The 35 commentaries cover a wide range of topics and take many different stances on the issues explored by the target article. We have organised our response to the commentaries around three central questions: Are Friston blankets just Pearl blankets? What ontological and metaphysical commitments are implied by the use of Friston blankets? What kind of explanatory work are Friston blankets capable of? We conclude our reply with a short critical reflection on the indiscriminate use of both Markov blankets and the free energy principle.

Evidence that women voluntarily expose themselves to some threats more than men do challenges the generalizability of the claim that women exceed men in self-protective responses. Examples include women's higher rates of living organ donation and rescuing Jews during the holocaust. In general, women's efforts to keep other people alive can take precedence over their efforts to protect themselves.

By themselves, mesencephalic subcortical mechanisms provide a preattentive kind of consciousness, related to stimulus-related, short-latency dopamine release triggered by collicular input. Elaborate forms of consciousness, containing identifiable objects (visual, auditory, tactile, or chemical), imply longer-lasting phenomena that depend on the activation of prosencephalic networks. Nevertheless, the maintenance of these higher-level networks strongly depends on long-lasting mesencephalic dopamine release.

Some of the assumptions underlying the arguments in Aggleton & Brown's target article are reviewed; discrepancies/predictions are pointed out in relation to human lesion studies. A&B's proposal is interesting, but it may require harder, confirmatory evidence before it can be considered to be all-encompassing.

“Contempt” is proposed to be a unique aspect of human nature, yet a non-natural kind. Its psychological construct is framed as a sentiment emerging from a stratification of diverse basic emotions and dispositional attitudes. Accordingly, “contempt” might transcend traditional conceptual levels in social psychology, including experience and recognition of emotion, dyadic and group dynamics, context-conditioned attitudes, time-enduring personality structure, and morality. This strikes us as a modern psychological account of a high-level, social-affective cognitive facet that joins forces with recent developments in the social neuroscience by drawing psychological conclusions from brain biology.

Penn et al. propose the relational reinterpretation hypothesis as an explanation of the profound discontinuities that they identify between human and nonhuman cognition. This hypothesis is not a genuine replacement for the explanations that they reject, however, because as it stands, it simply redescribes the phenomena it is trying to explain.

I greatly respect the authors of the target article. However, in contrast to the target article's assertion, practitioners of behavioral public policy are indeed involved in developing and promoting systemic solutions. Its “i-frame”/“s-frame” distinction is incoherent, unhelpful, and obscures promising future directions for behavioral public policy. Its content and presentation undermine its stated goals and encourage sweeping dismissals of the field.

On p. 662 of the target article “Is Human Information Processing Conscious,” by Max Velmans, BBS (1991), 14(4):651–69, the phrase “electrical stimuli applied 500 msec later” (sect. 5.1, para. 3, 2nd sentence) should read “electrical stimuli applied 500 msec earlier.”

We provide a mathematical category theory account of the size and location of the authors' Functional View Field (FVF). Category theory explains systematic cognitive ability via universal construction, that is, a necessary and sufficient condition for composition of cognitive processes. Similarly, FVF size and location is derived from a (universal) construction called a fibre (pullback) bundle.

Gervais & Fessler argue that contempt is a natural kind and that its experience cannot be explained by a constructionist account of emotion. We dispute these claims and offer a positive constructionist model of contempt that accounts for the existing evidence and unifies conflicting findings in the literature on contempt.

Morin suggested that one of the reasons for the difficulty in standardizing graphic codes is that the production of spoken language reduces the need for graphic codes. Here we try to extend their claims from a psychological perspective, which allows us to conclude that the puzzle of ideography is perhaps related to human psychological traits and psychological evolution.

The distinction between non-symbolic and symbolic number is poorly addressed by the authors despite being relevant in numerical cognition, and even more important in light of the proposal that the approximate number system (ANS) represents rational numbers. Although evidence on non-symbolic number and ratios fits with ANS representations, the case for symbolic number and rational numbers is still open.

The question of automaticity in emotion processing has been debated under different perspectives in recent years. Satisfying answers to this issue will require a better definition of automaticity in terms of relevant behavioral phenomena, ecological conditions of occurrence, and a more precise mechanistic account of the underlying neural circuits.

We extend Savage et al.'s music and social bonding hypothesis by examining it in the context of Chinese music. First, top-down functions such as music as political instrument should receive more attention. Second, solo performance can serve as important cues for social identity. Third, a right match between the tones in lyrics and music contributes also to social bonding.

Our understanding of dual-process models of cognition may benefit from a consideration of language processing, as language comprehension involves fast and slow processes analogous to those used for reasoning. More specifically, De Neys's criticisms of the exclusivity assumption and the fast-to-slow switch mechanism are consistent with findings from the literature on the construction and revision of linguistic interpretations.

Rationalization through reduction of cognitive dissonance does not have the function of representational exchange. Instead, cognitive dissonance is part of the “psychological immune system” (Gilbert 2006; Mandelbaum 2019) and functions to protect the self-concept against evidence of incompetence, immorality, and instability. The irrational forms of attitude change that protect the self-concept in dissonance reduction are useful primarily for maintaining motivation.

Yarkoni recommends that psychology researchers should take care to align their statistical models to the verbal theories they are studying and testing. This principle applies not just to qualitative theories in psychology but also to more quantitative sciences: there, too, mismatch between open-ended theories and specific statistical models have led to confusion.

I draw parallels and contrasts between dual-system and modular approaches to cognition, the latter standing to inherit the same problems De Neys identifies regarding the former. Despite these two literatures rarely coming into contact, I provide one example of how he might gain theoretical leverage on the details of his “non-exclusivity” claim by paying closer attention to the modularity debate.