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137 results in Trends in Southeast Asia

Page 6 of 7

Learning Diplomacy
  • Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam Diplomats in ASEAN
  • Deepak Nair
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    09 March 2019
    Print publication:
    14 October 2016
  • For nearly two decades, ASEAN has served as a vehicle for the postsocialist states of Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam (CLMV) to seek diplomatic recognition and enmesh their economies with the dominant discourses, structures, and visions of post-Cold War capitalist modernity. In scholarly and lay understandings of how CLMV states "integrate" through ASEAN, attention has been firmly on the political, security, and economic outcomes of ASEAN-CLMV interactions, with diplomacy viewed as a passive instrument to pursue such outcomes. Such a static view of diplomacy, I argue, obscures a vital mechanism in and through which these broader macro-social changes are being sought and accomplished. As they pursue modernist state projects, diplomats too must yield to experiences of learning and redefinition to express (and enable) the project of international "integration". This paper examines such processes of learning and redefinition by studying the effects and consequences of immersion in English-based ASEAN multilateral work for the diplomats of CLMV states. It delves into the Attachment Officers Programme for CLMV diplomats at the ASEAN Secretariat in Jakarta as an illustrative case to tease out the skills CLMV diplomats gain from their stints in ASEAN work. These skills — the ability to draft quasi-diplomatic documents in English, facility with speaking English, and an embodied ease in interacting with foreigners (both Asian and Euro-American) — are generic but also transposable as these junior diplomats embark on representational and negotiating roles for their countries. The paper demonstrates how stints in ASEAN multilateral diplomacy have emerged as a channel for exposure and grooming for CLMV diplomats as they themselves "integrate" with an English-based global (yet Eurocentric) diplomacy.

Is a New Entrepreneurial Generation Emerging in Indonesia?
  • Gwenael Njoto-Feillard, Kathleen Azali
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    09 March 2019
    Print publication:
    19 September 2016
  • The main actors in Indonesia's business landscape have long been assumed to be the country's Chinese minority. However, in the last decade, there has been a more visible, growing culture of entrepreneurship amongst the pribumi or "native" Indonesians. Democratic reforms, decentralization and the deregulation of certain sectors of the economy, facilitated by new information technology, have enabled a new generation of entrepreneurs to emerge outside the traditional system of political patronage. New forms of networking are taking shape within local and national business associations, networking forums, and the marketing and business media. While civil servant positions are still highly sought after, the idea of entrepreneurship and business as careers is becoming more and more popular, especially among young Indonesians. The challenge that the Joko Widodo administration faces is to encourage this new social dynamic without falling into the trap of constructing artificial support programmes. These showed themselves to be counter-productive in the past.

New Context of Vietnam's National Security Challenges
  • Nguyen Manh Hung
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    09 March 2019
    Print publication:
    28 November 2016
  • Vietnam's concept of national security is based on "the survival of the ruling regime that acts in the name of the country". Because the challenges to Vietnam's national security are perceived as challenges and threats to the ruling regime, the concept of national security tends to focus on the internal dimension of national security. The Mid-term National Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) in 1994 listed "four threats" facing the country, namely, the danger of falling behind neighbouring countries economically; the threat of "peaceful evolution"; deviation from socialism; and corruption and bureaucratism. None of them, except for peaceful evolution, comes from outside. Today, China is the only external threat to Vietnam's sovereignty and territorial integrity, and the focal point of that threat is the South China Sea. Vietnam has responded to this threat with a three-point policy: accommodating China's security interests; building up self-defence capability; and mobilizing international support. Recent serious challenges to Vietnam's national security policy include: the unpredictable politics of the United States over ratification of the TPP and uncertainty over its "pivot" to Asia strategy; President Rodrigo Duterte's tilt towards China, his country's "separation" from the United States, and the uncertain future of the U.S.-Philippines military alliance; China's strong reaction to the July ruling of the Permanent Court of Arbitration in favour of the Philippines, and a divided and weakened ASEAN.

Investigating the Popularity of Surabaya's Mayor Tri Rismaharini
  • Ulla Fionna
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    09 March 2019
    Print publication:
    30 March 2017
  • Indonesia's decentralization and direct local elections have produced several credible popular local leaders. One of them is Surabaya's mayor, Tri Rismaharini (Risma), who gained much attention for her impressive work ethics and her commitment in improving the city. Together with new vice mayor Whisnu Sakti Buana, she was successfully re-elected for the second term in 2015. Examination on the perception and support for her policies on cleanliness, the closure of Dolly (Surabaya's main red light district) and the management of education reveals that Risma is perceived as a capable leader. However, Surabaya residents still want Risma to do more on those particular fronts. This finding signals maturing voters who are not only aware of their needs and what their government does, but also are able to push their leaders to develop their successful policies further. Risma's success in Surabaya showcases an effective combination between an electorate that is politically savvy and a bold local leader with a clear and sustained focus in the implementation of her policies.

