The target article proposes a model to explain the emergence of sex differences in attachment in middle childhood and their implications for reproductive strategies. While biological factors are prominent in the model, little is said about the social context of middle childhood and its contributions. There is also a need to clarify the fundamental nature of attachment in middle childhood.

The tension between focusing on species similarities versus species differences (phylogenetic versus adaptationist approaches) recurs in discussions about the nature of neural connectivity and organization following brain expansion. Whereas Striedter suggests a primary role for response inhibition, other possibilities include dense recurrent connectivity loops. Computer simulations and brain imaging technologies are crucial in better understanding actual neuronal connectivity patterns.

Additional evidence is presented concerning the anisotropy between vertical and horizontal encoding, which emerges from studies of human perception and cognition of space in plane mirror reflections. Moreover, it is suggested that the non-metric characteristic of polarization – that Jeffery et al. discuss with respect to gravity – is not limited to the vertical dimension.

Puritanical morality regulates a range of seemingly insignificant behaviors, including those involving human sexuality. A sizable portion of the latter particularly burdens women, who are held responsible for the moral conduct of men. In my paper, I show that these norms have not necessarily served to evolve cooperation, but to subjugate and eliminate women from public life.

We demonstrate that Statistical significance (Chow 1996) includes straw man arguments against (1) effect size, (2) meta-analysis, and (3) Bayesianism. We agree with the author that in experimental designs, H0 “is the effect of chance influences on the data-collection procedure . . . it says nothing about the substantive hypothesis or its logical complement” (Chow 1996, p. 41).

The target article misunderstands the research program it criticizes. The work of Boyd, Richerson, Fehr, Gintis, Bowles and their collaborators has long included the theoretical and empirical study of models both with and without diffuse costly punishment. In triaging the situation, we aim to (1) clarify the theoretical landscape, (2) highlight key points of agreement, and (3) suggest a more productive line of debate.

Almaatouq et al. propose an “integrative approach” to increase the generalisability and commensurability of experiments. Yet their metascientific approach has one glaring omission (and misinterpretation of) – the role of sample diversity in generalisability. In this commentary, we challenge false notions of subsumed duality between contexts, population, and diversity, and propose modifications to their design space to accommodate sample diversity.

The 35 commentaries cover a wide range of topics and take many different stances on the issues explored by the target article. We have organised our response to the commentaries around three central questions: Are Friston blankets just Pearl blankets? What ontological and metaphysical commitments are implied by the use of Friston blankets? What kind of explanatory work are Friston blankets capable of? We conclude our reply with a short critical reflection on the indiscriminate use of both Markov blankets and the free energy principle.

De Dreu and Gross's description of the proximate mechanisms conditioning success in intergroup conflict omits humans' deontological morality. Drawing on research on sacralization and moral objectivism, I show how “moral rigidity” may have evolved through partner selection mechanisms to foster coalitions’ cohesion and combativeness in intergroup conflict.

Both target papers cite evidence from infancy and early childhood to support the notion of human musicality as a somewhat static suite of capacities; however, in our view they do not adequately acknowledge the critical role of developmental timing, the acquisition process, or the dynamics of social learning, especially during later periods of development such as middle childhood.

I respond to Norris et al.'s criticism of Gaskell and Marslen- Wilson (1997). When the latter's network is tested in circumstances comparable to the Merge simulations in the target article, it produces the desired pattern of results. In another area of potential feedback in spoken word processing, aspects of lexical content influence word recognition and our network provides a simple explanation of why such effects emerge. It is unclear how such effects would be accommodated by Merge.

We propose that IAM and déjà vu may not share a placement on the same gradient, per se, but the mechanism of cue familiarity detection, and a major differentiating factor between the two metacognitive experiences is whether the resulting inward directed search of memory yields retrieved content or not. Déjà vu may manifest when contentless familiarity detection is inexplicable by the experiencer.

If the explanatory gap between phenomenal consciousness (“p-consciousness”) and the brain cannot be closed by current naturalistic theories of mind, one might instead try to dissolve the explanatory gap problem. We hold that such a dissolution can start from the notion of consciousness as a social construction. In his target article, however, Block (1995) argues that the thesis that consciousness is a social construction is trivially false if it is construed to be about phenomenal consciousness. He ridicules the idea that the occurrence of p-consciousness requires that the subject of p-consciousness already have the concept of p-consciousness. This idea is not as ridiculous as Block supposes. To see this, one must accept that in a unique sense, p-consciousness is what we as the subjects of consciousness take it to be. Furthermore, the notion of consciousness as a social construction does not depend on the view that the concept of consciousness somehow precedes the occurrence of consciousness as such. In sum, consciousness can plausibly be seen as a social construction, and this view can promote a dissolution of the explanatory gap problem.

Evidence that women voluntarily expose themselves to some threats more than men do challenges the generalizability of the claim that women exceed men in self-protective responses. Examples include women's higher rates of living organ donation and rescuing Jews during the holocaust. In general, women's efforts to keep other people alive can take precedence over their efforts to protect themselves.

On several key issues we agree with the commentators. Perhaps most importantly, everyone seems to agree that psychology has an important role to play in building better models of human vision, and (most) everyone agrees (including us) that deep neural networks (DNNs) will play an important role in modelling human vision going forward. But there are also disagreements about what models are for, how DNN–human correspondences should be evaluated, the value of alternative modelling approaches, and impact of marketing hype in the literature. In our view, these latter issues are contributing to many unjustified claims regarding DNN–human correspondences in vision and other domains of cognition. We explore all these issues in this response.

Influences on social traits involve a tangled interplay of genetic, social, and environmental factors. Moreover, there is increasing awareness that gene–environment correlations are real and potentially measurable. Such gene–environment correlations can mislead if they are uncontrolled and genetic associations are interpreted as being purely because of direct genetic effects. This complexity is cause for more and better investigation, not a reason to refrain from researching one of the potentially important factors (genetics) influencing trait variation.

I greatly respect the authors of the target article. However, in contrast to the target article's assertion, practitioners of behavioral public policy are indeed involved in developing and promoting systemic solutions. Its “i-frame”/“s-frame” distinction is incoherent, unhelpful, and obscures promising future directions for behavioral public policy. Its content and presentation undermine its stated goals and encourage sweeping dismissals of the field.

The views of self-deception that Mele attacks are thoroughly metaphorical, and should never have purported to imply the existence of real internal acts of deception. Research on self-deception, including Mele's appealing account, could be enriched and constrained by a broader investigation of the prevalent use of metaphor in thinking and talking about the mind.

Mealey's evolutionary reasoning is logically flawed. Furthermore, the evidence presented in favor of a genetic contribution to the causation of sociopathy is overinterpreted. Given the potentially large societal impact of sociobiological speculation on the roots of criminality, more-than-usual caution in interpreting data is called for.