A paradox has emerged in the growing literature on the legacies of the precolonial past: areas home to precolonial centralized polities are associated with beneficial long-run outcomes in some studies, but harmful ones elsewhere. This article introduces an original dataset of precolonial African states in the nineteenth century to explain this seeming contradiction. By developing a typology of precolonial statehood, I show that there is no single legacy of the precolonial past. Rather, statehood only increases civil conflict where political power was highly concentrated in a polity. Where political authority was more diverse, conflict prevalence is lower. A largely inverse pattern holds for development outcomes. These findings, and the associated dataset, suggest promising new pathways for understanding not only the legacies of Africa’s precolonial past, but the study of comparative state-building, which has largely relegated the African experience to a single story.

Analyzing nominally partisan contests, previous literature has argued that state and local politics have nationalized. Here we use individual ballots from the 2020 general elections covering over 50 million voters to study the relationship between individual national partisanship and voting in over 5,700 contested down-ballot contests, including nonpartisan races and ballot measures. Voting in partisan contests can be explained by voter’s national partisanship, consistent with existing literature. However, we find that voting for local nonpartisan offices and ballot measures is much less partisan. National partisanship explains more than 80% of the within-contest variation in voting for partisan state and local offices but less than 10% for local nonpartisan contests and local ballot measures. The degree of partisanship in local spending measures varies by the type of service—for example, education, roads, public safety, housing. Finally, we find evidence of structure in the pattern of votes on local spending measures.

Only 15% of African households possess a formal title for their agricultural land, despite the widespread availability of titles and their documented benefits. Local politics combine with national land regimes to explain this empirical anomaly. I combine 170,216 household-level observations of titling across 22 African countries with a novel geospatial measure of land values and the returns to agricultural investment. Households in areas with high returns to potential agricultural investment title more. However, in countries with centralized land tenure regimes, strong customary institutions attenuate this relationship; in countries with decentralized land regimes, strong customary institutions reinforce it. I use a case study in Côte d’Ivoire, including an original survey of 801 households and 194 customary elites, to trace these mechanisms at work. This research documents granular variation in the uptake of land titles, illustrates how local politics explain this variation, and outlines conditions under which customary elites impede development.

This article reconciles conflicting views about the political landscape of corporate America with new data on the revealed political preferences of 97,469 corporate directors and executives at 9,005 different U.S. companies. Driven largely by turnover, I find that average observed ideology for directors and executives has shifted meaningfully to the left over time, changing from modestly conservative in 2001 to roughly centrist by 2022. This finding supports a middle-ground position between conventional wisdom casting “big business” as a conservative stronghold and revisionist views holding the opposite. Counterfactual simulations and a difference-in-differences design suggest multifaceted reasons for these changes, and hand-collected data on corporate stances on LGBTQ-related legislation suggest a strong connection between corporate political activity and individual views. Overall, this transformation has profound implications for American politics, as the individuals comprising one of the most powerful interest groups—corporate elites—appear to be fracturing ideologically and to some degree even switching sides.

Middle Eastern and North African (MENA) Americans are politically visible yet institutionally invisible, long categorized as “white” by the U.S. government despite neither self-categorizing nor racially assigned as such. Most forms—across public and private sectors—still lack a “MENA” category option. What are the political consequences of institutional invisibility? Across two survey experiments and in-depth interviews, I find that exclusion from official identity categories triggers the experience of categorization threat, a psychological response rarely linked to political behavior. When MENA Americans experience categorization threat, they respond by expressing opinions on politics in ways that attempt to signal and assert their MENA identity and, to a lesser extent, Person of Color (POC) identity. Such identity assertion demonstrates that bureaucratic categorization influences expressions of public opinion on politics, not simply how people self-categorize. Researching the effects of category exclusion on public opinions creates opportunities for more accurate and democratic scholarship.

