With the initiative and assistance of the Asian Development Bank, the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) economic cooperation programme was established in 1992 to promote closer economic cooperation among the GMS countries, which include Cambodia, the Lao People's Democratic Republic, Myanmar, Thailand, Yunnan province of China, and Vietnam. The GMS countries so far have a strong political will to foster closer cooperation through intergovernmental collaborations in such areas as agriculture, energy, telecommunications, tourism, transport infrastructure, and the like. However, different country backgrounds, objectives, and intentions among the GMS countries tend to create political impediments to cooperation and emerging innovative development.

In recent years, governance has emerged as a discipline for fostering development and cooperation because good governance theoretically and practically will deliver effective public service and create economic efficiency and equity for long-term and sustainable development of an economy. However, governance issues are likely to be much more complicated at an international level. To show that governance is an important element when discussing regional economic activities, this study therefore provides case studies in the logistics industry to demonstrate that governance is an important mechanism that should be promoted not only at a national level, but also at the regional level when dealing with development issues in the GMS.

The cross-border governance issues in the logistics industry become increasingly important as ASEAN moves towards the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) in 2015 because the industry will be related to regional public goods provision which require effective national road infrastructure and coherent coordination of transport infrastructure policies across the GMS countries’ borders. In tackling the problems that might occur, improved governance and a favourable policy and regulatory framework, along with capable institutions, will be the key factors for successful regional economic development and integration.

To investigate the governance issues in the logistics industry in Thailand and its importance at the regional level, this chapter explores the inefficient pricing framework, as well as weak regulatory and law enforcement in the Thai transport industry, and bottlenecks in cross-border transport in the GMS. Specifically, the chapter is divided into six sections. The next section gives an overview of governance in Thailand and other GMS countries. The section that follows discusses the challenges of the domestic transport market in Thailand.

Rapid social change, in and of itself, is not new to the region as it has been marked historically by imperialism, wars, and multiple migrations. The Upper Mekong, a previously remote area, has often been the subject of ambitious visions of infrastructure development, but, until recently, seldom the site of their realization. In the nineteenth century, British and French colonial authorities sent numerous missions to the region in search of land-based trade routes that might link mainland Southeast Asia to China. The French built a railway from Haiphong to Kunming via the Red River, while the British considered doing the same from northern Thailand. Later in 1937 the Chinese, seeking trade links with India, extended a road from Kunming as far as the Myanmar frontier. Subsequently, World War II, the Communist Revolution in China, and minority rebellions in northeast Myanmar halted further development of cross-border transport and trade connections. Likewise, the Cold War and regional geopolitics further hampered subsequent linkage projects.

But since the 1990s, economic reforms have given renewed impetus to streamlining trading arrangements in the border regions of Thailand, Laos, Vietnam, Cambodia, Myanmar, and southern China. By the turn of the millennium, visions of an integrated economic entity finally began to take shape when the Asian Development Bank launched the Greater Mekong Subregion Program. The initiative aims to build corridors that link the Mekong countries and provide the ability for trade goods, trucks, travellers, and tourists to move rapidly between and through previously remote and hinterland areas of neighbouring states. In a mid-term review of the regional programme, the ADB notes:

It has been nearly two decades since the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) regional economic strategy was initiated in 1992, aimed at promoting and integrating the economies of Cambodia, the Lao PDR, Myanmar, Thailand, Vietnam, and Yunnan Province and Guangxi autonomous region of China. Together, they encompass a huge population of over 316 million people (bigger than the United States) and a vast land area of around 2.6 million square kilometres (roughly the size of Europe), enjoying a rich agricultural base, considerable mineral and energy resources (renewable and non-renewable), and a strategic location at the heart of Asia between the burgeoning economies of China and India.

