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37953 results in Cambridge Textbooks

Page 1862 of 1898

  • 5 - On the impulsive cause of constituting the state

  • from BOOK II
  • Samuel Pufendorf
  • Edited by James Tully, McGill University, Montréal
  • Translated by Michael Silverthorne, McGill University, Montréal
  • Book:
    Pufendorf: On the Duty of Man and Citizen according to Natural Law
    Published online:
    14 September 2019
    Print publication:
    26 July 1991, pp 132-134

  • Summary

    1. There seems to be hardly any amenity or advantage that cannot be secured by the duties and conditions [status] we have so far discussed. Nevertheless we must now investigate why men have not been content with those first small associations [societas], but have constituted large associations which go by the name of states [civitas]. For this is the basis from which we must derive the justification of the duties which go with men's civil State [status civilis].

    2. It is not enough to say here that man is drawn to civil society [societas civilis] by nature herseif, so that he cannot and will not live without it. For man is obviously an animal that loves himself and his own advantage in the highest degree. It is undoubtedly therefore necessary that in freely aspiring to civil society he has his eye on some advantage coming to himself from it. Again, man was likely to be the most miserable of animals without association [societas] with his fellows; yet his natural desires and needs could have been abundantly met by the earliest societies and by duties based on humanity or agreements. We cannot therefore infer directly from man's sociality [socialitas] that his nature tends precisely to civil society.

    3. This will become clearer if we consider: (1) the human condition which results from the constitution of states; (2) the requirements for a man to be truly said to be a political animal, i.e., a good Citizen; and finally, (3) the observed features of human nature which are repugnant to the character of civil society.

    4. (1) In becoming a Citizen, a man loses his natural liberty and subjects himself to an authority whose powers include the right of life and death. At its command he must do much he would otherwise avoid; and he must not do much that he would otherwise powerfully desire to do. Again, in most of his actions he must take into account the good of society, which often seems to conflict with the good of individuals. Yet he has a congenital tendency to want to be subject to no one, to act at his own discretion, and to set his course for his own advantage in everything.

  • 3 - On natural law

  • from BOOK I
  • Samuel Pufendorf
  • Edited by James Tully, McGill University, Montréal
  • Translated by Michael Silverthorne, McGill University, Montréal
  • Book:
    Pufendorf: On the Duty of Man and Citizen according to Natural Law
    Published online:
    14 September 2019
    Print publication:
    26 July 1991, pp 33-38

  • Summary

    1. What is die character of natural law? What is its necessity? And in what precepts does it consist in die actual condition of mankind? These questions are most clearly answered by a close scrutiny of die nature and character of man. Just as one makes great progress towards an accurate knowledge of civil laws by first achieving a good understanding of the condition of a State and die customs and occupations of its Citizens, so if one first takes a view of the common character and condition of mankind, the laws on which man's security rests will easily become clear.

    2. In common with all living things which have a sense of themselves, man holds nothing more dear than himself, he studies in every way to preserve himself, he strives to acquire what seems good to him and to repel what seems bad to him. This passion is usually so strong that all other passions give way before it. And if anyone attempts to attack a man's safety, he cannot fail to repel him, and to repel him so vigorously that hatred and desire for revenge usually last long after he has beaten off the attack.

    3. On the other hand man now seems to be in a worse condition than the beasts in that scarcely any other animal is attended from birth with such weakness [imbecillitas]. It would be something of a miracle, if he came through to maturity without the help of other men, since even now when so many things have been discovered to relieve men's needs, a careful training of several years is required to enable a person to get his food and clothing by his own efforts. Let us imagine a man coming to adult years without any care and fostering from other men. He would have no knowledge except what has sprang by a kind of spontaneous generation from his own intelligence. He would be in solitude, destitute of all the help and Company of others.

  • Editor's introduction

  • Samuel Pufendorf
  • Edited by James Tully, McGill University, Montréal
  • Translated by Michael Silverthorne, McGill University, Montréal
  • Book:
    Pufendorf: On the Duty of Man and Citizen according to Natural Law
    Published online:
    14 September 2019
    Print publication:
    26 July 1991, pp xiv-xxxvii

  • Summary

    Overview

    As the preceding Chronology indicates, Pufendorf's writings fall into three groups. The first is his attempt to construct a comprehensive political and moral philosophy appropriate to the conditions of modem Europe and based on a set of universal principles or natural laws. He began this project at the University of Jena and worked it out from 1658 to 1677 in the three texts on natural law (EFU, DFN, DOH), the analysis of the German imperial constitution (DSI), and the three collections of clarifications and replies to his critics (DAS, SC, ES). This enterprise is surveyed in the following four sections of the Introduction.

