Evidence from aphasia is considered that leads to a distinction between abstract and concrete thought processes and hence for a distinction between rules and similarity. It is argued that perceptual classification is inherently a rule-following procedure and these rules are unable to be followed when a patient has difficulty with name comprehension and retrieval.

This commentary deals with the relation between human language and nonverbal signals used by nonhuman primates. It suggests that human language could have developed through the interaction of procedural learning with a preexisting system for socio-affective communication. The introduction of “content” into existing “frames” requires a neurobiologically plausible learning mechanism.

Additional experiments show that P-consciousness and A consciousness can be empirically dissociated for the theoretically so phisticated observer. Phenomenal consciousness can have several degrees that are indirectly measurable.

A single evolved psychological mechanism, social identity, may help explain the development of salient sex differences in aggression. Bearing children automatically provides a basis for positive social identity for females. Masculine identity is more problematic, especially where the range of possible cultural roles is small. Ethnohistorical data provides insight into the overlap between masculine values and warrior values.

This commentary suggests (1) that there are precedents for Smaldino's “collaboration” in the history of economic thought before 1900 and (2) that the distinction of collaboration from what is thought of as cooperation in game theory is less clear than Smaldino suggests.

Mehr et al. seek to explain music's evolution in terms of a unitary proper function – signalling cooperative intent – which they cash out in two guises, coalition signalling and (allo)parental attention signalling. Although we recognize the role signalling almost certainly played in the evolution of music, we reject “ultimate” causal explanations which focus on a unidirectional, narrow range of causal factors.

How can “predictive simulation” – as a conscious phenomenon, related to goal imagery – be interchangeable with mirroring, which is an automatic response that, from a first-person perspective, enters awareness only after the act? The correspondence between perception of another's action and execution of one's similar action may be an example of a general perception-motor interface that maps perception onto behaviour or disposition towards action, without the need for simulation.

Boyer & Petersen's (B&P's) evolutionary approach to folk-economic beliefs is insightful, with far-reaching implications. We add to their discussion by positing a complementary developmental approach to the study of “emporiophobia” – studying children whose behaviors provide insight into developmental origins. We hypothesize that emporiophobia emerges early in childhood through proximal mechanisms and propose that emporiophobia develops alongside emporiophilia.

Van Gelder's example of a dynamical model is a Perceptron. The similarity of dynamical models and Perceptrons in turn exemplifies the close relationship between dynamical and algorithmic models. Both are models, not literal descriptions of brains. The brain states of standard modeling are better conceived as processes in the dynamical sense, but algorithmic models remain useful.

Cluster analysis, factor analysis, and multidimensional scaling are not good guides to the number of groups in a data set. In fact, the number of groups may not be a well-defined concept.

Gold & Stoljar argue persuasively that there is presently not a good case for the “radical neuron doctrine.” There are strong reasons to believe that this doctrine is false. An analogy between psychology and economics strongly throws the radical neuron doctrine into doubt.

Whereas Phillips and colleagues argue that knowledge representations are more basic than belief representations, we argue that an accurate analysis of what is fundamental to theory of mind may depend crucially on the context in which mental-state reasoning occurs. Specifically, we call for increased study of the developmental trajectory of mental-state reasoning within socially evaluative contexts.

Glicksohn and Salter both raise good questions that force us to clarify our position. We agree with much of their commentary, with a few caveats. Glicksohn wrongly assumes that later drafts must be “more advanced” and Salter speaks of “recruitment into consciousness,” which invites (but does not require) a Cartesian interpretation. Their suggestions about the time course of “editorial” revision of the multiple drafts and the possibility of restoration of the information in abandoned drafts are possible extensions of the Multiple Drafts Model.

Niedenthal et al. present a model for embodied emotion simulation and expression understanding that spans multiple brain systems. This commentary addresses the potential role of time in this model, and its implications for understanding social dysfunction.

What inductive biases must be incorporated into multi-agent artificial intelligence models to get them to capture high-fidelity imitation? We think very little is needed. In the right environments, both instrumental- and ritual-stance imitation can emerge from generic learning mechanisms operating on non-deliberative decision architectures. In this view, imitation emerges from trial-and-error learning and does not require explicit deliberation.

The integrated information theory (IIT) equates levels of consciousness with the amount of information integrated over the elements that constitute a system. Conscious visual perception provides two observations that contradict the IIT. First, objects are accurately perceived when presented for ≪100 ms during which time no neural integration is possible. Second, an object is seen as an integrated whole and, concurrently, all constituent elements are evident. Because integration destroys information about details, IIT cannot account for perceptual detail preservation.