Can Myanmar's NLD Government Undo the Gordian Knot of Federalism and Ethnicity?
  • Robert H. Taylor
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    09 March 2019
    Print publication:
    08 April 2016
  • Daw Aung San Suu Kyi has said that peace is the first priority of the National League for Democracy (NLD) when it comes to power in April 2016. Both her remarks at the Union Peace Conference in January and the NLD election manifesto point to ethnicity and federalism being linked. This is a position similar to that taken by the outgoing Thein Sein government and the army. Now that the word "federalism" is accepted as useful in the debate over how to establish an end to Myanmar's persistent civil wars with ethnically designated armed groups, it was hoped that some meeting of minds might take place. But as revealed at the Union Peace Conference, that is yet to have happened. Rather, spokespersons for the ethnic armed groups continue to speak the language of ethnic rights and a federal army, while the government talks about reaching material and administrative agreements and the army insists that there can only be one army. These debates echo the past, going back to the formation of Myanmar in the late 1940s. In order to break the apparently endless debate about federalism, ethnicity, states and divisions in the Union of Myanmar, perhaps a new approach might be considered -- taking federalism a step further to the seventy-four district levels of administration. As the ethnically designated armed groups operate in relatively small and localized areas, a solution that squares the circle between ethnicity and territory might have appeal.

Johor's Forest City Faces Critical Challenges
  • Serina Rahman
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    09 March 2019
    Print publication:
    16 May 2017
  • The Forest City project in Johor, Malaysia is part of a larger plan to elevate Johor to development success, similar to Shenzhen's evolution from Hong Kong's backwaters to being a modern metropolis. However the project was embroiled in controversy from the beginning. The mixed development was meant to create sustainable homes, recreational areas, schools and business infrastructure that would house about 700,000 people, generate annual revenues of about RM30 million for the state, and create more than 60,000 jobs, including a substantial number for locals through a quota. Sudden capital controls imposed by China on its citizens in early 2017 put a spanner in the works. Middle-class Chinese struggling to afford homes in China's big cities were Forest City's prime clientele and the new regulations preventing the transfer of funds for property purchase and the use of credit cards for investment transactions have brought future sales and the completion of signed commitments into question. Forest City will now have to focus on other markets in order to meet its sales targets. While the project has its merits, the economic benefits might be overstated as a number of socio-economic and environmental impacts have not been fully taken into account.

The Red Shirts and Their Democratic Struggle in Northern Thailand, April 2010 to May 2015
  • Tanet Charoenmuang
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    09 March 2019
    Print publication:
    10 August 2016
  • The political education of members of Thailand's Red Shirt movement took place through the electoral process, and through learning how political institutions and the judiciary could be systematically used to topple the elected government. The main sources of instruction were the Red Shirt TV programmes followed by Bangkok rallies. In Chiang Mai Province, for example, Red Shirt activities centred around a radio station and participation in political gatherings. The former involved dissemination of information, the latter connected activists with those from other parts of Northern Thailand. The relationship between the United Alliance for Democracy against Dictatorship (UDD) and satellite Red Shirt groups was rather distant. The UDD leadership showed little interest in strengthening Red Shirt forces outside Bangkok and in turn, there was little participation by Red Shirt leaders from other provinces in Bangkok activities. Yingluck's elected government focussed on maintaining Party popularity among voters rather than on structural democratic reforms. At the same time, the UDD, the Red Shirt movement, the Party, and other parts of society did not actively pressure the government to enact such reforms. This contributed to the political deadlock that emerged before the military coup. In the wake of the military ban on all political gatherings, only a few Red Shirt radio stations remained open, but their programming changed drastically from political broadcasts to social broadcasts. Red Shirt groups have transformed into social clubs and now organize social events that do not include political activities.

