Recent legal and educational decisions have caused educational stakeholders to examine and redefine what it means for school and district demography to be diverse, equitable, inclusive, and anti-racist (DEIA). For some, DEIA is seen as being “limiting” to the very people who have created the legal, economic, educational, and historical obstacles which have limited and prevented opportunities for people of color (POC) for centuries and generations in the US. Rather than acknowledging and removing the intentional and external educational obstacles for POC, it has become a blame the victim proposition. Fortunately, or unfortunately, because the historical and social constraints for people of color have been ongoing, for decades (or centuries) the ways in which POC have worked around and through these challenges have had to be consistent, creative, and effective.

The themes of the chapters in this section suggest that school–university partnerships are a key structure for the preparation of new teachers and the ongoing professional development of veteran teachers. School–university partnerships value the expertise of all stakeholders including P-12 teachers, university- and school-based teacher educators, P-12 and university administrators, and teacher candidates. The chapters in this section focus on fully developed partnerships between universities and P-12 schools, the pedagogy of racial and social justice, effective teacher professional development, and community engagement.

There is growing global interest in how AI can improve access to justice, including how it can increase court capacity. This chapter considers the potential future use of AI to resolve disputes in the place of the judiciary. We focus our analysis on the right to a fair trial as outlined in Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights, and ask: do we have a right to a human judge? We firstly identify several challenges to interpreting and applying Article 6 in this new context, before considering the principle of human dignity, which has received little attention to date. Arguing that human dignity is an interpretative principle which incorporates protection from dehumanisation, we propose it provides a deeper, or “thicker” reading of Article 6. Applied to this context, we identify risks of dehumanisation posed by judicial AI, including not being heard, or not being subject to human judgement or empathy. We conclude that a thicker reading of Article 6 informed by human dignity strongly suggests the need to preserve human judges at the core of the judicial process in the age of AI.

Globalization has become a profound and transformative force in modern societies. Increasing connectivity has disrupted traditional sociocultural ways of life while new cultural influences suggest new ways of living. The neoliberal underpinnings of globalization have exacerbated inequality and prioritized profit-seeking over environmental concerns. Accordingly, the negative consequences of globalization have challenged central human needs such as local embeddedness, contextual predictability, justice, security, and sense of safety. As a result, the overarching processes of globalization have given rise to perceptions of threats in different locations, triggering extreme psychological reactions that may manifest through violent means. Thus, violent extremism rooted in globalization emerges in response to increased feelings of uncertainty, insignificance, and injustice driven by accelerating connectivity. Whereas the manifestations of globalization-based violent extremism may vary in different contexts, a key characteristic is mutuality and interconnectedness. Events and ideas resonate across the globe, amplified within online echo chambers, leading to heightened polarization and enclave deliberation. To counteract globalization-based violent extremism, we must foster a sense of stability and belonging and promote tolerance at the local level. Additionally, developing deliberative competencies to navigate the complexities of an increasingly plural and fluid world is crucial in mitigating the challenges posed by contemporary globalized connectivity.

Terrorism, radicalization, and (violent) extremism are all contested concepts, referring to specific political labels, ideologies, and related actions. The oldest of the three is “terrorism,” which, as a term, has been around since the late eighteenth century. “Radicalization” is derived from “radicalism” which has its roots in the progressive programs of nineteenth-century political parties that fought, inter alia, for secularism and democracy. “Extremism” is a term first associated with totalitarian movements emerging in the twentieth century in the wake of the First World War. “Violent extremism” is a construct that surfaced only at the beginning of the twenty-first century, referring initially to Islamist ideologies but became subsequently extended to acts of violence by secular groups, especially those on the far right as well. The three concepts are sometimes used wrongly interchangeably, as quasi equivalents. In this chapter some of their characteristics and relationships are explained. Practical and policy implications on countering (violent) extremism, based on the opposite of extremism – moderation – are outlined at the end.

Schools and universities have a long history of collaboration to address educational goals, but at present these partnerships find themselves at a crossroads navigating myriad contextual factors influencing both teacher education and PK-12 schools. In reviewing the evolution of the Mason Elementary PDS program, as well as the historical phases of School–University partnerships (Catelli, 2021), we identified partnership elements and ultimately designed a program framework that facilitated responsiveness in challenging times. Through examples, we demonstrate how our framework sustains partnership efforts in our context. In closing we recommend school and universities create supporting frameworks for adapting flexibly in their unique settings.

