This chapter analyzes shifts in labor behavior in the context of institutional change. Focusing on the period of structural adjustment (1986–1997), it examines how austerity measures, such as spending cuts and increased labor market flexibility, fractured traditional state–labor alliances in Tunisia and Morocco. The chapter links unions’ responses to these reforms to differences in institutional practices. It argues that Tunisia’s innovations in collective bargaining moderated labor opposition and disrupted alliances between unions and political elites, while Morocco’s institutional stasis, combined with deteriorating economic conditions, generated new incentives for labor unions to mobilize against the regime.

This chapter examines the initial conditions underlying the book’s theory by analyzing authoritarian labor control policies and political developments in Tunisia and Morocco in the postindependence period. It explores how these control strategies shaped unions’ interests, capacities, and perceptions during the early stages of state formation and investigates how relationships between unions and other collective actors influenced the emergence of labor movements. The chapter shows how exclusionary corporatism provided Tunisian unions with organizational resources that strengthened their capacity for opposition, while inclusionary strategies and alliances with political elites weakened labor autonomy in Morocco.

This chapter explores how political and economic institutions shaped labor mobilization during the early phase of neoliberal reform (1970–1985). It reviews the impact of these reforms on unions in Tunisia and Morocco and analyzes their divergent responses. The chapter examines how practices of institutional incorporation and/or exclusion affected the alliances that unions forged with authoritarian elites and opposition groups. The analysis reveals that labor exclusion perpetuated union militancy in Tunisia, while partisan alliances and incorporation into formal politics moderated labor opposition in Morocco.

This chapter introduces the central puzzle driving the study: Why are Tunisian unions militant and political in their protest behavior, while their Moroccan counterparts remain apolitical and moderate? It outlines the book’s core argument, emphasizing how authoritarian policies of labor exclusion or incorporation shape unions’ interests and capacities by influencing their relationships with political elites and their internal organization. The chapter reviews the current state of research on the topic, situating the study within broader debates on labor politics, authoritarianism, and regime change. It concludes with a justification of the case selection and an overview of the empirical methods guiding the analysis.

This chapter examines how labor mobilization returned to its earlier patterns of political militancy in Tunisia and business unionism in Morocco by the late 2000s. It situates the post-reform period (2000–2011) as a phase of continued decline for labor unions in both countries. However, the chapter links unions’ divergent reactions to differences in their internal governance structures, a legacy from previous experiences of institutional incorporation and exclusion. It highlights how democratic internal organization fosters labor militancy, while hierarchical structures hinder opposition, even when clear incentives to protest exist. The chapter concludes with a discussion of how labor mobilization advanced democratic transition in Tunisia while reinforcing authoritarianism in Morocco.

This concluding chapter synthesizes the key findings of the study and extends the theoretical framework by testing its predictions in four additional authoritarian regimes — Bahrain, Egypt, pre-apartheid South Africa, and Mexico under the PRI. It argues that the most important factor in sustaining labor militancy is autonomy from political elites and strong connections with the rank-and-file. The chapter reinforces the book’s central claim that labor militancy emerges from authoritarian exclusion and the absence of partisan coalitions to represent labor interests. It concludes by discussing the broader implications of these findings for theories of labor politics, authoritarianism, and institutional change.

This chapter establishes the theoretical foundations of the book by reviewing three major explanatory frameworks for labor protest: structural-economic, organizational, and institutional. Using quantitative data, it compares the structural features of Tunisia’s and Morocco’s economies and the organizational profiles of their labor unions. After finding existing explanations wanting, the chapter advances a integrative historical institutional perspective, underscoring the importance of labor incorporation policies, political coalitions, and internal union dynamics in shaping labor’s preferences and capacity for militancy. It argues that authoritarian strategies intended to depoliticize labor can paradoxically empower unions, equipping them with the resources and organizational capacity needed to challenge the state.