In this article, we consider how zones of slow death can emerge from epistemic marginalization—specifically, the kind that occurs when a social group lacks shared interpretive models due to processes of “social descent.” Drawing on an ethnographic study of waste collectors who moved from skilled to low-skilled or unskilled labor, we explore how this epistemic marginalization is reinforced by the temporal framing of certain lives in the “past tense.” In this way, epistemic marginalization and temporal disqualification are intertwined: denying a group’s interpretive authority simultaneously enables the erasure of their claims to justice as outdated and obsolete.

This article advances a methodological framework for field-based political philosophy that integrates ethnographic inquiry with normative theorising on socioeconomic injustice. Empirically, it draws on qualitative research with individuals reliant on cash in an increasingly digitalised economy, a context in which infrastructural reforms disproportionately disadvantage socially marginalised groups. The approach is characterised by (i) epistemic recognition of lived experience as a source of normative insight, (ii) critical interrogation of social norms and problem representations associated with digitalisation, and (iii) a commitment to addressing epistemic injustice within philosophical practice itself. We argue that grounding normative theory in subordinated perspectives enhances both the conceptual adequacy of theories of justice and their public relevance. Finally, we reflect on the ethical challenges of research communication aimed at societal impact, emphasising risks of affect-driven “politics of pity” and the importance of maintaining analytical integrity in public engagement.

Despite substantial corporate investment in mentorship, learning, and talent development, access to these knowledge sharing practices may be unequal. This could be due to structural prejudices that determine who receives mentorship, whose learning is prioritised, and how knowledge is shared in organisations. Philosophical business ethics research has primarily focused on speaker-directed epistemic injustice, where employees’ testimony is silenced or discredited. This article introduces hearer-directed epistemic injustice, a novel concept that highlights the wrong suffered by employees who are unjustly denied knowledge. Using Hidden Figures as a case, this article illustrates how testimonial oversimplification or omission can perpetuate structural inequalities in organisations. By extending Fricker’s theory of epistemic injustice, I argue that “speakers”—mentors, managers, finance professionals, and leaders—should actively foster virtuous knowledge sharing practices. This research contributes to business ethics by providing a conceptual framework for identifying hearer-directed epistemic injustice in organisations and ways to mitigate prejudice in organisational epistemic practices.

Epistemic injustice theorists have proposed various strategies for resisting oppressive knowledge structures, with José Medina’s concept of epistemic friction and the principle of acknowledgement and engagement standing as a central model. However, this paper argues that such strategies can unintentionally impose epistemic and emotional burdens on the very subjects they aim to empower. In this paper, I illustrate the importance of undertaking qualitative empirical research into epistemic injustice, particularly resistance. Drawing on original qualitative interviews with LGBTQIA+ individuals, allies, and parents of transgender children, I identify the burden that is often placed on them to be educators of their own sexuality and/or identity. I also offer alternative suggestions for resistance, including redistributing the labour of education to allies and creating a space for indirect engagement via entertainment and social media. This paper integrates empirical research with normative theory to expose how resistance efforts can reproduce structural inequalities – and how they might be transformed.

By considering real-life cases of epistemic reparations (Lackey 2022), such as the Truth and Reconciliation Commissions in Canada, I identify and characterize a form of epistemic injustice that I call “collective amnesia.” I distinguish this phenomenon from other recognized forms of epistemic injustice and argue that collective amnesia specifically leads to primary and secondary epistemic harms in the form of distorted representations of a community’s past, preventing an even broader epistemic community from gaining adequate knowledge of its past and present identities. More precisely, I argue that collective amnesia arises as an interplay of negative hermeneutical injustices, whereby conceptual tools are lacking (Fricker, 2007), and “positive” hermeneutical injustices, whereby the positive presence of distorting and oppressive concepts defeats or prevents the application of more adequate concepts or narratives (Falbo, 2022). In addition, I address and respond to four objections. The first two objections allow me to identify two necessary conditions under which instances of collective forgetting are morally relevant and thus may count as instances of collective amnesia as an epistemic injustice: they must be partly agential, whether on the part of individuals or structures, and due to hermeneutical marginalization. The last two objections enable me to precisely define the scope of this epistemic injustice.

Often, accounts of epistemic injustice either conflate epistemic harming with epistemic wronging or assume epistemic injustice is grounded in instances of epistemic harm. Recently, Dunne and Kotsonis (2024) have argued that neither conflation nor grounding make sense; the two are separate phenomena and have attempted to show how the two relate to one another. I argue this approach is mistaken: rather than just distinguish epistemic harming and wronging, instead we should question the very existence of epistemic harm. First, I discuss the relationship between epistemic harm and epistemic wrong and briefly summarize the ways in which they come apart. While I argue that Dunne and Kotsonis’ arguments are unsuccessful, I offer a new argument to the same effect, showing that current accounts of epistemic harm are underinclusive with respect to epistemic wronging. Second, I show that, generally, wronging does not require harming. Finally, I give us reason to believe that indeed, epistemic harm doesn’t exist: I argue that the notion of intrinsically epistemic harm is suspect, and does not fit within extant theorization on harm more generally and that we, therefore, ought to abandon it entirely: like the general case, epistemic wrong can exist without epistemic harm. To modify a slogan proposed by Bradley, we should do away with epistemic harm.