A prominent literature on pre-modern warfare and institution-building holds that intense military competition in pre-modern Europe encouraged institutional innovations—for example, centralized bureaucracies and monopolies on coercion—that empowered rulers and enhanced state capacity, with salutary effects on long-run political development. States that adopted these innovations were more likely to survive, whereas those that did not succumbed to invading armies. Yet links between geopolitical competitiveness and capacity building are largely theorized and tested based on the European historical experience. A broader view of that period reveals a more complicated picture. The dominant mode of warfare throughout much of medieval and early modern Eurasia, Inner Asian cavalry warfare (IACW), favored succession institutions that selected for competent military leaders at the expense of long, secure reigns and cumulative capacity-building potential. I explore these links between IACW, succession practices, and rule duration with a novel dataset of over 300 Eurasian dynasties.

The share of women in politics is higher, on average, under closed-list proportional representation (PR) electoral systems compared to majoritarian systems. Yet, even in PR systems, progress toward gender parity has been slow and uneven. We argue that women’s representation and career progression under PR might be impeded when single-occupant positions, such as local mayor and list leader, serve as important stepping stones in political career paths. Using a century of detailed candidate-level data from Norway, we investigate (1) whether gaps in women’s representation emerge at these “majoritarian stepping stones” and (2) how access to these positions affects women’s progression into higher offices. Our empirical analysis reveals that gender gaps indeed emerge at majoritarian stepping stones. However, we also document how Norwegian parties have employed workarounds—promoting women occupants of these positions at higher rates than men—to mitigate the adverse effects of this hidden majoritarianism on women’s representation in higher offices.

In East Jerusalem, the vast majority of Palestinians contest the legitimacy of the Israeli state’s claim to sovereignty. This necessarily affects how Palestinians engage with the state in pursuit of goods and services. But how? Using data from 55 interviews and original observational and experimental survey data from a representative sample of East Jerusalemites, I show that civilians’ engagement with each good, service, and institution of the state is a function of their perceptions of the state’s legitimacy, or right to rule, in that sector. Civilians will avoid engagement with goods, services, and institutions that explicitly affirm the state’s claims to monopolized sovereign rule, without forsaking essential goods and services. This article empirically illustrates that the same individual will make different choices with respect to each state sector, and in doing so builds on the burgeoning recognition of sector-level choices in the citizen claim-making literature.

This article examines the problem of racialized vulnerability to systemic violence by engaging with the works of Judith Butler and discussing police brutality. Butler has been criticized for presupposing vulnerability as an ontological condition inherent in embodied life and obscuring the distinctive characteristics of racialized vulnerability. Wrestling with these criticisms, the article reads this presupposition as a “contingent foundation,” and it turns to Butler’s longstanding engagements with phenomenology to foreground the norms and frames that inform the ways in which vulnerability is always perceived, interpreted, and adjudicated. Expanding on Butler’s analysis of the 1992 Rodney King trial with the help of Frantz Fanon’s concept of “sociogeny” and working with the trial archives, jurors’ statements, media coverage, and King’s memoir, it outlines a critical phenomenology inquiring into the sociohistorical constitution of racial schemas that turn Black bodies into phobic objects and disproportionately expose them to violence carried out with impunity.

How can public agencies become more responsive to marginalized citizens? We develop a theory of bureaucratic responsiveness as the product of resources, representation, and recognition. While material investments and inclusion of marginalized personnel are insufficient in passive forms, they can be jointly activated through institutional recognition: organizational dynamics that enhance a social group’s visibility and ascribe value to efforts to meet their needs. We illustrate this in the domains of policing and gender, examining station-level Women’s Help Desks in India. Combining a large-scale experiment and sustained qualitative research, we reveal how the desks—when staffed by female officers—increased police responsiveness to women’s cases. This occurred as female personnel actively used help desk resources to build professional standing while supporting women. These gains, however, were constrained by patriarchal norms that limit reporting and prosecution of gender-based violence. Our findings illuminate possibilities and challenges of institutional change in unequal settings.

