The strategies of Louis XIV were shaped both by France’s position as one of the largest powers in Europe and by the Sun King’s domineering personality. After his succession to the French throne in 1661, Louis XIV gradually asserted control over his state, to launch a series of wars against his neighbours, particularly the disconnected Spanish Habsburg territories which encircled France. Commanding one of the largest standing armies in Europe, he used diplomatic and military intimidation to effect rapid conquests of smaller neighbouring states (1660s–1680s). His initial successes led to opposing coalitions which further blunted French advances. By the Franco-Dutch War (1672–1679), his hopes for short wars were dashed, and the rest of his reign would see attritional struggles on land and at sea. Each time Louis sought to expand his frontiers through force, more belligerents joined the anti-French coalition, expanding the number of contested theatres, and increasing the duration of each conflict. Louis’s early victories in the War of Devolution (1667–1668) and the Franco-Dutch War benefited from French numerical superiority, from strategic surprise, and from the capacity of great captains such as the marshals Turenne and Condé. By 1701 Louis’s strategy aimed defensively to retain Spanish territories he had seized in the name of his grandson. His wars were costly, but France provided Louis the resources to pass a larger kingdom on to his successor.

From the sixth to fourth centuries BCE, the Persian empire under the Teispid and Achaemenid dynasties ruled most of western Asia and neighbouring regions, from the Indus river to Egypt and the coasts of the Aegean Sea. Despite the sources’ disproportionate emphasis on the failures of military expeditions against the overseas Greeks, the Persians enjoyed a lengthy period of military success and overall stability due in part to their rulers’ skill in the formulation of strategy. In the initial conquests, Persia absorbed peer competitors such as Babylon and Egypt; most subsequent conflicts pitted the empire’s superior forces against localised rebellions. Persia’s control stretched to vital subject communities in frontier zones and they also projected influence over external allies and clients. Persian kings rarely campaigned in person after the early expansionist phase, but relied on an exemplary communication system to manage satraps and other delegates tasked with provincial and frontier operations. To carry out military objectives, they relied on networks of provincial recruitment, supported as necessary by elements of a standing army associated with the royal court. Persian military activities were augmented by diplomatic outreach, most notably in Persia’s Greek relations after the failed invasion of mainland Greece. Persia’s strategic capabilities remained formidable until they were caught off guard by the tactical superiority of Alexander’s Macedonian invaders.

Air power, with its capability for mass destruction, changed the face of twentieth-century inter-state warfare and redefined what power means. Having had limited impact on the First World War, the unique characteristics of air power – speed, height and reach – were immediately recognised as were its attributes: ubiquity, agility and concentration. Theorists explored the potential of this novel instrument for future wars, with one school emphasising strategic utility while another school explored its potential in the context of continental land warfare. Theory directly influenced the creation of air power capabilities and air warfare during World War II. While military technologies – in particular due to precision munitions – and societal attitudes concerning the use of force have changed, the theoretical foundations of the interbellum and the debates about the utility of air power still resonate. Today air power has become the icon of Western-preferred style of warfare, having demonstrated its potential utility not only in inter-state wars but also during humanitarian interventions and irregular warfare. Air power can pose or counter threats simultaneously, across a far wider area than surface capabilities, and quickly switch the point of application within and between operational theatres to create tactical and strategic effects.

Europe across the period from 1000–1500 was characterised by a multiplicity of polities, but the majority were unified by membership of the Catholic Church. Indeed Latin Christendom (those polities that recognised papal authority and followed the Latin liturgy) doubled in size by the end of the twelfth century, as frontiers were pushed forward in the Holy Land, Sicily, the Iberian peninsula and the Baltic. This was generally achieved by extraordinary multi-polity coalitions loosely under the direction of the papacy, which confronted enemies of another faith and culture who seemed to present a military and existential threat to Christendom itself. Inter-polity conflict was nevertheless waged within Latin Christendom throughout the period, and especially after the collapse of Latin power in the Holy Land in 1291. As rulers focused more attention on nearby adversaries, they increasingly raised armies by contract for pay, aided by systems of credit, enabling the professionalisation of armies, to a limited extent. Meanwhile, throughout the period, securing divine support was considered important as military means in achieving strategic goals. The strategy and means of political–military elites are revealed through an increasing abundance of sources, notably chronicles and, particularly from the turn of the thirteenth century, an abundance of government records.

A history of the military strategy of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) involves in part China’s use of force around its periphery; whether that is the Korean War (1950–1953), the Sino-Indian border clash (1962), the Sino-Russian border clash (1969), China’s seizure of islets in the Paracels from South Vietnam (1974), the Sino-Vietnamese border clash (1979) and finally China’s seizure of islets from Vietnam in the Spratlys (1988). A close examination of these campaigns reveals a mixed pattern of strategic signalling, military opportunism, punishing adversaries and bolstering buffer zones around China to accomplish China’s long-term strategic objectives with minimal risk to China itself. Curiously, the PRC embarked on a multi-decade period in which the Chinese did not use large-scale force and initiated a concerted effort at defence modernisation and economic development. This has led to a dramatic transformation of the People’s Liberation Army from a backward force into one of the most modern militaries on the planet.

