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Zambia has recently witnessed the removal of four High Court judges within a period of less than two years, raising questions about the country’s commitment to judicial independence. This article examines the extent to which the current legal framework governing the removal of judges in Zambia coheres with the principles of judicial accountability and independence. Drawing upon insights from relevant international standards and scholarly literature, the article posits that the removal of judges is not only a necessary mechanism for judicial accountability but should also be seen as an essential safeguard for judicial independence. Its analysis suggests that some of the grounds for removal and the lack of adequate procedural safeguards within the current legal framework pose threats to both judicial accountability and independence. The article concludes with a call for necessary legal reform, urging policymakers to bring the framework in line with relevant international standards.
In his book Seeing Like a State, James Scott writes, “We have repeatedly observed the natural and social failures of thin, formulaic simplifications imposed through the agency of state power” (1998, 309). State and top-down planning lacks mētis, or the common sense and practical experience that people on the ground possess of their everyday environments. Instead, Scott proposes a focus on practical knowledge, which “depends on an exceptionally close and astute observation of the environment” (1998, 324).
This article examines the impact of informal intergovernmental relations on the Kenyan government’s handling of the COVID-19 pandemic. It argues that although informality in governance has been perceived negatively by many governance scholars, it nevertheless has the capacity to enhance the effectiveness and legitimacy of government. By virtue of informality’s adaptability and recognition of the centrality of context, it can enhance efficacy particularly in unpredictable circumstances as occurred in the pandemic. Notwithstanding this reality, until recently, literature on informality, mainly informed by Eurocentric colonial perspectives on governance, has focussed on its negative elements, criticizing it for diverse governance ailments. Through the prism of the negotiated order theory, this article challenges this dominant narrative using an analysis of informal intergovernmental relations during the COVID-19 pandemic in Kenya. It argues that though informality was at times applied negatively, overall, it ensured vibrant intergovernmental relations, thus positively impacting health service delivery and enhancing the government’s legitimacy in the management of the pandemic.
The Umayyad Empire (644-750 CE) was the first Islamic empire and one of the largest empires of ancient and medieval times, extending over 5,000 miles between the Atlantic Ocean in the West and the Indian Ocean in the East. This book traces the empire's origins to the Arabian Peninsula and the Syrian Steppe in the centuries before Islam. It explores the dynamics that shaped this formative era for the history of the Mediterranean, North Africa, the Middle East and Central Asia. The century of Umayyad rule witnessed war with the Eastern Roman Empire, against whom the Umayyads defined their claims to rule as God's deputies on Earth. This was the period in which the Qur'an was compiled, monuments such as the Dome of the Rock were built, and new Islamic and Arab identities developed.
On the Ethiopia–Somaliland border, harsh checkpoints imposed in 2015 relegated Somali kontarabaan (contraband) traders – mainly women – to precarious livelihoods. Beginning with an ethnographic description of crossing through these checkpoints, this chapter outlines a contradictory dynamic: Jigjiga, Ethiopia’s premier smuggling hub, has become the capital of a local government bent on hyper-securitizing its borders. Intensifying border security interventions and a wave of return-migration among the global Somali diaspora have made many local merchants viscerally aware of their marginality and immobility in contrast to people with foreign passports and government connections. For small-scale traders, Ethiopia’s borders tend to operate as dividers. For government-connected elites and diaspora returnees, the same borders often enable opportunities for business connections and mutually profitable alliances. This chapter uses this observation to critique what it calls the “connective cities, divisive borders” portrait of globalization. It explains the importance of thinking about borders and cities as interconnected spaces of daily life. It introduces the book’s main arguments: that African urbanites are active agents who work to refashion geopolitical borders and create opportunities from them, and that everyday practices of exchange and mobility in the city do not just produce urban space but also resonate more broadly into border management.
After 2010, hundreds of diaspora Somalis left seemingly stable lives in cities of North America, Europe, and Australia and flocked to invest in Jigjiga, a post-conflict boomtown ruled by an unstable authoritarian administration. This chapter follows these diaspora businesspeople beyond Ethiopia’s borders and explores how their motivations for, and practices of, return-migration to Ethiopia are shaped by the experiences of migrant life in cities outside the Horn of Africa. Drawing on fieldwork among Somali businesspeople in South Africa and the US as well as Jigjiga, I show that Somali return-migrants to Jigjiga are driven by a complex mix of motivations, including responsibilities for family support, perceptions of business opportunity in the Horn of Africa, and experiences of precarity and risk in cities abroad. The implication is that social transformations in the Ethiopia–Somalia borderlands cannot be analyzed only at a local level. These ongoing shifts in securitization and urbanization in the Horn’s borderlands are entangled with “urban borderwork” in cities far beyond Ethiopia. This analysis not only situates Jigjiga in a broader world of cities and social relations; it also pushes us to think more deeply about the dynamic relationship between city-making and border-making in the world more broadly.