The Geopolitics of Xi Jinping's Chinese Dream
  • Problems and Prospects
  • David Arase
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    09 March 2019
    Print publication:
    07 November 2016
  • Viewing China's current relations with neighbours in the East Asian littoral from geopolitical and macrohistorical perspectives enables us to evaluate China's current prospects for advancing its "peaceful rise". Today the ruling Communist Party of China (CPC) articulates a Chinese Dream that envisions a new age of Asian predominance to match China's memory of past golden ages. To realize this dream, China seeks geopolitical predominance in the East Asian littoral. Judging from the foreign policy goals and behaviour pursued by Xi Jinping, China appears likely to govern the region according to its core interests even when this may require other states to give up their lawful sovereign rights and prerogatives. Ever since the East Asian core region birthed Chinese civilization, this core has experienced cycles of political consolidation and disintegration. Although large swathes of the continental periphery were incorporated into the core, geopolitical factors that remain relevant today prevented the conquest of the maritime periphery. Peninsular and archipelagic states in East Asia's maritime periphery are again individually hedging or counterbalancing against Chinese efforts. This aids U.S. rebalancing strategy and frustrates China's effort to remove U.S. strategic influence from the region. Faced with mounting resistance, China must attempt to overcome this resistance with stepped up forcefulness or modify its ambitions. Domestic political constraints may make it difficult for Beijing to compromise, even though pushing harder for geopolitical predominance promises only greater costs and risk without improving prospects for ultimate success.

Middle Eastern Influences on Islamist Organizations in Malaysia
  • The Cases of ISMA, IRF and HTM
  • Ahmad Fauzi Abdul Hamid, Che Hamdan Che Mohd Razali
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    09 March 2019
    Print publication:
    29 February 2016
  • Interaction between Muslims in Malaysia and their Middle Eastern brethren has consistently been a source of apprehension to the powers-that-be from colonial times till today. Islamist activism in Malaysia has indeed undergone changes, and these did indeed arise from contemporary Middle Eastern influences. The religious thought, practices and lifestyles of Muslims in Malaysia have traditionally been regarded as moderate. Of particular importance in the present context is the transmission of puritanical interpretations of Islam. Furthermore, the Malaysian version of Islamist puritanism has always been pragmatic rather than dogmatic, moderated by its multi-cultural and multi-religious setting. But newer strands of Islamism influenced by developments in the Middle East have alarmed authorities. The impact of this Middle East-driven wave of Islamism is not restricted to Malaysian chapters of transnational extremist groups such as the Islamic State (IS) and Al Qaeda. However, in Malaysia, the influence is more varied in its organizational impact. Newly formed Muslim organizations such as Ikatan Muslimin Malaysia (ISMA, or Muslim Solidarity Front), the Islamic Renaissance Front (IRF) and Hizb at-Tahrir Malaysia (HTM) are all found to have maintained strong Middle Eastern links, both at the discursive or organizational levels. All three movements in question have so far not displayed violent tendencies although their versions of Islamism exhibit varying degrees of ideological absolutism, distinguishing them markedly from the wave of Islamism that engulfed Malaysia in the 1980s.

The State of Local Politics in Indonesia
  • Survey Evidence from Three Cities
  • Diego Fossati
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    09 March 2019
    Print publication:
    01 June 2016
  • Decentralization reforms in Indonesia have empowered local government with substantial powers. Local politics therefore constitutes a privileged arena for the study of democratic consolidation in this country. Research on local Indonesian politics is based almost exclusively on case-study analysis and qualitative work. As a result, while we have accumulated considerable knowledge on political elites, we know little about ordinary voters. This paper analyses a rich, original dataset with survey data from the cities of Medan in North Sumatra, Samarinda in East Kalimantan, and Surabaya in East Java. These three surveys, fielded shortly after the implementation of local direct elections on 9 December 2015, offer an unprecedented opportunity to learn about how various aspects of local politics are experienced by voters. After an introduction on local direct elections and the three field sites, I focus on the main themes emerging form survey data, namely evaluation of local government, experience of electoral campaigns, and voting behaviour. Findings reveal commonalities and differences in local politics across the three cities. Voters in Medan, Samarinda and Surabaya are rather similar in their evaluation of the strengths and weaknesses of local government performance, in their experience of electoral campaigns, in how they account for voting choices and evaluate candidates. However, they also differ in their satisfaction with and trust in local institutions, and in their degree of political interest, participation, and knowledge. The paper concludes with a discussion of the relevance of the finding for our understanding of Indonesian politics.