It is commonly assumed that the “classical” concept of sovereignty, bequeathed by Jean Bodin, stands in tension with fundamental commitments of liberal modernity, including cosmopolitanism and the aspiration to establish a global legal order. We argue, in contrast, that Bodin’s theory of sovereignty presupposes a universal legal order that imposes binding and enforceable constraints on sovereigns. To substantiate this claim, we examine Bodin’s curious assertion that God, the sovereign ruler of the cosmos, employs a celestial government or administration of angels and demons to enforce His laws. By situating Bodin’s earlier political works alongside his later religious and philosophical writings, we demonstrate that his political thought was neither “absolutist” nor “constitutionalist,” in the ordinary sense of those terms; rather, he was a theorist of what we propose to call “demonic constitutionalism.”

Public allegations of international law violations are common in international politics. When do these accusations generate international backlash for governments? We argue that political costs hinge on a rhetorical battle to shape perceptions of the government’s behavior. Governments use strategic messaging to contest information, challenge the appropriateness of international law, or cite extenuating circumstances. International organizations (IOs) counter government rhetoric to reinforce the law. These competing messages shape support for punishment among citizens and political elites. We test our argument with survey experiments measuring perceptions of alleged military aggression and human rights violations. Among the US public and a global sample of diplomatic elites, foreign government denials and claims about mitigating circumstances reduce punitive attitudes. IO rebuttals counter denials but can only partially neutralize other claims. We offer a new framework for analyzing the politics of noncompliance and present novel evidence illuminating the strengths and limitations of IOs in enforcing international law.

Contributing to a growing interest in disability in political science, this article makes the case for the central role of disability in upholding the belief in work as requisite for full citizenship. Turning to the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, it shows how disability and the figure of the disabled worker were used to fortify emergent understandings of work against the changes wrought by industrial capitalism. Focusing on three sites of disabled labor—the school-based workshop, custodial institution, and industrial factory—it reveals the crucial ideological work performed by disability in sustaining the myth of the independent worker-citizen. Where existing scholarship has focused on disability either as an identity category or as a target of rights and policy, this article models an alternative approach, arguing for the relevance of disability as a concept that is integral to, and productive of, the ways we understand citizenship and political belonging.

Do parties respond to inequality? Despite the relevance of inequality and its consequences, existing studies fail to capture parties’ emphasis on economic equality and redistribution or to differentiate between existing levels of inequality and increases in inequality. Based on 850,000 party statements from 12 (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) countries (1970–2020), we introduce a crowd-coded dataset that allows us to distinguish positive references to economic equality and redistribution from upward-trending equal-rights/anti-discrimination rhetoric. We show that responses found in previous studies do not capture economic equality and redistribution. In reassessing the impact of inequality, we argue that low visibility, status quo bias, and turnout effects discourage party responses to high inequality levels, while rising inequality poses a visible status quo change and a threat that left parties respond to. We find that left parties respond to inequality increases (except less tangible gains among the most affluent) but not to (high) inequality levels. This helps to understand why inequality is not self-correcting.

Aotearoa New Zealand’s recognition of the Whanganui River as a legal person in 2017 has generated a lively debate. While advocates argue that ascribing personhood to natural entities is a powerful tool for redressing historical injustices against Indigenous peoples and for protecting the environment, critics argue that it is incompatible with Western legal and political systems. In this article, we use Thomas Hobbes’s theory of personhood to develop a novel account of ecological personhood. Hobbes explains how natural entities can be empowered to speak and act through authorized representatives, much as states, corporations, and wards do. Our Hobbesian account has three main payoffs. First, it offers a bridge between different legal orders and ontologies of nature. Second, it explains how “ecoship” is normatively different from corporate personhood and guardianship. Third, it highlights both the transformative potential of ecological persons and the ways in which they can be coopted and subverted.

