In chapter 4, Foreign creditors (May 16 - May 25) the actors deal with the problem of raising an Austrian government bond loan, while at the same time Credit Anstalt’s foreign creditors are getting involved. Conflicts begin to disappear between Austrian actors and central bankers and international creditors, and it becomes increasingly clear to the latter that the situation may well be more problematic than they imagined in the first place. On the Austrian side talks of a moratorium upsets central bankers and creditors who favor a guarantee. It’s getting increasingly difficult for the central bankers to emplot a narrative that can make sense of the situation and enable action to dodge the crisis. The fear of contagion becomes widespread, adding to the uncertainty.

In chapter 2, central bankers and their world, I first present the most important protagonists and a few other actors. They include Montagu Norman and Harry Siepmann of Bank of England, George L. Harrison of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and Francis Rodd of the Bank for International Settlements. I discuss their background and worldview as they were headed into the 1931 crisis. Having presented these main actors and a few others, I proceed to present their world and how they saw it in 1930 and early 1931. The world was already in the midst of the great depression and private bankers as well as central bankers and other decision-makers were aware that they were dealing with crisis and radical uncertainty that might bring about the end of the gold standard and capitalism. I discuss the actors view of the "present world depression" and how they viewed the gold standard and their options as they got ready for trying to save the world from economic disaster.

Chapter 14, Aqnxiety within Germany at climax (July 11 - July 23). In this chapter tension reaches its climax as the Darmstädter und Nationalbank (Danatbank) fails on July 13. Without help from outside of Germany, the German government declares a bank holiday and introduces exchange controls, effectively ending the gold standard in Germany. The New York Fed and Harrison declines to intervene and the BIS does not have the resources or the inclination to intervene. Norman’s position that the situation goes back to the Versaille Peace agreement and is now a matter for governments strengthens. A conference in London is unable to come up with new solutions and meanwhile sterling comes under pressure. The fear of contagion beginning in early May is now a reality.

I first describe how the physical-science and economics literatures have sought to cope with uncertainty about the correct climate model and discount rate, respectively. I next formalize MMR policy choice in an abstract manner. I then present the computational model studied in my research and summarize the main findings.

I first review and critique the prevailing use of hypothesis tests to compare treatments. I then describe my application of statistical decision theory. I compare Bayes, maximin, and minimax regret decisions. I consider choice of sample size in randomized trials from the minimax regret perspective.

Chapter 8, Surrounded with trouble (June 5 - June 10). The BIS board decides to grant a second credit to the BIS, but only after a prolonged discussion and it is made conditional on the placement of the Austrian government loan. There is increasing concern about the schilling as capital flows out of the country and the government issues take increasing priority, without being placed. At the same time, Germany’s reparations issues become ever more present as the German Chancellor Brüning meets with Prime Minister MacDonals at Chequers. Shortly before, Brüning published a statement saying that the burden on the German people has reached its limit. The international creditors too become increasingly nervous about the Austrian situation.

Section 3.1 presents key findings on partial identification of mean treatment response with observational data, with accompanying illustrations. Section 3.2 considers identification problems that arise with data from randomized trials, focusing on an important practical issue that has escaped notice until recently. Section 3.3 discusses the difficult problem of identification of treatment response with social interactions. Section 3.4 revisits the subject of meta-analysis discussed in Chapter 2, now offering an alternative to the manner in which meta-analysis has been performed to date.

Chapter 18, The End (1931 - 2022). Since the narrative IS the analysis, there is no conclusion as such. Instead, The End provides a discussion of what a forward looking, thick description, humanistic approach to the financial crisis of 1931 have contributed to our knowledge in combination with the concepts embodied in the narrative. First, it is argued that the historical narrative provides new information exactly because writing the history forward brings out the uncertainty and need for sensemaking and narrative emplotment. This argument is discussed briefly in the context of the historiography of the 1931 crisis. Secondly, I ask what this narrative approach has contributed to our emprical and theoretical understanding of decision-making. By very briefly comparing with the Great financial crisis of 2008 I argue that uncertainty is a basic condition that requires sensemaking and narrative construction. I end by suggesting that rather than drawing lessons from history, history can be used as a way to reflect upon the past and the present.

Chapter 17, Exit (September 16 - October 23). In this chapter I follow the last few days before Britain leaves gold on September 21 after having exhausted the credits on the peg to the US dollar. The decision makes sterling decline by 20 per cent, which lead to massive losses not least for the Banque de France. J.P. Morgan is unhappy as well, seeing how the credits are gone with nothing to show for them. As Norman returns to Britain and the Bank, he is unhappy with the situation and Bank of England’s bad reputation following the devaluation. Rodd and Siepmann struggle to make sense of the situation, and Norman - some years later - expresses that it was all in vain. He was left ’a bitterly disappointed man.’ The narrative ends with this chapter.