Myanmar's Foreign Policy under President U Thein Sein
  • Non-aligned and Diversified
  • Jurgen Haacke
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    09 March 2019
    Print publication:
    27 April 2016
  • Given Myanmar's strategic location and the wider great power competition in Southeast Asia, how the country positions itself vis-a-vis the major powers in the reform era currently underway will have considerable bearing for the international politics of Southeast Asia. Historically, Myanmar's leaders have preferred an independent foreign policy that has also been couched in terms of neutralism and non-alignment. Following considerable tension between the stated principle of non-alignment and the practice of Myanmar's foreign policy under the SLORC/SPDC regime given U.S. pressure on Naypyitaw especially in the mid-2000s, Myanmar's threat perceptions vis-a-vis Washington have waned with the shift to the pragmatic, principled and calibrated engagement as favoured by President Obama. The Myanmar government under Thein Sein pursued a non-aligned foreign policy both in declaratory and practical terms.

Bipolarity and the Future of the Security Order in East Asia
  • William T. Tow
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    09 March 2019
    Print publication:
    22 July 2016
  • ASEAN is in danger of becoming marginalized as East Asian security becomes increasingly shaped by such volatile flashpoints as a nuclear North Korea and a South China Sea increasingly dominated by quarrels over sovereignty and maritime security. Accordingly, the notion of "ASEAN centrality" is now being seriously challenged and is unlikely to prevail against the growing bipolar security environment shaped by China and the United States. ASEAN and other Asia-Pacific states could gravitate toward one of five alternative order-building scenarios: (i) A Sino-American condominium that defines and accepts each other's geopolitical sphere of influence; (ii) The replacement or substantial revision of the United States' bilateral alliance system with the expansion of multilateral norms and instrumentalities; (iii) The gradual predominance of an "Asia for Asians" concept led by China but endorsed by a substantial number of Southeast Asian states; (iv) Effective balancing and hedging by smaller states and "middle powers", leading to eventual great power acceptance of a regional power equilibrium; and (v) An intensification of regional "community building" via an amorphous but wide-ranging series of economic, ideological and strategic compromises to make war unthinkable and to strengthen regional interdependence. However, none of these five scenarios is likely to predominate in a literal sense. Instead, the "realist" explanation for understanding security in the region is the most accurate forecast for understanding an East Asian security environment that is becoming increasingly disorderly. ASEAN can still play a constructive -- if not central -- role in shaping East Asia's strategic environment by working with China and the United States to strengthen confidence-building in regional security politics and to encourage their respect for strategic constraint.

Johor Remains the Bastion of Kaum Tua
  • Norshahril Saat
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    09 March 2019
    Print publication:
    17 January 2017
  • Many scholars on Malaysia have recognized that Salafism-Wahhabism has penetrated substantially into the countr's political and social life. The southern state of Johor has always been considered, and remains, the bastion of kaum tua, with its religious institutions dominated by ulama (religious scholars) who are traditionalist in character but tolerant of religious practices that are infused with local culture and mysticism. These scholars have also tended to maintain conservative attitudes on gender issues, inter-religious relations, and intra-faith differences. The Sultan of Johor appoints the Mufti whose primary role is to issue fatwas (religious rulings) and be the ex-officio of the Johor Islamic Religious Council, the highest Islamic body in the state. Johor's Muftis are dominantly political quietists, and loyal to the ruling family. Occasional interventions by the Sultan of Johor in the religious sphere have proved crucial in ensuring that the state maintains its Malay character. The Sultan also acts to protect the state's religious institutions from encroachment by the federal government.

Rural Thailand
  • Change and Continuity
  • Porphant Ouyyanont
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    09 March 2019
    Print publication:
    07 July 2016
  • Despite rapid industrialization in Thailand, the contribution of agriculture to GDP remains unusually high. The share of agricultural employment in total employment has also remained high, relative to the country's income level, as has the share of the rural population relative to the total population. Agribusiness has grown significantly, and there has been a rise in the number of large and strongly financed commercial farms that are less labour intensive. Contract farming has also been developing. The introduction of a rice premium by the government obstructed the modernization of the agricultural rice sector and caused the rice share in GDP to steadily decline, while that for upland crops such as cassava, maize, sugarcane, and oil palm increased. However, rice remains the most important crop. The high proportion of the population still living in rural areas and working in the agricultural sector attests to the resilience of that sector in the face of industrialization.

