Constitutional Law—Separation of Judicial Power—Constitution s. 51(xxxv)—Dispute as to classification of employee under Commonwealth Award—Whether dispute extends beyond the limits of any one State

This Article explores, from a participatory perspective of an engaged legal scholar, the case of homeless EU citizens in the Netherlands and the mobilization of their rights. By marking them as so-called niet-rechthebbenden (“non-rightholders”), Dutch municipalities have systematically denied homeless EU citizens access to overnight shelters and general homelessness services on equal footing as Dutch citizens. This legal and practical deadlock—a classic case of non-compliance through “law in action”—has most probably led to a denial of rights to EU citizens entitled to shelter as permanent residents, (former) workers, or otherwise legally residing EU citizens. The contribution explores the context and motivations that led a broad coalition of actors—ranging from homelessness organizations, advocacy groups, a public interest litigation organization and legal experts—to join efforts and consider strategic litigation a credible avenue to protect the interests of the most vulnerable under EU law within a national and local context. The case demonstrates, however, how strategic litigation is not considered the most effective or preferred strategy when other avenues for legal mobilization open up.

In Egan v Willis, the High Court declared that the New South Wales Legislative Council had a common law power to call for state papers from Ministers in the House. The case's greatest constitutional significance, however, may be its effect on the relationship between the Parliament and the Court. By making declarations about the relationship between a Minister and the House, the Court appears to have taken on a new role of arbitrating internal parliamentary proceedings independent of any substantive issue outside the House. While such intervention may help secure the rule of law within the legislature, it has traditionally been held that the internal proceedings of the legislature should be subject to the control of the people's elected representatives alone. The need for independence between the legislative, judicial and executive arms of government and their effective operation has, within the British and American constitutional traditions, led to the identification of certain issues as being outside the jurisdiction of the courts or otherwise not justiciable.

Section 92 of the Australian Constitution contains a terse statement that “trade, commerce, and intercourse among the States ... shall be absolutely free”. The High Court's troubled search since Federation to give that statement a clear and certain interpretation is well known and requires no reiteration here. Michael Coper has identified 32 different phases in the history of the interpretation of s 92 between 1909 and 1980. When the latest phase was ushered in with the High Court's 1988 decision in Cole v Whitfield, it was accompanied by predictions by some commentators that it would be the last Professor Lane, for instance, said that “The decision descended as a deus ex machina, providing an uncomplicated solution for those who write and advise on the kind of freedom of interstate trade and commerce that is now guaranteed by s 92 of the Constitution”. The more pessimistic might wonder whether the Cole v Whitfield interpretation will in fact prove more durable than any of its predecessors.

The title of this seminar reminds us of the extraordinary increase in access to information of all kinds which has overtaken us. This enhanced access to information is the chief gift bestowed on us by the information revolution of the past 15 or 20 years. And its gift has been an abundant one; some might describe it as over abundant, fearing lest the relevant be submerged in a great tidal wave of unco-ordinated information. This fear echoes the thought which lies behind TS Eliot’s lines when he wrote, “Where is the wisdom we have lost in knowledge? Where is the knowledge we have lost in information?”.

Clearly enough, mere information, now proffered to us in such profusion is only the raw material of knowledge. But so long as we recognise that information is only the raw material from which knowledge derives, not confusing information with knowledge, and so long as we are skilful in our use of the electronic tools which the information revolution has given us, narrowly focussing our retrieval processes, the raw material which information consists of can be precious stuff indeed.

It could hardly be disputed that the fundamental issue in Australian constitutional law and theory is federalism. Federalism is the keystone of the Australian constitutional system, and is the battleground over which most of the great conflicts in Australian constitutional law have been fought. Nor could it plausibly be denied that the absolute basis of Australian federalism is the continued existence of the States. What makes Australia ‘federal’ is the presence of two separate spheres of government, each with its own organs, powers and functions, the Commonwealth and the States. Whatever other features of the Australian constitutional system might safely be dispensed with without endangering the title ‘federal’, there can be little doubt that the abolition of the States would involve the termination of federalism within Australia.

The present article, then, is concerned with an issue which goes to the heart of Australian federalism — the abolition of the States which collectively go to make up the federation itself.

In a series of judgments in August and October 2004, the High Court found that the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (‘the Act’) unambiguously provides for the indefinite detention of unlawful non-citizens, and that such a law is constitutionally valid. In doing so, a majority on the High Court arguably rewrote the rule book on the operation of Chapter III of the Constitution (‘Ch III’), undermining the majority judgment in Chu Kheng Lim v Minister for Immigration in the process.

This case note focuses primarily on Al-Kateb v Godwin. To the extent that they clarify or expand on the reasoning with respect to the operation of Ch III, reference is also made to Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v Al Khafaji and Behrooz v Secretary of the Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs which were argued at the same time as Al-Kateb, and to Re Woolley; Ex parte Applicants M276/2003 by their next friend GS, which concerned the administrative detention of non-citizen children.

The events leading up to the sixth double dissolution of the Commonwealth Parliament on 2 June 1987 and the subsequent abandonment of the Australia Card Bill 1986 highlight the difficulties any Federal Government faces when negotiating the passage of controversial legislation through a hostile Senate.

