This chapter emphasizes narrative as a vehicle for psychological analysis. It begins by noting the prominence of emotion in the Confessions; Augustine himself tells us in the Reconsiderations that the work is meant to arouse not just the mind but also the heart toward God. It argues that the Confessions contributes to ancient philosophical debates about the character of the emotions and how they should be controlled and moderated. The work presents a “therapy of the emotions” that is sometimes aligned with, and sometimes in critical tension with, the philosophical spiritual exercises proposed by earlier writers. Augustine is, in certain respects, more hopeful about progress in virtue than his philosophical predecessors; he presents his therapy of the soul for everyone, not just those with fortunate natural proclivities. Yet he insists that such progress can be made only by God’s grace. The techniques of ancient philosophy are, in themselves, unavailing for moral transformation.

Hume writes that it is “no inconsiderable part of science barely to know the different operations of the mind, to separate them from each other, to class them under their proper heads, and to correct all that seeming disorder, in which they lie involved, when made the object of reflection and enquiry.” He describes this branch of knowledge as “mental geography.” Yet while his mental geography of thought is now well understood, his mental geography of feeling—specifically, of the non-sensory “secondary impressions” or “impressions of reflection” that he discusses in Books 2 and 3 of A Treatise of Human Nature—has not been. This essay seeks to clarify Hume’s doctrines in these two Books by explaining the nature and classification of the five kinds of secondary impressions that Hume distinguishes: (1) sensible agitations (i.e., “emotions” in one sense of that term); (2) feelings of or from mental operations; (3) volitions; (4) passions (both calm and violent); and (5) sentiments of taste.

For many readers, Hume’s lengthy analysis of the passions in Book 2 has questionable philosophical returns compared to the rest of the Treatise. This paper provides a guide to a philosophically rich reading of Book 2. Instead of a disconnected series of individual arguments, Book 2 is the second half of Hume’s theory of human cognition as started in Book 1. Guided by a comparison with Hume’s A Dissertation on the Passions, I argue that Hume is not merely applying Book 1 principles to the passions, but introducing new principles governing how feeling attends to and transfers between our perceptions. Employing his methodology of experimental reasoning, Hume identifies differences between ideas and impressions, and explores how their interactions impact the movement and quality of affectivity. This is a significant expansion on the associationism of Book 1 of the Treatise, providing more sophisticated explanations and predictions concerning mental life.

Illuminating the collectively held sentiments and widely shared narratives of citizens in the Taegu-Kyǒngbuk and Gangnam regions, this chapter analyzes why these citizens have unwaveringly supported the conservative party and explains the spatial and popular basis of the right in South Korea. I argue that these citizens’ conservative political orientation and voting behaviors are shaped by the places where they interact daily with other members in their communities and cultivate a shared political identity. Using the two terms nostalgic loyalists and privileged materialists, I compare two primary conservative constituencies. The former share strong pride of place in Taegu-Kyǒngbuk as the hometown of the national modernizer Park Chung Hee and as the engine of rapid economic development during the Park Chung Hee regime, while the latter enjoy a sense of superiority and exclusivity deriving from living in Gangnam, a neighborhood that symbolizes wealth and cultured lifestyles.

This chapter considers why conformation systems matter for scholars studying any aspect of human sociality; the importance of the book’s compilation of many hundreds of instances of conformations; how each of the four evolved dispositions for conforming constitutes a niche for the cultural evolution of congruent practices, artifacts, art, and architecture; and the selective forces on cultural practices and institutions in those niches.

The manipulation of risk and uncertainty by decision makers who are more or less rational and are experiencing more or less fear offers a first cut of the crisis (section 1). A second cut enriches the individual-level analysis by attending to organizational malfunctioning as a potential cause of inadvertent nuclear war. In this analysis political agency is widely dispersed across many layers of the American and Russian militaries (section 2). A symposium on nuclear politics refers briefly to “very innovative” work on nuclear issues without engaging with work in science and technology studies (STS) (section 3). Exemplifying large world thinking, it does away with dualities such as rational and irrational, politics and technology, risk and uncertainty. It integrates human agency, organizational functioning and malfunctioning, and politics across all levels. And embedding the observer fully in a world that does not exist “out there,” it acknowledges the importance of the risk-uncertainty conundrum. In the politics of the crisis, its meaning for different actors, and its effect on shaping the complementarity of risk and uncertainty language matters hugely (section 4). The analysis of nuclear politics has shaped profoundly a widely accepted rational model of war (section 5). And the conclusion illustrates the evolution of a crazy nuclear politics (section 6).

