Now that we have distinguished in this way between the various modes and significations of the said terms, let us draw certain conclusions: and the first is, that no person can licitly handle any temporal thing or aspect of a thing (e.g. its use or usufruct or similar) – whether it is his own or belonging to another, as his own property or in common – without right, that is, without having in it or in an aspect of it right so-called in the first and second significations of right. For every act which is not commanded or permitted to be done by right, is non-licit, as is plainly apparent to anyone from the definition of the ‘licit’. We need not delay to prove this, as it is almost self-evident to everyone.

2

From what we have said we can secondly infer that a person can handle a thing or an aspect of a thing in a way that is licit in respect of one law, e.g. the divine, and illicit in respect of another, such as the human; and similarly the other way round; and again, he can do the same thing in a way that is licit, or even in a way that is illicit, in respect of both. This is not difficult to see, since the commands, prohibitions and permissions in these laws sometimes diverge and mutually disagree, and sometimes converge. And therefore one who acts according to the command or permission of one, acts in a way that is licit in respect of it; and if this is prohibited by the other law, then he performs the same act in a way that is illicit in respect of that other law; while if such an act is permitted in both laws, then he acts in a way that is licit in respect of both. If, however, it is prohibited by both, then he performs the same act in a way that is illicit in respect of both.

Now since we have said that election is the more perfect and superior way of instituting the principate, we do well to inquire into its efficient cause, sc. that from which, in its full excellence, it must ensue; for the result of this will be that the cause both of elected principate, and similarly of the other parts of the polity, becomes apparent. But because the principate must regulate human civil acts (as we demonstrated in chapter 5 of this discourse), and do this according to a standard that is and should be the form of that which exercises it, it is necessary to inquire into this standard: if there is any such thing, what it is, and what is its purpose. For the efficient cause of the standard may turn out to be the same as that of the prince.

2

We suppose, then – as a thing almost self-evident by induction – that this standard, which is called ‘statute’ or ‘custom’ or by the common term of ‘law’, exists in all perfect communities. Taking this as given, we shall first show what it is. Secondly we shall identify its necessity in terms of its end. Finally we shall determine, through demonstration, by what kind of action, and on the part of what or which agents, it should be instituted. And this will be to inquire into its legislator or active cause; to whom we think that the election of principates also belongs, as we shall show by demonstration in the following chapters. In addition, as a result of these discussions, the matter or subject of the abovementioned standard (which we have called the law) will become apparent. For this is the princely part, to which it belongs to regulate the political or civil acts of men according to law.

3

As we embark on what we have proposed, therefore, it is appropriate to distinguish between the meanings of (or what is signified by) this term ‘law’, so that its multiple senses do not lead to frustration.