In the last decade, many scholars have sought to overcome the shortcomings of the reified conception of civil disobedience that was developed in the 1970s by offering alternative conceptions of (un)civil disobedience. The “disobedience framework” is now so predominant that it is almost unthinkable to refer to any protest involving an alleged infraction of official rules as anything other than disobedience. I argue that this overstretching of “disobedience” rests on the misleading assumption that “intentional lawbreaking” occurs in an uncontested political/legal space; it also ignores that, in certain contexts, activists insist on the legality of their protests even when they defy official orders. Examining how feminist activists in Turkey offer alternative interpretations of existing laws to challenge the legality of protest bans, I demonstrate that folding such protests into the disobedience framework silences protesters, erases their narratives of resistance, and adopts the state’s perspective on the “illegality” of their actions.

Understanding how to increase government revenue via taxation is a core puzzle in state development. Taxation is critical for states to fund public goods, and may have positive spillover effects on citizen-state relations. We argue that tax compliance will be higher when governments employ community-level, rather than individual-level, interventions. To test whether it is more effective to focus such interventions on top-down (TD) enforcement or bottom-up (BU) quasi-voluntary compliance, we ran a multi-arm field experiment in 128 markets in Malawi. We find that the BU intervention significantly increased tax compliance by 40%. The TD intervention had a less robust effect on compliance, although not significantly different from that in the BU group. The BU intervention, but not the TD, also increased trust in government, satisfaction with services, and political engagement. The results show that community-level tax interventions can increase compliance and that quasi-voluntary approaches can positively reshape citizen-state relations.

Much recent political theory aims to move beyond the dominant approach to theorizing justice by foregrounding cases of injustice. Judith Shklar’s The Faces of Injustice is regularly invoked in this context, yet the full force of her challenge to the “normal model of justice” and its implications for understanding injustice have not been fully appreciated. This article reconstructs and defends Shklar’s approach to theorizing injustice. It evaluates the differences between John Rawls’s account of the sense of justice and Shklar’s notion of the sense of injustice, showing why the latter should be theorized in relation to plural, competing, and ever-changing expectations, rather than in relation to ideal principles of justice. It illustrates how we can evaluate political responses to injustice without recourse to such principles and maintains that doing so is a strength of any democratic theory that is committed to giving injustice its due.

Scholars and policymakers bemoan an imperial presidency in the war powers context, where the unilateral use of force is frequently interpreted as evidence of an unconstrained executive. Focusing on the strong blame avoidance incentives faced by politicians in the military intervention setting, I develop a model of the war powers focused on “Loss Responsibility Costs.” It suggests that presidents only risk full-scale war when they have the political cover provided by formal authorization, which forces lawmakers to share responsibility. Smaller interventions, in contrast, are frequently undertaken unilaterally because having the president act alone is consistent with congressional preferences for blame avoidance. Novel sentiment data based on tens of thousands of congressional speeches supports the claim that when the president acts unilaterally, they almost always act alongside lawmaker support, who favor intervention but avoid formally endorsing the endeavor. Altogether, it suggests legislators’ influence over war is stronger than commonly appreciated.

Two-way fixed effects (TWFE) models are widely used in political science to establish causality, but recent methodological discussions highlight their limitations under heterogeneous treatment effects (HTE) and violations of the parallel trends (PT) assumption. This growing literature has introduced numerous new estimators and procedures, causing confusion among researchers about the reliability of existing results and best practices. To address these concerns, we replicated and reanalyzed 49 studies from leading journals that employ TWFE models for causal inference using observational panel data with binary treatments. Using six HTE-robust estimators, diagnostic tests, and sensitivity analyses, we find: (i) HTE-robust estimators yield qualitatively similar but highly variable results; (ii) while a few studies show clear signs of PT violations, many lack evidence to support this assumption; and (iii) many studies are underpowered when accounting for HTE and potential PT violations. We emphasize the importance of strong research designs and rigorous validation of key identifying assumptions.