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ASEAN is in danger of becoming marginalized as East Asian security becomes increasingly shaped by such volatile flashpoints as a nuclear North Korea and a South China Sea increasingly dominated by quarrels over sovereignty and maritime security. Accordingly, the notion of "ASEAN centrality" is now being seriously challenged and is unlikely to prevail against the growing bipolar security environment shaped by China and the United States. ASEAN and other Asia-Pacific states could gravitate toward one of five alternative order-building scenarios: (i) A Sino-American condominium that defines and accepts each other's geopolitical sphere of influence; (ii) The replacement or substantial revision of the United States' bilateral alliance system with the expansion of multilateral norms and instrumentalities; (iii) The gradual predominance of an "Asia for Asians" concept led by China but endorsed by a substantial number of Southeast Asian states; (iv) Effective balancing and hedging by smaller states and "middle powers", leading to eventual great power acceptance of a regional power equilibrium; and (v) An intensification of regional "community building" via an amorphous but wide-ranging series of economic, ideological and strategic compromises to make war unthinkable and to strengthen regional interdependence. However, none of these five scenarios is likely to predominate in a literal sense. Instead, the "realist" explanation for understanding security in the region is the most accurate forecast for understanding an East Asian security environment that is becoming increasingly disorderly. ASEAN can still play a constructive -- if not central -- role in shaping East Asia's strategic environment by working with China and the United States to strengthen confidence-building in regional security politics and to encourage their respect for strategic constraint.
Many scholars on Malaysia have recognized that Salafism-Wahhabism has penetrated substantially into the countr's political and social life. The southern state of Johor has always been considered, and remains, the bastion of kaum tua, with its religious institutions dominated by ulama (religious scholars) who are traditionalist in character but tolerant of religious practices that are infused with local culture and mysticism. These scholars have also tended to maintain conservative attitudes on gender issues, inter-religious relations, and intra-faith differences. The Sultan of Johor appoints the Mufti whose primary role is to issue fatwas (religious rulings) and be the ex-officio of the Johor Islamic Religious Council, the highest Islamic body in the state. Johor's Muftis are dominantly political quietists, and loyal to the ruling family. Occasional interventions by the Sultan of Johor in the religious sphere have proved crucial in ensuring that the state maintains its Malay character. The Sultan also acts to protect the state's religious institutions from encroachment by the federal government.
Despite rapid industrialization in Thailand, the contribution of agriculture to GDP remains unusually high. The share of agricultural employment in total employment has also remained high, relative to the country's income level, as has the share of the rural population relative to the total population. Agribusiness has grown significantly, and there has been a rise in the number of large and strongly financed commercial farms that are less labour intensive. Contract farming has also been developing. The introduction of a rice premium by the government obstructed the modernization of the agricultural rice sector and caused the rice share in GDP to steadily decline, while that for upland crops such as cassava, maize, sugarcane, and oil palm increased. However, rice remains the most important crop. The high proportion of the population still living in rural areas and working in the agricultural sector attests to the resilience of that sector in the face of industrialization.
The form of Islam normatively understood and practised in Malaysia, i.e. Malaysian Islam, has undergone myriad changes since the 1970s as a result of gradual Salafization. Powered by Saudi Arabian largesse and buoyed by the advent of the Internet, this new wave of Salafization has eclipsed an earlier Salafi trend that spawned the Kaum Muda reformist movement. Recent surveys suggest that there has been a rise in the level of extremism among Muslims in Malaysia. While the majority is far from being enamoured by the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), the Wahhabi-Salafi doctrine that ISIS claims to represent in unadulterated form does appeal to many of them following the decades-long Salafization of Islam in the country. This tallies with media reports on increasing numbers of Malay-Muslim youth harbouring an attraction towards radical Islamist movements such as ISIS. Salafization, referring to a process of mindset and attitudinal transformation rather than the growth of Salafi nodes per se, is not restricted to individuals or groups identified as "Salafi", but rather affects practically all levels of Malay-Muslim society, cutting across political parties, governmental institutions and non-state actors. It has resulted in Islamist, rather than Islamic, ideals increasingly defining the tenor of mainstream Islam in Malaysia, with worrying consequences for both intra-Muslim and inter-religious relations. Responses to the Wahhabi-Salafi onslaught from the Malay-Muslim ruling elite in Malaysia have been ambivalent, and have had weak counteracting effects on the Salafization process.
