Introduction

This chapter will consider one of the most important penal and spatial legacies of the mutiny-rebellion, Britain's permanent settlement of the Andaman Islands as a colony for the reception of convicts. Before the outbreak of the revolt the British had vague plans to populate the Islands, setting up the Andamans Committee to consider the issue in April 1857. At this time the government saw convicts as a means to an end, as labourers who might secure its long-term aim of productive colonial expansion, notably the protection of shipping and trade routes. In the aftermath of the uprising the British required urgently a place for the exile and imprisonment of mutineer-rebels. The trajectory of proposed settlement therefore changed between the constitution of the committee a month before the revolt began and its departure for the Islands in November 1857. The committee's original plan was to consider the suitability of the Andamans for colonization, but by the time it left India its brief had changed. Government then assumed that the Islands would be settled as a penal colony and the committee was asked to report on where best such a settlement should be located. Clearly, both during pre-settlement surveys and in the months after transportation began the government recognized convicts' economic and social potential as permanent settlers. In part, this was related to the government's desire to promote the colony's self-sufficiency.

The intellectual impetus for this volume is the abiding interest of its editors in promoting in-depth, cutting-edge analysis of the current global political economy in order to advance a political economy of more equitable, humane, eco-sensitive global futures. In meeting this challenge, the contributors of this book develop distinctive and original theoretical frameworks and propose new mediations between theory and history, which is a deeply problematic relationship in the social sciences. Put differently, this volume offers theoryinformed writing which contextualizes empirical research on current worldhistoric events and trends with an eye towards realizing a future of human socio-economic betterment. We view this project as a sequel to an earlier collection, edited by Albritton, Itoh, Westra, and Zuege, Phases of Capitalist Development: Booms, Crises, and Globalizations. Like with that well-received volume, we have gathered internationally recognized contributors who are based in diverse countries and write from different conceptual perspectives within the critical political economy tradition broadly understood. The key difference between the earlier and current volumes, however, is their respective orientations to time and location in time. While the previous work focused on periodizing capitalism and theorizing its successive world-historic phases to understand the present, the current project focuses on the present in order to better inform our reflections on possible or likely global futures. Moreover, whereas all the essays in the previous volume were written during or prior to the year 2000, this collection captures the momentous transformations of the global political economy, and its leading economies, in the intervening years.

Introduction

In February 1858 the superintendent of Meerut jail, H.M. Cannon, submitted the usual annual report to the government of the North-West Provinces. There was, however, nothing ordinary about his account. As Superintendent Cannon explained, he was not able to provide a formal report because rebels had either burnt or destroyed all the jail records during the previous year's disturbances. Instead, he presented a narrative of what had happened when mutiny broke out in the town. At the beginning of May, 85 sowars of the third regiment of light cavalry were sentenced to imprisonment by a general court martial, 80 for ten years and five for five years. The prisoners arrived at the old jail, which was situated about two miles from the cantonment, on the morning of 9 May. What Cannon did not mention was that these men had been tried over the previous three days for having refused to take the cartridges issued to them for use on parade when ordered to do so by their superior officer, Brevet-Colonel G.M.C. Smyth. These were of course the fated greased cartridges that allegedly were smeared in animal fat and coated with gelatine paper.

J.W. Kaye, who recorded an account of the events at Meerut that day in his classic account History of the Sepoy War in India, described what happened next. Guards brought the prisoners before their regiment. They stripped them of their uniforms and accoutrements.

It is widely recognized that the past three decades mark a significant break with the social, political, economic and cultural order that characterized the decades following World War II. Basic changes include the weakening and transformation of welfare states in the capitalist West, the collapse or fundamental metamorphosis of bureaucratic party-states in the communist East, and the undermining of developmental states in what had been called the Third World. More generally, recent decades have seen the weakening of national, state-centred economic sovereignty and the emergence and consolidation of a neo-liberal global order. Social, political and cultural life has become increasingly global, on the one hand; on the other hand, they have become increasingly de-centred and fragmented.