The AI Act contains some specific provisions dealing with the possible use of artificial intelligence for discriminatory purposes or in discriminatory ways, in the context of the European Union. The AI Act also regulates generative AI models. However, these two respective sets of rules have little in common: provisions concerning non-discrimination tend not to cover generative AI, and generative AI rules tend not to cover discrimination. Based on this analysis, the Chapter considers what is currently the Eu legal framework on discriminatory output of generative AI models, and concludes that those expressions that are already prohibited by anti-discrimination law certainly remain prohibited after the approval of the AI Act, while discriminatory content that is not covered by Eu non-discrimination legislation will remain lawful. For the moment, the AI Act has not brought any particularly relevant innovation on this specific matter, but the picture might change in the future.

Publications about practitioner inquiry in professional development schools (PDSs) tend to emphasize localized descriptions. This has led to a tension in the scholarship between valuing knowledge generated through reports of practitioner inquiry and valuing the generation of methodologically rigorous, potentially transferable knowledge about practitioner inquiry. This chapter addresses that tension by highlighting localized descriptions while aiming to produce new knowledge about practitioner inquiry within the PDS movement. The chapter’s purpose is to construct an up-to-date perspective on practitioner inquiry as a distinctive PDS practice. The authors conducted a systematic review of descriptions of practitioner inquiry in PDS literature published between 2008–2022. The chapter begins with an overview of the foundations of practitioner inquiry in PDSs. The review’s method is described, then its findings are presented through a five-part typology of ways practitioner inquiry was commonly positioned. The chapter concludes by discussing future directions for research about inquiry in PDSs.

An introduction to the Handbook, with summary of the chapters

This chapter points out the significant challenges in holding foundation model developers and deployers clearly responsible for the uses and outputs of their creations under US law. Scienter requirements, and difficulties in creating proof, make it challenging to establish liability under many statutes with civil penalties and torts. Constitutional protections for speech may shield model-generated outputs, or the models themselves, from some forms of regulation—though legal scholars are divided over the extent of these protections. And legal challenges to agencies’ authority over AI systems could hamstring regulators’ ability to proactively address foundation models’ risks. All is not lost, though. Each of these doctrines do have potential pathways to liability and recourse. However, in all cases there will likely be protracted battles over liability involving the issues described in this chapter.

This chapter constructs five ideal types of participants who undergo quite diverse processes of joining and leaving violent extremist groups: “ideologists,” “followers,” “adventurers,” “misfits,” and “traditionalists”. These five types tend to be influenced by relatively distinct combinations of push, pull, and barrier factors. The implications of this analysis are that to prevent recruitment into and engagement in violent extremism, push and pull factors should be reduced, and barriers to participation should be reinforced. Likewise, to facilitate disengagement from violent extremism, push and pull factors should be reinforced, and barriers to disengagement and reintegration should be reduced. Importantly, to be relevant and effective, preventive interventions should be targeted to the specific type of person in question, addressing their specific drivers or needs.

Chapter 19 looks at two landmark decisions that were issued after the submission of the full manuscript of this book for publication: the Advisory Opinion of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea on climate change and marine protection, and the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz and Others v Switzerland. The authors situate these decisions within the broader context of climate litigation, examining their implications for future cases and drawing connections to the themes explored in other chapters. They demonstrate how these decisions both reflect and advance emerging best practice in climate jurisprudence, potentially inspiring further innovation based on science and rigorous legal reasoning.

Chapter 3 on Attribution Science delves deeper into the science that establishes causal links between climate change, specific sources of emissions, and its impacts. The authors illustrate how these scientific developments are enhancing our ability to pinpoint the causes of climate impacts, an evolution crucial to a range of procedural and substantive issues that may arise in climate litigation. The authors also delve into specific regional impacts and showcase how attribution science has illuminated the ways in which different parts of the world are experiencing and responding to the unique challenges posed by a changing climate. This includes case studies in Africa, the Americas, Europe, the South Pacific, and Asia. The authors conclude by addressing the limitations and challenges in the field of attribution science before explaining how it is nevertheless poised to play an ever-more critical role in our collective response to climate change.

Chapter 6 on Separation of Powers offers a comprehensive exploration of how the balance of power between the judiciary and other branches of government plays out in climate litigation. The authors critically analyse key cases where these doctrines have been invoked, shedding light on how these doctrines shape the courts’ approach to climate cases. They underscore the significant variation in how this issue is dealt with across jurisdictions, acknowledging the diversity of constitutional and legal frameworks globally. Despite this diversity, the authors distil an emerging best practice where courts are increasingly recognising their crucial role in safeguarding fundamental rights and constitutional values in the context of climate change. This recognition is not a one-directional or universal trend but a nuanced evolution detectable across various jurisdictions and legal systems.