In diplomatic terms, the year 1905, when this chapter begins, was a turbulent one. The previous year Britain and France had sought to end decades of bitter colonial rivalry between them by signing the entente cordiale, an agreement that settled all in one go a range of outstanding imperial issues that had long bedevilled relations between the two countries. In formal terms the new treaty did little else – it certainly was no alliance – but there were many who hoped that such an agreement, if adopted in good faith, would ultimately lead not just to better relations between the two former foes, but even to a period of mutual cooperation and close friendship. In Berlin, where a perpetual state of Franco-British hostility had long been taken for granted and was looked upon as a necessity for Germany's freedom of action on the global stage, this prospect was viewed with something akin to alarm. Accordingly, the decision was taken by those in charge of German foreign policy to nip this incipient friendship in the bud by challenging one of the central provisions of the new Entente, namely the right of Britain and France to come to a settlement over the future status of Morocco without consulting other powers. Germany's démarche was made public in March when Kaiser Wilhelm II landed at Tangiers and proclaimed his intent to uphold Moroccan sovereignty. The ensuing crisis seemingly brought Europe to the brink of war.

In naval terms, the spat over Morocco brought about an outpouring of correspondence in which Germany was explicitly identified as the Royal Navy's most obvious future opponent and France, the foe of old, was recast as a likely ally in the impending struggle. Whether this reclassification was a significant moment of change or merely a symbolic expression of a transformation that had been in progress for some time depends upon on how one reads the documentation of previous years. Arguably, as Chapter 2 has already shown, this appraisal was merely the culmination of a trend of thought that had already been given form by Custance, Battenberg and Selborne in the period 1900–1904. However, there is no denying that the Moroccan Crisis increased both the immediacy and the intensity of the issue and gave it much greater public prominence.

In June 1912, Tirpitz had appeared triumphant again, as so often before in his struggle to build up a powerful navy. This time though, his triumph was rather fragile. The ink of the law had not even dried, when Capelle, Tirpitz's most loyal collaborator, warned that the financial constraints of this Navy Law would make further requests for naval increases impossible. In short, any technical innovation regarding either speed or gun-calibres would be difficult to follow for lack of money.

Tirpitz was well aware of these difficulties and until the outbreak of war, he continued to be haunted by the fear that his life's work might prove a failure in spite of the success he had just achieved. Disappointments, setbacks and frustrations soon further contributed to this state of mind. More often than before, Tirpitz, who had been in office since 1897, who had celebrated his sixtieth birthday in 1909, and who had been promoted to the rank of Grand Admiral in 1911, felt isolated, misunderstood, and sometimes even lonely.

Many minor or major incidents, contributed to his increasing uneasiness and his rising mistrust towards almost everybody, including the Emperor. For example, though Admiral von Holtzendorff, Commander-in-Chief of the High Seas Fleet, and one of his most important opponents within the navy, had had to retire in 1913, relations between Tirpitz and the ‘frontline’ did not improve. The ‘front’ continued to complain about Tirpitz's neglect of its more immediate needs – such as more personnel, higher pay, and both more time and more money for better training – instead of more ships which were increasingly difficult to man. Tirpitz, in turn, was soon convinced that neither Admiral Friedrich von Ingenohl, Holtzendorff's successor, nor Admiral Hugo von Pohl, who had succeeded Admiral August von Heeringen as Chief of the Admiralty Staff, were capable of fulfilling the tasks they had taken over. Moreover, the events surrounding the introduction of the Novelle in 1912 had made it clear to him that he could not rely upon Admiral von Müller, the influential Chief of the Navy Cabinet. In Tirpitz's eyes, Müller had tried to pave the way for a compromise between himself and the Chancellor instead ofgiving Tirpitz his full backing.

In June 1912, the Reichstag passed the third Amendment to the Navy Law of 1900 (Novelle) within six years. Eventually, at least it seemed, Tirpitz had achieved his main aim: building up a powerful fleet which would be more than a ‘risk’ for the Royal Navy. The strength of the German navy, at least on paper, was indeed amazing. In the future, 61 capital ships, 40 small cruisers, 144 torpedo boats and 72 submarines would be able to defend the nation's ‘sea-interests’ – as Tirpitz had always put it since the mid-1890s – even against the world's supreme sea power, Great Britain. Moreover, when the Reichstag finally passed this Amendment with a great majority, every observer could have the feeling that the nation had realised that the expansion of its sea power was inevitable in an era of imperial rivalry. From a strictly naval point of view, Tirpitz had also achieved his most important aim, namely building up a fleet which renewed itself automatically within 20 years at an annual rate of three large ships.

This triumph had, however, been very difficult to achieve. Occasionally, in the years before, it had seemed more likely that Tirpitz would fail instead of achieving a further success. Though the Amendment (Novelle) of 1908 had been passed in the Reichstag without any difficulties, the navy's future had soon looked dark for various reasons. Most importantly, the British government made clear in mid-1908 that it was willing and prepared to take up the gauntlet which Tirpitz had thrown down in 1906/7. Unless the Germans both slowed down the tempo of naval building and stopped enlarging their navy, a naval arms race would follow.

Though the Emperor stood firm and bluntly rejected any concessions in his talks with Sir Charles Hardinge during the visit of Edward VII at Cronberg in August 1908, the Chancellor, Prince Bülow, increasingly questioned the course that the German government had embarked upon. Unlike both the Emperor and Tirpitz, Bülow had realised that the situation had begun to change fundamentally. Whereas Germany's leadership had hoped to pursue a free-hand policy between the other great powers at the turn of the century, the country had been isolated in Europe since the signing of the Anglo-Russian entente in 1907.