Union (EU)'s newly appointed High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), described developing a partnership with Russia as ‘the most important, the most urgent and the most challenging task that the European Union faces at the beginning of the 21st Century’. It has also proved the greatest test of its credibility as a foreign policy actor, raising critical questions about its capacity for coherent and effective action. Although it has aspirations to play a global role, it is in Europe that the EU's most immediate interests and ambitions lie and Russia is recognized as the other key player on the continent. It is the EU's largest neighbour both in terms of population and territory and has immense reserves of natural resources, including oil and gas. Despite its loss of ‘superpower’ status, it is still a major military power in both conventional and nuclear terms and remains a key actor at the global level with a permanent seat on the UN Security Council (UNSC) and membership of the Group of Eight (G8). It has strong interests and significant influence in regions central to the EU's security, such as eastern Europe, the Middle East, the Balkans and Central Asia. The long common border means that cooperation with Russia is extremely important in tackling soft security threats such as illegal immigration, international crime, terrorism, nuclear accidents and environmental pollution.

The assertion about the peculiarly intricate and complex character of social phenomena has, in much of social discourse, a virtually uncontested tradition. A significant part of the premise about the complexity of social phenomena is the conviction that it complicates, perhaps even inhibits the development and application of social scientific knowledge. Our paper explores the origins, the basis and the consequences of this assertion and asks in particular whether the classic complexity assertion still deserves to be invoked in analyses that ask about the production and the utilization of social scientific knowledge in modern society. We refer to one of the most prominent and politically influential social scientific theories, John Maynard Keynes' economic theory as an illustration. We conclude that, the practical value of social scientific knowledge is not necessarily dependent on a faithful, in the sense of complete, representation of (complex) social reality. Practical knowledge is context sensitive if not project bound. Social scientific knowledge that wants to optimize its practicality has to attend and attach itself to elements of practical social situations that can be altered or are actionable by relevant actors.

This chapter represents an effort to re-examine the relation between social reality, social scientific knowledge and its practical application. There is a widely accepted view about the potential social utility of social scientific knowledge that invokes the peculiar complexity of social reality as an impediment to good theoretical comprehension and hence to its applicability.

Introduction

The period since the end of the Cold War has witnessed a transformation of the European security map and – as a necessary precondition of this – of politicalmilitary relations between Russia and Europe. The withdrawal of former Soviet forces from Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), the conclusion of arms control arrangements – in particular the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty, CFE-1A agreement and Open Skies treaty – verbal agreements on nondeployment of tactical nuclear weapons, cooperative threat reduction programmes and establishment of confidence and security building measures were designed to end the period of confrontation and usher in a new era of security cooperation while preserving, at least in formal terms, a balance of military power. This has been complemented by the institutionalization of security arrangements with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU) and active Russian involvement in regional security organizations. Since Europe needed Moscow's acquiescence to carry out the dual NATO/EU enlargements and stabilize the continent, and Russia needed access to ‘Western’ institutions, these developments have often been presented positively in diplomatic terms, not least in commentaries on the supposedly ‘pro-Western shift’ in foreign and security policy initiated by Putin in his first term.

The pressure of internal developments has often tended to push politicalmilitary relations between Russia and Europe into the background.

Applied sociology has been around for a long time. Lester Ward's distinction between ‘pure’ and ‘applied’ sociology in 1906 and the Outline of Applied Sociology, written by Yale's Henry Fairchild in 1916 are two of the most well-known indicators of the attention applied sociology received during sociology's emergent stage. After all, applied sociology as social reform – attracted many to the field of sociology – as illustrated by the Chicago School, making it an important part of sociology.

Lester Ward, the acknowledged founder of American sociology, wrote the classic Applied Sociology: A Treatise on the Conscious Improvement of Society by Society that provided an excellent illustration of the early integration of application and sociological knowledge. Furthermore, Ward, by training a botanist and zoologist, was attracted to the social world by his desire for its improvement. He states in his ‘Treatise’: ‘The purpose of applied sociology is to harmonize achievement with improvement’ (Ward, 1906). Like many of his contemporaries, Ward thought social knowledge should be used for social improvement and reform – ‘pure’ should result in ‘applied’, or ‘applied’ should be integral with ‘pure’.

An early example of this reform-oriented sociology is the ‘fivedollar day plan’ by Henry Ford and the development of the Ford Sociological Department within the company to conduct research to determine not only who should participate in the plan but also to suggest ways that non-qualifiers could alter their behaviour to qualify (Loizedes & Sonnad, 2004).

Introduction

It has been suggested that relations between the European Union (EU) and Russia can be seen as that between an elephant (being the EU) and a bear (being Russia) in the sense that there are few commonalities, few meeting points, and little common understanding. From this perspective, Russia is stuck in the nineteenth century geopolitical state-to-state thinking, while the EU approaches the external world from a unique, postmodern standpoint. The scope for misunderstanding would thus appear to be very significant.

The EU' s policy towards Russia is sometimes criticized as a failure. Some commentators argue that in fact there has not been much of a common policy at all. Member states often seem to pursue their own interests with Russia, led mainly by trade and energy considerations, to the detriment of common EU positions. While there may be elements of truth in both assertions, we will argue that EU-Russia relations have advanced significantly over the past years. Extreme scepticism is misplaced.

In the past two years, the EU and Russia have agreed to work towards increasingly close cooperation (possibly containing elements of convergence and integration in selected areas) in four broad domains that encompass nearly the whole range of the EU's multifaceted relations with Russia. These broad areas are now known as the ‘four common spaces’, which were initially agreed at the St Petersburg summit of May 2003: a Common Economic Space (CES); a Common Space of Freedom, Security and Justice; a Common Space of External Security; and a Common Space of Research and Education.