Several regional infrastructure projects in the transport and energy sectors have facilitated the process of integration of the GMS economies. For instance, the 1,320-kilometre-long East-West Economic Corridor cross-border project, triggered by the landmark trade accord signed in 1999, stretches from Danang in Vietnam, through the Lao PDR and Thailand to Myanmar, forming a land bridge connecting the South China Sea at Danang Port to the Andaman Sea at Mawlamyine Port in Myanmar. There is a growing recognition that these cross-border infrastructure projects have helped raise the GMS economies’ degree of connectivity and competitiveness, achieve accelerated shared prosperity, and expand intraregional trade and investment activities. Indeed there is a widely held perception that Asia's success story is not only about rise in income and decline in poverty, but is also the story of increased integration among the regional countries through various regional and subregional infrastructure projects.

Enhanced regional integration and cooperation also help build resilient economies through well-coordinated and timely responses to global crises. Hence, notwithstanding the recent international financial crisis, several GMS countries have made remarkable achievement in terms of their sustained economic growth (6 to 10 per cent per year) for the past decade. The intraregional trade among the GMS countries is now estimated at 30–50 per cent of their total trade. Foreign direct investment flows to the GMS countries have increased considerably and so have tourist arrivals.

Despite the above positive developments, several of the GMS economies remain the weakest link in the ASEAN chain. The economic divide that exists between these economies and other ASEAN nations remains a major concern for the ASEAN quest to achieve the ASEAN Economic Community vision by the year 2015.

In 1992 the six GMS countries, with the support of the Asian Development Bank (ADB), introduced a programme of subregional economic cooperation (GMS Programme) to enhance their economic relations. Building on their shared histories and cultures, the programme covers nine priority sectors: agriculture, energy, environment, human resource development, investment, telecommunications, tourism, transport infrastructure, and transport and trade facilitation. The programme basically offers member nations positive impulses for diverse development opportunities. Member countries have yet another mutual interest: they all want to use the Mekong River to further their national interests and goals which are not always free of conflict (Schmeier 2010, p. 28). This is where the union can offer opportunities to foster positive cooperation among the states.

In terms of cooperation, the member states of the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) reflect a range of very different political situations and economic development levels (Ishida 2005, p. 1). Specifically, issues arise in Cambodia, the Lao PDR, and Myanmar, which are all classified as being among the least developed countries (LDCs). Furthermore, Myanmar illustrates a very authoritarian regime: “There is no regime within South-East Asia that has attracted as much international condemnation for its domestic practices and failures as Myanmar's ruling State Peace and Development Council” (SPDC) (Haacke 2010, p. 153). Naturally this assessment is not viewed positively by the other members of the GMS union of states, nor by the ADB, and, consequently, cooperation is affected. This explains the fact that in this regional association of states, each of the GMS member states has a different level of integration. The economic profile of Myanmar, which is examined in greater detail in this chapter, shows that a stronger integration of Myanmar in the GMS would clearly be conducive to economic growth.

The study of Myanmar's economic development reveals a multitude of problems. When viewed from an economic standpoint, the country is in a desolate state, especially with regard to its economic potential. The causes of this are at times the subject of controversial debate. In recent years, the responsibility for the unsatisfactory economic situation has consistently been placed on sanctions imposed by Western countries (North America and Europe). Cyclone Nargis can also be cited as a cause, as it has had a likewise negative effect on the country's economic situation (v. Hauff 2009, p. 40).

The Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) embraces the nations and territories located in the Mekong river basin, including Cambodia, China (Yunnan Province and Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region), the Lao PDR, Myanmar, Thailand, and Vietnam. This diverse, dynamic subregion encompasses a huge market of more than 240 million people and a vast land area of 2.3 million square kilometres. The gross domestic product of the subregion was projected to reach US$863 billion in 2010 — more than triple the 1996 level — with Cambodia, the Lao PDR, Myanmar, Vietnam, and Yunnan Province, PRC, experiencing startling output growth rates of 6–10 per cent, despite the current global economic hardships. This is attributed fundamentally to their abundant resources, including a large motivated, cheap workforce, a rich agricultural base, extensive timber and fisheries resources, considerable mineral potentials, and vast energy resources in the form of hydropower and large coal and petroleum resources. The GMS is increasingly being recognized as a new frontier of the Southeast Asian economic strength.