Nuclear strategy as a concept defies easy characterisation. It is a contradiction in terms: such is the destructive power of many nuclear weapons that to employ them would not bring any tangible benefit, especially if the adversary could threaten nuclear retaliation. They hold so little political appeal that since 1945 nuclear weapons have not been used in conflict and are therefore effectively unusable as weapons. Moreover, the idea of a war in which only nuclear weapons are used might exist in theory but would be a remote possibility. Instead, the practice of nuclear strategy has been dominated by ideas and plans in which nuclear weapons might be used in the course of a war alongside conventional weapons. Thus, rather than a concept of ‘nuclear strategy’, a more accurate formulation would be a ‘strategy with a nuclear component’. Yet there remained utility in thinking in terms of ‘nuclear strategy’, particularly in relation to deterrence. This chapter will explore these complex dynamics in several ways. First, it will examine the strategic ideas underpinning use of the atomic bomb at the end of the Second World War. Second, it will discuss the different strategies nuclear states have devised in relation to other nuclear states. Finally, the strategies of non-nuclear states and nuclear aspirants when confronted with nuclear adversaries will be analysed.

The wars of decolonisation in Africa were contested by national liberation movements that, to varying degrees, all modelled their insurgencies on leftist theories of people’s war. At the same time, however, African national liberation movements never followed the precepts set out by the theorists of people’s war in a slavish manner. Instead, they adapted these precepts to local conditions and needs. Drawing on examples ranging from the Algerian war of independence to the armed struggle of the African National Congress against apartheid, this chapter explores the strategic practice of a disparate group of insurgent movements that sought to end decades and more of colonial and white minority rule in Africa. Focusing on their objectives, means, methods and priorities, the chapter argues that while people’s war was an important guiding principle for African liberation movements, from which they drew key lessons, it never represented an immutable blueprint for victory.

In the conclusion to the series, a series of significant observations are presented. In contrast to the pre-occupations of the field with theory and concepts, the practice of strategy shows a distinct picture. When heads of state, states, empires and other social groupings engage in strategy away from the abstract in concrete and real-life situations, it is messy, chaotic and largely ad hoc. First, core conceptual categories in the field hamper a proper understanding of strategy. The binaries of war/peace, rationality/emotion and state/non-state, as largely products of the nineteenth century, obscure rather than illuminate historical practices over the past three millennia. Second, four distinct patterns present themselves: (1) strategy as a utilitarian phenomenon with an alignment of means and ends, as the dominant perspective, holds explanatory power; (2) strategy as a performance offers a strong lens to look at the historical record as war and warfare are repeatedly part of a way of life; (3) opportunity offers a significant explanatory category; (4) practising strategy as an ordering or disordering exercise offers a way to look at reality, and is enacted as a process of making life difficult for an opponent. These findings form an invitation to reconsider the dominant perspective of strategy as stable and universal, attesting to the necessity of awarding more attention to deeds than words.

This chapter considers the strategic dimension of conflict in North America between the outbreak of fighting between the French and colonial Americans in the Ohio valley in 1754 and the formal end of the War of American Independence in 1783. While this thirty-year period saw several local struggles between colonists and Native peoples, the focus here is on the two major conflicts – the Seven Years War (1754–1760 in North America, 1756–1763 in Europe) and the War of Independence (1775–1783). Both wars were global struggles, extending well beyond North America – the Seven Years War from its outset, and the War of Independence from 1778, when the French became belligerents. Even so, the chapter will concentrate on the American aspects of these struggles, and only indirectly address the Caribbean, west African, European and Asian dimensions. It will aspire to cover all the participants in the North American parts of the two wars – settlers, Native peoples and Europeans, particularly the British and the French.

The Russo-Japanese War was fought during 1904–1905 between Tsarist Russia and Imperial Japan. The war broke out due to their conflicting interests in the Korean Peninsula and the north-eastern region of China, known then as Manchuria. Both saw the conflict as a zero-sum game in which compromise was a temporary solution. Japan’s objectives were the control of Korea, the seizure of southern Manchuria and the conclusion of the conflict with a peace agreement that would ensure its own long-term presence and interests in Korea and China. Russia’s objectives were the inverse of Japan’s and included the control of Manchuria, seizure of Korea and the expansion of its political and economic sphere to play a pivotal role in the entire region. Japan had far more limited resources and manpower, but it could mobilise its armed forces more quickly and gain the upper hand in the region, at least initially. As an island country, Japan had to control the seas from the outset and limit the duration of the war. The war lasted seventeen months but demonstrated that when strategic objectives are carefully defined and meticulously executed, as was the case with Japan, then the prima facie weaker party may win.

