McGinty v Western Australia is a significant indicator of present and prospective attitudes of the High Court to major issues of representative democracy, such as electoral representation and equality. In affirming by a majority that substantial numerical voter inequality in Western Australian state electorates did not infringe a concept of representative democracy in either the Commonwealth or the Western Australian constitutions, the court went beyond a refusal to overturn AG (Cth); Ex Rel McKinlay v Commonwealth of more than twenty years earlier.

In McKinlay, a voter had sought a declaration that s 19 of the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 (Cth), which permitted a variation of 10 per cent of the number of electors above or below the quota for a state's seats in the House of Representatives, was invalid on the grounds that it offended the first paragraph of s 24 of the Commonwealth Constitution. The High Courts held that s 24 did not require that the number of people or the number of electors in electoral divisions be equal. In other words, it was found that the Commonwealth Constitution did not mandate a principle of one vote, one value.

Ever since Bentham attempted to “pluck the mask of Mystery from the face ofjurisprudence”, courts have been accused of legitimating their decisions by hiding their real grounds, which are necessarily subjective and partisan, behind a smokescreen of artificial and esoteric ratiocination. Such iconoclasm has, in our century, been a staple of American realism, Marxism and more recently the critical legal studies ‘movement’, all of which have inevitably influenced Australian legal theory.

It has sometimes been argued that in constitutional cases the High Court has used ‘legalism’ to confer on essentially political decisions a speciously apolitical appearance. This argument is made most carefully and thoroughly by Brian Galligan, a political scientist, in his recent study of the High Court. His argument deserves to be carefully assessed, especially if he is right to predict that a more ‘realistic’ account of judging is destined to supplant ‘legalism’ in academic and legal circles, and in the public mind.

Interpretation of the function and role of the Mesopotamian – and peri-Mesopotamian – bevel-rim bowl (BRB) is enriched by recent residue analysis methods. A promising theme of secondary and even alternative primary uses of the BRB in the Uruk periphery during the fourth millennium B.C. is emerging. I make the case for such uses hinging not on its general utility as a small rough bowl (where it would compete with a range of conical cups) but on its pivotal characteristics: a sophisticated system of rapid, low skilled, production line manufacture of containers with specific features (notably thick walls for heat retention), and with an elegant technology-transfer concept of a single BRB as a portable manufacturing template and mould, notably suited to mobile groups. The BRB’s novel ‘system’ suggests it was initially devised for one specific purpose – as I argue, for large-scale baking of leavened bread, perhaps for commensal feasting events. But the renowned BRB discard stacks or stockpiles (perhaps from single-use commensality events or seasonal batch BRB manufacture) lent them readily to secondary use, notably in the Uruk periphery, where their original cultural resonance may have been diluted. The BRB’s virtues of speed and ease of manufacture might well then have encouraged production for more general purposes and new needs, including culinary – an evolution potentially detectable through morphology. The residue analysis to date additionally suggests a specific functional factor in the adoption of BRBs for secondary and eventually primary use: their heat retentive capabilities, making them specifically valuable as ‘thermal paint-pots’ for meltable materials such as bitumen, beeswax and animal fats. These materials could be heated in a larger vessel and decanted into thermally efficient BRBs for use, perhaps with a form of paintbrush, for coating, in a wide range of industrial and other uses.

This article is about the interpretation of legal texts. Its immediate aim is to defend, against a certain sort of originalist objection, the well-known cases that hold that the Australian Constitution, by implication, guarantees certain political freedoms and entitlements. That is not to say that the article intends to vindicate the outcome of every one of those cases – rather, it intends to vindicate the general methodology and orientation of those cases as stated by the High Court in Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation.

The general character of the originalist objection I have in mind is that no implication (other than perhaps a strictly logical implication) can be drawn from a legal text which is at odds with the actual intentions of the authors of that text.

Whilst the European Union (EU) does not compare easily with any other political/legal entity, including the Australian federation, both are concerned with the designation of powers and responsibilities to appropriate political institutions at various levels. In both the EU and Australia, environmental law can potentially be generated at two levels at least: national and supra-national, or State and Commonwealth, respectively. Whilst the legislative competence of the EU and the Commonwealth, with respect to certain defined environmental matters, has been confirmed beyond doubt,4 debate is still focused on the desirability or otherwise of an expansion of environmental competence for the central authority.

