In South Africa, municipal noncompliance with legislation promoting the constitutional right to sufficient water is both a failure of the rule of law and a betrayal of that right. Judicial intervention has prompted formalistic compliance with water law, but the underlying commitment to sufficient water remains unfulfilled. Does the inability of courts to achieve social justice despite enforcing social legislation confirm the thesis that commitments to the rule of law and to social justice are inconsistent, that upholding the rule of law may not advance social justice? This article offers an alternative to this “inconsistency thesis,” arguing that the rule of law can accommodate social justice if it demands normative congruence alongside congruence with formal rules. Empirical investigation reveals that structural challenges and the multifarious normative demands on officials create a condition of normative incongruence that impedes the pursuit of social justice, even as courts compel congruence with formal rules.

Federal law prohibits deceiving the public by falsely marking an item as patented. The “false marking” prohibition has been enforced primarily by private lawsuits on behalf of the United States, with the party plaintiff and the government splitting the penalty. When a court decision dramatically increased the potential recovery for false marking claims, lawyers pounced immediately, filing more cases per week than had previously been filed in years. Indeed, many lawyers who did not previously work on patent cases joined the fray. Within two years, Congress eliminated this type of false marking suit and terminated all pending cases. Using empirical data, interviews with lawyers, legislative history, litigation documents, and news sources, this article tells the instructive history of false marking litigation. This history shows that the supply of private enforcement—lawsuits by private parties to enforce laws in the public interest—is sensitive to market forces. It also shows that, even when concentrated interests encourage Congress to cut back on private enforcement, Congress does not move as quickly as the bar. This matters because once Congress authorizes private enforcement, the maintenance of that system depends on judges and lawyers interpreting private enforcement statutes.

A growing body of research suggests that contemporary law firms face challenges with the retention of legal talent—especially women and racialized lawyers. Yet, we know little about the conditions that prompt lawyers to leave law firms or where they go after leaving. This article builds on the scholarship of John Hagan, emphasizing the role of social capital in law firm culture, and work by Emmanuel Lazega, tracing dimensions of law firm collegiality—both with implications for lawyers’ careers within and beyond law firms. I draw on data from a twenty-seven-year longitudinal survey of Canadian lawyers. Using piecewise exponential survival models, I examine organizational, cultural, and individual factors that may encourage mobility from law firms. The study reveals a pervasive gender difference that is not explained by human capital, organizational characteristics, or individual traits. Results also demonstrate the importance of social capital and firm culture—specifically, the presence of workplace policies of flexible scheduling, lawyers’ sense of a good match with their firm, their satisfaction with status rewards, and finally, the role of mentors—in shaping the flow of legal talent from law firms to various job destinations.

This essay examines the intellectual history of the idea of judicial restraint, starting with the early debates among the US Constitution’s founding generation. In the late nineteenth century, law professor James Bradley Thayer championed the concept and passed it on to his students and others, including Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., Learned Hand, Louis Brandeis, and Felix Frankfurter, who modified and applied it based on the jurisprudential preoccupations of a different era. In a masterful account, Brad Snyder examines Justice Frankfurter’s attempt to put the idea into practice. Although Frankfurter arguably made a mess of it, he passed the idea of judicial restraint on to Alexander Bickel and others. Today it remains a topic of much academic debate, while Supreme Court Justices occasionally give the idea lip service when it advances outcomes they desire.

I propose that the intellectual history of judicial restraint reflects the all-too-human inability to refrain from exercising power. The founders, focused on the need to mitigate the flaws of human nature in designing the executive and legislative branches, failed to sufficiently foresee how the same flaws would affect members of the judiciary. The failed idea of judicial restraint stands as the legacy of the founders’ mistake.

This article demonstrates a method to measure the extent and variation of ethnoracial disproportion in world prison populations. Using a novel data set covering eighteen democracies for the year 2016, this method shows that conspicuous ethnoracial disproportion in prisons is pervasive in democracies for which data is available. Socioeconomically marginalized ethnic and racial groups are overrepresented in the prisons of every case. Further, this pattern extends to countries known for penal progressivism, which otherwise are regarded as models of fair and rational criminal justice implementation. Correlation between prison disproportion and national socioeconomic and criminal justice characteristics suggests the complexity of the issue. A selection of single-case analyses drawn from the sample describe prison disproportion emerging under significantly varied national conditions. I discuss causal hypotheses for why ethnoracial disproportion would occur in such differing places.

