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As unprecedented as the Declaration was, it was not without intellectual antecedents. The Declaration interacted with and built upon recent expressions of European Enlightenment political philosophy in its focus on “Nature and Nature’s God,” and in its reliance upon the normative principles of “laws of Nature” as well as natural or “unalienable” rights. European Enlightenment political philosophers themselves stood in complex and varied relationships with their ancient and medieval predecessors; sometimes adding to, sometimes transforming, and sometimes rejecting these preceding ideas. The Declaration brilliantly navigates this complex web of intellectual antecedents by treating the ideas of laws of nature, natural rights, the social contract, and republicanism in such a way that the points of tension between their different interpretations are minimized and subsumed within a shared understanding of the importance of nature for political life. In so doing, the Declaration provides an intriguing hint of how the deep fault lines between these political philosophical traditions might ultimately be bridged. The Declaration’s succinct statement of political principles may be viewed as a transformative distillation of a few of its most important European antecedents.
Chapter 2 begins with Emerson’s responses to the ineffable character of mystical experience: one of silence and listening, the other of a profusion of terms from a multitude of cultures. Writings on mystical experience by William James and Ludwig Wittgenstein are part of the discussion. This chapter considers Emerson’s skepticism about the “external world” and “other minds” and about both freedom and fate, which form a “knot of nature.” The following section concerns skepticism as an existential condition, as when Emerson writes in “Experience”: “So it is with us, now skeptical, or without unity.” The chapter concludes by considering skepticism as a positive way of life, what Emerson calls a “wise skepticism.” This form of skepticism has roots in the ancient Greek and Roman worlds and, in a particularly important form for Emerson, in the Essays of Montaigne.
A key source of CPC power is its control of the armed forces, which it can mobilize not just for national defence but also to preserve the regime. This chapter examines the CPC’s evolving relationship with its military wing – the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). In previous decades the PLA has enjoyed a high degree of autonomy from the CPC’s civilian leaders. The Central Military Commission (CMC), which oversees the armed forces, has maintained a status commensurate with the Politburo, partly as a result of the fragmentation of control mechanisms. Since coming to power Xi Jinping has worked to bring the armed forces under his direct authority, but it remains unclear the extent to which direct control mechanisms can be institutionalized. This chapter examines the new features of CPC–PLA relations in the Xi era.
This chapter focuses on the practical aspects of education, such as the organisation and funding of the classical schools. It traces the status of classical education as a public institution in the late imperial period, during the transformations of the fifth century, and within the early barbarian successor kingdoms. The chapter begins by establishing the extent of direct involvement of the imperial government in education, arguing that cities and individuals had always played a far more important role in patronising and funding classical schools. It then considers opportunities for ‘graduates’ of classical schools in late and post-imperial Gaul, the crucial difference between literacy and literary education, and emphasises the important connection between classical education and structures of power that promote and demand literary training.
Simultaneously an assertion of universal natural rights and the unique story of a particular peoplehood, the Declaration of Independence has from the beginning played a central role in the ongoing struggle over the ever-contested meaning of American identity. Though its ringing phrases have at times become occasions for smug self-congratulation, more often, the Declaration has presented an opportunity for self-evaluation, offering an internal critique of American practices that fall short of the claims the Declaration makes about American values and character. In this sense, the Declaration has become a capacious and evolving civic myth that in its best moments has invoked – and cultivated – a pluralistic solidarity out of volitional adherence to civic ideals and participation in democratic rituals that has substituted for the “natural” ascriptive allegiances characteristic of ethnonationalisms. The essay also suggests that this story of peoplehood was within the scope of Jefferson’s own intention. Through common commitment to the principles of the Declaration, Americans might unite as a nation.
China’s development under the Chinese Communist Party’s rule challenges the conventional understanding of the correlation between wealth and democracy that the more well-to-do a society, the more likely it will democratize and business owners will be driving such political changes. Despite the unprecedent growth and prosperity over the past decades, the authoritarian system has neither collapsed not embraced democracy. Instead, the one-party rule has remained stable and the business owners complacent, which invites the question of why China’s economic liberalization has not created a business class who are not advocates of political change. This chapter aims to answer this question by looking into the interactions between the party-state and private business owners. It argues that the state–business relationship in China is one of interdependence, where the business owners depend on the party-state for business success and the party-state depends on business owners for economic growth.
