In the 1970s, LGBT students at fourteen US colleges and universities took their institutions to court after newly established gay student groups were denied official recognition. While the students suffered defeats along the way, by the end of the decade they had won the war for recognition. This article provides a broad overview of these cases, discusses their significance, and argues that we cannot understand the struggle for gay student group recognition without considering its relationship to the state regulation of sex. Advocates for gay student groups won most of their battles by responding to the claim that recognition would be tantamount to aiding and abetting criminal sexual activities. They did so by pursuing strategies of desexualization, which denied that gay student groups encouraged same-sex sex. The article explores these strategies by focusing on three 1976 Virginia cases, one about gay student group recognition, one about the criminalization of same-sex sex, and one about the application of the state’s sodomy law to an interracial threesome. The divergent outcomes help us understand the strategic effectiveness and political limitations of LGBT desexualization strategies.

In the immediate aftermath of Reconstruction, coverage of executions in the Atlanta Constitution and the New Orleans (Times-)Picayune occasionally portrayed African Americans executed by the state as legally, politically, and spiritually similar to their white counterparts. But as radical white supremacy took hold across the South, the coverage changed. Through an analysis of 667 newspaper articles covering the executions of Black and white men in Georgia and Louisiana from 1877 to 1936, I found that as lynching became the principal form of lethal punishment in the South, accounts of Black men’s legal executions shrank in length and journalists increasingly portrayed them as ciphers, nonentities that the state was dispatching with little fanfare. In contrast, accounts of white men’s executions continued to showcase their individuality and their membership in social, political, and religious communities. A significant gap between the material reality and the cultural representation of capital punishment emerged. Legal executions in Georgia and Louisiana overwhelmingly targeted Black men. But on the pages of each state’s most prominent newspaper, the executions of white men received the most attention. As a result, capital punishment was increasingly represented as a high-status punishment that respected the “whiteness” of those who suffered it.

This study empirically examines whether and how the introduction of disability rights impacted the portrayal of disability in personal injury court decisions in Israel and offers a method for doing such research in other legal realms and contexts. We conducted a quantitative content analysis of Israeli district court judicial rulings over twenty years to measure whether a discursive shift occurred from a medical-individual view of disability to a social constructionist and a rights-based understanding of disability. Our coding system included descriptive and conceptual indicators, forming two indexes: a conventional index and a progressive index. Our findings reveal a steady dominance of the conventional discourse and a gradual yet limited rise in progressive discourse. Moreover, individual court decisions often manifest both types of discourse but are still dominated by a conventional view of disability and rarely apply direct disability rights terminology. These findings provide pioneering empirical evidence that substantiates the disability critique of tort law, demonstrating that judicial decision making is slow to adopt a disability rights perspective. More broadly, our findings show that the infusion of a disability rights orientation does not necessarily replace the older medical-individual view of disability but adds to it, resulting in a mixed discourse that includes both conventional and progressive elements.

Federal law prohibits deceiving the public by falsely marking an item as patented. The “false marking” prohibition has been enforced primarily by private lawsuits on behalf of the United States, with the party plaintiff and the government splitting the penalty. When a court decision dramatically increased the potential recovery for false marking claims, lawyers pounced immediately, filing more cases per week than had previously been filed in years. Indeed, many lawyers who did not previously work on patent cases joined the fray. Within two years, Congress eliminated this type of false marking suit and terminated all pending cases. Using empirical data, interviews with lawyers, legislative history, litigation documents, and news sources, this article tells the instructive history of false marking litigation. This history shows that the supply of private enforcement—lawsuits by private parties to enforce laws in the public interest—is sensitive to market forces. It also shows that, even when concentrated interests encourage Congress to cut back on private enforcement, Congress does not move as quickly as the bar. This matters because once Congress authorizes private enforcement, the maintenance of that system depends on judges and lawyers interpreting private enforcement statutes.

This is a review essay of Caron Beaton‐Wells and Ariel Ezrachi (eds.), Criminalising Cartels: Critical Studies of an International Regulatory Movement (2011); David J. Gerber, Global Competition: Law, Markets, and Globalization (2010); and Ioannis Lianos and D. Daniel Sokol (eds.), The Global Limits of Competition Law (2012). It explores the fragmented nature of national competition laws in the context of globalization and several harmonizing trends: the defining role of economics, the strong influence of US antitrust economics and law internationally, and the relative insularity of competition law from other subdisciplines of law. The recent emergence of competition regimes, especially in the BRICS countries, challenges these harmonizing trends, reducing US hegemony. Economics will remain central but cultural and institutional factors that reflect societal values will become more significant. This leads to a contradiction of convergence as to the benefits of competition law internationally and continuing fragmentation along national lines.

In South Africa, municipal noncompliance with legislation promoting the constitutional right to sufficient water is both a failure of the rule of law and a betrayal of that right. Judicial intervention has prompted formalistic compliance with water law, but the underlying commitment to sufficient water remains unfulfilled. Does the inability of courts to achieve social justice despite enforcing social legislation confirm the thesis that commitments to the rule of law and to social justice are inconsistent, that upholding the rule of law may not advance social justice? This article offers an alternative to this “inconsistency thesis,” arguing that the rule of law can accommodate social justice if it demands normative congruence alongside congruence with formal rules. Empirical investigation reveals that structural challenges and the multifarious normative demands on officials create a condition of normative incongruence that impedes the pursuit of social justice, even as courts compel congruence with formal rules.

Educational research is increasingly subject to legal restrictions designed for the protection of human subjects of research. In this article the author discusses legal restrictions–both in the courts and under HEW regulations–on educational research, comparing these restrictions with those on biomedical research. He finds that although educational research in particular instances may give rise to suits for damages for invasion of privacy or intentional infliction of psychological distress, the legal issues relating to educational research will most often be resolved in proceedings before institutional review boards charged by HEW with the responsibility for passing upon proposals to conduct research on human subjects. He argues that the interests protected in proceedings before institutional review boards are not limited to those that have received judicial recognition in suits for damages. The author finds that the requirement that the informed consent of subjects be obtained presents difficult issues for educational research. He notes in particular the problems presented by research proposals that as an element of the research design contemplate the observation of subjects without their knowledge and the use of children as research subjects.