This chapter explores the redefinition of “youth,” their relationship with the federal government, and their role in national security in the 1930s. Due mainly to the widespread unemployment among young people in their late teens to mid-twenties, adults classified them as a distinct age group with economic, educational, and cultural problems. Many adults believed that the federal government should intervene in the “youth problem,” which prompted the establishment of New Deal programs for young people, such as the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC) and the National Youth Administration. The chapter also demonstrates, through an examination of debates over the introduction of military training to the CCC, as well as the transition of these agencies’ goals from unemployment relief to national defense in the late 1930s, how the Great Depression, often compared to war, was a significant turning point in the evolution of the relationship between youth, education, and national security.

This chapter explores how the U.S. ideas about youth, education, and national security were projected onto U.S. policies for Japanese youth during the postwar occupation of Japan. The Americans who arrived in Japan after the end of the hostilities drew on both the U.S. and Japanese conceptions of youth to advance their national security objectives. That is, they rhetorically addressed young Japanese as a unitary group of people craving to be rescued from a militaristic dictatorship while stratifying them through policy. The chapter also demonstrates how the period in which “total war” defined youth’s relationship with national security was coming to an end, with the outbreak of the Cold War.

This chapter examines the debates in American society surrounding the conscription of young men, particularly those under the age of majority (age twenty-one), for World War I. Before the war, men under the age of twenty-one had served in the U.S. armed services, but mainly as volunteers. The necessity to establish a selective draft system in 1917 sparked an intense debate in American society about whether minors should be drafted into the military. This chapter also explores how military training programs for soldiers were established on civilian college campuses during the war, most notably the Student Army Training Corps, and how the educational elite played an active role in doing so and established educational institutions as military training sites during wartime.

This chapter explores how selective service laws for World War II both built on and changed the relationship between youth, education, and national security that had been developed in the preceding decades. Through nationwide debates over what made the disproportionate draft of young men aged eighteen to twenty-five as American and democratic, adults reinterpreted the characteristics of “youth” that had been deemed serious problems in the 1930s. That is, the lack of advanced work experience now indicated immediate availability for military service, unstable lifestyle meant mobility, and mental malleability now signified adaptability to military discipline. The supporters of the youth draft also formalized the link between military duty and education, advocating for the formation of military-educational training for young soldiers with military value as a democratic and American method of conscripting youth.

The chapter delves into the iconic imagery and contested legacy of Moshe Dayan as the “minister of victory” during the Six-Day War. It examines the strategic decisions and military maneuvers orchestrated by Dayan, shedding light on his pivotal role in shaping the objective and management of the war. The emphasizing his focus on neutralizing the Egyptian military threat and avoiding unnecessary entanglements with other Arab armies. Dayan’s adaptability and opportunistic approach to seizing fleeting opportunities are highlighted, underscoring his influence on major decisions while attempting to minimize intervention in routine management. Furthermore, the chapter delves into Dayan’s considerations of international sensitivities, particularly regarding the Holy Basin and the potential involvement of the Soviet Union. The controversy surrounding the war’s objectives and priorities, as well as the tensions between the political and military echelons, is also examined. Additionally, the chapter delves into Dayan’s interactions with political figures and military leaders, revealing the complexities and challenges he faced in navigating the rapidly evolving dynamics of the war.

The chapter offers a unique perspective on strategy development and the role of a strategist, highlighting the importance of context-specific thinking, flexibility, and reflection. The chapter begins by examining Dayan’s early experiences as a revolutionary guerrilla fighter, which shaped his view of war as a phenomenon that can only be understood in its local, concrete geographical, cultural, and political contexts. This dismissal of rigid, established military patterns is central to Dayan’s approach to strategy development throughout his career. The chapter then explores Dayan’s unique approach to strategy development, which was characterized by contextualized learning, the application of the 80:20 principle for setting priorities, delegation and empowerment, time management for maximum flexibility, and the use of meetings to generate and test new ideas. Dayan’s ability to hold two opposing points of view simultaneously and his love for the land of Israel are also discussed. Overall, the chapter offers valuable insights into the development of a strategist and the importance of context-specific thinking and flexibility in strategy development.

