Psychology is often defined as the study of the mind, or as William James (1890) put it, “the science of mental life.” However, during the behaviorist and neobehaviorist eras, many psychologists were hesitant to make such a description. Some of B. F. Skinner’s followers tried hard to avoid using any mental terms (e.g., think), even in casual conversation, and behaviorism’s founder John B. Watson had asserted that he was not even sure what those terms meant. However, after World War II, developments both in psychology and in other disciplines led to a major change, a return to explicitly and openly studying the mental processes by which conscious and deliberate behavior emerges. This change is often known as the cognitive revolution (e.g., Gardner, 1985).1 Cognitive approaches to psychology are very popular now, to the point where they are often taken for granted. In this chapter we consider how that change came about, and then discuss some even more recent developments in the field. As you read, consider the following questions: How did advances outside of psychology lead to pushback against behaviorism and the emergence of a general cognitive perspective? What was early cognitive psychology like, and what features of behaviorism has it retained? What do cognitive perspectives look like across different areas of psychology, and what recent trends have followed in the past few decades?

‘Lawyers are professionally parochial. Comparative law is our effort to be cosmopolitan.’1 This statement may seem exaggerated, but there is also a good deal of truth in it. Most lawyers are almost entirely trained and specialised in the law of their domestic jurisdiction. Thus, as soon as lawyers leave the borders of their own country, they may feel as if they are stranded on a foreign planet. Learning about comparative law aims to address this problem. But where do you start? Which method do you apply? And is it really feasible to learn about all laws of the world?

Human rights have traditionally been viewed as being of concern to governments only. The BHR discussion challenges this traditional, state-centric view and provides reasons why businesses ought to have human rights responsibilities, too. Such reasons or justifications can be formulated from an ethical, legal, and even a more pragmatic, managerial point of view. From an ethical perspective, the chapter shows why businesses have obligations beyond profit-maximization and why human rights obligations are among such responsibilities. It lays particular emphasis on the power and authority of corporations as a possible foundation. From a legal perspective, the chapter addresses the question of whether multinational corporations have international legal personality and assesses to what extent corporate human rights obligations can be derived from international human rights law. From a pragmatic perspective, the social license to operate and the so-called business case for human rights responsibilty are explored. The chapter concludes with some reflections on general objections against corporate human rights responsibility.

This chapter deals with Hugh of St. Victor and his main works, such as De Tribus Diebus, Didascalicon and De Sacramentis. It covers the following topics: the sacramental understanding of the world, his pedagogy and his major theological writing On the Sacraments, with specific attention to his views on faith and love.

To the general public, a “psychologist” usually does not denote a researcher, but a clinician who diagnoses and treats psychological problems. In this chapter, we discuss the roots of this distinct type of psychology. We start with Sigmund Freud and the development of psychoanalysis. Freud lived a fascinating life, and his ideas are best understood in their historical context. In particular, that context helps to make certain apparently bizarre ideas seem much more sensible. If you already have opinions about Freud and psychoanalysis, observe how they change (if at all) as your historical understanding increases. We then turn to the work of Lightner Witmer, a man far less well known than Freud, but who did nothing less than invent clinical psychology (both the term and the practice) by opening the first psychological clinic. We finish by discussing the separate histories of clinical, counseling, and school psychology; as we will see, even though Witmer influenced all of them, other external influences were important in making these specialties different from each other.

Globalisation has given rise to legal transplants, convergence, and regional and international laws, as discussed in the previous two chapters. However, the proliferation of transnational law and the emergence of global law may have had an even more profound impact as they challenge the traditional notion of state-based law. For comparative law, such changes to the legal configuration may show the limitations of traditional methods and tools of comparative law.

This new chapter deals with two important women authors who wrote in the vernacular. They developed a rich, deeply Christocentric spirituality. Hadewijch’s spirituality and theology are especially rich. Her views on Christ, love and desire, the Trinity and detachment are discussed in some detail.

It is one of the aims of this book to challenge traditional comparative law and promote alternative approaches. Yet, to start with, it is useful to discuss the ‘comparative legal method’ of traditional comparative law in some detail. For this reason, Section A of this chapter outlines how, according to traditional comparatists, a comparative legal analysis should be conducted. Section B focuses on two of the most important concepts on which this method is based: functionalism and universalism. A critical analysis follows in Section C, and Section D concludes. Examples will be provided throughout this chapter, in particular from topics of private law as these feature most prominently in this approach to comparative law.

Many psychologists trace their heritage to Wundt. As we have seen, Wundt is often given credit for the very founding of psychology. But Wundt’s laboratory at Leipzig was not without German rivals, and Wundt was not without German critics. These competing approaches to the “new psychology” of the nineteenth century were also experimental but differed from the approach of Wundt in the topics they emphasized. In their psychophysics, Ernst Weber and Gustav Fechner made precise measurements of sensation; these scholars actually preceded and influenced Wundt. Hermann Ebbinghaus studied memory under carefully controlled laboratory conditions; and Carl Stumpf and Oswald Külpe investigated mental acts including problem-solving and attention. In this chapter, we consider the work of these five scholars in detail. As you will see, the German pioneers of psychology extend far beyond Wundt himself.

There are two ways of understanding the title of this chapter: it can either mean ‘comparative law’ and development, or it can refer to comparative ‘law and development’. Both variants are addressed in the following. In the sense of ‘comparative law’ and development, the chapter considers how insights drawn from comparative law can assist development policy. This reflects the aim of traditional comparative law to provide policy recommendations while also responding to the criticism that traditional comparative law is largely uninterested in the countries of the developing world.

In order to understand the key questions and issues surrounding BHR, a basic understanding of human rights more generally is necessary. Since BHR is an interdisciplinary field, it is important to gain an understanding both of the legal and non-legal dimensions of human rights. This chapter first provides a brief introduction to the philosophy of human rights and some of the key discussions that derive from this. Among them are the disputes between universalism and relativism and between foundationalist and non-foundationalist accounts of human rights. The chapter then takes a look at the main human rights bodies that institutionalize human rights in the international and regional context, paying particular attention to the United Nations’ human rights system. Finally, the chapter provides a brief introduction to international human rights law, outlining some of its key principles and instruments.