The current study characterizes the attenuation of instabilities in steady and unsteady shear layers by investigating shear-thinning flows downstream of a confined axisymmetric sudden expansion. Flow fields were captured using particle image velocimetry. Tested fluids exhibited approximate power-law indices of 1, 0.81, 0.61 and 0.47 and measurements were performed at mean throat-based Reynolds numbers of ${Re_m} = 4800$ and 14 400. Unsteady flows were tested at a Strouhal number and amplitude-to-mean velocity ratio of $St = 0.15$ and $\lambda = 0.95$, respectively. For unsteady shear layers, shear-layer roll-up regardless of shear-thinning strength was evidenced by collapse of average circulation over time. For steady shear layers, consistent shear-layer behaviour regardless of shear-thinning strength was evidenced by similar shear-layer trajectories and by growth rates in vorticity thickness. However, vorticity fields of the unsteady and steady shear layers, standard deviations of shear-layer trajectory, thickness of steady shear layers and Reynolds shear-stress spectra of the steady shear layers reveal an attenuation of shear-layer instabilities not captured by Reynolds number. Specifically, shear-layer instabilities exhibit increased diffusion with increasing shear-thinning strength and, in the case of steady shear layers, shear-thinning strength is shown to promote shear-layer stabilization. Also, evidenced by vorticity fields and through Reynolds shear-stress spectra, instabilities frequently coalesce into large rollers, a result that would suggest the presence of an inverse eddy cascade. The behaviour of shear-thinning fluids is shown to stabilize shear layers through attenuating shear-layer instabilities, complementing observations from previous studies showing how shear-thinning fluids promote turbulence in the dominant flow direction.

Australia's Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) (‘the Act’) makes several exceptions to the exclusive rights of copyright owners. The effect of these exceptions is to confer an immunity from legal liability for acts which would otherwise constitute an infringement of copyright. Some of the statutory exceptions relate specifically to the use of copyright material by agents of government. Other exceptions are of more general application, though they may be relied upon by agents of government in circumstances not covered by the more specific exceptions.

This article examines not merely the statutory exceptions which relate to and bear upon the acts of agents and organs of government. It examines also the protections against liability for infringement of copyright which are afforded by the laws of parliamentary privilege, legislation concerning printing and publication of parliamentary papers, and freedom of information legislation. Some constitutional issues are also considered.

I welcome the opportunity to respond to Jeffrey Goldsworthy’s article, “Realism about the High Court”, in which he criticises aspects of my account of the High Court’s political role in interpreting the Australian Constitution. My book, Politics of the High Court, sets out the functions that the Founders intended the Court to play — interpreting the Constitution and adjudicating high level disputes involving governments — and examines, within a historical context, how the Court has actually carried out those functions in major decisions and lines of interpretation of key sections of the Constitution. As I pointed out in the book, this is the stuff of ‘high’ politics: authoritatively determining the meaning of the Constitution which is the basic instrument of government; and in particular disputes deciding whether to overrule democratically elected governments.

This article will examine the divergence between law and practice in criminal investigation by police and consider the degree to which it may contribute to an imbalance between the interests of the individual and the public interest in the efficient detection and investigation of crime. It will be argued that the imprecision of the existing law and the failure by the legislature to accord new, tightlydefined, specific-purpose powers to the police have made a major contribution to the pressure on police to misuse existing (and often more intrusive) powers or to exercise de facto powers not authorised by law. It is contended that this pressure often arises from a desire by police to find a more practical means of attaining agreed community objectives than that provided by the artificial standards of the existing law. A strong case can therefore be advanced in favour of refurbishing police powers to accord (more closely) with present conditions, while at the same time strengthening the safeguards cast around those powers. This article will argue that case.

Whilst the nature and scope of Commonwealth judicial power has been much examined since federation, the nature of judicial power exercised in the Australian Capital Territory (ACT) or, indeed, the Commonwealth's territories more generally, has not. Usually the analysis of territory judicial power extends only to the conclusion that it does not form part of the judicial power of the Commonwealth and that it is territorially limited as a result of the operation of s 122 of the Constitution. This article examines in more detail the nature of judicial power in the ACT and identifies some of the significant limits upon, and uncertainties surrounding, that power. It examines the history of courts in the ACT, the relationship between Territory judicial power and the judicial power of the Commonwealth, the jurisdiction of ACT courts and some of the important limits on that jurisdiction.