Pasquale draws from the world of literature and film to explore the role of emotions in being human and the ways that affective computing both seeks to duplicate and constrain caring as a fundamental human quality. Focusing on digital culture, he discusses various films (e.g. Ich bin dein Mensch), novels (e.g. Rachel Cusks), and TV series (e.g. Westworld) in order to unpack the alienation and loneliness which robots and AI promise to cure. He argues that cultural products ostensibly decrying the lack of humanity in an age of alexithymia work to create and sustain a particular culture, one that makes it difficult to recognize or describe human emotions by creating affective relationships between humans and technology. He concludes with critical reflections on the politico-economic context of those professed emotional attachments to AI and robotics.

During the late 1980s and early 1990s, the field of diplomatic history took a cultural turn – or rather, a series of turns. Inspired by a host of factors internal and external to the discipline as a whole, a number of foreign relations historians came to feel that there were forces other than strategy, economics, politics, or national interest narrowly defined, at play in the shaping of American policy. The symbolic anthropologist Clifford Geertz had already had enormous influence on social and cultural history, emphasizing what he called -borrowing from Max Weber – the “webs of significance” that shaped the everyday experience of human beings. Borrowing from Geertz, and from scholars of cultural and subaltern studies, historians explored the impact on US relations with others of ritual, gesture, body language, identity (e.g., race, gender, and religion), language, emotion, and the senses. The cultural turn, significantly, led to a greater interest in imperialism and colonialism, and, with that, to greater appreciation for the participation of all sides in international encounters. The study of culture invites self-reflection, allowing historians who deploy it to think hard about the assumptions, stereotypes, prejudices, and emotions that they bring to their work.

This chapter offers, first, some how-to tips for close analysis of documents and other texts to uncover a greater range and depth of meaning. Examining the choice of words, the grammatical structures, and the leaps of logic within metaphors and other figures of speech can yield fresh insight into the assumptions, the categories of analysis, and the overt as well as the less conscious agendas of historical actors. Cadence, inflection, repetition, and even silences can in this sense “speak.xy4 Physical presentation, cultural practices, and personal behaviors can suggest how leaders oriented themselves toward others and their likely intents. Second, this chapter explains how historians can read sources for evidence of the interplay between more emotional and more rational modes of thinking. Historians studying the emotions do not need training in neuroscience or psychology. Rather, they need to read texts carefully and evaluate such evidence as discussion of emotion, words signifying emotion, emotion-provoking tropes, and bodily actions triggered by emotion. Also significant is language evidencing excited behaviors, ironies, silences – and the cultural milieus of these and other expressions. Like all historical evidence, such signs of emotion should be interpreted and contextualized rather than taken at face value.

The connection between olfaction and emotions has been established across many subjects. Considering the anatomy of the olfactory system, the canonical targets of olfactory projection neurons are part of and associated with nonolfactory neural circuits, widely summarized as the limbic system. Presumably, partly due to this strong connection between olfaction and the limbic system, odors can directly evoke emotions and result in emotional autobiographical memories. Accordingly, odors have been used to modify emotions via nocturnal exposure, active inhalation, and olfactory training. Odor pleasantness impacts these beneficial effects. The valence of odors changes resting state functional connectivity in regions associated with emotions, memory, motivation, and action control. Considering all the above, olfactory loss negatively influences human behaviors in various life domains, including ingestion, hazard avoidance, and social communication, often resulting in a reduced quality of life and well-being, which in turn may be associated with depressive disorders.

The definitions of the emotions in Cicero’s Tusculan Disputations 3 which refer to magnitude are not meant to represent Stoic orthodoxy, and should not be read as direct evidence for the Stoic theory. Cicero’s aims and methods in the Tusculans led him to use non-Stoic accounts of the emotions, in order to offer a kind of consolation that is neutral between Stoic and Peripatetic theories of value. This chapter also discusses the structure of the Tusculans as a unified whole.

The chapter will help you to be able to explain the overarching purpose of any CBT treatment process, consider the rationale for having therapy goals, define the most important features of a good goal, collaboratively create a set of goals with individual patients, and determine the key targets of treatment from a therapist perspective.