    When Pufendorf moved from the University of Lund to Stockhohn in 1677 as political adviser to the Swedish king Charles XI, he set aside the juristic analysis of politics in terms of universal law and obligation and turned to the major competing approach to the understanding of politics in the seventeenth Century. This method consists in analysing the relations within and among contemporary European states by means of comparative and historical analyses of their interests and relative powers with a view to predictions and recommendations to State builders. From the Reason of state (1598) by Giovanni Botero (1540-1617) and the early Spanish and French raison d'état writers, this form of analysis was rapidly developed into pan- European sciences of comparative politics and international relations. The object domain of these sciences is the modern System of independent states locked into a military and commercial rivalry which emerged after the Thirty Years’ War (1618-48) and the Peace of Westphalia (1648). Pufendorf's contributions include the earlier history of Philip of Macedon (DRGP), the political history of the Catholic Church (HUP), the contemporary political histories he wrote for Charles XI (CRS, DRC) and, after 1688, for Frederick William I and Frederick III of Prussia (DRF, DRGF), and especially his monumental introduction to the history of the principal states of Europe (EZDH). The EZDH with its rigorous concepts of State interest and relative powers and its comprehensive design, was republished throughout the eighteenth Century. The editors of the French éditions added more chapters, making it a prototype of Enlightenment encyclopaedias of comparative politics.

  • 16 - On war and peace

  • from BOOK II
  • Samuel Pufendorf
  • Edited by James Tully, McGill University, Montréal
  • Translated by Michael Silverthorne, McGill University, Montréal
  • Book:
    Pufendorf: On the Duty of Man and Citizen according to Natural Law
    Published online:
    14 September 2019
    Print publication:
    26 July 1991, pp 168-172

  • Summary

    1. It is most agreeable to natural law that men should live in peace with each other by doing of their own accord what their duty requires; indeed peace itself is a State peculiar to man, insofar as he is distinct from the beasts. Nevertheless, for man too war is sometimes permitted, and occasionally necessary, namely when by the ill will of another we cannot preserve our property or obtain our right without the use of force. In this Situation, however, good sense and humanity counsel us not to resort to arms when more evil than good is likely to overtake us and ours by the prosecution of our wrongs.

    2. The just causes of engaging in war come down to the preservation and protection of our lives and property against unjust attack, or the collection of what is due to us from others but has been denied, or the procurement of reparations for wrong inflicted and of assurance for the future. Wars waged for the first of these causes are said to be defensive, for the other causes, offensive.

    3. One should not have immediate recourse to arms as soon as one thinks oneself wronged, particularly so long as there remains some doubt about right or fact. One should explore the possibility of amicable settlement of the matter by various means, for example by initiating dialogue between the parties, by appealing to an arbitrator, or by submitting the question to lot. The claimant particularly is obliged to try this method, since there is in any case a predisposition to favour possession with some title.

    4. Unjust causes of war are either openly such or have some plausible pretext, however weak. Open causes come down to two main types: avarice and ambition, namely lust for wealth and lust for power. Those covered by pretexts are various: they include fear of the wealth and power of a neighbour, unjustified aggrandizement, desire for better territory, refusal of something which is simply and straightforwardly owed, stupidity on the part of a possessor, a desire to extinguish another's legitimately acquired right which the aggressor finds rather inconvenient, and others of this kind.

  • 9 - Public enterprises

  • from PART II - Decision modes
  • David W. Conklin
  • Book:
    Comparative Economic Systems
    Published online:
    12 October 2018
    Print publication:
    26 July 1991, pp 291-328

  • Summary

    Introduction

    Throughout history, societies have chosen to own and operate some economic enterprises on a collective basis. “State-owned enterprises are nothing new in the market economies of the world. The historians of the Roman Empire and the chronicles of the Old Testament offer ample evidence of their ancient origins.” The sixteenth century religious Reformation gave moral weight to the free-enterprise process for organizing production and consumption, and the rise of industrial capitalism extended the concept of individual ownership and private decision making. Yet even with the growth of capitalism, societies continued to choose collective ownership and operation for certain activities. Of particular importance were transportation systems. Private investments in roads, canals, and railways exhibited weaknesses or shortcomings of free enterprise, and societies frequently rejected that decision mode in favour of collective ownership.