The debate over China's One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative has been lively and at times heated, both in China and internationally. In many ways, this is a reflection of the vagueness of the concept, and of its exceptionality. OBOR does not prioritize trade and investment concessions, which makes it essentially different from traditional regional economic cooperation models such as FTAs, the TPP and the RCEP. Instead, it emphasizes regional infrastructure connectivity. After China proposed the initiative, countries within the New Silk Road Economic Belt, especially the five Central Asian countries, responded enthusiastically and positively, while Southeast and South Asian countries, on the other hand, expressed more concerns and reservations about the initiative. In response to these countries' concerns, China has tried to adjust its approaches to convince Southeast Asian countries that the OBOR initiative holds potential synergy with ASEAN's development strategies and can play a complementary role in the building of the ASEAN community. Beijing has also adjusted its India strategy. From previously "inviting" India to join OBOR, it is now stressing "strategy connectivity" and "policy coordination" between the two countries. Nevertheless, OBOR is viewed by some as an expression of China's grand ambitions to lead Asian economic growth, and by others as a grand strategy to build a "China-dominated Asia". While it may be mainly an economic and trade initiative, its broader consequences have a strong political and security dimension. Hence, China badly needs to cultivate political trust with neighbouring countries if it wishes to convince them that the initiative is a "public" strategy, and not a "conspiratorial" one.
The foreign policy issue in the 2014 Indonesian presidential election was the rejection by both candidates, Joko Widodo (Jokowi) and Prabowo Subianto, of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's high-profile globalism. Both promised instead a foreign policy directed to the real economic and social interests of the people. This raised concerns by Indonesia's international partners that its new foreign policy would be more nationalistic and inward looking. A year and a half into Jokowi's presidency, it is possible to make a preliminary assessment of the course of Jokowi's foreign policy in relation to the goals that Jokowi the candidate set forth for Jokowi the president. Indonesia's foreign policy under Jokowi, like his predecessor's, is that suited to a rising middle power with a claim to regional leadership. Its operating principles have been unchanged since first enunciated in 1948: "bebas dan aktif" — independent and active — shaped pragmatically to existing situations. Jokowi revived Sukarno's trisakti ("threes pillars of the state") as the organizing principles of his presidential campaign -- an Indonesia that is sovereign, economically independent, and with a strong socio-cultural identity — and these are reflected in his foreign policy. In his "Vision and Mission" manifesto for the presidential election, Jokowi listed the action agendas necessary for achieving his four foreign policy priorities. These were (a) promotion of Indonesia as an archipelagic maritime state, (b) promotion of Indonesia's middle-power regional role, (c) a new focus on the Indo-Pacific, and (d) reforming the foreign policy process. Five critical areas in particular define Jokowi's foreign policies. These are (a) building the Global Maritime Axis, (b) economic diplomacy, (c) Indonesia's role in ASEAN, (d) navigating between China and the United States, and (e) Indonesia's role in the South China Sea. The bedrock of Indonesian foreign policy since at least 2001 remains firm. The country continues to be a responsible, cooperative international partner sharing interest in economic growth and a peaceful, secure international order with like-minded states. However, heightened tension in the South China Sea is limiting the space for Indonesia's hedging strategy.
In 2014 Myanmar introduced a constituency development fund (CDF) to sponsor small public works and development projects in each of the country's 330 electoral constituencies. As a form of "pork-barrel" spending, CDF programmes have long remained controversial among international donors, anti-corruption agencies and civil society watchdogs for their potential for corruption, embezzlement, waste of public money, vote-buying and other clientelistic behaviours. The CDF has however emerged in as an extremely popular instrument for lawmakers, in offering new opportunities for meeting the basic infrastructure and development needs of local communities. The scheme has also fostered more frequent interactions among parliamentarians, local bureaucrats, and citizens. Mechanisms for vetting and monitoring the CDF projects seem also to have grown stronger each year. Rumours about petty corruption and misappropriation cases have gradually surfaced, particularly since the National League for Democracy (NLD) took control of the legislature in 2016. Yet in the first three fiscal years of its implementation, the scheme did not lead to any known major punitive action. There is also not yet enough of a record to identify credible linkages between the use of CDFs and the building of an electoral clientele by politicians — another common criticism of "pork-barrel" funding.
