With the passage of the Climate Change Act, and to help meet its net zero obligations by 2060, Nigeria must transition from its dependence on fossil fuel energy sources to renewable energy. This will involve the procurement of large amounts of renewable energy by the government. In the past, procurement of power from the government-owned bulk trader has been chaotic, with no discernible strategy, and it is doubtful whether the government or Nigeria's citizens have derived value for money from the process. This article suggests a transition from the current, mostly unsolicited, proposal system to energy auctions, as the authors believe that this will help the country achieve low prices for renewable energy. The article also examines polices that have been implemented in other countries to drive energy auctions, with a view to applying relatable practices to the Nigerian exercise.

Defence procurement is a notoriously difficult and often controversial field of public management. In Australia, problems with schedule and budget overruns have been addressed through business process reforms aimed at tightening control and improving professionalism. However, studies of complex contracting in other contexts show the importance of relational factors of trust, collaboration and risk-sharing. These factors are not encouraged by the predominantly transactionally based contractual environment of Defence. Based on a detailed examination of three case studies, we suggest that there is a disjunct between the types of controls that are applied by Defence and the requirements of delivering complex, long-term projects involving multiple stakeholders. The need for both improved flexibility as well as heightened accountability is evident. We argue that balancing these values involves processes that encourage, rather than discourage, communication, risk-sharing and trust.

For decades, the U.S. Air Force has contemplated replacing the A-10 Thunderbolt II “Warthog” with a newer fighter aircraft. However, a quantitative analysis comparing the Warthog’s performance and costs with those of its intended replacement, the F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter, shows that retiring the Warthog would be operationally unsound and fiscally imprudent. The rationale for the replacement is that it would increase airpower capability while controlling costs. That rationale does not withstand scrutiny. An effectiveness analysis based on results from a survey of joint terminal attack controllers indicates that the A-10 vastly outperforms the F-35 in providing close-air support (CAS), a critical requirement for future conflicts against terrorists and insurgents. A cost analysis demonstrates that replacing the A-10 before its service life ends in 2035 would cost at least $20.9 billion. The replacement plan would waste substantial resources and seriously impair U.S. military capabilities. Given that constrained future budgets and low-intensity conflicts requiring precision CAS can be expected, the U.S. air fleet should include the A-10 Thunderbolt II.

The private security industry in Latin America has been associated with human rights abuses, particularly in the context of extractive operations. Most private security guards in the region are poorly trained and do not undergo adequate vetting. These factors combined with serious deficiencies in the rule of law across the region too often enable private security companies to effectively operate outside state control and engage in human rights abusive practices. This article argues that adoption of the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Providers (ICoC) by Latin American private security companies and states, coupled with civil society engagement with ICoC’s Association, may help reduce negative human rights impacts arising out of private security services within the extractive industry.

This paper examines revolutionary changes in the federal procurement regime that have taken place over roughly the past thirty-five years. The procurement process has long been formalized, but contractors were dispersed across the country and tended to furnish tangible goods in singular and discrete transactions. As a result of technology, global competition and security threats, ideological shifts, and fiscal changes, procurement spending exploded after 9/11 and today the regime forms “information communities” in which private companies exert both political and economic influence and supply staffing and information to the federal government within a continuous and seamless relationship where lines demarcating responsibilities and personnel are blurred.

The volume of food purchased by the American military makes it perhaps the single largest intermediated market for food in the USA. Consequently, it is not surprising that those seeking to enhance the economic viability of small and mid-scale farms may view military bases as a promising market for locally produced foods. This is a challenging prospect, however, due to the centralized structure of military command, the nature of the military procurement system and federal mandates to obtain products that maximize value at the lowest available cost. This paper describes the US military food procurement system and the work of a 3-yr initiative to increase the amount of locally produced, source-identified products used at a North Carolina military installation. Our experiences serve as a cautionary tale, with this paper designed as both a primer on ‘how it works’ for food procurement at the federal and base level, and a description of our largely unsuccessful attempts to increase the volume of local food products from small-/mid-scale producers moving through the supply chain into base dining halls and restaurants. Based on our experiences, we also make recommendations on possible entry points for local food and farm advocates to work within the existing system to localize food procurement.

Due to EU legislation, public procurement through competitive tendering has been applied in most European countries. One purpose of such procurement is to lower the costs of the procured service and another is for the political level to gain better control over what it is purchasing. However, monitoring problems exist when conducting public procurements; recent studies indicate that actions related to public servant corruption are most common in public procurement processes. Citing cases from Sweden, this article argue that, in the case of public procurement, private firms have assumed a monitoring role towards the public sector similar to that of whistleblowers, and that the public system in fact depends on private firms to detect procurement bypasses committed by civil servants. This article provides an understanding of this monitoring role and discusses its theoretical and practical implications for the public system. I conclude that upholding the public system is not the primary objective of the private whistleblower but a positive side effect. The monitoring role is analyzed in the framework of principal–agent theory and should be seen as complementary to the existing monitoring functions available to public principals.

This article evaluates the effects of alternative fluid milk procurement strategies on the aggregate net revenue of Florida cooperative members. They are (1) supplemental milk obtained from import sources, (2) supplemental milk obtained from a supply plant, (3) increased supply as a result of an expanded production area, and (4) supplemental milk obtained through pooling arrangements with regional dairy cooperatives. The final ranking of a scenario appears to be dependent primarily on the total cost of exports within the model. The optimum procurement strategy for Florida cooperatives should concentrate on reducing the quantity of surplus milk.

In 2005, Canada implemented its first-ever domestic human trafficking legislation under sections 279.01 through 279.04 of the Criminal Code of Canada. The first conviction under this legislation came about three years after its implementation, with a total of only five convictions having been obtained as of January of 2011. This article examines the legislation and the legislative definition of human trafficking in Canada, arguing that the vagueness of this legislation, the breadth of the legislative definition, and its similarity to other provisions within the Criminal Code make it difficult to distinguish human trafficking from other criminal offences, particularly procurement, or in lay language—pimping, which is governed under section 212 of the Code. Analyzing cases identified as human trafficking by Canadian police and legal authorities, this article demonstrates the problematic effects of Canada’s human trafficking legislation. The article points out the challenges arising from identifying non-trafficking cases as human trafficking, including undermining the severity of human trafficking and impeding efforts to combat it.