The Riau Islands were part of Riau Province from 1957, but on 1 July 2004 they officially became a distinct province of Indonesia. The Riau Islands consist of 1,350 islands, which are divided into four regencies (Kepulauan Riau, Natuna, Karimun and Lingga) and two cities (Batam and Tanjung Pinang). They are strategically located close to the Straits of Malacca and Singapore (Dewan Maritim Indonesia 2007a, p. 26). The Riau Islands are located at the border between Indonesia and Singapore, Vietnam and Malaysia. Around ninety-six per cent of the territory of the province consists of waterways (ibid., p. 26). Thus, ports play a crucial role in the economic development of the Riau Islands. Ports are the gateways for inter-island trade within the Riau Islands and a point of interaction that links this province and other parts of Indonesia. The ports of the Riau Islands also serve as trading hubs that connect Indonesia with Malaysia and Singapore. Export and import activities take place at nearly every port in this province (ibid., p. 56).

The large number of ports and outlying islands in the Riau Islands has posed enormous challenges for the Indonesian government to monitor and secure the transport of goods and people coming in and out of the province. Areas within and around the ports are rampant with criminal activities. These include smuggling, human trafficking, illegal logging, illegal fishing, and armed robbery against ships. The government authorities have involved preman organization to secure the ports and outlying islands in this province.

This chapter will explain the role of preman organizations in the Riau Islands, focusing primarily on Batam, the largest port city in this province, and Tanjung Pinang, the capital city of this province. The chapter comprises four parts. The first part will outline the competing preman organizations in the Riau Islands and explain their cooperation with government authorities to guard ports and outlying islands. The second part will examine conflicts between preman organizations and government authorities. This section will also analyse the reasons underpinning the tensions between preman organizations, the government and society. The third part of this chapter will account for the participation of preman organizations both in support of illicit activities and in efforts to address them. Finally, the conclusion of the chapter points to the ambiguous role of preman organizations in port security.

North Sulawesi is situated in the most northern part of Indonesia. This border province encompasses 15,472,98 square kilometres, and the length of its coastline is 1,837 kilometres (Dewan Maritim Indonesia 2007a, p. 31). North Sulawesi consists of a large number of islands, including Manado Tua, Bangka, Lembeh, Siau, Tagulandang, Karakelang, Karabuan, Salibabu, and 124 smaller islands (ibid.). These smaller outlying islands are grouped into the following three categories: the Talaud Islands, the Sangir Besar Islands, and Siau Tagulandang and Biaro (ibid.).

North Sulawesi shares a maritime border with the Philippines to the north and a land border with the Indonesian Gorontolo province to the west. It faces the Tomini Gulf to the south and the Moluccas Sea to the east (Dewan Maritim Indonesia 2007a, p. 32). Located strategically between the Sulawesi Sea and the Pacific Ocean, North Sulawesi has grown to be the economic centre for the eastern part of Indonesia. The port sector presents commercial opportunities that contribute significantly to the North Sulawesi economy (ibid., p. 62). Thus, the security of ports in North Sulawesi is crucial to developing the economic potential of this border province and to maintaining the safety of maritime gateways that connect the east and west parts of Indonesia.

The transport of goods and people to and from North Sulawesi ports face various challenges from trans-border criminal and terrorist activities. In order to secure ports and the many outlying islands in North Sulawesi, government authorities have formed close partnerships with preman organizations. This chapter will explain the participation of preman organizations in port security in North Sulawesi. The next part of this chapter will map the existing preman organizations in North Sulawesi that take part in securing ports and outlying islands in the province. It will explain their cooperation with state authorities and identify government agencies that collaborate with preman organizations. The third part will elaborate on the relatively low degree of tensions within North Sulawesi society that occur as a result of the involvement of preman organizations in the security sector. The fourth part of the chapter will outline the illicit trans-border activities that are rampant at North Sulawesi's maritime borders. It will provide details of the involvement of preman organizations in seeking to deter these illicit activities.

