Genuinely broad in scope, each handbook in this series provides a complete state-of-the-field overview of a major sub-discipline within language study, law, education and psychological science research.
Genuinely broad in scope, each handbook in this series provides a complete state-of-the-field overview of a major sub-discipline within language study, law, education and psychological science research.
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This chapter discusses the relationship between children and money in developmental psychology researches. It summarizes the four maxims of developmental psychology for money. First, it is not predicated on the homo economics as rational economic decision-makers. Second, in analyzing children's understanding and knowledge of money, such understanding and knowledge should be always discussed in association with children's life-world, instead of separating from it. Third, it is not predicated on a neutral money goods exchange system in market economy, but should be analyzed in the social context with its own cultures and histories. Fourth, developmental psychology for money inquires how children would appropriate money as a cultural tool and change their participation in their societies through the appropriation. The chapter explores how they would form new culture through implementation of such activities, instead of inquiring how children would understand money as a neutral tool which functions in a market economy system.
Mediationism extends across two contrasting approaches to theory in psychology, namely, the dominant tradition of individualistic, cognitive theory, and the too loyal "opposition" consisting of various alternative approaches. Within cognitive psychology, mediationism has primarily taken the form of representationalism: the appeal to internal rules and representations as a necessary and sufficient basis for explanation within human psychology. The dualisms of matter and mind and of biology and culture are institutionalized in the very structure of modern academic disciplines. Some of the most influential current approaches within social psychology are frank extensions of individualistic cognitive theory to the interpersonal realm, and so it is hardly surprising that representationalism figures centrally in both. The curious thing about the windowless room of mediationism is that there are so many ways of getting into it. Taking note of those different ways is an important first step towards getting over mediationism.
Language acquisition is seen as having a plurality of functions that are themselves linked to a plurality of contexts beyond language without which its uses could not be understood. This chapter explains how the pragmatic perspective was introduced in early Cognitive development through the acquisition of language. In the study of early infancy, it is very common for objects to be treated as natural signs that lead to "natural and direct interpretations. The chapter discusses the Bruner's work in the 1970s, influenced by the philosophers of the linguistic turn. He introduced the idea of "pragmatic opportunism" which humans use when solving problems. Based on the work on triadic adult-infant-object interaction, the chapter highlights the importance of longitudinal, microgenetic and qualitative research, based on the processes of construction. The Peircien approach, which allows for the inclusion of objects and their uses within a semiotic reading, is also discussed.
This chapter focuses on the historical socio-cultural processes of producing psychological theories, and most specifically theories of a socio-cultural kind. Psychology is a consequence of situated activities and thus the knowledge it offers is subordinated to a process of continuous cultural and historical transformation. The chapter describes how human rationality gets shaped in a socio-historical spiral, focusing on how culture establishes and distributes levels of self-reflection about human action. An analysis of the emergence of psychological theories about the socio-cultural phenomenon follows. The chapter then explains how multidisciplinary heritage produced current psychological approaches to socio-cultural phenomena. The sociocultural network of contents, reasons, and meanings, which shape subjectivity and permit to make sense of human activity is examined. Finally, the chapter argues that human behavior involves an activity oriented towards establishing the meaning of experiencing.
This chapter examines the concept of communication traditionally and currently used in the field of ethology. It describes a few landmarks in the evolution of communication in the different species, paying particular on the mechanisms that regulate these features since this is where the levels of progressive complexity of processing are found. The different modalities of communication have evolved to serve the general function of regulating the (social) behavior of each species within its own ecological niche. The emergence of birds and mammals was accompanied by a reorganization of perceptive systems, which were for the first-time centralized in the brain. The chapter focuses on communication in primates, and in particular the anthropoids, since these animals make use of forms of communication very close to those of humans. Finally, the chapter focuses on describes the sign created by the hominid mind in order to facilitate communication between minds.
