Chapter 4 deals with the philosophical meaning of dialogue as a form of writing and thinking. I take as my starting point the apparent paradox of Plato’s written critique of writing in the Phaedrus and explain how Gadamer, Strauss, and Krüger resolve this question. For all three of them (inspired by Friedländer on this point), dialogical writing overcomes the deficiencies inherent to writing. I argue that for all three of them, dialogical writing and dialogical thinking reflect the practical embeddedness of philosophical inquiry: for Strauss, it is the political situatedness of the philosopher that has priority; for Gadamer, it is our ethical facticity; for Krüger, it is the fundamental attunements (Stimmungen) of philosophy. The chapter also explains how these three trajectories propose three different interpretations of the meaning of Socratic and Platonic irony, which is a key feature of Plato’s dialogical compositions.

According to Dazai Shundai, ritual and music are essential elements of the government of the sages. They complement each other, with ritual drawing strict distinctions of status and establishing ethical standards for different types of human relationships, while music functions as a gentle force for bringing people together in harmony. Compared with other methods of governing, the superiority of ritual and music lies in their ability to enter people on a deep level and transform their customs, creating long-lasting stability without the need to rely solely on explicit laws. In order for ritual and music to work properly, though, they must be established by rulers who look back to the traditions of the ancient Chinese sage kings. In earlier times, Japan learned such ritual and music from China and used these to govern, but in recent times, vulgar ritual and music have arisen from among the common people, with detrimental effects for Japanese society. To remedy this situation, vulgar ritual and music need to be suppressed and replaced with proper ritual and music.

This response provides a practical guide to incorporating philosophical discourse in classrooms to help children grapple with life’s big questions. It outlines three approaches to integrating philosophy into curricula: firstly, launching units of learning on any subject with philosophical discussions based on overarching themes such as power, freedom or eternity; secondly, designating a half term as a period for focusing on philosophy and ethics, using an overarching question to guide exploration; and thirdly, a project whereby each week a member of the school community poses a big question for discussion. Implementation of these approaches can improve students’ oracy skills, self-esteem and overall well-being.

Energy access, sustainability, and innovation introduce complex scenarios for all dealmakers, regardless of their level of power and leverage. This chapter examines negotiation planning, strategies, tactics, and ethics to provide a roadmap for educators who will develop strategic courses for future energy dealmakers, whether they are business leaders, politicians, environmentalists, entrepreneurs, bureaucrats, or educators.

Chapter 2 turns towards the neighbourhood of Ituura. It introduces my field site in detail by exploring cases of local youth who are said to have been ‘wasted’ by alcoholism. In contrast to those who are said to have ‘given up’ on their futures, other young men are shown to embrace discourses of moral fortitude to sustain their hopes for the future while working for low, piecemeal wages in the informal economy. Such youth claim that one must be ‘bold to make it’. Engaging with anthropological discussion on waithood and hope, the chapter shows how young men cultivate moral fortitude through an ethics of endurance – a hope for hope itself, a way of sustaining belief in their own long-term futures that involves economising practices, prayer, and avoidance of one’s peers who are seen to be a source of temptation and pressure to consume.

This chapter provides an ethnographic examination of how rubies extracted by a multinational mining company in Northern Mozambique are constructed as ethical, responsible, and transparent. At the same time, rubies extracted by small-scale miners working with screens and shovels around the company concession become unethical, illicit, and opaque. Informal ruby mining sustained a vibrant and illegal, but not necessarily illicit, international economy. Miners were subject to violent expropriation by state and company security forces. Some joined an insurgency and attacked government institutions and extractive infrastructure. That conflict continues to this day. My contention is that transparency is a technical claim, willfully mistaken as an ethical claim. Transparency is weaponized against very poor people trying to extract a living from the ground beneath their feet. As a result, ethical mining became the handmaiden to an international conflict.

