Recent assertions by the Australian States of a right to participate in the foreign policy process, in particular by the conclusion of international agreements and by the establishment of relations with foreign governments, are examined in the light of constitutional and international law. Some reference is made to Canadian and United States precedents.

The author concludes that the Federal Government has, to a large extent, an exclusive executive and legislative competence in matters of foreign relations. However, the States also have certain legitimate concerns and aspirations in such matters. The way in which these State interests can be met, while maintaining a unified Australian voice, is discussed, with particular reference to the new arrangements for co-operation between the Commonwealth and the States in treaty-making, agreed to at the Premiers’ Conference in 1977. The way in which the Commonwealth uses its constitutional powers, as well as the responsibility which the States show in the exercise of their powers in relation to treaty implementation, is likely to determine the course of future constitutional development in this area.

In Australia there are nine bodies of legislation; Commonwealth, State and Territorial. The laws within each of these systems may differ from each other in significant ways. Such differences, especially when occurring in areas of “technical law”, may cause considerable inconvenience to Australians and to their legal advisers. In social and economic terms, for many purposes Australia is a single nation, and is not divided by State boundaries. Enactment of uniform laws in each part of Australia could lead to much greater convenience for businesses, individual citizens and lawyers.

This article examines some of the ways in which international organisations and bodies within other federal nations have been working towards the unification and harmonisation of rules of law, in selected areas. From this examination, some parallels are drawn with the situation in Australia. The article also makes some suggestions for greater uniformity of laws in Australia against the political background which may explain why law in Australia has come to be diverse.

The relationship between ultra vires and negligence in a statutory body has become important as a result of recent House of Lords decisions. In this article this relationship is examined and found to contain some serious difficulties. A solution to these difficulties is proposed.

The abolition of all appeals from the High Court to the Privy Council, coupled with the High Court’s recent statement that it no longer regards itself as bound by Privy Council decisions, highlights the fact that appeals still lie, in many matters of State jurisdiction, from State Supreme Courts direct to the Privy Council. In this article, Mr Gilbert is primarily concerned to examine the extent to which section 106 of the Commonwealth Constitution may provide protection for these “direct” appeals. To this end, Mr Gilbert examines what case-law exists on section 106, and attempts to place the section in perspective in relation to the rest of the Constitution. The difficult (and largely unexplored) relationship between section 106 and section 51 is considered, to discover the possible reaches of Commonwealth legislative power with respect to the subject-matter protected by section 106. The position of “direct” appeals within the States’ constitutional structures is looked at, in order to determine the possible ambit of whatever protection is offered by section 106, and finally, Mr Gilbert analyses the recent comments by Mr lustice Murphy that the abolition of Privy Council appeals from the High Court has meant the consequential demise of “direct” appeals from State courts.