The Perception-Action Model of empathy (PAM) is both sufficiently broad and sufficiently detailed to be able to describe and accommodate a wide range of phenomena – including the apparent “cold-heartedness” or lack of empathy of psychopaths. We show how the physiological, cognitive, and emotional elements of the PAM map onto known and hypothesized attributes of the psychopathic personality.

Osiurak and Reynaud highlight a major omission of models of cumulative technological culture. I propose an additional problematic omission: pride. By taking this emotion into account, we can address the question of why humans seek to learn, teach, and innovate – three processes essential to cumulative technological culture (CTC). By fostering achievement, prestige, and social learning, pride provides a pivotal piece of the puzzle.

Phillips et al. discuss whether knowledge or beliefs are more basic representations of others' minds, focusing on the primary function of knowledge representation: learning from others. We discuss links between emotion and “knowledge versus belief,” and particularly the role of emotions in learning from others in mechanisms such as “social epistemic emotions” and “affective social learning.”

“Music As a Coevolved System for Social Bonding” (MSB) is a brilliant synthesis and appealing hypothesis offering insights into the evolution and social bonding of musicality, but is so broad and sweeping it will be challenging to test, prove or falsify in the Popperian sense (Popper, 1959). After general comments, I focus my critique on underlying neurobiological mechanisms, and offer some suggestions for experimental tests of MSB.

The hypothesis of a phylogenetic connection between protorespect in primate dominance hierarchies and respect in human prestige hierarchies lies in the principle that dominance is a domain of competence like others and, hence, that high-ranking primates have protoprestige. The idea that dominant primates manifest protocontempt to subordinates suggests that “looking down on” followers is intrinsic to leadership in humans, but that the expression of contempt varies critically in relation to the socioecological context.

It is argued that the alleged cases of cognitive penetration of visual modules actually arise from the integration of information among different modules. This would reflect a general computational strategy according to which constraints to a particular module would be provided by information coming from different modules. Examples are provided from the integration of stereopsis and occlusion and from computation of motion direction.

Whitehouse's focus on two causes of identity fusion (evolution and shared experiences/biology) deepens understanding of these specific topics. While we applaud his analysis, in his efforts to elaborate these two causes, he has – perhaps unavoidably – produced a narrower conceptualization of identity fusion. This is unfortunate because it undermines his stated goal of developing a more general, encompassing theory.

In my response to the commentaries from a collection of esteemed researchers, I reassess and eventually find largely intact my claim that human tool use evidences higher social and non-social cognitive ability. Nonetheless, I concede that my examination of individual-level cognitive traits does not offer a full explanation of cumulative culture yet. For that, one needs to incorporate them into population-dynamic models of cultural evolution. I briefly describe my current and future work on this.

Empirical evidence suggests that high frequency electrographic activity is involved in active representation of meaningful entities in the cortex. Theoretical work suggests that distributed cell assemblies also represent meaningful entities. However, we are still some way from understanding how these two are related. This commentary also makes suggestions for further investigation of the neural basis of language at the level of both words and sentence planning.

We are big fans of propositions. But we are not big fans of the “propositional approach” proposed by Mitchell et al. The authors ignore the critical role played by implicit, non-inferential processes in biological cognition, overestimate the work that propositions alone can do, and gloss over substantial differences in how different kinds of animals and different kinds of cognitive processes approximate propositional representations.

Although many simulations draw upon only one level of abstraction, the process for generating rich simulations requires a dynamic interplay between abstract and concrete knowledge. A complete model of simulation must account for a mind and brain that can bridge the perceptual with the conceptual, the episodic with the semantic, and the concrete with the abstract.

Carruthers claims that global workspace theory implies that sensory states, unlike propositional attitudes, are introspectible in a non-interpretative fashion. I argue that this claim is false, and defend a strong version of the “mindreading is prior” model of first-person access, according to which the self-ascription of all mental states, both propositional and sensory, is interpretative.