“Manners” alternates between the portrayal of self-reliant “gentlemen” like Montaigne, Socrates, and El Cid, who are “original and commanding” and “fashion,” an imitative “hall of the Past” where “virtue [has] gone to seed.” But near the end of the essay he turns away from forms of aristocratic morality by introducing two new heroes: a woman, “the Persian Lilla,” who reconciles “all heterogeneous persons into one society”; and then “Osman,” a poor beggar at the gates of the Shah who is a “great heart … so sunny and hospitable in the centre of the country,” and whose wealth lies in his ability to “harbor” madness without sharing it. The introduction of Lilla and Osman late in “Manners” raises the question of how they align with its other heroes. Are they part of a turn or contrary tendency showing up late in the essay, or a deeper exploration of forms of virtue – especially love – already introduced?

This chapter sets the scene in urban Penang at the time of research through a consideration of public discourses about marriage and gender relations. It examines newspaper accounts, public events, debates, exhibitions and theatrical productions in Penang’s capital, George Town. Alongside interviews with lawyers, these public discourses show how discussions about what are perceived by many as ‘dysfunctional relations’, including child marriage, polygamy, the conversion of minors to Islam, divorce and LGBTQ rights, have the capacity to expand and take on a life of their own at moments of national tension. The chapter illuminates the dense connections between kinship, gender, ethnicity, religion and law. Stories about child marriage at different political moments – to take one example – condense ethical and political concerns and contestations in times of radical change.

This chapter discusses the relation between ‘Morals’ (Sitten, Moral) and ‘Right’ (Recht) in Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals. Two questions should be distinguished: (1) Are Kantian Morals necessary for Kantian Right in the sense that the latter presupposes Kant’s specific account of morality? (2) Is Kant’s account of Morals sufficient to justify his conception of Right, in the sense that the fundamental principles of Right can be derived from, or normatively justified by, the Categorical Imperative (or some other element of Kantian Morals) without additional normative principles? With respect to the first question, it is argued that Kantian Right presupposes a central aspect of Kantian Morals: the idea of moral universality, where moral rights and duties are the same for all. This idea must be distinguished from the Categorical Imperative introduced in the Groundwork for a Metaphysics of Morals. Concerning the second question, it is argued that only when applied to individual juridical (coercible) rights does the idea of moral universality result in a Kantian conception of Right. Thus, Kant’s conception of Morals alone is not sufficient to derive juridical rights and duties.

This chapter explores, in a roundabout way, whether Kant’s legal philosophy relies on his mature ethics of autonomy and respect. The normativity of the law must be externally enforced by coercive measures. The proportionate and credible threat that transgressions will be punished acts as a deterrent and make the rights of individuals comparatively secure – the law is occasionally broken. Now, the Kantian state does not concern itself with why in particular citizens break or comply with the law. In that sense, Kant’s philosophy of law does not rely on his ethical theory or moral psychology. But agents must be in a position to comply with the law. They must face a meaningful choice, which can only be secured by the availability of the motive of ethics: respect for the law. Without respect, agents would be exposed to prudential considerations only. Those who break the law take their criminal act to be prudentially justified. Viewed from this limited perspective, their actions turn out to be imprudent if they are punished for them. But punishability and imprudence are different. So, making what the law prohibits properly illegal requires an ethical foundation after all.

Moral distress as a reason for ethics consultation is common, but perceived or real racism is underrecognized as a potential cause. The consultation requested in this case was nominally for moral distress, but elements of cultural misunderstanding and culturally relevant value conflicts rapidly became apparent. Cultural concordance between the ethics consultant and the patient’s family enhanced communication and allowed the medical care team to change their perspective on interactions they had observed and previously considered to be belittling between family members and staff. This led to a broadening of medically permissible options being considered and ultimately resulted in a discharge plan that was acceptable and welcome by both the patient’s family and the ICU staff. Further discussion of reasons why greater diversity in ethics consultation members may be helpful.

An ethics consultation case is presented in which a hospice patient wished to deactivate his Cardiovascular Implantable Electronic Device (CIED), specifically an implantable cardioverter-defibrillator, at the end of life to prevent the prolongation of the dying. The consultants developed an ethical analysis supporting the deactivation of the pacemaker based on authoritative literature and moral reasoning. The consultants’ recommendations to deactivate the pacemaker were ultimately rejected by the medical team based on an alternative assessment which concluded the patient is suicidal, doubts based on the consultants not being physicians, and the healthcare professionals’ sense that deactivating a pacemaker is different from withdrawing other forms of life-sustaining treatment at the end of life. Professional reflections by the consultants and lessons learned are discussed.