These changes have occurred against the background of a lengthy period of stagnation and crisis: since the early 1970s, the growth of real wages has decreased dramatically, real wages have remained generally flat, profit rates have stagnated, and labour productivity rates have declined. Yet, these crisis phenomena have not led to a resurgence of working class movements. On the contrary, the past decades have seen the decline of classical labour movements and the rise of new social movements, often characterized by the politics of identity, including nationalist movements, movements of sexual politics and various forms of religious ‘fundamentalism’. Trying to come to terms with the large-scale transformations of the past three decades, then, entails addressing not only the long-term economic downturn since the early 1970s, but also important changes in the character of social and cultural life.

Introduction

In this chapter, I argue that in the current phase of social development, a crisis of exhaustion of the biosphere may be beginning to radicalize segments, or ‘fractions’ of what I call the class of managerial cadre – the auxiliary, executive arm of the capitalist class properly speaking.

The capitalist ruling class is the owner of capital, who by its restless quest for high-yield assets decides the direction of social development. The cadre are the paid functionaries overseeing that development in the economy and society at large, integrating all its technical, educational, and other aspects, and as organic intellectuals, providing ideological cohesion to the consequences of this particular course. Thus, when capitalist discipline is effectively imposed on a global scale, the cadre will be involved in managing globalization in all its aspects, from actual transnational business operations and training other managers, via propaganda praising the blessings of free trade and payments, to organizing forms of ‘global governance’. In the process, certain fractions of the cadre are in a position to observe, at close range, current developments from a different angle than that of the stock market operator. And what they see is not necessarily encouraging. Indeed as Anthony Hopkins playing Nixon in Oliver Stone's movie says to his First Lady, ‘It's not pretty, Buddy! It's not pretty!’

The effect of the world-embracing operation of capital creates complex webs of interaction, a socialization of labour on a planetary scale.

We are living in one of the most exciting times in history. It is a time of crisis and breakdown, and a time of potential transition to a new and more evolved economic and social stage. Diverse and vibrant movements for social transformation are springing up all around the world. The US, while playing a reactionary role through its imperialist state policies and globalizing corporations, is also a locus of significant post-modern transformation. We call this time in the US ‘the Transformative Moment’, to emphasize its potential for paradigmatic and systematic economic and social change.

The Transformative Moment can be understood as a deep-seated and many-faceted response to the imbalances, inequality and lack of freedom created by the reigning economic and social paradigm, a paradigm that we call the Hierarchical Polarization Paradigm. In the first part of this paper, we will analyse the core elements of the Hierarchical Polarization Paradigm. In the second part, we will discuss the seven transformative processes that various US social movements are participating in now; processes, which are beginning to construct a new, more balanced, free and equal paradigm of economic and social life.

Our goal in this paper is to provide the reader with a new conceptual framework, which will help them understand the transformative potential of the present historical conjuncture in the US – the Transformative Moment. The conceptual framework presented here builds on the fundamentals of Marxian economics, particularly as interpreted by David Levine (1977; 1978; 1981).

This chapter explores neo-liberalism, its forms, its periodization, and its future in the context of the changing dynamics of the capitalist world market. It focuses particularly on American neo-liberalism and foreign economy policy because the US remains the dominant neo-liberal power. It argues that, notwithstanding the loss of American economic hegemony and the growing challenge to its domination across a number of fields, US economic and political power retains disproportionate significance. This is because the new forms of financial domination promoted by the federal government, its associated international economic apparatuses, and transnational financial capital are still ‘ecologically dominant’ in shaping the world economy and global order more generally. The chapter has five parts. It first addresses issues of periodization that bear on the capitalist world market and neo-liberalism, then defines neo-liberalism and distinguishes its four main forms. Subsequently, it proceeds to discuss four forms of economic determination broadly considered, argues that the logic of American neo-liberalism is ecologically dominant in the world market, and concludes with some general remarks on the contradictions and limits of American domination.

