The author first discusses the statutory framework which has led to the divided jurisdiction over matrimonial property in Australia. This is followed by an examination of the problems that this division creates, such as delay in settling property disputes, jurisdictional conflict when one spouse unilaterally seeks a “State” remedy, and evasion of the intention behind the legislation to divide matrimonial property equitably between the parties. Some of the mechanisms like gifting and trust arrangements by which a spouse may rearrange his affairs to insulate himself from the jurisdictional reach of the Family Court are examined. The limitations of the injunction power under s. 114 of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) are exposed and following this the author speculates about the scope of s. 85 of the Act which attempts to empower the Court to set aside transactions designed to avoid the provisions of the Act. He concludes that the powers of the Family Court are uncertain and limited and that the only real solution would lie in a reference of power in this area to the Commonwealth by the States.

This article provides insight into the emerging global-local and public-private nature of professional regulation. Specifically, it reports on recent cross-border interaction to modify professional regulation involving the recognition of qualifications, rights of practice and discipline and ethics. That interaction reveals how – loosely - the regulation of legal competence and conduct has been drawn into a web of global governance. A particular interest is the prominent role that Australian practitioners and officials have played in both multilateral and bilateral relations.

In characterising the way governance of regulation has gone global, Picciotto describes it as a networked field. The governance of regulation has spilled over national borders, yet it has not moved cleanly upwards into a regime of binding public international law. Global governance lacks a clear regulatory hierarchy. Regulatory relations extend out horizontally as well as vertically and they blur the boundaries between public and private regulators.

Following the High Court's decision in the Election Advertising case, Toohey J's extra-eurial speech at a 1992 conference on constitutional law has inspired speculation as to the existence of an implied “Bill of Rights” in the Constitution. As reported in the Australian Financial Review, Toohey J's thesis avoided any direct challenge to the doctrine of Parliamentary supremacy by, “resorting to the Constitution — albeit implications arising from the Constitution as opposed to the written text — to legitimise judicial scrutiny of legislation”.

By examining the history of the Ahvāz pipe mill in the 1960s and 1970s, this article investigates the manner in which competing understandings of Iran's modernizing trajectory among Pahlavi officials were bound up with the material aspects of steel, such as weight, volume, and form. The mill was built to provide pipe for the First Iran Gas Trunkline, a sprawling system intended to gather, refine, and transport natural gas to Iranian cities and the Soviet Caucasus. Officials overseeing the project debated whether the mill's design should prioritize serving the pipeline project or, more ambitiously, establish a new pipe rolling industry able to serve domestic and regional markets. Argued in this article is the significance of attending to infrastructure and materiality in understanding Iran's twentieth-century history of developmentalism.

Teaching death, spirituality, and palliative care equips students with critical skills and perspectives for holistic patient care. This interdisciplinary approach fosters empathy, resilience, and personal growth while enhancing competence in end-of-life care. Using experiential methods like simulations and real patient interactions, educators bridge theory and practice. Integrating theological insights and inclusive-pluralism encourages meaningful dialogue, preparing students to address patients’ physical, emotional, and spiritual needs. This holistic pedagogy not only improves patient outcomes but also promotes collaboration and compassion in healthcare.

Anthony Frank Mason came to the notice of many in the legal profession early in his career. He was admitted to the New South Wales Bar in 1951 and three years later had his first significant success in a constitutional challenge to provisions of the Bankruptcy Act, arguing that provisions purporting to give power to the registrar were contrary to Chapter III of the Constitution. Shortly afterwards he endeavoured to appear for Fitzpatrick in the proceedings before the House of Representatives against his client and Browne for contempt of Parliament but he was denied permission. He has said that that experience had a considerable effect on his outlook in respect of the principles of natural justice and the importance of the courts in protecting the citizen.

In 1964 he was appointed Solicitor-General of the Commonwealth. While he was the fourth person to hold that position (the others being Garran, Knowles and Bailey) he was the first Solicitor-General who was not also Secretary of the Attorney-GeneralIs Department. His main duties were, therefore, to act as counsel and adviser to the Commonwealth. This gave him insights into the institutions and organisation of government which no doubt played their part in the formation of his later judicial views on public law.

Amidst the turmoil of the recent Gair controversy in the Senate the Attorney-General tabled the first report of the Legal Aid Review Committee. Somewhat in keeping with the real political significance of the subject under review, the report was tabled very late one evening. Little or no publicity was given to its tabling, any notice taken being washed away by the turmoil of the times. Some might say that the modest size of the report deserved no greater recognition, but such a view is ungenerous and most certainly naive.

The document tabled is quite bulky, the greater part being taken up by the appendices. The almost clinical dissection of the existing legal aid facilities throughout Australia will give the role of this Committee real impetus. For too long lawyers and politicians in Australia have been smugly satisfied with the existing legal aid services. A close examination of the Report's appendices will reveal that local legal aid is very much like a badly moth-eaten patch work quilt.

