Previous research has found that individuals harboring hostile sexist attitudes are more likely to support the use of political violence. In this study, we examine this relationship further. We theorize that the impact of hostile sexism on support for political violence is mediated through two mutually reinforcing factors: social dominance orientation and political illiberalism. We test this argument using an original survey we administered to over 1,400 subjects in the United States. We employ two operationalizations of individuals’ support for political violence: support in the abstract and support for specific acts of political violence. We find that individuals who exhibit hostile sexism are substantially more likely to support political violence, both abstract and specific. Moreover, we find that both social dominance orientation and political illiberalism together mediate 64.9% of the effect of hostile sexism on support for political violence in the abstract and 80.5% of the effect on support for specific acts of political violence. We conclude with a discussion of the implications of these findings.

Does the situation in Afghanistan amount to persecution due to the accumulation of repressive measures enacted against women and is it sufficient that women are affected by such measures merely on the basis of their gender? While these two questions remain in front of the Court of Justice of the EU, several EU member states have moved to grant asylum to women and girls from Afghanistan on general risks of gender-based persecution. This dynamism in asylum regulations across the EU has occurred alongside renewed discussions around gender-based persecution and gender apartheid in international criminal law in light of the ongoing process for a Crimes Against Humanity Treaty. In this article, I put these developments into conversation through case study method and legal-institutional analysis, and argue that the historical link between international refugee law and international criminal law provides a space to envision an integrated system of protection around gender-related claims. To this end, I offer three outlooks for establishing general risks of gender-based persecution in international refugee law and the relationship between gender apartheid and asylum.

The Dutch parliamentary far right has been considered a relatively liberal outlier to the gender politics of the European far right, yet recent years have shown the increasing anti-gender mobilization of the party Forum voor Democratie(FvD). Based on a theoretical framework of anti-gender mobilization, the far right, and politics of knowledge, this article explores anti-gender politics as a form of alternative knowledge production through a qualitative content analysis of the FvD’s online presence. Through applying Verloo’s concept of the episteme, this article’s findings show that the FvD mobilizes against epistemic institutions by claiming they disseminate dangerous knowledge about gender, which they argue presents a fundamental threat to society, captured in conspiratorial terms like “transgender ideology” and “woke.” Simultaneously, the party promotes illiberal gender politics through the establishment of alternative epistemic institutions. This article shows how far-right actors may promote anti-gender politics by presenting themselves as “alternative intellectuals” who seek to carve out an epistemic niche alongside the mainstream.

Women have long been underrepresented in American politics. This is evidenced by women being less likely to run for and hold elected office. Existing scholarship largely focuses on explaining why women are less politically ambitious than their male counterparts but pays less attention to why some women do run for office. To this end, I focus on the potential role of labor union membership. I argue that labor unions can foster political ambition and increase ordinary people’s likelihood of running for office. I test this among women in the American mass public, primarily with survey data from the 2010–22 Cooperative Election Study (CES). Overall, I find that labor union membership is significantly associated with women’s likelihood of running for office. I also find that this robust relationship is unlikely to be driven by self-selection or omitted variable biases. Overall, these findings help us to better understand the sources of political ambition, illustrate a viable potential pathway to boost women’s likelihood of seeking elected office, and underscore the political consequences of organized labor.

Mass public opinion on globalization shows a persistent gender gap, but explanations for this gap differ. In the context of Africa, understanding this gender gap is particularly important because of women’s growing representation in legislatures and the rapid expansion of global economic flows on the continent. Why are women on average more skeptical of foreign economic actors? We consider this question across Sub-Saharan African countries, using Chinese economic engagement as a salient, visible form of economic globalization. Numerous studies have explored the impact of China’s presence on Africans’ attitudes toward China, but we know little about a documented gender gap in these attitudes. We explore the roots of this gap from an angle of economic vulnerability, positing that women at higher risk of a negative economic impact of Chinese engagement are more likely to view China negatively than their male counterparts. Using multilevel analyses of up to 84,000 respondents from up to 37 countries, we find a consistent pattern of economic vulnerability explaining the gender gap in attitudes, and factors associated with economic security mitigating it. Our findings suggest that economic vulnerability shapes attitudes differently across genders, and that increasing representation of women in African legislatures may have implications for policies toward Chinese engagement.