    For the transportation infrastructure, one could argue that the marginal cost of an additional user was negligible. Yet to set price equal to the negligible marginal costs, as efficiency would require, would not yield enough revenue to make the project financially viable. Roads, of course, had the peculiar difficulty that a private owner could not easily exclude use for non-payment of tolls. Tollgates were built, particularly for costly bridges, but individuals could gain access to most private roads quite readily. This pricing issue was made even more difficult because many such projects were in a monopoly position. One road, one canal, or one railway could provide adequately for all the needs of the populace within the geographical area being served. Being a monopolist, the owner would set a price above the marginal cost. Other members of society perceived such monopoly pricing as unfair and inefficient. Rapidly acquired fortunes were seen as concrete evidence of the inappropriateness of free enterprise. Many believed that only government ownership and operation could provide for appropriate pricing.

    Transportation infrastructures also demonstrated the problems associated with externalities and private contracts. With a new transportation system, the costs of many products would fall. Local producers could sell their goods over a larger geographical area, and because of scale economies they could experience a reduction in production costs.

  • 10 - On the ways of acquiring authority, particularly monarchical

  • from BOOK II
  • Samuel Pufendorf
  • Edited by James Tully, McGill University, Montréal
  • Translated by Michael Silverthorne, McGill University, Montréal
  • Book:
    Pufendorf: On the Duty of Man and Citizen according to Natural Law
    Published online:
    14 September 2019
    Print publication:
    26 July 1991, pp 148-150

  • Summary

    1. Consent of subjects is required to constitute any legitimate government, but it is not always and everywhere elicited in the same way. Sometimes men are compelled by military force to consent to a conqueror's rule; sometimes Citizens acquiesce of their own accord in the appointment of their prince.

    2. Acquisition of authority by military force, which is usually called conquest [occupatio], occurs when a man relying upon a just cause for going to war and having been successful by force of arms and fortune reduces a people to the point that they are compelled thenceforth to submit to his authority. The legitimate title of his power is partly drawn from the fact that if he had wished as victor to take advantage of the strict rights of war, he might simply have taken the lives of the vanquished; and thus, by allowing them to get off with a lesser misfortune, he also earns a reputation for clemency. But it is also drawn from the fact that his enemy in going to war with one whom he had previously wronged, and to whom he has refused reasonable satisfaction, has placed all his fortunes on the gaming tables of Mars; he has thus already given tacit consent to whatever condition the event of war may assign him.

    3. A kingdom is acquired by the free consent of a people when an election takes place by which a people (whether in process of formation or already formed) freely designates a specific man as in their opinion capable of holding power. The decision [decretum] of the people is signified to him; he accepts; the people promise obedience; power is conferred.

    4. An election in a State already formed occurring after the death of the previous king is usuaJly preceded by an Interregnum. During this time the State recedes into an imperfect form, as the Citizens are then bound together only by the first contract. But a high degree of stability is provided by the love of their common country and its name, and by the fact that for most of the Citizens their fortunes are settled there. These motives constrain good Citizens to maintain peace with each other of their own accord and to make every effort to restore perfect government as soon as possible.

  • 8 - On the common duties of humanity

  • from BOOK I
  • Samuel Pufendorf
  • Edited by James Tully, McGill University, Montréal
  • Translated by Michael Silverthorne, McGill University, Montréal
  • Book:
    Pufendorf: On the Duty of Man and Citizen according to Natural Law
    Published online:
    14 September 2019
    Print publication:
    26 July 1991, pp 64-67

  • Summary

    1. The third of the duties owed by every man to every man, to be performed for the sake of common sociality, is: everyone should be useful to others, so far as he conveniently can. For nature has established a kind of kinship among men. It is not enough not to have harmed, or not to have slighted, others. We must also give, or at least share, such things as will encourage mutual goodwill.

    We are useful to others, either in an indefinite way or in a definite way; and it either costs us something, or it costs us nothing.