Questions of Periodization

To ask what follows neo-liberalism is to pose a problem of periodization. The primary purpose of any periodization is to interpret an otherwise undifferentiated ‘flow’ of historical time by classifying events and/or processes in terms of their internal affinities and external differences in order to identify successive periods of relative invariance and the transitions between them (cf. Elchardus, 1988, p. 48).

In this essay I want to utilize a particular interpretation of Marx's Capital to explore the extreme contradictions of the contemporary fast food system as it manifests in a particular sector (food) and in acute forms the general contradictions that Marx discussed in his brilliant three volume study of capital's inner logic. My approach features two levels of analysis proceeding from a theory of capital's deep structures to an analysis of some central features of the production and consumption of food in the US currently. The abstract level develops seven crucial themes extracted from capital's inner logic, and the historical level illustrates some ways in which these themes are played out in the current fast food sector of the increasingly globalized American economy.

Following the remarkable work of Japanese political economist Thomas Sekine, I have come to see that Marx's Capital can be reconstructed as a rigorous dialectical logic making it potentially the most powerful theory in modern social science. While the commodity-form never rules us completely, in developed capitalist societies, it does so to such an extent that it is possible to complete its rule in theory. By doing this we convert social power relations into economic structures that can be theorized as forming necessary inner connections that interrelate through quantities (essentially price signals) that are manifested in markets.

Introduction

More than 150 years ago, in The Communist Manifesto, Marx and Engels observed that capitalism has a powerful tendency to destroy pre-capitalist relations and institutions:

Since those words were written, the continuing history of capitalism has borne them out. The vigorous accumulation process that capitalism gives rise to has continued to erode non-capitalist institutions. Feudal and semi-feudal relations throughout the world have, over time, dissolved under the pressure of capitalist penetration. Relations of independent commodity production, while not entirely eliminated, have been gradually reduced and increasingly marginalized.

However, capitalism has not eliminated all pre-existing non-capitalist institutions. In certain instances it reshaped them to suit its needs while retaining them as non-capitalist in form. Three examples that have been essential to capitalist reproduction are states, families and educational institutions. Such institutions are able to play a role in the reproduction of capitalism, not in spite of their internally non-capitalist form, but because of it, as will be explained below.

The tendency of capitalism to erode non-capitalist institutions potentially clashes with the need for non-capitalist institutions to be maintained in their supportive role in capitalist reproduction. A social system made up entirely of institutions that operate on capitalist principles and embody capitalist relations would not be viable.

Few events in the history of the British Empire have attracted as much interest or controversy as the Indian mutiny-rebellion of 1857–8. Since its immediate aftermath historical readings of the tumultuous events that swept across north India during these years have focussed largely on the causes of the revolt, and explanations for it are many and various. This reflects the multi-facetted character of the military and popular uprisings that fuelled and sustained events. Widespread mutiny in the Bengal army was accompanied rapidly by massive civil unrest, and few communities in rebellious areas in the North-West Provinces, Awadh, and western Bihar were unaffected. Though British and Indian historians have claimed variously that the unrest was ‘mutiny’, ‘rebellion’, or ‘war of independence’, it is impossible to capture the essence or meaning of the revolt in such simplistic, singular ways.

Mutiny first erupted in the cantonment of Meerut on 9 May 1857, provoked by the fettering and imprisonment of a group of sowars (cavalrymen) and sepoys (from the Persian sipahi, meaning native infantry) who had refused to use a new issue of cartridges allegedly greased with animal fat. Military mutiny fanned civil unrest and that night sepoys and rebels broke open the town's two prisons.

When in 2006 the original edition of this publication was completed, there were growing concerns regarding the state of Russian-European relations. Russia was in the process of becoming a more assertive energy power, the values gap between Russia and the West was perceived to be widening with the latter facing a difficult challenge of balancing values against interests in the pursuit of a strategic partnership with the Russian Administration.