The COVID-19 pandemic posed new challenges for leaders, requiring behavior change and public self-compliance. Stereotypically feminine qualities, such as compassion and a good approach to people, may have helped achieve these goals, rendering the pandemic a “feminine crisis.” The special nature of this crisis, along with media attention on female-led countries successfully managing the pandemic, raises the question of whether female leaders would be perceived as more competent in handling such a crisis. In an experimental study conducted on a representative sample in Poland, we assessed whether female prime minister candidates or candidates with feminine traits had an advantage when their competence in managing a large-scale pandemic was evaluated. Surprisingly, we found that, contrary to national security and economic crises (where male or masculine candidates tend to be advantaged), women or feminine candidates were not perceived as having an advantage in managing a COVID-19 type crisis. Furthermore, conservative participants seemed to perceive male candidates as more competent, even in the pandemic context. Although the differences were small in magnitude, they suggest that even in a potentially “feminine crisis,” women do not fare better than men, while men still fare better in stereotypically male crises.

We take a deep dive into the sponsorship and cosponsorship activity of Republicans in the US House of Representatives from 1993–2014 to examine how ideology and gender influence the policy priorities of Republican legislators on issues associated with women, as well as on the party-owned issue of tax policy. We expect that Republican women are cross-pressured since assumptions about their policy expertise as women conflict with the policy reputation of the Republican Party. As a result, Republican women’s policy choices are impacted by their ideology in a way that is different from their male counterparts. Moreover, our analysis of which members’ bills move through the legislative process demonstrates that beyond their own policy preferences, women are strategic party actors. Thus, women are only more likely to see action on their women-focused and anti-abortion proposals, the two areas that define the partisan divide over women’s place in society.

The objective of feminist institutionalist (FI) political science is to expose institutions that perpetuate gender inequalities. The nature of these entities and the best strategies for studying them remain hotly debated topics. Some scholars identify ethnography as a valuable methodology for FI research. However, novices to this methodology might need help navigating it. In this theory-generating article, we aim to bridge the gap between different approaches to FI and ethnographic methodologies. We propose ethnographic approaches suitable for scholars who see gendered institutions as real entities that constrain and enable human practices, as well as those who perceive them as sedimented clusters of meanings. We illustrate our arguments using a partially fictional empirical example, inspired by findings from our own ethnographic research. We hope that this article will promote increased engagement, both theoretical and empirical, with ethnography among FI scholars.

The 2024 elections made US history in numerous ways. Vice President Kamala Harris became the first Black and South Asian woman to be nominated by a major party for the presidency. Former president Donald Trump made history by becoming the oldest person and the first convicted felon to become president. 2024 marked the first presidential election following the historic Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization decision in 2022.

Vice President Kamala Harris became the Democratic presidential nominee on August 23, 2024. Her campaign was significantly different than others. As the sitting vice president to Joe Biden, Harris’s campaign was shortened. She had less than 90 days to mount a formal campaign after her endorsement from Biden. In this essay, I take an intersectional analytical framework — accounting for how power in society is shaped by multiple axes of social division, including race, class, and gender, and not a single axis of identity (Collins and Bilge 2020, 2). I seek to explain the racial and gendered dynamics during the campaign, the activism of Black women voters leading up to Election Day, and Black women’s activism in the aftermath of the 2024 election. This essay highlights the resilience of Black women, evident in their political behavior and political attitudes in the 2024 presidential election campaign and aftermath. In Black women’s support for the Democratic Party, Democratic ticket, and Vice President Harris, we better understand how this pivotal base influences electoral politics and how race-gendered identities influence American politics overall.

The 2024 presidential election was historic in many ways, but one trend did not buck the norm: the gender gap. Indeed, despite Kamala Harris becoming the first Black and South Asian woman to win a majority party’s nomination, the recent overturning of Roe v. Wade, and clear attempts by the Harris campaign to win over white Republican women voters, “gender differences in vote choice in the 2024 elections were remarkably similar to recent presidential elections” (CAWP 2024). This essay highlights the long-term ideological and demographic shifts among party constituencies that can help to explain why Republican women cast their vote for Donald Trump, even in a uniquely gendered political landscape.

