This chapter will examine the notion of theology as a science in some summae from the end of the twelfth century and the beginning of the thirteenth century, exploring the works written both by secular masters and members of the religious orders.

The introduction to this Critical Guide offers some background to Hume’s classic A Treatise of Human Nature, originally published in three books in 1739 and 1740. The introduction then briefly broaches the debate whether Hume leaves the doctrines of the Treatise behind with his later works, and it defends the importance of the Treatise to Hume’s corpus and to subsequent and contemporary philosophical thought. It presents a summary of the fourteen critical essays contained in the volume, which include seven articles on Hume’s epistemology and philosophy of mind, six articles on the passions and ethics, and one essay on the early reception of the Treatise. Several of these essays highlight the unity of Hume’s approach in the Treatise, showing how the principles of Hume’s epistemology and psychology in Book 1 are foundational to his discussion of the passions and of morality in Books 2 and 3.

How did mapping and measurement act as technologies of improvement? By the early seventeenth century, a professional class of surveyors had emerged in England, promoting concepts of geometric justice in print. They also integrated their services into crown estate management, promising to make forest and fen commons profitable. Much has been written about the spread of cartographic literacy among early modern elites, but relatively little is known about how local communities interacted with maps, surveys, and their makers. Fen projects brought the geometric techniques of improvement into contact with local customary knowledge. Examining maps and surveys of the northern fens across three centuries, this chapter traces how they were produced; how they re-organised social environments; and how fen communities negotiated these processes. It situates surveying as one epistemological tool within disputes over the redrawing of land and water in Hatfield Level, which involved legal officials, written documents, crowds, experiential knowledge, and oral testimony. Intended to author and authorise improvement, the boundaries that maps and surveys demarcated did not prove stable.

One of the central themes of this book is that, contrary to usual treatments, Arnauld has a consistent and subtle method and that once this method is appreciated the consistency of his philosophical thought emerges. Chapter 2 plays a central role in that overall argument by offering an account of Arnauld’s method and basic epistemological commitments. I argue that Arnauld distinguishes between three sources of knowledge - the central two being faith and reason - and each has a distinctive method for its use. I continue to outline Arnauld’s general rationalist commitments concerning reason. Finally, I argue for a central, and overlooked, difference between Arnauld’s and Descartes’s epistemological commitments revolving around their respective uses of clear and distinct ideas and accounts of judgment. This difference allows Arnauld to endorse many of the aspects of Descartes’s rationalism, while maintaining stricter limits on the scope of such knowledge.

Chapter 3 focuses on Ibn ʿAbd al-Salām’s theorization of maṣlaḥa, one of the two core features of his legal philosophy. I first sketch the evolution of maṣlaḥa in the Shāfiʿī school in the centuries before Ibn ʿAbd al-Salām and then analyze his own theory of maṣlaḥa, its underlying moral philosophy, its legal normativity, and its debt to Ibn ʿAbd al-Salām’s Khurasani Shāfiʿī predecessors. The chapter also considers the challenges to the law’s rationality and morality in the Damascene milieu that likely motivated Ibn ʿAbd al-Salām’s development of his theory of maṣlaḥa.

This chapter outlines the basic principles of qualitative research in the context of mental health. We begin by discussing the philosophy of reality and knowledge production, demonstrating how these discussions filter through to every aspect of qualitative research. We then explain the fundamental elements of qualitative research, including how to formulate a research question, different methodological approaches, the application of qualitative methods in clinical trials, data collection, sampling, and analysis. This chapter also focuses on how qualitative research can make a change, providing unique insights on how to influence policy and engage government. We devote a substantial part of the chapter to research ethics and reflexivity, summarising not only basic bioethical principles, but thinking about ethics from an anti-colonial perspective. We end the chapter by exploring what constitutes high quality qualitative research, laying out some guiding principles and practices for promoting quality. Our aim with this chapter is not to provide an exhaustive account of qualitative research, rather to offer guidance and inspiration to fledgling researchers who would like to find out more.

This chapter analyses the epistemological overhaul of genres and ideas of textuality that took place in Ethiopia between the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth, and that prepared the grounds for the rise of Amharic print culture. Gäbrä-Əgziabher Gila-Maryam is generally credited with producing the first Amharic newspaper. His poetic newssheets readapted the genre of the awaj, or imperial proclamation. Most of these newssheets were handwritten, but Gäbrä-Əgziabher also pioneered the use of print to clandestinely circulate a longer type of awaj in prose. Through an analysis of Gäbrä-Əgziabher’s genre innovations, the chapter argues that the emergence of print in Ethiopia should be understood as part of a broader transformation of the oral/written interface – itself a result of the resignification of notions of ‘the public’ in the context of the new global dimension of politics.

In this chapter, I endorse phenomenal conservatism as an epistemic theory of justification and I defend that we are justified in believing that the direction of time is primitive because it seems to us to be primitive, unless there were defeaters for having such a belief. This is what I call the “Argument From Appearances.” I then analyse one of the most powerful arguments against this argument, the “Time-Reversal Argument,” and claim that it relies on supplementary premises that can be challenged. Therefore, it is rendered harmless and does not qualify as a solid defeater against the Argument from Appearances.

This chapter invites consideration of Bloomsbury as the Biography group. It details Bloomsbury’s founding and defining contributions to the “New Biography,” particularly in theoretical and creative works by Harold Nicolson, Virginia Woolf, and the most influential British biographer of the past century, Lytton Strachey. Focusing its attention most carefully on the latter two, it explores how both Woolf and Strachey, as “spiritual” writers of the modernist age (Woolf, “Modern Fiction”), understood biography as a means of revealing personality, while diverging on some essential matters. Woolf, whose initial understanding of biography as an art evolved into a more subdued description of it as (mere) craft, anticipated that this aim might be accomplished through archival assiduity over time by a succession of fact-bound biographers, each bringing a different perspective to facts, old and new. Strachey, for his part, who always considered biography an art form, thought such an aim might be accomplished in the present, using fictional means to reveal both the personality of the nominal biographical subject and the personality of the biographer. This chapter finally reads Strachey as the most important progenitor of biographical fiction.

Chapter 3 introduces the nature of the information we think about and how that affects what we might conceptualise as ‘knowledge’, thus addressing the book’s titular perspective. Specifically, the nature of epistemology is discussed, alongside its relationship with reflective judgment. These concepts are explored through examples pertaining to the nature of theory, proof, certainty and falsification.