Since this time, the relationship has become even more problematic. The impact of the European Union's enlargement to the East in 2004 has been extensive in terms of policy formulation on Russia, and has seen an emerging rift between accommodationist and more hard line member states. The breakdown of negotiations on a new treaty agreement in 2007 presented political challenges for both Russia and the EU, and it remains to be seen what kind of deal will be reached in the course of 2009. The election of Dmitri Medvedev in March 2008 prompted speculation regarding the relationship between the new President and Vladimir Putin, who had taken up the post of Prime Minister, and the future course of Russian foreign and domestic policy, particularly in terms of the ‘shared neighbourhood’, comprising the former Soviet republics to Russia's western and eastern borders. The outbreak of violent conflict in South Ossetia in August 2008 has had a detrimental effect on Russia's relations with the European Union, NATO and the US, and has prompted discussion whether we are witnessing the onset of a new Cold War.

Social Realities in Crisis

Are sociologists, therefore, getting back to their original roots? Applied sociology has its own tradition, which urges its practitioners to raise the question – ‘Sociology for whom and for what purpose?’ Simplistically speaking, those sociologists should not trouble themselves any further to open new avenues for intellectual stimulation. If such a process continues it is undeniable that we will touch the borderline of post risk society and simulacra-fashioned ‘sociological imagination’. The reality of the unreal has already dominated the field of theoretical puzzles. The other name for theoretical simulacra is postmodern theoretical abstraction. Alfred McClung Lee (1976) feels that ‘the character of any sociological inquiry depends upon by and for whom it is conceived and applied.

The Legacy of the Soviet Period on Russia's International Trade Structure

Russia's Communist experience resulted not only in political, but also in economic isolation from the West. Trade and financial transactions with the non-Communist world were not ruled out per se – indeed the Soviet authorities carefully nurtured a reputation for being reliable debtors and were not averse to tapping foreign financial markets when needed. Nevertheless, the doctrine of economic self-sufficiency (autarky) and the country's adversarial relationship with the West quickly reduced economic contacts to a minimum. The situation did not change radically after the victory in World War II; indeed, the extension of Soviet power over central Europe allowed the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) access to supplies of advanced mechanical equipment (notably from Eastern Germany or the Czech Republic) and to agricultural produce, giving new life to the system. The USSR did not join any of the major international economic institutions (such as International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank), and prevented its satellites from participating in the Marshall Plan and in the organisation that ran it, which later developed into the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Soviet-bloc countries instead joined the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon), whose transferable rouble system offered the Soviet Union the opportunity to base trade with its satellites on a favourable monetary regime, unconnected to world prices and not dependent on hard currency.

Introduction

No developed countries embrace the concept of multipolarity as much as France and Russia do. Using fulsome language on frequent occasions, both sides go to great pains to emphasize their mutual goals to replace the current US-dominated unipolar system with a multipolar world order. ‘France and Russia’, hailed Jacques Chirac, ‘have a common vision of the future…, a certain vision of a multipolar world that takes fully into account the end of the Cold War and the process of reunification of the European continent.’ This is not mere diplomatic pomp. These two countries genuinely see each other as like-minded pioneers in the struggle for multipolarity. Each views itself as a vanguard power, indeed a great power, with a universal mission to help erect a new, multipolar system of international relations. Each envisions this future system as one in which emerging poles of power – including the European Union (EU) (inspired by France), Eurasia (Russia), China, India and Latin America (Brazil) – would join the highest ranks of the international stage within a multilateral, law-based framework, putting an end to ‘unjust’ and ‘unequal’ American unipolarity. Moreover, their multipolar quest even lies at the heart of their bilateral relationship.

None of this is surprising – even though it may seem particularly odd to link France (an established democracy and the seventh largest capitalist economy in the world) and Russia (a ‘bureaucratic authoritarian’ polity with an emerging, state-capitalist economy) in any serious way.