This chapter is devoted to reviewing some aspects of thalamic structure and function as they may contribute to making small fractions of mentation momentarily conscious, with particular emphasis on those thalamic constituents sometimes called non-specific. It offers a brief discussion of usages of the word consciousness and a few explicit assumptions about neuronal activity patterns (NAPs). The chapter employs a philosophically technical usage, following Wimsatt, who contrasts emergent with aggregative. The idea that consciousness is generated independently in different places is supported by the finding that color and motion occurring at the same time can sometimes be perceived at different times. The chapter's hypothesis suggests that for some content represented by neuronal activity pattern in cortex to be endowed with consciousness, there must be a connection between the intralaminar nuclei (ILN) and the region(s) of cortex containing those NAPs.
This chapter traces the development of the problem of consciousness in Western philosophy from the time of the ancient Greeks to the middle of the 20th century. The core problem of consciousness focuses on the nature of subjectivity. The chapter focuses on what has become the central issue in consciousness studies, which is the problem of integrating subjectivity into the scientific view of the world. The mainstream view has not long been mainstream, for the problem of consciousness cannot strike one at all until a fairly advanced scientific understanding of the world permits development of the materialism presupposed by the mainstream view. It was the scientific revolution of the 16th and 17th centuries that forced the problem of the Christian dogma into prominence. In philosophy, the 1950s saw the beginning of a self-conscious effort to understand the mind and, eventually, consciousness as physical through and through in essentially scientific terms.
This chapter describes two empirical movements that have shaped the recent study of consciousness in relation to memory. The first breakthrough can be traced to the reports of implicit memory in severely amnesic individuals. The second impetus came from the distinction Endel Tulving introduced between remembering and knowing. The chapter adopts Tulving's tripartite distinction among three states of consciousness to provide coherence to the review of the literature. Tulving distinguished among autonoetic (remembering), noetic (knowing), and anoetic forms of consciousness, which refer, respectively, to self-knowing, knowing, and non-knowing states of consciousness. One of the most compelling findings from recent studies is that subjects sometimes report vivid conscious experiences (Remember responses) for events that never occurred. This phenomenon has been termed false remembering, illusory recollection, or phantom recollection. Research on remembering, knowing, and priming reveals the systematic responsiveness of these measures to the influence of specific independent and subject variables.
Consciousness of the kind we value often takes narrative forms. This chapter adopts the psychological stance of Bruner who writes that narrative deals in human or human-like intention and action and the vicissitudes and consequences that mark their course. It discusses the interaction-type elements and story-type elements of narrative, and explores whether consciousness has causal properties. The chapter explains the evolution and development of consciousness, and the developmental psychology of narrative consciousness. The chapter presents a debate of a protagonist and an antagonist. It proposes that we accept not only Dennett's metaphor of self-as-novelist but also that, different conclusions may be drawn than those offered by Dennett. The chapter explores the idea of a conscious unitary self, based on functional properties of narrative. It discusses four aspects of consciousness: the Helmholtzian consciousness, Woolfian consciousness, Vygotskyan consciousness, and Meadean consciousness.
This chapter discusses three classes of theories: information-processing theories that build on modular elements, network theories that focus on the distributed access of conscious processing, and globalist theories that combine aspects of these two. It also discusses cognitive or functional models of consciousness with less reference to the burgeoning neuroscientific evidence that increasingly supports the globalist position. Beginning in the 1980s, a number of experimental methods gained currency as means of studying comparable conscious and non-conscious processes. The metaphor of cognitive architectures dates to the 1970s when cognitive psychologists created information-processing models of mental processes. The general position is that consciousness operates as a distributed and flexible system offering nonconscious expert systems global accessibility to information that has a high concurrent value to the organism. Future work should focus on obtaining neuroscientific evidence and corresponding behavioral observations that can address global access as the distinguishing feature of consciousness.
Many theorists treat consciousness as a single, all-or-nothing phenomenon, others distinguish between first order consciousness and a meta-level of consciousness. This chapter proposes that discussions of the development of consciousness have been hampered by reliance on relatively undifferentiated notions of consciousness. It describes the Levels of Consciousness (LOC) model, which addresses explicitly the potential implications of neurocognitive development for children's subjective experience. First, the chapter presents an overview of the model and then provides an account of the way in which consciousness develops during the first 5 years of life (and potentially beyond). Finally, it considers the implications of the LOC model for: the structure of consciousness, cognitive control via the use of rules at different levels of complexity, the functions of prefrontal cortex, and the development of consciousness in childhood.