Jakarta is the capital city of Indonesia. The 7,659.02 square kilometres territory of Jakarta consists of 661.52 square kilometres of land, including 110 islands in Kepulauan Seribu, and 6,997.50 square kilometres of sea (Dinas Komunikasi, Informatika dan Statistik Pemprov DKI Jakarta 2017). Ports in Jakarta have played a crucial role as key gateways for both Indonesia's inter-island and international trade as well as the fishing industry. The busiest container port in Indonesia, Tanjung Priok, is located in Jakarta. Tanjung Priok Port alone is responsible for managing over 27 per cent of Indonesia's exports and more than 39 per cent of its import activities (Badan Pusat Statistik 2020a; 2020b, pp. 36–39). Jakarta is also home to six fishing ports. These include Cilincing, Samudera Nizam Zachman–Muara Baru, Pulau Pramuka, Muara Angke, Kamal Muara and Kali Adem (Kementerian Kelautan dan Perikanan 2013).

Security management across all ports in Jakarta, however, is not trouble free. The involvement of preman organizations in port security on the one hand has aided the security apparatus. On the other hand, it has brought various challenges, including violent conflicts among preman organizations and with the government security apparatus. Jakarta is home to many preman organizations that are competing for resources and influence in the country's capital city. As of 2016, there were 470 civil societies and 50 youth organizations formally registered with the Agency for National Unity and Politics (Badan Kesatuan Bangsa dan Politik) of the Jakarta provincial government. These include those that adopt hyper-nationalist ideology such as Pemuda Panca Marga and Pemuda Pancasila (PP); ethnic-based organizations such as Forum Komunikasi Anak Betawi and Forum Betawi Rempug (FBR); and groups that exhibit Islamic ideology such as Forum Pembela Islam and Gerakan Pemuda Ka’aba. Among the many preman organizations operating in Jakarta, two are deemed the largest and have been involved in port security; these are PP and FBR. The involvement of these two CSOs in port security took place at different periods. PP played an important role in port security during the early decades of Suharto's regime up till the 1980s. FBR's involvement in port security only began in the years after Suharto stood down.

Any explanation for the use of non-state security providers by government authorities should not rely solely on the examination of international politics or the domestic structure. A government security policy is generated from the interface between interstate negotiations on the one hand and interaction within the domestic realm on the other—among individuals, social and interest groups, and the state (McSweeney 1999, p. 127; Gourevitch 2002, pp. 310, 316, 318). The interaction between international politics and the domestic structure may influence the use of preman organizations for port and coastal security in Indonesia. This proposition, however, has not been examined in the existing literature. This chapter will fill this gap.

This chapter consists of three parts. The first part will explain the implications of the 9/11 attacks for Indonesia's port security. It will examine why, despite Indonesia's long history and experience of terrorist incidents, it was only after 9/11 that governments around the world begin to highlight the possibility and significance of terrorist attacks in Indonesian waters and on Indonesian maritime facilities. It will also elaborate on Indonesia's efforts to improve the security of its ports and outlying islands following the 2002 Bali bombings and the issuance in 2008 of port security advisories (PSAs) to most Indonesian ports by the United States Coast Guard. These include the involvement of preman organizations as one of the main features of Indonesian government policy to secure its ports and outlying islands in the archipelago. The second part of the chapter will provide detailed background information on Indonesia's domestic political dynamics and the involvement of preman organizations in the process. It will highlight the political practices that have changed and those that remain the same in post-authoritarian Indonesia. It will elaborate on the specifics of Indonesia's security and political practices that sustain the use of preman organizations in security. And finally, the concluding part of the chapter will highlight that the use of preman organizations for port and coastal security in Indonesia is shaped by a combination of domestic political dynamics that compel the government to take low-key approaches to counterterrorism and institutionalized local practices and everyday politics that normalizes the use of preman organizations for the provision of security.

INTRODUCTION

The Chinese Open Door Policy implemented in the late 1970s resulted in new patterns of Chinese migrations. Following the Going Out Policy (1999) and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) (2013), around 688,000 new Chinese migrants had emigrated to Southeast Asia by 2020.2 The characteristics of new Chinese sojourners differ from those of traditional Overseas Chinese in that they come as more well-educated middle-income earners and adapt well to the relocation.

The US-China trade war in 2018 and the Coronavirus outbreak in late 2019 aggravated anti-Chinese sentiments in many nations. Xenophobiaagainst Asians rose in Europe and the United States, and along the BRI routes, resistance to the Chinese became more obvious in the domestic politics of host countries. In Central Asia, the advent of Chinese entities has been regarded to be potentially exploitative. In Singapore, newly arrived mainland Chinese are often regarded as “Others” by Singaporean Chinese.

