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Dan Friedman, a cofounder and artistic director emeritus of the Castillo Theatre in New York City, interviews Daniel Maposa, the founder and executive director of Savanna Trust, a politically engaged theatre based in Harare, Zimbabwe. Their conversation covers the history of political theatre in Zimbabwe from colonial times to the present.
Hydatid cyst is an infectious disease that occurs in humans due to infection of Echinococcus granulosus larvae. Although cardiac hydatid cysts are rare, right atrial localisation is even rarer. The aim of this article is to emphasise the importance of always being alert and prepared for the risk of anaphylaxis developing due to cyst rupture in paediatric patients with isolated cardiac hydatid cysts, to initiate oral albendazole treatment immediately upon diagnosis, to underline the importance of surgical timing, and to discuss the role of clinical assessment and imaging methods in predicting of cyst rupture.
The outbreak of the American Revolution thrust would-be revolutionaries into a paradoxical relationship with the law. As they overthrew colonial governments from New Hampshire to Georgia during the summer and fall of 1775, leaders of the resistance to Great Britain found themselves in the awkward position of having to justify rebellion against British authority while still professing to be law-abiding Britons. The revolutionaries’ mandate to govern rested on protecting rights to property and representation that many colonists believed had been violated by agents of the Empire, but the practicalities of war demanded extra-legal measures. The popular governments that replaced colonial administrations had to find a way to balance upholding many of the laws of the old regime while simultaneously organizing an armed insurrection against it. Much of this burden fell on revolutionary committees at the town and local level. As the Continental Congress and provincial elites vacillated between rebellion and reconciliation and struggled to assert control over the fast-growing revolutionary coalition, ad hoc governments comprised of ordinary citizens took on the tasks of governing their regions and organizing for armed struggle. For much of 1775 and early 1776, these popular regimes precariously balanced the need for extra-legal expediencies with the need to maintain at least a semblance of law to maintain their legitimacy.
I spell out a distinctive account of what is wrong with inequalities of wealth: they constitute asymmetries of power. Two ideas lie behind this view. The first is that asymmetries of power constitute inegalitarian relationships. Think of the relationship of king to subject or master to slave: these are in part constituted by asymmetric power. The second is that wealth gives one power over people. When you have a lot of money, you can pay people to do what you want, and that gives you power over them. Inequalities of wealth, by constituting asymmetries of power, thus constitute objectionably inegalitarian relationships.
Let A be an abelian variety defined over a global function field F and let p be a prime distinct from the characteristic of F. Let $F_\infty $ be a p-adic Lie extension of F that contains the cyclotomic $\mathbb {Z}_p$-extension $F^{\mathrm {cyc}}$ of F. In this paper, we investigate the structure of the p-primary Selmer group $\mathrm {Sel}(A/F_\infty )$ of A over $F_\infty $. We prove the $\mathfrak {M}_H(G)$-conjecture for $A/F_\infty $. Furthermore, we show that both the $\mu $-invariant of the Pontryagin dual of the Selmer group $\mathrm {Sel}(A/F^{\mathrm {cyc}})$ and the generalized $\mu $-invariant of the Pontryagin dual of the Selmer group $\mathrm {Sel}(A/F_\infty )$ are zero, thereby proving Mazur’s conjecture for $A/F$. We then relate the order of vanishing of the characteristic elements, evaluated at Artin representations, to the corank of the Selmer group of the corresponding twist of A over the base field F. Assuming the finiteness of the Tate–Shafarevich group, we establish that this corank equals the order of vanishing of the L-function of $A/F$ at $s=1$. Finally, we extend a theorem of Sechi—originally proved for elliptic curves without complex multiplication—to abelian varieties over global function fields. This is achieved by adapting the notion of generalized Euler characteristic, introduced by Zerbes for elliptic curves over number fields. This new invariant allows us, via Akashi series, to relate the generalized Euler characteristic of $\mathrm {Sel}(A/F_\infty )$ to the Euler characteristic of $\mathrm {Sel}(A/F^{\mathrm {cyc}})$.
In her latest book, Sally Sedgwick raises two essential questions. The first will be of interest to all philosophers: why do most of Hegel’s texts take the form of ‘progressive narratives’? Why does Hegel give the form of a narrative to some of his philosophical texts, in a relatively unusual way? The second will be of particular interest to the Hegelian community: to what extent is Hegel’s conception of reason itself historical? Does it make sense to anchor in historical experience the rational instruments that enable us to give meaning to experience?
Smith’s “luxury hypothesis” seems to assert that the endless violence of the feudal era ended with the appearance of luxury goods. This view holds that feudal lords had nothing to do with their wealth but to wage war—no other markets were available to them. As luxury goods became available, the lords dropped their weapons and disbanded their armies so that they could buy more luxury goods. The traditional account has causality going from the appearance of luxury goods to the lords disbanding their armies. On my approach, ubiquitous violence under feudalism implies that the causal logic in this account goes from the logic of violence to the gradual and sequential appearance of luxury goods to ending violence near the towns and cities, but not in the agrarian hinterland.