Firms operating in environmentally vulnerable contexts will inevitably face difficult cases where long-term profits clash with environmental values. This remains true even with enlightened management and strong regulation. Yet, business models fail to acknowledge this inconvenient truth. This chapter explains why current business models reach an "outer boundary" in their ability to incorporate intrinsic values such as environmental integrity. It introduces two key concepts: the efficiency model and the value gap. Efficiency models use terminology designed either to optimize the allocation of scarce resources toward measurable future goals or to explain the optimal achievement of past goals. A value gap arises when ideal social corporate action diverges from ideally efficient corporate action. The presence of large, recurring value gaps in extractive industries signals the need for fundamental changes – both in corporate decision-making and in the business models that shape it.

This chapter dives into one of the most difficult clinical ethics consultations in the author’s career. A vibrant patient suffers a cardiac arrest and severe anoxic brain injury on their way to dialysis. After weeks of ICU treatment, the family came when the patient was liberated from the ventilator. The daily spontaneous breathing trials made everyone think (and prepare) that the patient would only have minutes to live after extubation. Yet, the patient began to breath. When the minutes turned into an hour, the yelling began. The ethics pager went off moments later, and no one could have be prepared for journey ahead. Trust was gone, and the current course of comfort care would bring an irreversible outcome. The effort to buy time in the face of uncertainty resulted in a complex sequence of events that unfolded over months. The author reflects on the case and shares the opportunity to learn by failing forward.

The question of how politics and ethics connect, if at all, in our societies is crucial, especially given today’s socio-economic and geopolitical challenges. Commentators have sought answers in Kant’s texts: the relation between the Categorical Imperative (CI) as the fundamental principle of ethics, and the Universal Principle of Right (UPR) as the fundamental principle of politico-legal norms, has been variously interpreted as one of simple dependence, simple independence, or complex dependence. Recent interpretations increasingly agree that Kant was not a simple independentist. However, questions persist about the philosophical significance of Kant’s account, specifically whether certain aspects of his thought inconsistently commit him to simple independentism. One aim of this chapter is to illustrate this critical strategy starting from a specific interpretation of the UPR. It is argued that, although robust, this interpretation is not the most accurate. While this strategy opens new avenues for further objections to Kant, the chapter concludes that the complex dependentist reading is philosophically the most convincing to date.

This introduction situates the volume within contemporary debates surrounding Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG). It traces the historical evolution of the ESG movement—originally conceived as a voluntary form of regulation—from its origins in the early 2000s, associated with the launch of the UN’s Who Cares Wins initiative, to current developments marked by political backlash in the United States and regulatory consolidation in Europe. The authors argue that the widespread tendency to reduce ESG to issues of financial materiality—a view they describe as “mainstream ESG”—risks undermining its ethical and social foundations. Against this backdrop, the book advances the claim that ESG cannot be meaningfully developed without serious ethical reflection. The second part of the introduction presents the chapters included in this collection along three main lines: debates about the purpose(s) of ESG; discussions concerning the tensions between profitability and sustainability; and analyses of ESG as a form of voluntary or mandatory disclosure.

The introduction to this Critical Guide offers some background to Hume’s classic A Treatise of Human Nature, originally published in three books in 1739 and 1740. The introduction then briefly broaches the debate whether Hume leaves the doctrines of the Treatise behind with his later works, and it defends the importance of the Treatise to Hume’s corpus and to subsequent and contemporary philosophical thought. It presents a summary of the fourteen critical essays contained in the volume, which include seven articles on Hume’s epistemology and philosophy of mind, six articles on the passions and ethics, and one essay on the early reception of the Treatise. Several of these essays highlight the unity of Hume’s approach in the Treatise, showing how the principles of Hume’s epistemology and psychology in Book 1 are foundational to his discussion of the passions and of morality in Books 2 and 3.

This chapter discusses the definitions of the virtues employed by early scholastic authors and examines their systems for classifying the virtues, as well as their accounts of specific virtues and the gifts of the Holy Spirit.