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11366 results in Ancient philosophy

Page 127 of 569

  • Chapter 2 - Definition, Explanation and the Soul–Body Relation

  • from Part I - Aristotle’s Methodology of Psychological Inquiry
  • Jason W. Carter, University of Edinburgh
  • Book:
    Aristotle on Earlier Greek Psychology
    Published online:
    08 March 2019
    Print publication:
    21 March 2019, pp 47-56

  • Summary

    In Chapter 2, I argue that, in DA 1.3, Aristotle puts forward a further definitional requirement, that a scientific definition of the soul should include a description that explains the soul–body relation. I argue that Aristotle bases this idea on a general principle of his natural science, established in On Generation and Corruption, which I call the Axiom of Causal Association. Aristotle’s extension of this principle to the case of the soul–body relation commits him to a view I call associative substance dualism and puts pressure on definitions of the soul that cannot provide such a principle.

  • Chapter 3 - Plato’s Psychology

  • from Part II - Earlier Theories of Psychological Motion
  • Jason W. Carter, University of Edinburgh
  • Book:
    Aristotle on Earlier Greek Psychology
    Published online:
    08 March 2019
    Print publication:
    21 March 2019, pp 59-78

  • Summary

    In Chapter 3, I show how Aristotle appeals to the demonstrative heuristic to show that the Platonic definition of soul as a self-mover entails either that the soul will be one of the four material elements – which it cannot be – or that it will destroy itself during its motion. What Aristotle gains from this criticism of Plato is the idea that one cannot explain the soul’s ability to be an efficient cause of the body’s motion by treating it as a separate physical object with its own motion. Instead, Aristotle suggests that soul will need to be identified as itself an inner principle of the body if it is to be a natural efficient cause of the body’s local motion. This lays the groundwork for the soul’s being a principle of efficient causality, in accordance with the Efficient-Final Causal Thesis.

  • Chapter 10 - The Puzzle of the Soul’s Divisibility

  • from Part IV - Earlier Theories and Two Psychological Puzzles
  • Jason W. Carter, University of Edinburgh
  • Book:
    Aristotle on Earlier Greek Psychology
    Published online:
    08 March 2019
    Print publication:
    21 March 2019, pp 206-218

  • Summary

    In Chapter 10, I show how Aristotle attempts to make an empirical advance over the Platonic theory that the soul has determinate spatial-parts in the body. What Aristotle takes over from this theory, I argue, is that the soul has ‘parts’ which exercise powers within the body, but these parts cannot be understood as spatial-parts. Aristotle’s investigation of this puzzle results in the discovery that, while the soul does not have a determinate spatial structure, it does have a metaphysical structure. These discussions, I claim, place a positive constraint on him to adopt the Part-Hood Thesis.

  • Chapter 9 - The Puzzle of the Soul’s Uniformity

  • from Part IV - Earlier Theories and Two Psychological Puzzles
  • Jason W. Carter, University of Edinburgh
  • Book:
    Aristotle on Earlier Greek Psychology
    Published online:
    08 March 2019
    Print publication:
    21 March 2019, pp 193-205

  • Summary

    In Chapter 9, I argue that, in DA 1.5, Aristotle sums up the basic shortcomings of early Greek psychology by arguing that these theories are at best able to provide an explanation of either the soul’s power of perception, or its power to initiate the body’s local motion, but not both. This criticism lays out the empirical groundwork for Aristotle’s claim in DA 2.3 that there is no uniform entity called ‘soul’ in nature, but various kinds of soul associated with broad divisions in the animal kingdom. I argue that this discussion places a negative constraint on him to adopt the Non-Uniformity Thesis.

  • Chapter 4 - Democritus’ Psychology

  • from Part II - Earlier Theories of Psychological Motion
  • Jason W. Carter, University of Edinburgh
  • Book:
    Aristotle on Earlier Greek Psychology
    Published online:
    08 March 2019
    Print publication:
    21 March 2019, pp 79-102

  • Summary

    In Chapter 4, I show how Aristotle appeals to his demonstrative heuristic to show that Democritus is able to provide a formal, but not adequate, explanation of both the soul’s ability to cause the body to move and its ability to think. This is because he thinks Democritus lacks an explanation of our ability to have a stable form of cognition from which deliberated actions proceed. What Aristotle gains from this criticism is the idea that the soul’s production of local motion, even if it involves mechanistic causes within the body, must also involve (at least in the case of humans) a free decision to move or to not move. The result of this criticism implies that the explanation of animal behaviour cannot be reduced to a deterministic series of causal interactions, and hence, that Democritus’ definition of the soul, which implies such a determinist account, is not scientific. The criticism of Democritus helps to show, indirectly, that the soul operates in an intentional way as both a final and efficient cause in the origination of the motion of animals, and thus lays further groundwork for the Efficient-Final Causal Thesis.

Page 127 of 569