In the light of the legislative history of the Australia Card Bill, I propose to discuss the requirement of “identical bills” in s 57 of the Constitution, the amendments which ajoint sitting may consider and finally, the disallowance of regulations by the Senate with reference to s 57.

Several recent cases in Australia have raised once again the recurrent historical problem of marriages of convenience. A “marriage of convenience”, or “sham marriage”, or “limited purpose marriage” occurs when a man and a woman enter a full status legal marriage and yet at that time one or both of them do not intend to fulfil some or all of the important legal and social duties culturally expected of a normal marriage. That is, although the parties consent to the ceremony or commencement of the marriage, they do not fully consent to its cultural and legal functions. Examples include marriages where at the time of the ceremony one or both parties have reservations about sexual intercourse, cohabitation, procreation, or intend to marry solely or predominantly for the purposes of satisfying immigration or emigration laws, acquiring money, Tertiary Education Assistance Scheme grants or minimising taxation.

This is the fourth in the annual Menzies Lecture series. These lectures were delivered at the Australian National University in October 1988.

Probably the most basic contemporary controversy over the interpretation of the Australian Constitution is that between the methodologies of originalism (or intentionalism) and progressivism. According to the first, the fundamental task of the Courts (and especially the High Court) usually is regarded as being to interpret the Constitution so as to give effect to the intentions of those who framed it at the great Conventions of the 1890s, commonly referred to as 'the Founding Fathers' or (as here) 'the Founders'. Progressivists, on the other hand, believe that a search for historical intention is at best incidental in the process of constitutional interpretation, and that the Court should construe the Constitution so as to bring it into accord with modern needs and exigencies. Between the two sides in this fiercely contested debate stretches a vast chasm both of theoretical approach and rhetoric. A third approach, literalism, despite a hallowed history in Australian constitutional law and its routine deployment in virtually all important cases concerning federal legislative power, today largely is overshadowed in the minds of constitutional lawyers by the fascinations of its two rivals.

This is the sixth in the annual Menzies Lecture Series. This lecture was delivered at the Australian National University in October 1990.

The allocation of war powers between the President and Congress under the Constitution of the United States and the problems that have flowed therefrom for two centuries, are subjects perhaps too remote to inflict upon an Australian audience. Nevertheless, I do so, mindful that the vast nuclear capability of my country, as well as its present deployment of significant forces on land and sea in much of a shrunken world, make decisions of war and peace by the United States a matter of some concern for those living beyond its geographic boundaries, and throughout this planet.

We examine the generalizability of single-topic studies, focusing on how often their confidence intervals capture the typical treatment effect from a larger population of possible studies. We show that the confidence intervals from these single-topic studies capture the typical effect from a population of topics at well below the nominal rate. For a plausible scenario, the confidence interval from a single-topic study might only be half as wide as an interval that captures the typical effect at the nominal rate. We highlight three important conclusions. First, we emphasize that researchers and readers must take care when generalizing the inferences from single-topic studies to a larger population of possible studies. Second, we demonstrate the critical importance of similarity across topics in drawing inferences and encourage researchers to consider designs that explicitly estimate and leverage similarity. Third, we emphasize that, despite their limitations, single-topic experiments have some important advantages.

From the time of the Statute of Monopolies 1623, 21 Jac 1, c 3 ('Statute of Monopolies’), the flexible concept of a ‘manner of manufacture’ was understood to involve some form of limitation which was expressed in the statute as being ‘mischievous to the State … or hurt of trade, or generallie inconvenient'. Years of judicial consideration resulted in various classes of subject matter being carved out as unpatentable. Apart from non-contentious material such as discoveries, ideas and principles of nature, these classes included methods of medical treatment for humans, horticultural and agricultural methods, computer programs, presentations of information, plans and business schemes. The classes were relatively clear by 1959 when the High Court in National Research Development Corporation v Commissioner of Patents was asked to judge the patentability of an invention in an excluded class, namely a horticultural method. The trouble was that there were no consistent rationales to justify the excluded classes and to distinguish patentable from non-patentable subject matter.

This article reports on the use of enforceable undertakings by the Australian employment standards enforcement agency, the Office of the Fair Work Ombudsman (FWO), and its predecessor, the Workplace Ombudsman. Enforceable undertakings are used by the FWO as an alternative enforcement tool to court litigation in relation to breaches of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth), which regulates wages, working hours and other minimum employment conditions. Proponents of enforceable undertakings argue that they deliver value to regulatory agencies as a responsive alternative to traditional, punitive enforcement action. On the other hand, critics have raised concerns about the accountability and effectiveness of this enforcement tool. The authors provide a critical analysis of the FWO's use of enforceable undertakings, including consideration of the decision-making process, content, monitoring and enforcement of undertakings. The analysis is based on a review of all enforceable undertakings concluded in the period from 1 July 2008 to 30 June 2012, as well as qualitative interviews with approximately 60 inspectors, managers and lawyers of the FWO, and a number of specialist workplace relations lawyers. The article reveals that the FWO has made limited but promising use of enforceable undertakings in the review period. Through deployment of enforceable undertakings, the FWO has demonstrated that it has a mix of regulatory approaches available to it that are consistent with the key principles of responsive regulation. The number of enforceable undertakings accepted by the FWO, however, remains fairly limited. We set out a number of ways in which the regulator may maximise the utilisation of enforceable undertakings, and more fully realise the regulatory benefits of this particular compliance tool.