Iceland and the United Kingdom experienced a series of crises that follow a similar pattern. Iceland extended its maritime limits – to preserve more fish for Icelandic vessels and conserve fish stocks. Britain resisted the extension. Both sides escalated their behavior (e.g., issuing threats and coercively harassing each another’s vessels), and Britain ultimately conceded. This chapter covers the 1971–1973 Cod War. It follows the above pattern, but with a somewhat unique twist. In the 1971–1973 episode, domestic politics within both democratic states encourage escalation. Iceland, moreover, threatens to leave the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and to evict United States (US) forces from the Keflavik air base. Because of these threats, as well as escalating coercion, NATO mediates, and NATO and the US pressure Britain to concede. Ultimately, this crisis does not escalate to a major-state war because the disputed issue (i.e., maritime limits) lacks sufficient salience and past, similar episodes demonstrate that a nonwar solution exists.

This chapter analyses the different procedural grounds of review and to what extent they may lead to annulment of an administrative decision by an international administrative tribunal. It shows that principles initially developed for court proceedings now play a crucial role also in administrative procedures. Although terminology and application may vary among IATs due to differences in administrative practices, there is mutual influence in their approaches.

Mediation ends in three distinct ways: achievement of the mandate, for instance in the form of a peace agreement; termination by the mediator, by the term limits given by the mandator, or by the warring parties themselves, in effect undermining the third party; or due to external events such as changes in conflict dynamics or concerns about the mediator’s security (threats or assassination). These possible endings are explored using concrete cases.

This chapter introduces mandates in mediation and provides a rationale for why we need to study them if we want to understand the process of mediation. The chapter also provides a list of Nordic mediation interventions stretching over a period of over seventy-five years. Mediators are individuals. Yet an overwhelming majority of those individuals who act as mediators between warring parties do so as representatives of what we here call a mandator – an organization, a country or countries, or both – that has sent them to mediate, and mediators can utilize the connections, reputation, leverage, and resources that the mandator possesses. The link between the mandator and the individual is the mandate. The mandate comprises the goal, instructions, and authority that together create the foundations for all that the mediator sets out to do. Still, despite their fundamental role in the mediation process, previous research on international mediation is largely silent on how mandates create the framework for the mediation efforts.

This chapter develops a conceptual framework in order to understand the role of mandates in the process of mediation. It draws on what previous mediation research has theorized in terms of mandates and tries to develop a broader basis for how mandates can be systematically taken into account when studying mediation processes. It provides a definition of mediation mandates and explores how mandates might affect the various phases of the mediation process. A mediation mandate is an externally given formal or informal authorization to a third party for what it could/should do concerning settling or managing a threatening, ongoing, or stalemated armed conflict. We show how mediation mandates may differ depending on whether they originate from the conflict parties or externally to the conflict. The mandate is one of the key ways in which the trilateral relationship between sending organizations, conflict parties, and individual mediators are regulated. Mandates also vary in terms of being explicit or implicit as well as general or specific.

The mandate informs the mediators about key issues required to be able to design a peace accord with lasting qualities. This chapter discusses some of the procedural issues, such as the timing of ceasefires and questions of partial versus comprehensive agreements: Should all issues be negotiated or some left for future processes? A particular issue is the demand for territorial self-government or even complete independence. It seems that Nordic mediators have been influenced by previous experiences in this regard. Examples are given from the Oslo Process, Kosovo, Guatemala, Sudan, and Northern Ireland. The chapter addresses matters of power sharing and the importance Nordic mediators give to the role of women in negotiations and implementation. Human rights, justice, and security for the parties are discussed.

Here, the significance of mandates is shown for the initiation, pursuit, and outcome of mediation, as demonstrated by the Nordic cases of mediation from the past seventy-five years. Mandates influence the selection of mediator, but we argue that mediators can influence the mandate and develop it, within the confines set by the warring parties and the mandator. Some mandates are vague, which can allow space for the mediator, and mandates may change over time. Either way, they are important for the pursuit and outcome of the mediation. Five general conclusions are proposed for research and practice, including the mismatch between mandates and support for mediation efforts. In particular, the chapter emphasizes the utility of the mediation staircase for assessing outcomes. It also encourages the study of non-Nordic cases of mediation.

Chapter 5 explores the stakes of touching, tasting, smelling, and hearing books. Writers connected bookish words with sensory language to conceptualize the process of mediation.

This chapter considers the various means and methods for the peaceful settlement of international disputes as envisaged under the UN Charter and associated mechanisms. The key provisions of the UN Charter are considered, followed by an assessment of various methods of dispute settlement: negotiation, enquiry, mediation and conciliation, arbitration and adjudication. Given its significance to international law, particular attention is given to the ICJ and its jurisdiction in contentious cases and to deliver advisory opinions. The relationship between the ICJ and the Security Council is assessed, as are trends in dispute settlement.

Each process to resolving intrastate conflicts requires different strategies and objectives. Yet, as conflicts continue to increase, researchers have asked if peacekeeping is truly possible. Furthermore, is peace from these approaches stable and durable? The role of third parties in ending intrastate wars or post-conflict instability is central to these processes, where organizations and states play a critical role in ushering in peace during and following civil wars. Over the last three decades a strong trend in third-party attempts to resolve intrastate conflict has emerged. Here, mediation and peacekeeping have played a pivotal role in addressing crises within various countries since the end of the Cold War. From mediation to peacekeeping, this chapter expands upon the different forms and interventions that prevent and resolve conflict, all of which incorporate various sociopolitical and international legal principles in the process. It highlights the benefits and consequences of each intervention, what institutions utilize these principles, and how international humanitarian law has changed since World War II.

The chapter gives an overview of dispute settlement during the Old Regime. Contrary to older assessments of the historiography, dispute settlement retained its importance in this era, both in qualitative and in quantitative terms. This was true for the field of theoretical literatures, which, from the last decades of the seventeenth century, dealt intensively with the subject. Normally, a clear distinction was made between an elected arbiter, who definitively decided a dispute, and a mediator, who only made peace proposals. Diplomatic practice, which made intensive use of the instruments of dispute settlement until the last decades of the eighteenth century, was much more flexible. The transitions between arbitration and mediation were fluid; the boundaries of confession and rank were also frequently crossed. In Old Regime Europe, mediation was also used for the first time in peace negotiations between Christian and Islamic powers. New forms of mediation emerged as well. One was the armed mediation, in which a power intervened in a conflict uninvited and set a peace ultimatum; this could easily lead to war. This indicates that dispute settlement did not automatically contribute to an increase in peace; the relationship of dispute settlement to war and peace remained rather ambivalent in Old Regime Europe.

In the early modern age, the settlement of disputes between the actors of ‘international’ relations hinged on communication channels and negotiation networks that were meant to limit the recourse to violence. Multireligious Renaissance Europe saw the emergence of the jus gentium – as a distinct, gestating branch of law – and modern diplomacy, perceived as a social and cultural practice used not only by sovereigns, but also by non-sovereign actors – a practice allowing both Europeans and non-Europeans to engage in formal and informal interactions, in state and non-state settings, through the elaboration of common languages, of (verbal and symbolic) communication practices and of shared political and legal cultures. In a belligerent era, which spawned many wars, European diplomacy developed new forms of negotiation that attest to an elaborate ‘art of peace’. By the end of the period, the Thirty Years War ended with the first experience of dispute settlement through multilateral talks involving nearly all European powers in Westphalia (1643-9) and reflecting conflicts that attest to the successive integration of non-European territories in ongoing European dispute. The congress demonstrated both the effectiveness and the limitations of this innovative negotiation model.