Prediction, like filling-in, is an example of pattern completion and both are likely to involve processes of statistical inference. Furthermore, there is no incompatibility between inference and neural filling-in, for the neural processes may be mediating the inferential processes. The usefulness of the “bridge locus” is defended, and it is also suggested that the interpersonal level needs to be included when considering subjective experience.

Plamondon's kinematic theory is very powerful from a descriptive point of view. Unfortunately, the fact that it neglects some fundamental features of the motor system, such as nonlinear inertial torque interactions or joint redundancies, limits its explanatory power and biological validity. As a consequence, the data presented by Plamondon & Alimi should be analyzed and interpreted with caution. There appears to be a gap between the observations reported by the authors and some of the conclusions they draw.

Lifelines mounts a vigorous attack on sociobiology on the utterly mistaken grounds that sociobiologists believe that genes single-handedly determine social behavior. The many previously published rebuttals to this pernicious criticism are conveniently ignored by the author.

Several suggestions are made for revision of Strategic Pluralism Theory (SPT). One revision requires recognition of the impact of individual differences in cognitive and behavioral competence on optimal mating strategy. In addition, SPT may need to incorporate certain self-regulatory processes such as the impact of widespread valuation of mates with one trait on their availability.

The rich diversity of avian natural history provides exciting possibilities for comparative research aimed at understanding three-dimensional navigation. We propose some hypotheses relating differences in natural history to potential behavioral and neurological adaptations possessed by contrasting bird species. This comparative approach may offer unique insights into some of the important questions raised by Jeffery et al.

We propose that a control system will address the causal dynamics of the neural network that Depue & Collins regard as underlying extraversion. We briefly describe a control system approach and articulate the notion of integration. The integration of goals and regards is achieved by subcortical assessment of reward in the nucleus accumbens and VTA (ventral tegmental area) transmission of this information largely by dopaminergic systems and representation of reward in the MOC (medial orbital cortex). Thus reward information is collected, integrated, and evaluated in the MOC. Such control decisions rely on constraining processes, a functional property of the MOC mediated largely by serotonergic neurons.

Crespi & Badcock (C&B) hypothesize that psychosis and autism represent opposite poles of human social cognition. I briefly outline how computational models of cognitive brain function may be used as a resource to further develop and experimentally test hypotheses concerning “autism-psychosis spectrum disorders.”1

Our commentary addresses two issues that are not developed enough in the target article. First, the model does not clearly address the distinction among external objects, external body parts, and internal bodies. Second, the authors could have discussed further the role of body schema with regard to its dynamic character, and its role in perspective and in imitation.