For Somali merchants in eastern Ethiopia, border securitization seems to be driving urban inequality. Ethiopia’s governing elites have instrumentalized borders, offering exclusive import–export licenses to political supporters, including diaspora return-migrants. In turn, the beneficiaries of these trade schemes speculate in sectors such as urban real estate. The “informal” kontarabaan (contraband) markets in Jigjiga are a seeming locus of resistance to these new elite collaborations. In contrast to the securitized checkpoints around the city, officials rarely try to regulate smuggling within the dense urban market. But is this really an issue of governance versus informality, political elites versus lower-class traders, and border security versus urban tolerance? Looking closely at people’s transactions in urban space, this chapter shows how expectations about obligation and reciprocity crosscut apparent social divisions in the city. In their daily interactions, both merchants and government regulators often draw on ideals of Somali nonhegemonic or “egalitarian” ethos to explain and justify their activities. Yet the way these egalitarianisms function in the city looks different than the idealized “egalitarian society” of anthropological lore. I show how people’s practices of reciprocity and exchange are spatial work that affects how “transformations of space” including walls, streets, and borders operate in daily life.
When Ethiopia aligned itself with the US in the global war on terror after 2001, top–down security interventions in the Ethiopia–Somalia borderlands led Somali secessionist conflict to spiral out of control. The protracted “state collapse” of neighboring Somalia spawned regional instability throughout the 1990s. In what is today Somali Regional State (SRS), the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) spearheaded Somali-led rebellion against the new Ethiopian federal government. Somali rebels massacred Chinese oil workers in 2007 and attempted to assassinate SRS’s president in Jigjiga in 2008. Why, then, did diaspora Somalis begin returning from stable lives in North America and Europe to invest in Jigjiga before these conflicts had even settled? This chapter addresses this question by tracing how SRS authorities sought to create alliances among the global Somali diaspora. Through an ethnographic analysis of the dramatic change in diaspora–homeland relations that unfolded after 2010, it argues that border securitization in the Horn of Africa is not just a matter of topography – of territorial control, walls and razor wire, and security patrols. It is also a matter of reorganizing a complex topology of transnational relationships.
This chapter offers a pathbreaking urban history of the Ethiopia–Somalia borderlands. Eastern Ethiopia’s cultural distinctions and tense interethnic relations are often described in terms of broad contrasts between Somali nomadic pastoralism and the sedentary agriculture of Ethiopian highland populations. A close reading of historical accounts tells a different story. Beginning with a discussion of present-day ethnic competition and cooperation in the marketplace, I trace Jigjiga’s social relations back in time, showing how towns including Jigjiga have been crucial sites of interethnic encounters, identity formation, and cultural change. Shifting the focus away from Ethiopia’s tense history of ethno-territorial politics, I suggest that in the city, everyday interactions between identity groups are significantly shaped by expectations about transactability: who is trustworthy, who is not, and who is a legitimate target for cheating or for collaboration. This argument places urban encounters at the center of understanding the salience of ethnic and clan identities in eastern Ethiopia. I argue, furthermore, that urban encounters in Jigjiga play an important role in how distinct identity groups relate to geopolitical borders outside the city and have done so throughout Jigjiga’s history.
In August 2018, ʿAbdi Moḥamoud ʿUmar, president of Ethiopia’s Somali Regional State, was ousted and arrested by federal security forces. ʿAbdi had led an unprecedented decade-long push to securitize the Ethiopia-Somaliland border, to “Ethiopianize” Somalis, and to entice Somali migrants living abroad to return to Ethiopia and collaborate with the regional government. Yet a significant number of those who collaborated with and benefited from the regime also celebrated its downfall. This concluding chapter describes these more recent events as an entry-point to reflecting on the broader implications of the book’s argument that city-making and border-making are deeply intertwined in today’s world. It addresses three specific possible counterarguments, which serve to highlight the themes of the book and link them to broader debates in economic anthropology, border studies, migration studies, and urban studies.
In the Ethiopia–Somalia borderlands, kontarabaan (contraband) trade is not just a source of livelihood. Over decades of efforts to avoid Ethiopian taxation, it has become an integral part of Ethiopian-Somali identity. This chapter locates today’s cross-border trade practices in the broader context of a century-long effort by Ethiopia and foreign colonial powers to impose effective authority and taxation on the Horn of Africa’s borderlands. Following small-scale traders and other travelers across several borders and checkpoints, it ethnographically explores what Jigjigan Somalis call “the cultural economy” (dhaqan-dhaqaalaha). Examining interactions between border-crossers and border-enforcers, it argues that Ethiopian-Somalis’ egalitarian ethos, long associated with pastoralist culture, has taken specific form in the Jigjiga area through practices of evading taxation and border regulation imposed by non-Somali authorities. The lines between governor and governed, tax-collector and tax-evader, border-enforcer and border-crosser have historically been entangled with ethnic distinctions between Somalis and so-called Habesha ethnic groups from central Ethiopia. Because of this, the advent of Somali-led border security since 2010 has prompted not only new challenges for cross-border traders’ livelihoods but also new debates about what it means to be Somali in the Ethiopian borderlands.