Over the past two decades, trade union activity in Batam has been heavily influenced by regional demographics, employment conditions and the prevalent political scenario. Following the end of the New Order in 1998, the single state-authorized union was fragmented, giving rise to a number of new enterprise unions. Batam's young and diverse immigrant population, with no pre-existing loyalties to particular trade unions, made it a hotspot for industrial relations activities. Low and stagnant workers' wages throughout Indonesia and outbreak of social unrest resulted in the formation of three strong national-level unions: FSPMI, KSPSI and the KSBSI. By the mid-2000s, these unions were also active in Batam. Unsettled ethnic relations resulted in escalation of labour mobilizations from 2011 to 2013. The Garda Metal (union member formation) spearheaded a number of intense demonstrations throughout Indonesia, including Batam, during this time. The 2012 mobilization was particularly effective, and the union bodies were able to successfully negotiate for significantly higher minimum wages for all workers in Indonesia. After intervention by the Widodo government, and the signing of a harmony declaration, there has been a change in the unions' approach in demanding wages and conditions improvement. Instead of addressing employment concerns through national-level campaigns, matters are now to be resolved at the enterprise level. While there are no visible signs of a confrontational mobilization in the near future, a number of worker welfare issues remain unsettled.
In recent times, the United States, Japan and Australia have all promoted extremely similar visions of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific as the central organizing concept to guide their efforts in the region. The concept is essentially a reaffirmation of the security and economic rules-based order which was cobbled together after the Second World War - especially as it relates to freedom of the regional and global commons such as sea, air and cyberspace, and the way nations conduct economic relations. Be that as it may, the Free and Open Indo-Pacific is an updated vision of collective action to defend, strengthen and advance that order. It signals a greater acceptance by the two regional allies of the U.S. of their security burden and takes into account the realities of China's rise and the relative decline in dominance of the U.S. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and its member states continue to delay any definitive response to the Free and Open Indo-Pacific concept. Although its principles are attractive to many ASEAN member states, long-held conceptions of ASEAN centrality and its meaning gives the organization apparent reason for hesitation. The reasons include fears of diminished centrality and relevance, and reluctance to endorse a more confrontational mindset being adopted by the U.S. and its allies - including the revival of the Quadrilateral grouping with India - with respect to China. The reality is that while ASEAN and major member states are focused primarily on the risks of action, there are considerable risks of inaction and hesitation. The current era will either enhance or lessen the relevance of ASEAN in the eyes of these three countries in the years ahead depending on how the organisation and its key member states respond. Indeed, this Trends paper argues that ASEAN is more likely to be left behind by strategic events and developments if it remains passive, and that the ball is in ASEAN's court in terms of the future of its regional 'centrality'.
Johor is a key battleground in Malaysia's 14th General Elections. The state is economically vital to the country: it is the birthplace of the United Malays National Organization (UMNO); and it has a large number of parliamentary seats. Johor-specific dynamics that have worked to the advantage of the ruling coalition include: UMNO's unique links with the state; the tight control over religion; and the phenomenal scale and success of the Federal Land Development Authority (FELDA) scheme. Despite these advantages, support for the ruling coalition has been slipping across the state. Furthermore, the emergence of new parties such as Parti Pribumi Bersatu Malaysia (PPBM) will challenge Barisan Nasional's control over Johor's rural and Malay heartland. The redelineation of parliamentary and state constituencies now underway is however likely to benefit BN, and recent survey data indicate that Johoreans are yet to be attracted to the reconfigured opposition coalition, Pakatan Harapan. Thus, while BN may suffer a drop in support, it is likely to retain power in Johor.
Growing urbanization, increasing trade and investment due to integration, and emerging new business models like e-commerce are accelerating the demand for efficient logistics in each ASEAN country. The logistics sector is inherently complex due to its scope, ranging from physical infrastructure covering four modes of transport, customs, and services. Each of these sub-sectors is regulated by different government agencies, leading to complex challenges in each country's logistics sector. Policymaking has a tendency to be done piecemeal rather than integratively, while a more or less fragmented governance structure impedes implementation. ASEAN liberalization commitments focusses on raising the cap on foreign equity, while regulatory reform remains untouched. Also, flexibility offered in these commitments allows for non-compliance. Going forward, developing seamless logistics requires ASEAN countries to first overcome their domestic challenges. Each country needs to develop comprehensive plans, and effective implementation of these is essential. Liberalization commitments should complement domestic reforms in each country.
