This article traces the impact of Robert Gordon's “Critical Legal Histories” on scholars writing at the intersection of law and history. While Gordon's central claim about the constitutive character of the law has come to serve as a working assumption in the field, the case he made for the intellectual history of doctrine as articulated by legal mandarins has proven less influential in the twenty-five years since the article was published. Instead, legal historians have focused their attention on the interaction between official and lay forms of law-making with a decided emphasis on popular legal consciousness. For precisely this reason, the time may be ripe for reconsideration of mandarin materials, not only for what they have to tell us about the dynamics of cultural change, but also as sources of insight into basic puzzles of the human condition that have tended across time to be expressed in and through legal forms.

Compared to the practice in other professional schools and academic fields at universities, law professors are hired at a young age based primarily upon their academic merit determined through grades, class rank, and school rank. This emphasis upon narrowly defined academic merit—apart from achievement demonstrated through original scholarship or experience in professional practice—first emerged during “the professionalization of the American law professor” between 1870 and 1900 at Harvard Law School (HLS). Though normative today, this outcome was neither necessary nor uncontested. In the late nineteenth century the new standard of hiring faculty according to their academic merit was energetically opposed by those favoring the antecedent standard of professional experience and reputation. Only when financial considerations counterbalanced that traditional standard did hiring decisions tip in favor of the new principle. Not until the early 1900s, when the second generation of academic meritocrats dominated the HLS faculty, did the new hiring standard become unequivocally established as policy in the school and, by extension, in legal education.

This article was stimulated by the publication of Toward Equal Justice: A Comparative Study of Legal Aid in Modern Societies, edited by Mauro Cappelletti, James Gordley, and Earl Johnson, Jr. (Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana Publications, Inc., 1975), a recent and ambitious entry in the debate over alternative methods of delivering legal services to the poor. Brakel, the author of several publications in the field, feels that the portion written by Johnson, presenting the operational and research experience with legal services for the poor in this country, is one-sided and unsatisfactory and maintains that, through the process of critically examining the Johnson portion, it is possible to present a more balanced picture of the legal aid experience in the United States. This is important for the domestic audience as well as for the international readers whom the book seeks to address.

Preemption is one of the most important legal doctrines for today’s progressives to understand because of its power to constrain progressive policymaking and social movement lawyering at the state and local level. By examining the detailed history of a decades-long campaign by the labor and environmental movements to improve working conditions in an industry at the heart of the global supply chain, Scott L. Cummings’s Blue and Green: The Drive for Justice at America’s Port (2018) provides a case study about the doctrine and impacts of preemption. The study also inspires lawyers and activists alike to reexamine core questions of factual relevance, representation and voice, and precedent.

As law deepens its engagement with visual data, legal scholars have expressed concern that courts all too often uphold photographic evidence as objective representations of truth, rather than as necessarily partial portrayals of reality. To combat this naïve realism in legal institutions, some are incorporating insights from media studies in calling for a jurisprudence of the visual. Drawing on an ongoing lawsuit over the disclosure of detainee abuse photographs taken in Iraq and Afghanistan after September 11, I suggest this project expand its scope to examine litigants' interpretations of images in courtrooms, as well as concerns beyond photographic objectivity that arise in disclosure disputes, including images' unique privacy implications and national security risks. Though the stakes in this case are atypical, these specific concerns are to varying degrees more germane. Having all been raised before, they are likely to be heard again, if only by a single judge or jury.

In this exploratory cross-cultural study, we use interview data from representatives of social service, criminal justice, and policy-making agencies in two capital cities (Washington, D.C.) and Madrid, Spain) to compare responses to domestic violence within each country's sociolegal and cultural context. While both countries have patriarchal structures, there is great difference in the history, funding, development, and participants of the battered women's movement. For instance, in Spain the government determined the appropriate response to domestic violence from the onset, whereas in the United States the power to frame, find, and respond to the issue operated through a more insidious process of state cooptation. In both countries, wider social changes did not result; rather, services were provided as the movements became tied to finding requirements and to satisfying bureaucratic exigencies. Within this context, we analyze respondents' perceptions and interpretations of domestic violence as well as the institutional practices and future strategies proposed for continued social action.

Rapid changes in family life over the last forty years have led to substantial alterations in family law policy; specifically, most states now endorse joint custody arrangements for divorcing families. However, we know little about how lower court judges have embraced or resisted this change. We conducted in‐depth interviews with judges in twenty‐five Indiana jurisdictions in 1998 and 2011. Our findings suggest that judges' views of joint custody dramatically changed. Judges in Wave II indicated a strong preference for joint custody—a theme that was relatively absent in Wave I. The observed change in judicial preferences did not seem to be related to judicial replacement, gender, age, or political party affiliation. Although our conclusions are exploratory, we speculate that shifts in judicial views may be related to changing public mores of parenthood and, relatedly, Indiana's adoption of Parenting Time Guidelines in 2001.

In All Judges Are Political—Except When They Are Not: Acceptable Hypocrisies and the Rule of Law (2010), Keith Bybee considers the hypocrisy of modern law—that is, the widespread view that judges are both principled and partisan—by drawing an analogy with courtesy. Both law and courtesy contain and manage the diverse and potentially divisive interests that would, were they not contained, disrupt social life. In this essay I extend this argument by considering whether the relationship between law and courtesy is more than merely analogical. I suggest that both systems are aspects of larger historical developments out of which emerged the modern subject and the modern state, creating a social world made up of apparently bounded individuals and institutions. As such, law and courtesy do more than conceal and contain interests and subjectivity; they produce the unruly, partisan subjects they are designed to manage.