This paper introduces the concept of self-fulfilling testimonial injustice: a distinctive form of epistemic injustice whereby credibility deficits become true by shaping the very conditions that sustain them. Much of the literature on testimonial injustice has rightly emphasized cases in which credibility deficits are rooted in false beliefs, themselves underwritten by ethically bad affective investments. Yet such a focus risks obscuring a structurally significant variant: namely, those credibility deficits that are rendered true through self-fulfilling mechanisms. Drawing on insights from economics and psychology, I distinguish between motivated cognition-based and cognitive bias-based testimonial injustice, which together furnish the background conditions under which self-fulfilling testimonial injustice can take hold. I develop this account by drawing on both theoretical and experimental work on labor market discrimination, which illuminates the ways in which credibility deficits may become self-fulfillingly entrenched. Finally, I explore the distinctive harms of this form of injustice, focusing on its corrosive effects on epistemic self-confidence or self-trust and epistemic self-esteem, and suggest that its insidiousness and relative invisibility render it both difficult to detect and potentially more pervasive than has hitherto been acknowledged.

According to a recent move in social epistemology, certain types of epistemic wrongs require distinctively epistemic reparations. For instance, if you have been wrongfully convicted of murder, you have not only the right to various kinds of economic and social reparations but also the ‘right to be known’ (Lackey 2022) – crudely, the right to tell the true story about yourself and be listened to. In this paper, I extend this framework to the context of epistemic decolonisation. I argue that the key decolonial epistemic reparations are reparations for the undermined epistemic authority of the colonised. I call these ‘decolonial epistemic authority reparations’ and develop five constraints on a plausible account of them. If the argument is compelling, it will advance both the epistemic reparations framework (which does not talk to the decolonisation literature at present) and the project of epistemic decolonisation (which does not yet canvass epistemic reparations).

In this paper, I begin a philosophical theorisation of the phenomenon of toxic positivity (TP) within the framework of social epistemology. TP is the phenomenon of people being positive and optimistic to a degree that is unreasonable in a given situation, and as such makes others feel as if their own (less than positive) feelings are invalid or in some way wrong. I begin by providing an example of TP. I then identify four features of TP: appropriate emotion, unreasonableness, dismissal, and potential harm. Following this, I discuss the possible epistemic effects of TP and argue that it can affect knowledge in three ways: doubting belief, losing belief, and undermining self-trust. Finally, I argue that TP can in some cases be a form of gaslighting and can undermine epistemic agency, both of which are epistemic injustices.

Since 2021, 18 states in the USA have restricted education on race and structural inequality. Conservative coalitions frame these restrictions as a war on “woke” ideologies. Through interviews with youth and educators in locales (Florida; Georgia; and York, Pennsylvania) that restrict education on race and structural inequality, I investigate the following: What discourses do students and educators use to describe bills that restrict race-related studies? What, if anything, do their discourses suggest about the perceived political implications of these restrictions?

In this study, I argue that gleaning students’ and educators’ views on “anti-woke” legislation sheds light on the perceived political consequences of these bills for American democracy. I find that students and educators perceive restrictions on race-related studies as epistemic injustices that divest society of the knowledge to identify, problematize, and redress the structural conditions that (re)produce racial subordination. For participants, the health of democracy is contingent on addressing racial disempowerment. Hence, they suggest that restrictions on race-related studies encumber democracy precisely because these policies impose epistemologies of racial ignorance that impede racial redress and allow systems of racial inequality to fester.

This article explores the implications of non-ideal theorising for the problem of evil. The critique of ideal theory – which has gained increased attention in several philosophical sub-disciplines during recent years – states that analytic philosophers tend to rely on overly idealised conditions, to the point of being completely unrealistic, in their theorising. To investigate if this charge holds merit in the philosophy of religion, I apply a non-ideal methodology to one traditional area of philosophy of religion – the problem of evil. Here, Richard Swinburne’s theodicy constitutes a sample of how the problem of evil is typically approached in mainstream philosophy of religion. Additionally, Swinburne’s Principle of Credulity will, in relation to his theodicy, be interrogated as well. Applying non-ideal theorising, I find that Swinburne’s theorisation relies on idealised cases and presupposes ideal conditions, while overlooking non-ideal realities. Turning to epistemic injustice and epistemology of ignorance, I find that Swinburne assumes ideal epistemological conditions in both inter-agent communication (testimony), and in collective cognition. After examining the implications of such idealisations, I find that Swinburne’s idealisations abstract away non-ideal factors which are relevant for his theories, concluding that Swinburne displays tendencies typical of ideal theorising.

Borderline personality disorder (BPD) has been a controversial diagnosis for over 40 years. It was to be removed from the latest version of the ICD, only to be reintroduced as a trait qualifier as a result of last-minute lobbying. Retaining BPD as a de facto diagnosis keeps us stuck at a deadlock that undermines the voices of patients who have persistently told us this label adds ‘insult to injury’. Miranda Fricker's concept of epistemic injustice helps illuminate how this affects subjectivity and speech, hermeneutically sealing patients in ways of thinking that are not evidence-based, resulting in testimonial smothering (altering or withholding one's narratives) and testimonial quieting (dismissing a speaker's capacity to provide worthy testimony) that prevent more affirmative explanations.