The Extensive Salafization of Malaysian Islam
  • Ahmad Fauzi Abdul Hamid
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    09 March 2019
    Print publication:
    13 July 2016
  • The form of Islam normatively understood and practised in Malaysia, i.e. Malaysian Islam, has undergone myriad changes since the 1970s as a result of gradual Salafization. Powered by Saudi Arabian largesse and buoyed by the advent of the Internet, this new wave of Salafization has eclipsed an earlier Salafi trend that spawned the Kaum Muda reformist movement. Recent surveys suggest that there has been a rise in the level of extremism among Muslims in Malaysia. While the majority is far from being enamoured by the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), the Wahhabi-Salafi doctrine that ISIS claims to represent in unadulterated form does appeal to many of them following the decades-long Salafization of Islam in the country. This tallies with media reports on increasing numbers of Malay-Muslim youth harbouring an attraction towards radical Islamist movements such as ISIS. Salafization, referring to a process of mindset and attitudinal transformation rather than the growth of Salafi nodes per se, is not restricted to individuals or groups identified as "Salafi", but rather affects practically all levels of Malay-Muslim society, cutting across political parties, governmental institutions and non-state actors. It has resulted in Islamist, rather than Islamic, ideals increasingly defining the tenor of mainstream Islam in Malaysia, with worrying consequences for both intra-Muslim and inter-religious relations. Responses to the Wahhabi-Salafi onslaught from the Malay-Muslim ruling elite in Malaysia have been ambivalent, and have had weak counteracting effects on the Salafization process.

China's One Belt One Road
  • An Overview of the Debate
  • Zhao Hong
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    09 March 2019
    Print publication:
    01 June 2016
  • The debate over China's One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative has been lively and at times heated, both in China and internationally. In many ways, this is a reflection of the vagueness of the concept, and of its exceptionality. OBOR does not prioritize trade and investment concessions, which makes it essentially different from traditional regional economic cooperation models such as FTAs, the TPP and the RCEP. Instead, it emphasizes regional infrastructure connectivity. After China proposed the initiative, countries within the New Silk Road Economic Belt, especially the five Central Asian countries, responded enthusiastically and positively, while Southeast and South Asian countries, on the other hand, expressed more concerns and reservations about the initiative. In response to these countries' concerns, China has tried to adjust its approaches to convince Southeast Asian countries that the OBOR initiative holds potential synergy with ASEAN's development strategies and can play a complementary role in the building of the ASEAN community. Beijing has also adjusted its India strategy. From previously "inviting" India to join OBOR, it is now stressing "strategy connectivity" and "policy coordination" between the two countries. Nevertheless, OBOR is viewed by some as an expression of China's grand ambitions to lead Asian economic growth, and by others as a grand strategy to build a "China-dominated Asia". While it may be mainly an economic and trade initiative, its broader consequences have a strong political and security dimension. Hence, China badly needs to cultivate political trust with neighbouring countries if it wishes to convince them that the initiative is a "public" strategy, and not a "conspiratorial" one.

Understanding Jokowi's Foreign Policy
  • Donald E. Weatherbee
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    09 March 2019
    Print publication:
    10 August 2016
  • The foreign policy issue in the 2014 Indonesian presidential election was the rejection by both candidates, Joko Widodo (Jokowi) and Prabowo Subianto, of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's high-profile globalism. Both promised instead a foreign policy directed to the real economic and social interests of the people. This raised concerns by Indonesia's international partners that its new foreign policy would be more nationalistic and inward looking. A year and a half into Jokowi's presidency, it is possible to make a preliminary assessment of the course of Jokowi's foreign policy in relation to the goals that Jokowi the candidate set forth for Jokowi the president. Indonesia's foreign policy under Jokowi, like his predecessor's, is that suited to a rising middle power with a claim to regional leadership. Its operating principles have been unchanged since first enunciated in 1948: "bebas dan aktif" — independent and active — shaped pragmatically to existing situations. Jokowi revived Sukarno's trisakti ("threes pillars of the state") as the organizing principles of his presidential campaign -- an Indonesia that is sovereign, economically independent, and with a strong socio-cultural identity — and these are reflected in his foreign policy. In his "Vision and Mission" manifesto for the presidential election, Jokowi listed the action agendas necessary for achieving his four foreign policy priorities. These were (a) promotion of Indonesia as an archipelagic maritime state, (b) promotion of Indonesia's middle-power regional role, (c) a new focus on the Indo-Pacific, and (d) reforming the foreign policy process. Five critical areas in particular define Jokowi's foreign policies. These are (a) building the Global Maritime Axis, (b) economic diplomacy, (c) Indonesia's role in ASEAN, (d) navigating between China and the United States, and (e) Indonesia's role in the South China Sea. The bedrock of Indonesian foreign policy since at least 2001 remains firm. The country continues to be a responsible, cooperative international partner sharing interest in economic growth and a peaceful, secure international order with like-minded states. However, heightened tension in the South China Sea is limiting the space for Indonesia's hedging strategy.