    2. Someone is being useful to others in an indefinite way when he develops his mind and body to be a source of actions useful to others, or if he makes discoveries by the acuteness of his intellect for the betterment of human life. Hence they are thought to sin against this duty who learn no honest skill but passing their lives in silence, regard their mind as no more than salt to preserve them from decay, mere numbers ‘born to consume the fruits of the earth'. So do they who are content with their ancestral wealth, and believe they are justified in devoting themselves to idleness, because the industry of others has already assured their livelihood. So too do they ‘who hoard the wealth they have won not setting aside a portion for their kin\ Likewise those who, like pigs, give no one pleasure except by dying, and others of that sort, useless burdens on the earth.

    3. To those who set themselves to do good to the human race, others owe duty not to be grudging nor to put obstacles in the way of their splendid endeavours. Then, even if they have no other way of repaying them, they will at least be extolling their memory and advancing their fame, which is the chief reward of toil.

    4. It is thought to be a particularly odious act of ill will and inhumanity not to make freely available to others those good things which we can offer them without loss, labour or trouble to ourselves. Such things are normally recognized as beneficial and harmless; that is, things that help the recipient without burdening the giver.

  • 13 - On the duties arising from ownership in itself

  • from BOOK I
  • Samuel Pufendorf
  • Edited by James Tully, McGill University, Montréal
  • Translated by Michael Silverthorne, McGill University, Montréal
  • Book:
    Pufendorf: On the Duty of Man and Citizen according to Natural Law
    Published online:
    14 September 2019
    Print publication:
    26 July 1991, pp 90-92

  • Summary

    1. The following are the duties which have arisen from the introduction of ownership in things:

  • (i) Every man is obliged to allow everyone (except an enemy) quietly to enjoy his own property, and neither by force nor fraud to attempt to spoil, steal or misappropriate it. This is why theft, robbery and similar crimes against others’ property are forbidden.

    • 2. (2) When without crime or breach of good faith on our part another man's property comes into our hands, and we have it under our control, we are bound to do all we can to return it to the control of its legitimate owner. However, we are not bound to restore it at our own expense, and if we do spend anything on maintaining it, we may rightly recover our expense or keep the property until we are paid. The Obligation of restitution begins when we become clearly aware that the property belongs to someone else. At that time we should make it known that we have the thing in question and do nothing to hinder the owner in recovering what is his [suum], If, however, we have acquired something with good title, we are not obliged to cast doubt on the title ourselves, or make a kind of public announcement whether anyone wishes to claim it for himself. The duty of restitution takes precedence over particular contracts and is a ground for a counter-claim: for example, if a thief deposits stolen goods with me and the real owner subsequentiy turns up, they must be restored to the owner, not the thief.

    3. (3) If in good faith we have acquired something of another's and consumed it, our duty is limited to restoring to the owner the amount by which we have been enriched, so that we do not gain from another's undeserved loss.

    4. The following duties are derived from the above:

  • (i) A bona fide possessor is not obliged to make any restitution if the thing has perished, because he has neither the thing itself nor any gain from it.

  • 4 - On man's duty to God, or on natural religion

  • from BOOK I
  • Samuel Pufendorf
  • Edited by James Tully, McGill University, Montréal
  • Translated by Michael Silverthorne, McGill University, Montréal
  • Book:
    Pufendorf: On the Duty of Man and Citizen according to Natural Law
    Published online:
    14 September 2019
    Print publication:
    26 July 1991, pp 39-45

  • Summary

    1. So far as man's duty to God can be traced out on the basis of natural reason, it has no more than two articles: first, to have right notions of God, and secondly, to conform our actions to His will. Hence natural religion consists of theoretical propositions and practical propositions.

    2. Of all the notions which everyone must hold about God, the first is a settled conviction that God exists, that is, that there really is a supreme and first being on whom this universe depends. This has been most plainly demonstrated by philosophers from the Subordination of causes which must find an end in some first thing, from motion, from reflection on the fabric of the universe, and by similar arguments. Claiming not to understand these arguments is no excuse for atheism. For since this conviction has been a constant possession of the whole human race, anyone who wished to overthrow it would not only have to produce a solid refutation of all the arguments which prove God's existence, but also come forward with more convincing reasons for his own position. At the same time, since the salvation of the human race has been believed hitherto to depend on this conviction, he would also have to show that atheism would be better for the human race than to maintain a sound worship of God. Since this cannot be done, we must heartily detest and severely punish the impiety of all who make any attempt whatever to shatter that conviction.

