This chapter explores the role of culture (e.g., trust, solidarity, rule of law) in predicting the success of voluntary compliance and its malleability toward trust-based rather than coercion-based regulation.

This chapter compares the impact of different regulatory tools (command and control, mandates, and incentives relative to reasoning, honesty oath, and nudge) on the crowding out of different types of intrinsic compliance motivations.

This chapter concludes the book with normative messages on contexts where states can trust public cooperation without coercion, addressing jurisprudential and normative aspects of governments gaining public cooperation.

The arc of our story will show how Morgan evolved from being primarily concerned with providing aid to firms who were his customers to providing aid to the whole system, less centered on individual companies.

This chapter examines the likelihood of voluntary compliance in public health contexts, with emphasis on lessons learned during COVID-19 regarding trust in mask wearing, social distancing, and vaccine uptake.

We have analyzed how Morgan learned to link the three pools of global reserves during American crises, and the Panic of 1907 was no different. Morgan’s lender of last resort skills were on full display during the panic, the last and most severe of the National Banking Era panics. We analyze sixteen last resort activities (eleven domestic, five international) led by Morgan coordinating the three detached sources of liquidity.

This chapter assesses the potential of technological tools to ensure voluntary compliance without coercion and improve the predictability of trustworthiness, focusing on the ethical challenges such differentiation might create.

Chapter 1 introduces the challenges of trusting public cooperation without monitoring and coercion, considers current research on the relationship between concepts such as cooperation and honesty, and examines the effectiveness of voluntary compliance.

This chapter investigates factors influencing voluntary compliance with environmental regulations, exploring the role of environmental motivation in shaping behavior and analyzing various types of pro-environmental actions.

With Congress unwilling to authorize another public loan, the proceeds of which would be intended to buy much needed gold for the Treasury, Cleveland and Carlisle cast about for other ways to secure financing. Morgan would eventually create three additional transactions to stave off populist attempts to pursue a full-fledged bimetallic currency regime: one would be accepted, one would be rejected, and one would be executed without government request, approval, or oversight.

This chapter investigates moderating factors such as trust-related mechanisms, norms, and institutions, and their ability to explain the relationship between intrinsic motivation and compliance, which is free of regulatory coercion.

Farmers sought relief from the 1893 recession by lobbying for an increase in the money supply from newly mined silver. Railroads sought relief by reorganizing their debt, through extended maturities and combinations of smaller roads with larger ones. The specter of bimetallism in the US added to the financial uncertainty following the Panic of 1893 for European investors who became increasingly worried that US debtors would pay them with silver instead of gold. A slow-motion run on the US Treasury’s gold began and then gained steam. Morgan’s own business was not insulated from the turmoil surrounding the Treasury’s gold reserves.