In stark contrast to the Mao era, today’s party propaganda has adapted to consumer culture. This chapter argues that ideology and patriotism under Xi have been transformed into commodity and fashion. The chapter examines the mechanism of commodifying ideology from three angles. The first are the more traditional media and popular cultural products such as movies and CCTV New Year’s Gala. The second is through the enterprise of “telling China’s story” exemplified by venture capitalists and technology entrepreneurs such as Eric Xun Li and Rao Jin, whose enterprises support party-endorsed popular intellectuals such as Jin Canrong, Zhang Weiwei, and Hu Xijin. The third is through the we-media, or self-media, flatform, where millions around the globe profit by posting repetitive sensationalized “loving China” videos. The trident principle manifests itself in the Chinese celebration of Huawei executive Meng Wanzhou’s return to China. The party has masterminded a grand-scale ambitious propaganda movement that reaches far beyond the Great Wall of China.
This chapter explores the role of China’s state-run media in perpetuating “correct collective memory.” Using the official narrative of the state’s COVID-19 response as a case study, it demonstrates the capability of the CPS in shaping public discourse. The party’s Publicity Department oversees social media platforms such as Sina Weibo, which has nearly 600 million active users. The chapter shows how party agencies work with Key Opinion Leaders (KOLs) who are elevated to prominent and authoritative status within the tightly controlled media environment. These storytellers promote Manichean rhetoric and nationalist sentiments by boosting polemics against foreign powers, presenting a narrow spectrum of facts, silencing opposing ideas as “unpatriotic.” The chapter demonstrates the party’s ability to deftly manipulate social media to advance politically expedient narratives.
This chapter explores the origins and early development of the sonnet, from its invention in Sicily at the court of Frederick II and across its evolution among the Tuscan poets up to the late-Duecento stilnovo. Far from being ‘closed’ or monadic, sonnets often appeared in dialogic exchanges (tenzoni) between multiple authors. Focusing on the theme of love, the chapter explores how sonnets were used between the 1220s and 1290s to explore philosophical, moralistic and affective aspects of a dominant medieval literary theme, in poems by Giacomo da Lentini, Guittone d’Arezzo, Guido Cavalcanti and Dante Alighieri, and their various poetic correspondents. Close readings demonstrate how sonnets could be used to showcase rhetorical ability across a range of styles and registers, asserting authorial individuality via formal as well as thematic means, and generating either closed or dialogic meanings in different material and textual contexts.
The fourth chapter of Invisible Fatherland examines the work of the Federal Art Custodian (Reichskunstwart). Led by art historian and Werkbund member Edwin Redslob, this government office played a pivotal role in shaping the Weimar Republic’s modern and functional representational style. Redslob’s responsibilities included designing federal service flags, seals, coins, and postage stamps, orchestrating nationwide festivities, and reimagining the architecture of railway stations, canals, post offices, and customhouses. His ambitious redesign of the republic’s official symbolism challenges the notion that Weimar democracy was deliberately anti-ritualist. Instead, his work demonstrates that Weimar republicans clearly recognized the importance of symbolically legitimating the nascent democratic state. While Redslob embraced modern design principles, he also wrestled with how to preserve elements of the Kaiserreich’s heritage. This tension in the republic’s official symbolism continues to resonate with contemporary debates about cultural heritage and the politics of memory.
This chapter challenges simplistic narratives of global corporate governance convergence by examining the complex reality of corporate governance in Asia. We introduce “faux convergence,” where jurisdictions adopt Anglo-American governance forms while adapting their function for local needs. Through analyzing independent directors, derivative actions, and stewardship codes across Asia, we show how surface-level similarities mask diverse practical implementations. Inter-Asian comparisons reveal local factors shaping governance that East–West comparisons might miss. By examining how Asian jurisdictions adapt similar governance mechanisms, we gain insights into the relationship between legal transplants and jurisdiction-specific practices in corporate law and governance. The faux convergence framework and inter-Asian comparative approach advance our understanding beyond simplistic convergence theories toward more nuanced, contextual perspectives that better reflect corporate governance in a globalized-yet-regionalized world. This research demonstrates the importance of careful, contextual analysis in comparative corporate law and governance, with inter-Asian comparison providing a valuable analytical tool.
The Communist Party is building a digitally capable state to remain at the vanguard of social and political development in China. CPC leaders are advancing digitalization forcefully throughout the governance and economic system through various policy initiatives. Informatization serves both better governance and public service, by overcoming previous bottlenecks and spatial challenges in administration. It also enhances the party state’s surveillance and monitoring capabilities. The CPC’s goals for China’s future under its continued rule require a digital infrastructure and economy that is both efficacious and subject to the Party’s control. To this end, the CPC is building out a comprehensive governance architecture for cyberspace, including the world’s most expansive data regulatory regime. The current leadership regards these digital capabilities as a key part of its comprehensive governance model that will enable the CPC to implement its domestic and international vision for China in the coming years.