In Thailand, Sinophobic sentiments have been increasingly expressed on social media. Over the past few years, hashtags that criticize the Chinese government, such as #MilkTeaAlliance (a coalition between Thai and Taiwan youth movements), #StandingWithBright (protecting a famous Thai actor regarding the Taiwan issue), #StopMekongDam (opposing the building of power dams on the Mekong River) and #Onechina, have been introduced to connect transnational youth, democratic and human rights movements. These hashtags trended online for some time during 2019 and 2022. In addition to the unfavourable perception of China as a nation, there have been personal and news reports of unfavourable behaviour exhibited by Chinese individuals, such as inappropriate behaviour in public spaces, and aggressive job and business competition.

To an extent, social media trends have affected China-Thailand ties. For instance, the Chinese embassy in Bangkok stated on the embassy's Facebook page that “the One China Principle is irrefutable […] the recent online noises only reflect [the] bias and ignorance of [the noise] makers, and does not in any way represent the Thai government's stance or Thai people's mainstream public opinion.”

Thailand's importance to China should be recognized by virtue of the presence of traditional overseas Chinese and the growing commercial ties between the two countries over the last decade. At present, the country has over 7.5 million citizens of Chinese descent.

The economic, political, strategic and cultural dynamism in Southeast Asia has gained added relevance in recent years with the spectacular rise of giant economies in East and South Asia. This has drawn greater attention to the region and to the enhanced role it now plays in international relations and global economics.

The sustained effort made by Southeast Asian nations since 1967 towards a peaceful and gradual integration of their economies has had indubitable success, and perhaps as a consequence of this, most of these countries are undergoing deep political and social changes domestically and are constructing innovative solutions to meet new international challenges. Big Power tensions continue to be played out in the neighbourhood despite the tradition of neutrality exercised by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

The Trends in Southeast Asia series acts as a platform for serious analyses by selected authors who are experts in their fields. It is aimed at encouraging policymakers and scholars to contemplate the diversity and dynamism of this exciting region.

THE EDITORS

Series Chairman:

Choi Shing Kwok

Series Editor:

Ooi Kee Beng

Editorial Committee:

Daljit Singh

Francis E. Hutchinson

Norshahril Saat

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

• Approximately 110,000–130,000 new Chinese migrants reside in Thailand in 2022. They are comprised of five categories: entrepreneurs, employees, students, accompanying family members and lifestyle migrants.

• These migrants contribute to the Thai economy but also precipitate negative impacts as well.

• Some stay and work in Thailand illegally, and some engage in unlawful business practices.

• Five positive impacts include business cooperation, economic circulation, sources of Chinese-speaking manpower, technological transfers and a cross-cultural environment.

• Five perceived negative impacts are bad public mannerisms, occupying of local jobs, competition in business, control of businesses and tarnishing of Thailand's reputation.

Introduction

Indonesia has decided to relocate its capital city (Ibu Kota Negara, IKN) to East Kalimantan, in the Penajam Paser Utara and Kutai Kartanegara regencies, with Law No. 3 (2022) confirming the decision. The government has named the IKN “Nusantara”, which according to the Minister of National Development Planning, Suharso Monoarfa, reflects the reality of Indonesia: a maritime country in which the islands are united by the sea. Additionally, the minister stated that the name was chosen because it reflects Indonesia's geography and is internationally iconic.

In building a new capital, the government has highlighted several characteristics representing Indonesia's identity. The IKN Law states that it will be built as a forest city, a sponge city, and a smart city. Beyond the three characteristics, maritime identity—an identity that Indonesia has claimed through its archipelagic status, has yet to be adopted as the main characteristic of the new IKN.

It will be unfortunate if Indonesia fails to make the new IKN reflects the country's maritime identity. The location for the IKN is strategically situated near the coastal area of East Kalimantan. It has proximity to the Makassar Strait, a central feature of the second of Indonesia's archipelagic sea lanes (Alur Laut Kepulauan Indonesia II, ALKI II) which is also connected to the Lombok Strait. As one of the world's choke points, these straits directly connect the Indian and Pacific oceans. The nearest designated port, Semayang Port in Balikpapan Bay, has been built to facilitate international shipping and long-distance sea routes. It is estimated that 420 large ships mostly sail through the Lombok and Makassar straits each year, carrying around 36 million tons of cargo.