For Indonesia, which is keen to accelerate its infrastructure development, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is seen as an opportunity to tap into China's huge financial resources and technological capability. There has however been no concrete BRI project agreed to between China and Indonesia so far. While China considers all projects, including infrastructure projects and economic interactions as part of BRI, Indonesia only considers those infrastructure projects initiated during the Xi Jinping period as BRI projects. Indonesia has offered several broad areas for cooperation under the BRI framework and carefully selected project locations to minimize political risk for the Joko Widodo government. But no agreements have been signed yet as China requires detailed project proposals from Indonesia, which it has apparently not received. What appears to hamper progress are four key issues: the perception of China's economic domination, the ethnic Chinese issue, the Natuna issue, and the mainland Chinese workers issue.
Islam has become an important symbol in post-Suharto Indonesia, and political figures or parties feel they cannot afford to be seen to be against the religion or be considered unfriendly to it. Islamism emerges to challenge Pancasila (or cultural pluralism) again. Islamists already challenged Pancasila soon after Indonesian independence. But during that initial era under Sukarno, this challenge was already under control. Under Suharto, Pancasila as an ideology was effectively used to govern Indonesia, and political Islam was suppressed. However, Suharto began to co-opt Islamic political leaders during the last decade of his rule. Religious Islam grew significantly during the Suharto era and would gradually transform itself into political Islam after Suharto's fall. Nevertheless, the electoral strength of 'Islamic political parties' remained relatively low. But since then, Islam has been used as an effective tool to undermine political rivals. The pluralists who are now in power continue to promote Pancasila, and combining with moderate Islamic organizations and through laws and regulations, have tried to hinder the further development of Islamist organizations. The future of Pancasila depends on whether the Indonesian government and other pluralist forces are able to control the Islamists and provide political stability and economic development in the country.
Regardless of the size of the domestic economy, there are ample reasons for firms to extend their markets beyond home shores. These include increasing sales, improving profits, diversifying risks, reaping economies of scale, matching the moves of competitors, enhancing competitiveness or accessing government incentives. Both Indonesia and Malaysia seek to enhance the competitiveness of their micro, small and medium enterprises (MSMEs) by including internationalization goals in their respective national development plans for these enterprises. Findings from fourteen case studies in the two countries indicate that exporting may be a serendipitous discovery, as few of these cases were born global in intent. Shifting to intentional exporting will require entrepreneurs to tap into government and/or private networks and thus connect with international buyers. Indonesian MSMEs are more inclined to depend more on government than private networks as they perceive the former to be more credible. Malaysian cases indicate some firms prefer private to government networks. This is attributed to the differences in the political economy of the two countries. Going forward, both countries need to consolidate their government-run programmes and reduce the fiscal burden. MSMEs should tap more into private networks to bridge the information gap that hinders their access to external markets. ASEAN can facilitate the entry of MSMEs into the ASEAN market by implementing resolutely current plans to reduce technical barriers to trade.
In Indonesia's Riau Islands Province - a place envisioned as a distinctly 'Malay Province' upon its legal formation in 2002 - ethnic Malays are the proud heirs and custodians of a rich legacy associated with a once-sprawling Malay empire that stretched across present-day transnational borders from Indonesia, to Singapore, to Malaysia. Malays of Bugis descent have long played a disproportionately central role in the history (and the historiography or 'history-telling') of the region that now encompasses Indonesia's Riau Islands Province. While steadfastly 'Malay', members of this community readily acknowledge that their ethnically Bugis roots maintain an enduring historical and ideological salience in their everyday lives. However, transregional economic trends and rapid sociodemographic shift shaped by ongoing migration flows have led to feelings of 'marginalization' (peminggiran) among the islands' Malay-Bugis community. This has led them to claim that they are being gradually pushed to the literal and figurative 'edges' of social life in the Riau Islands Province. Fears that a one-time ethnic 'majority is becoming a minority' (mayoritas menjadi minoritas) have fuelled feelings of inter-ethnic resentment, and have shaped provincial government policies geared toward the 'preservation' of Malay custom. While international focus continues to centre on Indonesia's Chinese-pribumi divide as diagnostic of Indonesian inter-ethnic and religious relations on edge, a grounded assessment of ethnicity in the Riau islands offers an alternative perspective on these important issues.