We examine how political participation and political competition are shaped by two class-based extensions of the franchise in twentieth-century India. Creating a new dataset of district-level political outcomes between 1920 and 1957, we find that both the partial franchise extension of 1935 and the universal suffrage reform of 1950 led to limited increases in citizen participation as voters or candidates, and neither reform had a significant effect on increasing political competition. Despite the limited effects on political outcomes, districts with greater enfranchisement increases experienced higher education provision by provincial governments.

This article examines the role of international humanitarian law (IHL) in safeguarding artisanal fishing communities residing along the banks of the Magdalena River in Colombia after the recognition of the river as a rights-bearing entity1 and a victim of the armed conflict. The article also explores the potential of targeted peacebuilding interventions for achieving sustainable well-being, ecological restoration and enduring peace. Against the backdrop of historical conflict, the Magdalena River and its adjoining communities have suffered significant harm, requiring widespread reparations that go beyond immediate crisis management. The study proposes a comprehensive approach for achieving sustainable well-being, ecological restoration and enduring peace, acknowledging the complex connections between legal frameworks, environmental considerations and the cultural heritage of the riverine community.

The main purpose of this article is to review the limitations that will be imposed by the Privy Council (Limitation of Appeals) Bill on appeals to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council from the High Court of Australia, federal courts other than the High Court, and the Supreme Courts of the Territories as well as the limitations and restrictions which now apply to appeals to the Privy Council from the High Court and courts exercising federal jurisdiction.

It was never intended that the company to be constituted should consist of one substantial person and six mere dummies.

The robust affirmation of separate corporate personality by the House of Lords in Salomon is in sharp contrast to the fragile legal personality possessed by Mrs Salomon in 1897. In corporate law discourse Salomon v Salomon & Co Ltd is portrayed as the first case about the “one person company”. The case has given rise to considerable debate about the recognition of corporate personality where the corporation is the alter ego of a human person. In fact the portrayal of A. Salomon & Co Ltd as the alter ego of Aron Salomon is misleading because the company was a family company. The subscribers to the memorandum, described by Lopes LJ in the above quote as “six mere dummies” were Aron Salomon's wife and five children who were active participants in the company.

Ruminant livestock farming is predominant in England’s grassland regions, including the south-west of England (SWE). The common farming view that such regions are only good for growing grass amounts to a simplistic ‘traditionality of grasslands’ (TOG) narrative, which may discount the potential of these regions to align food production with diverse, sustainable consumption. We interrogate the assumptions underlying the TOG narrative through the analysis of contemporary and historical agricultural data sources and recent interviews with SWE food producers to reveal an SWE traditionality of mixed farming and diverse food production. By unsettling the TOG narrative, we draw attention to multiple elements intertwining physical limitations of land with powerful but mutable human-made limitations of the wider food system as drivers of land use in the SWE, underscoring the role and responsibility of policymakers to ensure wider dynamics of the food system enable the transition to diverse, sustainable food production in England’s grassland regions.

During 1978, the High Court of Australia and the New South Wales Court of Appeal handed down decisions which announce a departure from the long-standing rule that decisions of the Privy Council bind all Australian Courts. In this article, Mr Geddes analyses these decisions and considers their future impact on the authority of Privy Council decisions in the various courts which make up the Australian judicial hierarchy.

In the Australian liberal democratic tradition, the expectation that government be accountable to the people is a product of the electorate’s grant of power to government. As government becomes more complex due to the expansion of human activity it regulates there is increased reliance upon official means of facilitating democratic accountability. Indicative of this development is the 20th century supplementation of traditional Westminster mechanisms of accountability with administrative law institutions such as the Commonwealth Ombudsman. These supplementary review processes and institutions of ‘new administrative law’ aim to render the application of discretionary decision-making by government administrators transparent and fair to the individual citizen. This was the primary vision of the Kerr and Bland Committees which framed the need for administrative review agencies against the background of the protection and promotion of individual citizen rights.