Although the early part of the century involved the Nationalist Party (KMT) campaigns – the Northern Expedition (1926-28) – to reunify China after the collapse of the Qing Dynasty, the history of China’s military strategy in the twentieth century is largely dominated by the activities of the Chinese Communist People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Embroiled in the first civil war with the Nationalists and avoiding annihilation during the latter’s five encirclement campaigns (1927–1937), the PLA under Mao Zedong’s leadership began to develop some of the core ideas of Communist Chinese military strategy – People’s War, and Active Defense. During the anti-Japanese War of Resistance, the Communists and the Nationalists arrived at a temporary truce to fight Japanese invaders (1937–1945). This period was largely marked by stalemate, but still involved millions of casualties, the use of guerrilla warfare, and the movement of millions of troops across China. Mao’s vision of military strategy unfolded with the resumption of the Communist–Nationalist civil war: guerrilla warfare; manoeuvre warfare; a hybrid of conventional and unconventional operations; conventional warfare; and then a war of annihilation, culminating in the Nationalist retreat to Taiwan.

Evidence for discussing grand strategy in the Roman Empire is extremely limited. In reaction to Luttwak’s thought-provoking book, ancient historians have tended to focus on limitations in the information available to emperors and hence their capacity to determine priorities. Kagan’s reformulation of Luttwak’s thesis to use troop movements as a proxy for strategic decision making does not adequately take into account the personal and cultural considerations that often influenced rulers, and in particular that suppression of internal rivals took priority over external threats. That said, grand strategy remains a useful tool for investigating imperial decision making, especially for emperors such as Augustus and Diocletian, both of whom had to stabilize the empire after protracted bouts of civil war and enjoyed long reigns. It is also relevant to the later empire (after AD 300) when rulers regularly had to balance threats and opportunities on different frontiers against the more limited resources that were available.

The rise and the survival of the Ottoman Empire for six centuries is one of the most important event of the European and Middle Eastern histories. At the apex of the Ottoman conquests in the mid-1500s, Süleyman the Magnificent pushed deep into Hungary and Mesopotamia, as well as making the empire the master of the eastern Mediterranean Sea. Later sultans advanced into southern Russia, Caucasia, Persia and north Africa. In concert with these military successes, the empire transformed itself into a sophisticated administrative entity of great strength, which encouraged diversity, culture, learning and religious activity. The Ottoman high tide reached the gates of Vienna in 1683, only to fail because of faulty command decisions and internal deficiencies. While the Ottomans were trying to counter the military reverses, the forces of the socio-economic revolutions in the West and rapidly evolving market economies added new stresses to it. A new generation of sultans and members of the governing elite evolved, who were convinced of the need for modernisation and westernisation (both terms have been used synonymously and interchangeably) and were committed to change in order to keep the empire intact. They did achieve some results but they failed to stop the interventions and machinations of the Great Powers, which sought to benefit from the empire’s collapse. The Ottoman Empire gained notoriety as the ‘Sick Man of Europe’ and additionally became a target for the forces of ethnic nationalism that fought to dismember it. The First World War became the swan song of the empire. For the first time since the 1680s, the Ottoman Army consistently defeated its European enemies. But it was too late. The empire, bankrupt and blockaded, could not match the resources of its enemies and surrendered.

In this first global history of strategic practice, we define strategy making (following K. Kagan) as making choices, prioritising means in pursuit of political ends in the context of armed conflict, actual or threatened. The usage of the term took a long time to spread from the East Roman Empire to the Occident, and most civilisations discussed in these volumes did not have a distinct word to describe what they were doing in the modern sense. Yet by applying Kagan’s definition, we see evidence of complex reasoning and prioritisation of means and ways; even the greatest empires could not pursue unlimited ends. Our volumes bring together experts on each individual civilisation and period to explore analogous dimensions of strategy making: who are the enemies, and why? What means are available to them? What are the political strategic goals? And the central questions: how were ultimate and immediate goals formulated, and how were they linked up with military means? What were the enablers and limitations, in terms of geography, resources and other means, which produced distinctive approaches? But also, was there a transfer of ideas and methods? How were they translated, adopted, enacted, imitated and emulated in warfare around the world?

The Asia–Pacific War was caused by the expansionist ambitions of Imperial Japan, which by the 1920s had secured Taiwan, Korea and Manchuria. This strategy led to war with Nationalist China in 1937, and to provide fuel and supplies Japan seized the oil-rich Netherlands East Indies and Malaya. When the Japanese moved into southern Indo-China in 1941 the United States applied an oil embargo. Japan struck first at the US fleet at Pearl Harbor, hoping to form a defensive ring around its captured territories and reach an acceptable peace. But having been humiliated at Pearl Harbor, the United States would never have agreed to a negotiated peace.

The Allied strategy was largely reactive. To deter Japan, Britain applied the faulty Singapore Strategy. The US planned to advance gradually across the central Pacific, but were thwarted by Japan. Although the Allies’ overall strategy was to ‘beat Hitler first’, the United States continued to pursue and control the war in the Pacific. Given the industrial power of the United States, it was inevitable that it would prevail in the largely maritime war. By 1945 Japan was being strangled by the Allied blockade and conventional bombing. The atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945 forced Japan’s surrender.