The 2018 election cycle was referred to as a “Rainbow Wave” because of the record number of LGBTQ+ candidates seeking and winning elective office. The backlash toward the LGBTQ+ community during the first Trump administration, at the local and national level, invigorated queer candidates to run for office. Then, in 2020 and 2022, news headlines again called the election cycles a “Rainbow Wave” (Debussy 2020; Lavietes 2022). According to the Victory Institute, the 2024 election marked a 1.1% increase in LGBTQ+ candidates compared to 2020, however, it was also a 4.8% decrease compared to candidates in 2022. Further, among LGBTQ+ candidates, the share of lesbian candidates dropped nearly 10 percentage points, from 26.7% of all LGBTQ+ candidates in 2020 to only 16.1% in 2024. At the same time, the group of LGBTQ+ candidates in 2024 were the most racially diverse in history, with 37.6% being people of color and just over 15% not identifying as cisgender (LGBTQ+ Victory Fund 2024).

At the 2024 US Democratic Convention, Kamala Harris presented her approach to the military in her speech accepting her historic nomination as the party’s candidate for the US presidency. In this essay, I reflect on the question: what would it mean if a woman of color led the American empire? I argue that scholars of gender, politics, and representation must turn their attention toward evaluating not just how gender conditions how politicians legislate, run their campaigns, or face barriers to winning office — but whether and to what extent politicians of any gender use their identities to combat the material suffering wrought by American imperialism. I echo calls for greater attention to power structures in the study of gender and representation (Brown et al. 2024) and argue that we must decenter “imperial feminism” and recenter tenets from Black and Third World feminism (Amos and Parmar 1984; Johnson-Odim 1991; Taylor 2017). To this end, I theorize a new type of representative that bridges these concerns: identity representatives.

Over the past quarter-century, the literature on gender, peace, and security has evolved into a substantial interdisciplinary field. In this line of work, researchers have investigated the interplay between state security and women’s security, or how gender equality at the state level affects the occurrence of international and intranational conflict. The conclusion is that more gender-equal countries are less prone to engage in warfare, pointing toward a link between women’s security and national security. Various indicators have been used to capture gender equality in this literature, such as the representation of women in parliamentary roles, the proportion of women participating in the labor force, and school enrollment among girls relative to boys.

What does it mean to be a brave woman? In 2020, we saw Belarusian women take to the streets dressed in white to oppose the violent dictatorship that had been in power for twenty-six years. In 2021, our television screens showed the Fall of Kabul, and the takeover by Taliban fighters, who overnight began to reverse decades of women’s empowerment. In response, and despite the risks, women demonstrators took to the streets in Kabul to demand their rights to work, education, and political participation. And in late 2022, we saw Iranian women fight for freedom, cutting their hair and burning their headscarves as they called for women’s rights in the context of brutal repression. These are but a handful of the myriad examples of women transgressing what is societally expected of them. They go out into the streets, they post on social media, they protest governments and make demands for change. Around the world, we see women being brave. They do so at great personal risk, and often when the potential benefits of being brave are infinitesimally small.

Scholars of gender have long realized that questions regarding gender, women, and politics require a multi-method, nuanced approach. When a plurality of white women voted for Donald Trump over Hillary Clinton in the 2016 presidential election, social scientists increasingly began to recognize the urgency of undertaking new approaches to understanding gender, race, and voting behavior in the United States.1 Since then, researchers have helped us understand why so many white women support right-wing candidates and policies that aim to suppress their autonomy, offering explanations such as the influence of belief in traditional gender roles (Christley 2022), “possessive investments in white heteropatriarchy” (Strolovitch, Wong, and Proctor 2017, 354), and “gendered nationalism” in American politics (Deckman and Cassese 2021, 278). In more recent years — as election results and polling suggest growing numbers of men of color have shifted rightward — there has been increased interest in employing an intersectional approach to analyze the gulf between men and women of color.

Nancy Pelosi makes history. She was the first woman elected to a high-ranking position in the US House of Representatives when she became the Democratic Whip in 2001. She made more history as the first female Democratic Leader in 2003, and first woman elected as Speaker of the House in 2007. She made history by remaining the Democratic Leader even after losing the House majority. Pelosi made history yet again when she was again elected Speaker in 2019, joining Sam Rayburn as the only House leader to lose and then regain the Speakership.