The GMS enjoys a strategic location at the heart of East Asia and between the burgeoning economies of China and India. Closer economic ties to external markets offer the GMS opportunities to tap benefits from boosts in trade, tourism, and investment, which have been a crucial driving force of impressive economic growth in the subregion. The last two decades since its inception in 1992 witnessed strong growth in intra-GMS trade and investment. Cross-border trade is now estimated to account for 30–50 per cent of the GMS economies’ total trade, and has increased sharply at a compound average annual rate of nearly 10 per cent, while intra-GMS net foreign direct investment nearly doubled during the period of 2000–2002.

This chapter aims to assess the recent economic, social, and political developments in the GMS, and identify emerging opportunities and challenges facing the region's successful transition towards a market-driven economy. The GMS countries are at a critical juncture where subregional efforts and cooperation must be made to address fully the rapidly evolving issues which are vital to appropriate policy formation, yet remain widely debatable. The deliberation in this chapter sheds light on what the development stages of GMS countries are, and gives an overview of the contributions of the ensuing chapters.

165. One of the most challenging issues facing multicultural and multireligious societies today is the balance between faithfulness to one's religious tenets and respect for the religious sensitivities of others. The broader literature has shown that Christians in multicultural societies may experience tensions between their religious and civic identities because of the different demands and responsibilities that come with these different identities (Bramadat and Seljak 2008; Turner 2010).

166. Specifically, for Singapore, one of the key concerns in a multicultural society is the relationship between different faith communities as well as attitudes towards proselytization. This section has three objectives. Firstly, it seeks to survey the respondents’ perception of other religions and communities; secondly, it gauges the attitudes of respondents towards proselytizing in a multicultural society; and thirdly, it gauges the social habits of respondents with regards to friends from other faiths.

167. H1.1 Christian values are compatible with those of different ethnic or cultural communities.

Megachurch respondents are most likely to “agree” with this statement at 51.5 per cent, while independent church respondents are most likely to “disagree” with it at 27.5 per cent (see Figure H1.1). Large percentages of respondents across denominations chose “neutral”. This may indicate that they had no opinion on the matter or did not want to register a negative or positive answer.

168. H1.2 Christian values are compatible with those of different religious communities.

Megachurch respondents are most likely to “agree” with this statement at 45.4 per cent, while independent church respondents are most likely to “disagree” with it at 34.5 per cent (see Figure H1.2). Again, large percentages of respondents across denominations chose “neutral”. This may indicate that they had no opinion on the matter or did not wish to register a negative or positive answer.

169. H2.4 I believe that the message of God's Word can overcome ethnic and religious sensitivities in Singapore.

The majority of respondents across denominations agreed with this statement (see Figure H2.4). The findings were similar across ages and education.

61. The survey was administered to members of mainline denominations — namely the Anglican, Methodist and Bible-Presbyterian churches, as well as independent churches and megachurches.

62. Independent churches are defined here as churches that are not embedded within the organizational structure of any established denomination. The size of independent churches in this survey ranged from 120 to 800 sized congregations.

63. The literature defines a conventional “megachurch” as a Protestant church that draws weekly attendances of at least 2,000 or more (Thumma and Bird 2008). However, size alone does not define a megachurch. They are usually loosely tied to a mainline denomination or are non-denominational, and identify themselves as Pentecostal, evangelical or charismatic (Ellingson 2007). Typical megachurches in America witness weekly attendances of 20,000 or more. Meanwhile, in Singapore, the commonly understood notion of megachurch is that of non-mainline churches like New Creation, City Harvest, Faith Community Baptist Church, or The Lighthouse (see Ong 21 July 2002; Lee and Long 17 July 2010).

64. This survey — in the form of a questionnaire — was conducted with 24 churches from December 2009 to January 2011. A total of 2,860 questionnaires were returned, of which, 663 were suitable for analysis.