Batam's economic transformation has been accompanied by a marked degradation of its natural environment. Enforcement to protect the environment has often been inadequate on many fronts, exacerbated by population increases. Though regulations exist for the provision of public amenities like wastewater and sewerage treatment, existing facilities are run-down and ill-equipped to cope with the present demands. The capacity of reservoirs to meet the present demand for water is also strained because of the large population base, with illegal intrusion and squatters further threatening supplies. Economic and environmental imperatives can be reconciled if more emphasis and resources are put into enforcing regulations and protecting the environment.
Parti Pribumi Bersatu Malaysia (PPBM) was officially launched on 14 January 2017, led by prominent personalities including former Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad, former Deputy Prime Minister Muhyiddin Yassin, and former Kedah Chief Minister Mukhriz Mahathir. Upon establishment, the party immediately announced that they are aiming to win the southern state of Johor in the upcoming general election. Historically, UMNO splinter parties have never been able to threaten UMNO in this state. Since independence, Johor has always been seen as an UMNO bastion. PPBM has moved quickly to establish themselves in all parliamentary and state constituencies in Johor, however, and it has been rather successful in attracting support from those aged below 35. Their key challenge remains the rural and female voters. Identity politics is a major hurdle for PPBM. The presence of the Democratic Action Party (DAP) in the Pakatan Harapan coalition - of which PPBM is a member - is a hurdle in attracting Malay support. Among Malay voters, DAP is perceived as a threat to Malay privileges. At the same time, PPBM leaders in Johor believe that their contribution towards the coalition is not yet fully recognized by their coalition partners who insist that PPBM contests only in constituencies with a large Malay population. Areas with a high percentage of Malay voters are difficult for PPBM to win because UMNO tends to enjoy huge support in such constituencies, and PPBM leaders argue that they deserve more mixed seats to run in as well. Winning Johor, or some other state, is crucial for PPBM. Should the coalition fail to win at the federal level, PPBM will need a base to avoid disintegration.
This study was carried out in Johor and Kedah through a combination of focus groups, formal and informal interviews and long-term ethnographic participant observation. Johor was selected for this study because it is the birthplace and long-time bastion of UMNO while Kedah was of interest because of the Mahathir family legacy in the state. The study shows that the rural vote is not homogeneous; views and perceptions that could lead to electoral action differs between regions, ages and genders. Daily survival and rising costs of living are the key common issues that were raised across all regions. The importance of Malay rights and the priority of Islam are also important to the rural voter. Another common problem mentioned is that of the middleman who prevents allocated funds or financial assistance from reaching the average rural resident. Malay cultural norms, traditional obligations of loyalty and patronage politics are major factors that affect the decisions of older rural voters. Younger voters might be open to the idea of a new government, but they need to overcome community and family pressure to break away from generational practices of voting for Barisan Nasional. Some rural voters feel that they gain no benefits from having either side of the political divide in power. While these voters generally do not see the point of voting, a last-minute decision to vote may go the way of the party that provides them with immediate gains.
In Malaysia's last general election, urban voters tended to support the opposition coalition - 72 of the 97 urban parliamentary seats were in fact won by it. However, most of these seats have a mixed demography, with a high percentage of ethnic Chinese voters. In the upcoming general election, Pakatan has a good chance of winning the federal government if Malay voters join their Chinese counterparts in supporting the opposition coalition. A subsequent so-called 'Malay tsunami' could lead to a Pakatan victory. This present study, which is based on a series of focus group discussions held in the Malaysian states of Kedah and Johor, finds that urban Malay voters are very unhappy with the economic condition of the country and are also worried about corruption. But despite their grouses, they are still uncertain about supporting the opposition coalition due to the fear of losing the race-based privileges they enjoy as ethnic Malays.
EduCity, built as an integrated learning hub, is a constituent part of Malaysia's general programme to enhance its reputation as a regional centre for higher education. Located in Iskandar Malaysia, Johor, on a 305-acre catalyst development housing seven higher education institutions, EduCity aims to become a best-in-class higher education destination and at the same time provide talent to support economic activities in Iskandar Malaysia. With over 3,500 students currently enrolled, EduCity is moving towards its goal of having 16,000 students by 2025. Its proximity to Singapore and Kuala Lumpur provides it with a large population of potential students, although attracting academic staff to work there remains a challenge. Other challenges that EduCity faces revolve around the provision of facilities and support services, coordination of courses on offer, and coordination between the entity that runs the site - EduCity Iskandar Sdn Bhd (EISB) - and the universities.