On maritime identity, Indonesia has politically recommitted to its maritime development aspect by launching the Global Maritime Fulcrum (GMF) vision in 2014, at the beginning of President Joko Widodo's administration. This vision aims to build up Indonesia's maritime capacity at the national and international levels. From building infrastructure that connects ports to building international shipping hubs and driving a regional and international maritime-centred foreign policy agenda, Indonesia has been proving its seriousness in embracing its maritime identity.

Introduction

The relocation of the Indonesian state capital city is not a new issue. Historically, this policy has been echoed in the eras of Indonesia's past presidents Sukarno, Suharto and Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY). The lessons that can be learnt from the relocation policies in these three presidential eras are related to top-down and reactionary policies to domestic and international problems. For example, the policymakers took into account security and geopolitical tensions (external concerns) and environmental risks (domestic concerns).

Across the different administrations, the presidents directly initiated a top-down policymaking process when responding to the changing conditions during their administrations. For President Sukarno, it was more about the need for a new identity as the glue of solidarity between Java and outside Java, and for symbols for Indonesia as a leading “third world” country post-decolonization. In the era of President Suharto, this focused on the need for a new economic centre for economic equity and for an independent city that was regionally and globally competitive. The next few transitional governments under B.J. Habibie, Abdurrahman Wahid and Megawati Sukarnoputri arguably did not prioritize capital relocation. Instead, these presidents’ signature policy legacies included the first direct presidential elections (after Megawati), domestic reconciliation and anti-corruption drives. The idea of capital relocation returned under President SBY, whose policy was more of a reaction to the potential for bigger ecological disasters such as floods, the subsidence of the soil layer and uncontrolled population density in Jakarta.

Unlike the top-down relocation plans of Sukarno, Suharto and SBY, in the era of President Joko Widodo (“Jokowi”) the moving of the capital city and building a new one called “Nusantara” (or Ibu Kota Negara, IKN) is a mixed policymaking agenda that includes both an elite-driven agenda and a bottom-up one. Advocacy for the relocation of the capital was provided by the “Vision Indonesia 2033” team (since 2008) with Andrinof Chaniago as the pioneer and initiator. When Andrinof was subsequently appointed Minister of National Development Planning/Head of National Development Planning Agency (Bappenas), this idea was further developed into a policy draft paper starting in 2015. From there, a comprehensive agenda was formed, which eventually resulted in IKN Law No. 3 of 2022 (hereafter, UU IKN).

INTRODUCTION

The plan to relocate Indonesia's capital city (IKN) has finally come to its realization under President Joko Widodo's leadership. Jakarta claims that Nusantara, the new capital city now under construction, will be one of the most sustainable cities in the world. The term “Forest City” has been emphasized as the designated design slogan to accentuate an integrated human-nature approach, where about 75 per cent of the total landscape will be green open spaces. Walking and public transport will be the main modes of mobility in a city where main attractions and services can be accessed within 10 minutes of travel time for any commuter. Besides creating a sustainable city, the planners’ agenda aims to distribute or more evenly transfer economic and population growth out of Indonesia's main island of Java. The central government aims to create approximately 5 million local jobs by 2045,1 which will potentially attract massive in-migration from Java and other islands to the IKN area.

To successfully develop Nusantara, planners must engage in thorough planning. In the initial stage, the government made the plan to relocate the capital a priority in the National Mid-term Development Plan (RPJMN) 2020–2024. This was followed by the enactment of Decree No. 3 of 2022 on the IKN, which highlighted the cruciality of spatial planning as an instrument to guide the construction of a safe, convenient, productive, and sustainable capital city. The General Spatial Plan for the IKN (Presidential Decree 64/2022) will provide a macro-level reference for urban planning, which marks the inauguration of developing Nusantara. Considering the commencement of this megaproject, this chapter reviews and further discusses the related opportunities and challenges and identifies how spatial planning can play significant roles in Indonesia's urban development.

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGY

This chapter will emphasize the importance of spatial planning as an instrument for development planning in the megaproject of Nusantara. In doing so, the authors observe the social and environmental issues concerned, to provide initial information to identify the potential implications for spatial planning. Separately, the authors initiated a workshop using the Synergistics method3 to observe institutional issues within the planning framework and to identify the potential forward pathways for spatial planning.