65. Of the survey respondents, 579 (21.7 per cent) were from the Methodist church; 609 (22.9 per cent) were from the Anglican church; 66 (2.5 per cent) were from the Bible-Presbyterian church; 439 (16.5 per cent) were from independent churches; and 970 (36.4 per cent) were from the megachurches. While the sample from the Bible-Presbyterian church is included in the statistical analysis, their number is too small to be statistically significant and therefore they are not reflected in the charts. At the same time mainline churches, for analytical purposes in this study, will refer only to the Methodist and Anglican churches.

66. The questionnaire was subjected to two focus group discussions in order to ascertain the relevance of the questions. It was then referred to selected church leaders as well as the National Council of Churches of Singapore (NCCS) to ensure it did not offend sensitivities.

1. This survey is an attempt to tell a story of a complex community. It is a story of a community with very different members, many of whom come from different socio-economic backgrounds, sharing the same faith. As it is in many cases, the diversity within faith communities is often obscured, sometimes out of ignorance, sometimes out of political convenience, by the sheer visibility of religion and religiosity.

2. Christianity is one of the fastest growing religions in Singapore. According to Singapore census data, Singaporeans aged 15 years and over who professed to be Christians have grown from 14.6 per cent in 000 to 18.3 per cent in 2010. In addition, it is a well educated community with over 40 per cent of a total of 350,000 Protestant Christians holding a university degree. Quite clearly, it is a story that needs to be told. This is not to say that the Christian community in Singapore has not been adequately studied. Indeed there have been several noteworthy local studies which have guided our thoughts and which we have duly cited in this report. However, the rapid growth of Christianity in Singapore has not been accompanied by systematic quantitative studies, unlike elsewhere (Putnam and Campbell 010). As a result, many interesting qualitative arguments have not benefited from the broad overview that quantitative evidence provides.

3. The central plot to this story is the phenomenal growth of the so-called “megachurch” in Singapore. Images of charismatic pastors, rock concert-like worship services and trendy congregations are certainly popular (see Ong 1 July 008; Lee and Long 17 July 010). But who are these megachurch members? What are their backgrounds? How do they view the world? How are they different from their Anglican or Methodist counterparts? On which issues do they converge? And while it is generally recognized that Protestant Christians in Singapore are mainly middle class (Clammer 1978, p. 2; Sng and You 1982, p. 59), are there variations within this middle class? And if so, do they correspond to denominations? These were the overarching questions that motivated this survey.

145. This section explores the relationship between Christian values and sex and sexuality through 5-point Likert items. Some of the issues explored include pre-marital sex, homosexuality, abortion and sex education. With regards to homosexuality, a distinction is made between attitude and practice through asking “yes/no” questions to gauge the level of interaction with homosexuals.

146. G1.1 Pre-marital sex (sex before marriage) is fine as long as those involved are consenting adults and if they practise safe sex.

Eighty-one point five per cent of Methodists, 81.1 per cent of Anglicans, 84.9 per cent of Independents and 93.1 per cent of megachurch respondents disagree or strongly disagree with this statement. As such, megachurch respondents are slightly more likely to disagree with this statement in comparison with respondents from mainline and independent churches (see Figure G1.1).

147. G1.3 It is morally wrong to engage in homosexuality (same sex sexual relations).

Eighty-two point three per cent of Methodists, 79.7 per cent of Anglicans, 81.5 per cent of Independents and 85.7 per cent of megachurch respondents agree or strongly agree with this statement. The distinction between denominations is quite marginal (see Figure G1.3-1).

When we cross-tabulate responses with educational level, the more educated respondents are marginally more likely to agree or strongly agree with the statement. Thus, 78.8 per cent of those with secondary education and below, 81.5 per cent of those with diplomas and 85.5 per cent of those with university degrees and above agree or strongly agree with the statement (see Figure G1.3-2).

148. G1.4 I feel comfortable interacting with homosexuals.

Thirty-seven point nine per cent of Methodists, 32.2 per cent of Anglicans, 28.0 per cent of Independents and 59.2 per cent of megachurch respondents agree or strongly agree with this statement. Megachurch respondents are much more likely to agree with this statement in comparison with respondents from mainline and independent churches (see Figure G1.4-1).