This article argues that there is body of governing laws appearing widely throughout the global history of religions that warrants classification as constitutions. Like national constitutions, these religious constitutions present themselves as a form of “higher law” that declare the identity of a given a community, organize its structures of governing power, define its foundational norms, and authorize further acts of rulemaking. In this article, I offer an overview of these texts across several traditions and a defense of their importance in the study of comparative constitutional law. I then draw on fieldwork from Sri Lanka to provide a firsthand account of what a modern religious constitution looks like and how it works to govern one of the country’s largest communities of Buddhist monks. I conclude by urging scholars to view religion and constitutional law not as opposing legal domains but, rather, as homologous forms of social ordering that draw upon similar concepts and logics to address common human dilemmas.

How do transnational lawyers valorize their expertise in a political and economic crisis? This article argues that knowing how transnational lawyers valorize their expertise is critical to understanding how transnational law evolves and affects society, especially when existing legal frameworks prove to be inadequate and novel practices must pave new paths. Using the acute phase of the Eurozone crisis between 2010 and 2012 as an empirical case, I examine how European Union (EU) legal agents constructed a framework that accommodated the uncertainty of governing a crisis while also mediating the contentious politics between EU Member States. The analysis shows that as intergovernmental bargaining dominates Eurozone crisis governance, EU legal advisors intervene to reconcile these bargains with the EU legal order using novel practices that simultaneously valorize their legal expertise. These practices in effect engender a high degree of interdependence and interconnection between the EU legal order and several intergovernmental arrangements—especially the European Stability Mechanism—leading to the creation of a unique form of EU governance: semi-intergovernmentalism. This article contributes to debates on legal globalization by empirically examining how transnational legal agents valorize their expertise through strategies directed at defending their autonomy while protecting the normative coherence of their transnational legal order: the EU.

Why do activists employ international human rights law in domestic policy disputes and to what effect? Can international human rights law play an important role in cases where its direct application and justiciability by domestic courts is questionable? This study considers these questions in the area of socioeconomic rights by analyzing the mobilization of human rights law in the German social movement against tuition fees. Whereas legal mobilization theory is broadly concerned with the invocation of law on behalf of political demands, this article emphasizes discursive opportunity structures and vernacularization to make sense of which rights are adopted, why, and with what impact. I draw on content analysis of movement and political party documents, court decisions, and news reports as well as semi-structured interviews and participant observation. I find that activists in Germany were not naive about human rights. Instead, activists invoked human rights to resist political elites’ framing of education as a private good and students as consumers and to broaden the issue to include social inclusion and justice throughout the German education system. The mobilization of human rights law also was an effective means by which activists generated media attention and pressured politicians.

How do courts mediate the relationship between the practice of torture and the content of law in places where torture is neither explicitly criminalized nor authorized? If torture is recounted in court, then what happens? Drawing on sixteen months of observation and documentary research in Thailand, this article outlines a jurisprudence of torture in which judges accommodate the practice by denying the facticity of narratives about torture, or accepting the narratives’ facticity but denying that anyone can be held responsible, or accepting that someone might be held responsible but excusing them of responsibility in the name of duty or by holding only one or two of them, or their employer, in some way liable. Through this jurisprudence, judges in Thailand have kept torture at the limits of law: not on a boundary between the legal and illegal, but on a line between the legally ordered and unordered, which is to say, in the realm of the alegal.

Educational research is increasingly subject to legal restrictions designed for the protection of human subjects of research. In this article the author discusses legal restrictions–both in the courts and under HEW regulations–on educational research, comparing these restrictions with those on biomedical research. He finds that although educational research in particular instances may give rise to suits for damages for invasion of privacy or intentional infliction of psychological distress, the legal issues relating to educational research will most often be resolved in proceedings before institutional review boards charged by HEW with the responsibility for passing upon proposals to conduct research on human subjects. He argues that the interests protected in proceedings before institutional review boards are not limited to those that have received judicial recognition in suits for damages. The author finds that the requirement that the informed consent of subjects be obtained presents difficult issues for educational research. He notes in particular the problems presented by research proposals that as an element of the research design contemplate the observation of subjects without their knowledge and the use of children as research subjects.

The French, American, and English legal professions are compared in terms of four common goals: to control admission and training, to protect their jurisdiction, to regulate the behavior of their members, and to enhance their cooperative status. The varying ways in which revolutionary attacks affected their capacity to realize these goals is traced. It is argued that these attacks, and the way lawyers in these societies recovered from them, largely explain the differences between the three professions in the modem world.