Sometime after 1992, I first learned that the High Court of Australia had discovered that the Australian Constitution contained something that sounded very much like a freedom of speech guarantee. And the reasoning that supported that discovery sounded like the philosophy of Alexander Meiklejohn which I had been teaching in a seminar on Free Speech for several years.

Although Meiklejohn was talking about the United States Constitution, he was not emphasising the words of the First Amendment thereto. Drawing upon pre-Bill of Rights commitments recorded in various historical documents, Meiklejohn's view was that the framers of the United States Constitution had made a covenant with each other to build a democracy in which the people were both the governors and the governed. Freedom of speech, according to Meiklejohn, was necessary to make a democracy, and that was all that freedom of speech was designed to do.

The role of the judiciary in public law cases is a topic of debate in every age. The present age is no different. On topics as diverse as implied constitutional rights, native title, refugee determination and public sector tort liability, there has been a vigorous public debate between the critics and the defenders of judicial power. We live in an age, as the Tampa litigation reminds us, in which the national public policy agenda is increasingly structured by legal claims.

Many commentators would take the judicial role a step further by giving judges a more explicit role in applying human rights standards when evaluating the validity of executive (and, possibly, legislative) action. A constitutional or statutory Bill of Rights would be the most direct way of conferring that function on the judiciary. Less direct is the option, with steadily growing support, of judges taking account of international human rights instruments in discharging their adjudicative function. Whatever level of support those options attract, it seems probable that human rights principles will play an increasing role in judicial review of executive action. The principles are stamped already on many aspects of public law.

The nature of the Australian Consitution is usually described as eiher monarchic and parliamentary, or republican and federal. However, more than succinct expressions of the key political concepts behind the Australian Constitution, the two metaphors are the products of particular forms of analysis. Essentially, the terms parliamentary or consitutional monarchy and federal republic are the products of either revisionist or institutional interpretations of the Australian Constitution. The institutional interpretation focuses on tie practical function of the Constitution's federal and parliamentary institutions, and the origins of these devices within the British and American Constitutions. For example, as the Australian Constitution embraces the institutions of both Anerican federalism and British parliamentary government, institutionalists interpret its nature by relating the strucure and operation of Australia's federal and parliamentary institutions to the function of sinilar devices within the British and American Constitutions.

Constitutional law—Commonwealth—Legislative power—Implied limitations—Power to bind States—Power to bind State authorities—Discriminatory law—Invalidity of law—Commonwealth Constitutions 51(xxxv)—Conciliation and Arbitration (Electricity Industry) Act 1985 (Cth).

Industrial law—Commonwealth—Conciliation and arbitration—Legislative power—Implied limitations—Power to bind States—Power to bind State authorities—Discriminatory law—Extent to which discrimination authorised—Commonwealth Constitution s 51 (xxxv)—Conciliation and Arbitration (Electricity Industry) Act 1985 (Cth).

Constitutional Law—Separation of Judicial Power—Constitution s. 51(xxxv)—Dispute as to classification of employee under Commonwealth Award—Whether dispute extends beyond the limits of any one State

This Article explores, from a participatory perspective of an engaged legal scholar, the case of homeless EU citizens in the Netherlands and the mobilization of their rights. By marking them as so-called niet-rechthebbenden (“non-rightholders”), Dutch municipalities have systematically denied homeless EU citizens access to overnight shelters and general homelessness services on equal footing as Dutch citizens. This legal and practical deadlock—a classic case of non-compliance through “law in action”—has most probably led to a denial of rights to EU citizens entitled to shelter as permanent residents, (former) workers, or otherwise legally residing EU citizens. The contribution explores the context and motivations that led a broad coalition of actors—ranging from homelessness organizations, advocacy groups, a public interest litigation organization and legal experts—to join efforts and consider strategic litigation a credible avenue to protect the interests of the most vulnerable under EU law within a national and local context. The case demonstrates, however, how strategic litigation is not considered the most effective or preferred strategy when other avenues for legal mobilization open up.

In Egan v Willis, the High Court declared that the New South Wales Legislative Council had a common law power to call for state papers from Ministers in the House. The case's greatest constitutional significance, however, may be its effect on the relationship between the Parliament and the Court. By making declarations about the relationship between a Minister and the House, the Court appears to have taken on a new role of arbitrating internal parliamentary proceedings independent of any substantive issue outside the House. While such intervention may help secure the rule of law within the legislature, it has traditionally been held that the internal proceedings of the legislature should be subject to the control of the people's elected representatives alone. The need for independence between the legislative, judicial and executive arms of government and their effective operation has, within the British and American constitutional traditions, led to the identification of certain issues as being outside the jurisdiction of the courts or otherwise not justiciable.