This chapter examines the post-Six-Day War period and the challenges faced by Moshe Dayan, particularly in governing the West Bank and Gaza Strip, home to a significant Palestinian population hostile to Israel. Dayan grapples with the complexities of governing non-citizen residents and contemplates the future of the occupied territories, seeking a final arrangement with the Palestinians and the broader Arab world. The chapter also sheds light on Dayan’s experiences in Vietnam, where he gained insights into the challenges faced by the US military. He would use his experience in Vietnam later on in his career. Dayan’s observations on the need for precise intelligence, the importance of winning hearts and minds, and the struggle against Communist ideology offer valuable lessons for military strategy. Additionally, the chapter explores Dayan’s personal experiences, including his profound connection to the historic sites of Jerusalem and his recognition of the need for intense work to regulate the complex situation in the region and preempt potential conflicts.

This chapter provides a comprehensive analysis of the War of Attrition, a conflict between Israel and Egypt that lasted from 1967 to 1970. The chapter explores the political and social processes triggered by the war, as well as the significant involvement of the Soviet Union and increased US aid to Israel. It also delves into the limited scope of the war, with both sides aiming for a strategy of exhaustion The chapter highlights the role of Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Dayan in shaping the country’s military strategy during the war. Dayan’s advocated for Israeli concessions and partial settlement with Egypt, arguing that the opening and reconstruction of the Suez Canal could generate positive dynamics for promoting peace. Another aspect is the social impact of the war on Israeli society, revealing the emergence of cracks in the national consensus. The war was long-lasting and resulted in heavy losses, leading to discontent and criticism from various levels of society. Despite this, the war ultimately demonstrated Israel’s military strength and ability to withstand pressure from a much larger opponent.

The Sinai Campaign of 1956 was shaped by significant geopolitical developments, including the end of colonialism and the emergence of the Cold War. As former colonial powers relinquished control over territories, the Middle East became a focal point for global power struggles. Great Britain and France, seeking to protect their interests in the region, became involved in the conflict, aligning with Israel to achieve their strategic goals. Amidst these shifting dynamics, the Sinai Campaign unfolded as a pivotal military endeavor. The campaign was characterized by the emphasis on speed in battle, as articulated by Moshe Dayan. Dayan’s strategic vision prioritized the relative advantage of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), focusing on areas where they could create a decisive edge over their adversaries. This approach led to a reevaluation of force-building principles, with an emphasis on offense and rapid execution capabilities. Furthermore, the campaign revealed the formidable power of the IDF’s armored corps, triggering a genuine revolution in Israeli military strategy. The Sinai Campaign thus stands as a multifaceted historical event, shaped by geopolitical realignments, military innovations, and ethical dilemmas.

The chapter provides a detailed account of the decision-making processes that led to strategic surprise in the Yom Kippur War 6 of October 1973 and the battles during the first days of the war. The chapter highlights the differences in opinion among Israeli military leaders regarding the best approach to defending against an Egyptian attack, with some advocating for a flexible defense and others favoring a rigid defense with strongpoints. Ultimately, political considerations led to the adoption of a rigid defense strategy integrated with some mobile units. The chapter also explores the misunderstandings and communication issues that occurred during the first hours of the war that led to Israel’s military failures, particularly with regards to the delayed call-up of reserve units but also the air force. Israel’s counter offensive on the 8 of October failure in its southern front is also analyzed.

The chapter outlines Dayan’s transition from commanding the Southern Command to becoming the Chief of Staff, emphasizing his strategic vision and operational command. The document delves into Dayan’s approach to military training, his participation in advanced command courses, and the unique leadership style he exhibited during his command of the Northern Command. Additionally, it sheds light on Dayan’s role in shaping Israel’s security doctrine, particularly through the implementation of reprisal actions to address ongoing security threats. The content elucidates Dayan’s belief in the importance of readiness for both routine security challenges and high-intensity conflict, as well as his deep-seated conviction in the necessity of an reprisal operations for maintaining Israel’s deterrence posture that is necessary for Israel’s survival. Furthermore, it provides insights into Dayan’s perception of the conflict through his famous eulogy for a fallen officer, which underscores his complex sentiments towards peaceful coexistence and the harsh realities of conflicts in the region. Overall, the chapter highlights Dayan’s multifaceted leadership, military strategy, and the evolving nature of Israel’s security challenges during his tenure.