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11366 results in Ancient philosophy

Page 126 of 569

Plotinus' Legacy
  • The Transformation of Platonism from the Renaissance to the Modern Era
  • Edited by Stephen Gersh
  • Published online:
    05 April 2019
    Print publication:
    25 April 2019
  • The extensive influence of Plotinus, the third-century founder of 'Neoplatonism', on intellectual thought from the Renaissance to the modern era has never been systematically explored. This collection of new essays fills the gap in the scholarship, thereby casting a spotlight on a current of intellectual history that is inherently significant. The essays take the form of a series of case-studies on major figures in the history of Neoplatonism, ranging from Marsilio Ficino to Henri-Louis Bergson and moving through Italian, French, English, and German philosophical traditions. They bring clarity to the terms 'Platonism' and 'Neoplatonism', which are frequently invoked by historians but often only partially understood, and provide fresh perspectives on well-known issues including the rise of 'mechanical philosophy' in the sixteenth century and the relation between philosophy and Romanticism in the nineteenth century. The volume will be important for readers interested in the history of thought in the early-modern and modern ages.

  • Chapter 8 - Anaxagoras’ Psychology

  • from Part III - Earlier Theories of Psychological Cognition
  • Jason W. Carter, University of Edinburgh
  • Book:
    Aristotle on Earlier Greek Psychology
    Published online:
    08 March 2019
    Print publication:
    21 March 2019, pp 168-190

  • Summary

    In Chapter 8, I analyse Aristotle’s account of Anaxagoras’ doctrine of mind. I claim that whilst Anaxagoras is criticised for not explaining how mind is able to think its objects, his lack of explanation serves as the starting point for the development of Aristotle’s own view that mind is a psychological power that possesses no actual properties in common with any material object. Aristotle’s attempt in DA 3.4 to solve the problems that Anaxagoras’ view poses proves crucial to the defence of the Separability Thesis.

  • Chapter 6 - Harmonic Psychology

  • from Part II - Earlier Theories of Psychological Motion
  • Jason W. Carter, University of Edinburgh
  • Book:
    Aristotle on Earlier Greek Psychology
    Published online:
    08 March 2019
    Print publication:
    21 March 2019, pp 123-140

  • Summary

    In Chapter 6, I argue that Aristotle suggests that the definition of soul as a harmony of bodily opposites nominally passes the requirement of providing a principle that explains the soul-body relation. However, by appealing to his demonstrative heuristic, he is able to show that no bodily, arithmetical, or geometrical harmonic properties are explanatory of any of the soul’s per se attributes. The results of this criticism, I argue, show that the soul’s power to act as an efficient and formal cause of the body, like in the case of Xenocrates, cannot be explained by identifying soul with mathematical form or geometrical organisation, nor with an emergent entity whose existence is derived from the mixed elemental powers. What Aristotle takes over from the harmony theory, however, is the idea that soul is plausibly a kind of non-mathematical form or determiner (λόγος), and the idea that (some kinds of) soul and living body are likely to be existentially interdependent. By this criticism, Aristotle is negatively constrained to affirm the Hylomorphic Thesis.

  • Chapter 1 - Definition, Explanation and Psychological Inquiry

  • from Part I - Aristotle’s Methodology of Psychological Inquiry
  • Jason W. Carter, University of Edinburgh
  • Book:
    Aristotle on Earlier Greek Psychology
    Published online:
    08 March 2019
    Print publication:
    21 March 2019, pp 21-46

  • Summary

    In Chapter 1, I propose a solution to Aristotle’s puzzle about what method we should follow in order to discover the essential definition of soul. I call this the method of scientific inquiry. I argue that Aristotle casts earlier Greek psychologists as engaged in trying to explain the soul’s basic per se attributes, and that for this reason, he views their theories as possible subjects of scientific criticism. To carry out this criticism, I argue, Aristotle advocates using a simple test by which to judge definitions of an entity under investigation, which I call the demonstrative heuristic. This heuristic consists in using the tools of dialectic and deduction, as well as a critical form of imagination, to test the consequences of adopting competing definitions of an item whose nature is under investigation.

Page 126 of 569