    3. The second notion is that God is the Creator of this universe. For since it is self-evident that all this world did not come into existence of itself, it must have a cause and that cause is what we call God.

    It follows from this that it is an error to prattle about nature (as people do from time to time) as the final cause of all things and all effects. For if the word ‘nature’ is meant to be taken as the causal efiicacy and power of action which is observed in things, it surely gives evidence itself of its author, God; so far is nature's power from lending support to any argument in denial of God. If, however, by ‘nature’ is meant the supreme cause of all things, it is a kind of fastidious profanity to avoid the plain, accepted term, God.

  • Author's preface

  • from ON THE DUTY OF MAN AND CITIZEN ACCORDING TO NATURAL LAW
  • Samuel Pufendorf
  • Edited by James Tully, McGill University, Montréal
  • Translated by Michael Silverthorne, McGill University, Montréal
  • Book:
    Pufendorf: On the Duty of Man and Citizen according to Natural Law
    Published online:
    14 September 2019
    Print publication:
    26 July 1991, pp 6-14

  • Summary

    To the benevolent reader - greetings.

    It would seem superfluous, if the practice of so many learned men had not made it almost mandatory, to write a preface explaining the purpose of this work. It is immediately clear that I have done no more than expound to beginners the principal topics of natural law in a short and, I hope, lucid compendium. I would not want students to be put off at the beginning by a massive accumulation of difficult questions, as would happen if they were to set out on the wide expanses of this subject without a knowledge of what one might call the elements. I also believe it to be in the public interest to steep their minds in a moral doctrine whose usefulness in civil life is accepted as obvious. In any other case I would naturally take it to be too trivial a task to reduce an extensive work to the form of a compendium, particularly a work of my own; but I think that in this case no sensible person will blame me for spending so much labour on a task which is uniquely useful to young people, particularly as I undertook it at the behest of my superiors. One's Obligation to the young is such that no work undertaken for their benefit should be thought to be below anyone's dignity even if it gives no opportunity for brilliant or profound thought. Besides, no one with even a grain of sense will deny that such basic principles are better suited to the universal discipline of law than are the elements of any particular System of civil law.

    So much might have seemed sufficient, but certain people have advised me that it would be pertinent to make some remarks directed towards understanding the character of natural law in general and towards a careful delineation of its boundaries. I am the more happy to do this as I may in this way remove the excuse for men of misplaced subtlety to apply their feverish criticism to the discipline of natural law. It is quite distinct from their province; there is a line of demarcation between them.

  • 11 - Constraints imposed by the new world economy

  • from PART III - Choosing objectives and decision modes
  • David W. Conklin
  • Book:
    Comparative Economic Systems
    Published online:
    12 October 2018
    Print publication:
    26 July 1991, pp 364-384

  • Summary

    Introduction

    For each society, the choice of an economic system is affected by that society's relationships with other economic systems. This can be seen clearly in cases of military or political domination, where both the ruler and the ruled adjust their economic systems in accordance with the realities of the domination. The existence of the British Empire in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries meant that, for the many member societies, the choice of economic system was severely circumscribed. The Soviet Union extended its power over Eastern Europe after the Second World War in a manner which limited the options facing societies there. In recent decades, the United States has actively sought to influence the choices of many societies throughout the world, particularly in Central and South America. These cases of military and political intervention illustrate the necessity, when comparing economic systems, to consider each society's choices in the context of that society's relationships with other economic systems.

    Relationships that are not military or political can also affect a society's choices. Of special importance are trade and investment. The development of trade relationships can strongly influence a society's economic system, particularly as the domestic structure adjusts to the provision of exports. The characteristics of a principal export, and its production requirements, may affect many features of the economic system and its decision modes, including the nature of employment relationships. The staple theory, for example, describes the reliance of some colonial societies in the nineteenth century on exports of wheat, timber, and cotton, and it explains how their economic systems were shaped by these exports. Even in recent decades, many societies continue to rely on the export of a narrow range of natural resources, with significant repercussions on their economic system.

    As earlier chapters have indicated, the New World economy has facilitated the mobility of labour and capital, and this has also restricted each society's options. People and corporations may move away from a particular society if its economic system becomes significantly different.

Page 1862 of 1898