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[The following Appendix has already appeared as an article in the Journal of Philology, Vol. 1 No. 1 (1868), pp. 88—93. s.]
There are four terms in Greek which represent different states or degrees of affection, fondness, liking, love, in its most general acceptation. Of these στοργή and ἔρως are co-ordinate terms, in this respect, that they both designate what Aristotle calls πάθη, instinctive affections, implanted in sentient beings by nature.
In the following chapter we have a very brief account of the second kind of rhetorical proof, viz. the ethical, the ἦθος ἐν τῷ λέγοντι. The treatment of it is cursory ; and we are referred backwards to the analysis of virtue moral and intellectual in Book I c. 91, for further details of the topics from which are to be derived the enthymemes whereby the speech and the speaker may be made to assume the required character of Φρόνηησις, ἀρετή and εὔνοια; and forwards to the chapter on ϕιλία and μῖσος (11 4), in the treatise on the πάθη, where the indications of these affections are enumerated, which will enable the speaker to convey (always by his. speech) the good intentions and friendly feeling by which he is affected towards his audience. As supplementary and auxiliary to the direct logical arguments this indirect ethical mode of persuasion is indispensable to the success of the speech. People are hardly likely to be convinced by a speaker who sets them against him.
[Among the books belonging to the late Mr Shilleto which have been recently acquired by the University Library, are two interleaved copies of the edition of the Rhetoric printed at the Oxford University Press in 1826. One of these, which is in bad condition owing to many years of use, contains a large number of annotations of very unequal value, written in various hands; in the other, which bears on the title-page the name Richard Shilleto with the date Dec. 15, 1863, apparently all the notes on which his maturer judgment set any value, are copied out by himself in a hand rivalling that of Richard Porson for clearness and beauty. All these notes, and a few selections from the older book, with some trifling omissions, (parallel passages, for instance, already quoted at large in these volumes,) I have transcribed in full by permission of the Syndics of the University Library, and I append them here as an epilogue to Mr Cope's Commentary.]