The chapter traces Dayan’s military career progression during Israel’s War of Independence, which prepared him for future senior command and leadership positions. It highlights his experiences in battles over Degania and his command of the Commando 89th Battalion, including leading the battalion in the conquest of Lod, and finally his command over the Jerusalem front. In Jerusalem, Dayan became involved in peace negotiations with Jordanian Jerusalem front commander Abdullah al-Tal and later with Jordan’s king, showcasing his diplomatic skills. Dayan acknowledged being blessed with the very best teacher – David Ben-Gurion himself. Ben-Gurion was hugely impressed by Dayan’s political and diplomatic finesse, forging even closer relations with him. However, Dayan’s success also made him a target of criticism and jealousy among former Palmach commanders, making him several enemies.

The chapter provides a detailed account of the second part of Yom Kippur War, starting with the turning point in the war on October 12. It highlights the existential danger that Israel’s leaders believed they faced before the turning point and how Israel’s leaders strategized and made a bold move to cross the canal and encircle Egypt’s Third Army, a move that changed the course of the war. It also discusses the differences in approach between Dayan and Elazar in achieving a ceasefire and how Israel’s leaders used a ruse or move to force one of their enemies to lay down their arms. It also sheds light on the difficult decisions that leaders must make during times of crisis, such as Dayan’s decision to give the order to prevent more losses that could weaken the new defense line. The chapter also discusses the aftermath of the war, including the establishment of a National Commission of Inquiry, the Agranat Commission, to examine the war’s prelude and conduct until October 8. It held the military echelon responsible for the catastrophe, a decision which escalated antigovernment protests and calls for Dayan’s and Meir’s resignations.

The preface introduces the reader to the enduring fascination with Moshe Dayan, a prominent figure in Israeli history. Dayan’s legacy has been the subject of much debate and controversy among historians, and the purpose of the book is to present both the debates and the author’s own interpretation of Dayan’s life and career. It also highlights the importance of studying Dayan’s legacy, both for understanding Israeli history and for gaining insights into leadership and strategy more broadly. Dayan was a complex figure, with both strengths and weaknesses as a leader and strategist. However, his singular mental abilities, wisdom, experience, and insights continue to make him a compelling figure for study. The chapter also touches on the challenges of studying history, particularly when it comes to interpreting historical events and figures: historical facts are one thing, but interpretation is another. The book attempts to present a comprehensive and accurate historical assessment of Dayan’s life and career.

The chapter delves into Dayan’s early life, tracing his family history from his birth in the first Israeli Kibbutz Degania to his upbringing at Moshav Nahalal. It explores Dayan’s education and the formative events that shaped his character, including his complex relations with his Arab neighbors. Despite admiring the nomadic Bedouin tribes and forming close friendships with some of them, Dayan also engaged in local skirmishes over land disputes. His early exposure to handling weapons and combat, under the guidance of exceptional mentors such as Orde Wingate and Yitzhak Sadeh, honed his skills in guerrilla tactics and leadership. Joining the Haganah early on, Dayan and fellow members were imprisoned by the British, only to be released to aid in the defense of Palestine as the Germans approached. During a British raid against Vichy-controlled Lebanon in 1942, Dayan suffered a debilitating eye injury, which, while halting his operational advancements, ultimately steered him towards a career in politics and a close relationship with David Ben Gurion, Israel’s foremost leader.

The chapter provides a detailed account of Moshe Dayan’s pivotal role in the peace process with Egypt. The chapter begins by discussing Dayan’s belief in a significant settlement between Israel and Egypt after the Yom Kippur War, despite facing public backlash and political isolation. The chapter then delves into the key events that led to Dayan’s involvement in the peace process, including the War of Attrition, the separation of forces agreements, and the Camp David Accords. It provides insights into Dayan’s interactions with key figures such as President Jimmy Carter and Prime Minister Menachem Begin, and how his negotiations ultimately led to the interim arrangement reached by the Rabin government in 1975. The chapter also explores Dayan’s views on the Palestinian issue and the future of the West Bank, as well as his role in Israel’s nuclear program and the policy of ambiguity. Overall, the chapter offers a comprehensive analysis of Dayan’s contributions to the peace process with Egypt, highlighting his strategic thinking, political acumen, and willingness to take risks for the sake of peace

In the twelfth century AD, European elite warriors, knights, finding themselves in dire straits during battle, adopted the practice of surrendering themselves to adversaries who then guaranteed the safety of their prisoners. In turn, prisoners promised to pay a ransom to their captors, payment of which would free the prisoners and allow them to take up arms again. This practical transaction was considered honorable, even praiseworthy. Because ransoms could be substantial, it might be necessary for a prisoner to return to his lands to collect the funds. To do so, he would swear on his word of honor, parole d’honneur, to return with the required funds. The practices of honorable surrender, ransom, and parole were established in customary laws of war, and disputes between captors and their captives could be appealed to courts of honor. There were circumstances in which honorable surrender was not permitted. For example, military commanders could forbid their forces to accept surrenders until a battle was decided, lest their men disperse during battle to collect prisoners and ransoms. The recourse to honorable surrender was limited to the elites; common soldiers could be overwhelmed or killed outright in battle or siege.