The Emergence of Pork-Barrel Politics in Parliamentary Myanmar
  • Renaud Egreteau
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    09 March 2019
    Print publication:
    30 May 2017
  • In 2014 Myanmar introduced a constituency development fund (CDF) to sponsor small public works and development projects in each of the country's 330 electoral constituencies. As a form of "pork-barrel" spending, CDF programmes have long remained controversial among international donors, anti-corruption agencies and civil society watchdogs for their potential for corruption, embezzlement, waste of public money, vote-buying and other clientelistic behaviours. The CDF has however emerged in as an extremely popular instrument for lawmakers, in offering new opportunities for meeting the basic infrastructure and development needs of local communities. The scheme has also fostered more frequent interactions among parliamentarians, local bureaucrats, and citizens. Mechanisms for vetting and monitoring the CDF projects seem also to have grown stronger each year. Rumours about petty corruption and misappropriation cases have gradually surfaced, particularly since the National League for Democracy (NLD) took control of the legislature in 2016. Yet in the first three fiscal years of its implementation, the scheme did not lead to any known major punitive action. There is also not yet enough of a record to identify credible linkages between the use of CDFs and the building of an electoral clientele by politicians — another common criticism of "pork-barrel" funding.

The Rise and Decline of Labour Militancy in Batam
  • Max Lane
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    12 February 2019
    Print publication:
    18 April 2018
  • Over the past two decades, trade union activity in Batam has been heavily influenced by regional demographics, employment conditions and the prevalent political scenario. Following the end of the New Order in 1998, the single state-authorized union was fragmented, giving rise to a number of new enterprise unions. Batam's young and diverse immigrant population, with no pre-existing loyalties to particular trade unions, made it a hotspot for industrial relations activities. Low and stagnant workers' wages throughout Indonesia and outbreak of social unrest resulted in the formation of three strong national-level unions: FSPMI, KSPSI and the KSBSI. By the mid-2000s, these unions were also active in Batam. Unsettled ethnic relations resulted in escalation of labour mobilizations from 2011 to 2013. The Garda Metal (union member formation) spearheaded a number of intense demonstrations throughout Indonesia, including Batam, during this time. The 2012 mobilization was particularly effective, and the union bodies were able to successfully negotiate for significantly higher minimum wages for all workers in Indonesia. After intervention by the Widodo government, and the signing of a harmony declaration, there has been a change in the unions' approach in demanding wages and conditions improvement. Instead of addressing employment concerns through national-level campaigns, matters are now to be resolved at the enterprise level. While there are no visible signs of a confrontational mobilization in the near future, a number of worker welfare issues remain unsettled.

The "Free and Open Indo-Pacific" and Implications for ASEAN
  • John Lee
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    12 February 2019
    Print publication:
    26 August 2018
  • In recent times, the United States, Japan and Australia have all promoted extremely similar visions of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific as the central organizing concept to guide their efforts in the region. The concept is essentially a reaffirmation of the security and economic rules-based order which was cobbled together after the Second World War - especially as it relates to freedom of the regional and global commons such as sea, air and cyberspace, and the way nations conduct economic relations. Be that as it may, the Free and Open Indo-Pacific is an updated vision of collective action to defend, strengthen and advance that order. It signals a greater acceptance by the two regional allies of the U.S. of their security burden and takes into account the realities of China's rise and the relative decline in dominance of the U.S. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and its member states continue to delay any definitive response to the Free and Open Indo-Pacific concept. Although its principles are attractive to many ASEAN member states, long-held conceptions of ASEAN centrality and its meaning gives the organization apparent reason for hesitation. The reasons include fears of diminished centrality and relevance, and reluctance to endorse a more confrontational mindset being adopted by the U.S. and its allies - including the revival of the Quadrilateral grouping with India - with respect to China. The reality is that while ASEAN and major member states are focused primarily on the risks of action, there are considerable risks of inaction and hesitation. The current era will either enhance or lessen the relevance of ASEAN in the eyes of these three countries in the years ahead depending on how the organisation and its key member states respond. Indeed, this Trends paper argues that ASEAN is more likely to be left behind by strategic events and developments if it remains passive, and that the ball is in ASEAN's court in terms of the future of its regional 'centrality'.

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