Americans invaded Afghanistan and Iraq during the “War on Terror” following 9/11. Because the Taliban gave sanctuary to al Qaeda, the United States attacked Afghanistan in October 2001. Within months, Osama bin Laden had fled, and the Taliban took refuge in Pakistan. However, the Taliban launched an offensive in 2006. Despite Allied efforts, the Taliban gained control of Afghanistan. In 2020, Trump agreed to a peace plan that would remove all Allied troops from Afghanistan in 2021. Biden carried out Trump’s capitulation. Like Vietnam, the fighting ended in American surrender by withdrawal in a chaotic evacuation. Justified by faulty rationale, Americans invaded Iraq in 2003. After a quick victory in the conventional attack, Iraqi resistance transformed into an insurgency that brought the Americans to the brink of defeat. In December 2006, Bush authorized the Surge, increasing the number of troops and instituting a new counterinsurgency strategy. The Surge proved successful, and Obama reasonably extracted all American combat troops by December 2011. The treatment of detainees during the War on Terror began with Bush abandoning humane guidelines. Abu Ghraib strikingly revealed American abuses. But with the Surge, detainee operations emphasized rehabilitation and release to increase trust among the Iraqi population.

This brief conclusion surveys the history presented in the preceding chapters and demonstrates how that history supports the conceptual framework presented in Chapter 1 and the primary themes of Leaving the Fight. These themes include the evolution of state, military, and individual surrender from the Middle Ages to the present and the origins and development of the treatment of prisoners of war and detainees. This last can be seen as growing out of medieval honorable surrender, becoming formal cartels between combatants, and then becoming international conventions, from the second half of the nineteenth century into the twenty-first. The conclusion also argues that detention operations instituted during the Iraq Surge serve as a source of lessons to be learned in future conflicts.

In the more centralized states of early modern Europe, rulers exerted greater control over warfare. They established ransom, parole, and exchange for all ranks, not simply the elites. Men taken in battle and held by enemy forces could be ransomed by the states for which they fought. In certain circumstances, prisoners could be free of confinement until ransoms were paid, a new sense of parole. Prisoners could also be exchanged between warring parties. The details of these practices were set out in formal agreements, “cartels,” between adversaries. State surrenders in European wars were set down in treaties; however, the language of the treaties was typified by respectful treatment of the defeated, avoiding the term “surrender,” and praising the return of peace. Moderate language conformed to the principles of an age in which contemporary writings praised the more civilized, even polite, conduct of war. Surrender of military units was common, particularly in siege warfare. The besieged could win advantages by surrender. Garrisons might be given the honors of war, by which a defeated garrison would be allowed to march out and proceed to a friendly camp or garrison, rejoining their own army and escaping imprisonment.

This chapter provides conceptual models of state surrender and military-unit surrender, as well as commenting on individual surrender through time. The models also explain and define the process and consequences of surrender, including the phenomenon of surrender taking the form of withdrawal since World War II. In dealing with the surrender of individual soldiers, the chapter disputes the idea that classifying something as “surrender” depends on the surrendering party making a voluntary choice to yield, a usual part of dictionary definitions of the term. Combatants, most combatants it can be argued, become prisoners of war not because of their own decision but because of the decisions of their commanders. The chapter also discusses prisoners of war and detainees, distinguishing the former from the ladder. It also lists the possible fates of those held by the enemy. Beyond this, the chapter introduces the evolution of the laws of war as a major theme of the volume, from medieval customary practices to modern international conventions.

The Cold War conflicts in Korea and Vietnam, fought in the context of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, differed in the nature of surrender. After the first year of the Korean War, the war became a stalemate. However, the fighting ended only with an armistice two years later. The delay resulted in part from an ideological dispute between the belligerents. American negotiators insisted that POWs be allowed to refuse repatriation to the country for which they fought; the Communists insisted on compulsory repatriation. The armistice allowed POWs to choose, and the Communists were internationally embarrassed because large numbers of Chinese and North Koreans refused repatriation. The major American intervention in Vietnam was fought primarily as a guerrilla campaign, with some large-scale battles. The Americans made little headway, and protests against the war expanded. After Nixon won the 1968 presidential election, he first tried carrot and stick means to convince the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese to cease fighting. When these failed, he and Kissinger maneuvered to end the American intervention by any means necessary. The Paris Peace Accords granted nearly all the enemies’ demands so that the United States could withdraw American troops. Withdrawal amounted to utter surrender.